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ABSTRACT
NUSLIM SEPARATIsr·! IN NORTI-JllIESTCHINA
DURING THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD, 1911-1949
Andrew D.W. Forbes
Ph.D. History, June, 1981
This dissertation represents an attempt to trace and analyse the
recent history of the predominantly Muslim Chinese ;province of S1nkiang
(and, where relevant to events in Sinkiang, of the neiehbouring Chinese
provinces of Kansu and Tsinghai). A study of this nature has been
deemed desirable both because of Sinkiang's important strategic
position* and also because it is ~oped that an analysis of the ;political
and cultural aspirations of the 11uslim peoples of Sinkiang during the
period 1911-1949 will throw light on the r·luslimrevival now sweeping
Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of Soviet Central Asia.
No previous study of lTuslim separatism in Northwest China exists.
The field is almost completely new, and as such it has been necessary
to include long passages of previously unrecorded historical narrative
to provide a background for the sections of historical and political
analysis which are also included. In view of the existenoe of several
earlier studies dealing with the subjeot, disoussions of great power
strategy within Sinkiang have been kept to a minimum, except where they
impinge directly upon the MUslim population of the province.
EXtensive use has been made of unpublished diplomatic sources held
in the India Office Library and Records and Publio Records Office in
London. The great majority of published sources employed are of a
;primary nature. The thesis provides an overall economio and political
survey of Sinkianz from 1911 to 1949, with a postsoript dealing in less
detail with the situation up to 1955. Particular emphasis has been
placed on the narration and analysis of events surrounding the'Kumul
rebellion of 1931J the "Turkish-Islamic Republio of Eastern Turkestm"
in 1933; "Tunganistan" and the southern Sinkiang Rebellion of 1937. and
the ":East Turkestan Republio" of 1944-49. Similarly, the Tungan
invasions of Ma Chun~ying during 1931 and 1932-4 have been examined
in depth for the first time.
The thesis concludes that, during the Chinese Republican era, the
Turkic Muslim peoples of Sinkiang were divided less b~ their supposed
ethnio and cultural partioularities than b~ politioal differences
manifested on a ree'ional basis, with the eastern part of the province
influenced by China, the north-west by Russia (later the Soviet Union),
and the south-west by Afghanistan and the }~slim ~~ddle East. Despite
their Islamio identity, the Hui !1uslims of the province remained
consistently aloof from }luslim separatist struggles in Sinkiang through-
out this period. Their spiritual loyalties may have been directed
towards Necca, but their political orientation remained exclusively
Chinese.
*The province, which is China's largest, shares a 1,500 mile border with
the Soviet Union, as well as shorter frontiers with Afghanistan, Pakistan
and India, and since 1964 has been the home of China's nuclear testing
ground at Lop Nor.
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"The sacred Issik Kol, on which the first Turk,
Born of the grey wolf, saw the light of the world;
The two rivers, Jaihun and Saihun,
And between the~ the holy graves of thine ancestors;
The great mountains of Turan, Khan Tenri reaching to heaven ---
Look now to the ~ountains and think how the Turks
suffer in bondage!
~aghjan Jumabay, Kazakh national poet.
iii
Maghjan Jumabay, a Kazakh poet, was born in 1894 in Yedisu to the eaat
of Lake Balkash. His collected poems were published 1n Tashkent in 1923,
but the collection is incomplete, for many were too patriotic to pass
the censors.
rrom: Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire (London, 1967), p. 227.
The Issik KSI is a major lake - verging on an inland sea - lying in
the foothills of the northern Tien Shan in present day Kirghizia. The
two rivers Jaihun and Saihun are the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya lthe
Oxus and Jaxartes of antiquity). Turan is the Turkic counterpart of
Iran, the great area of steppe and mountain, desert and oasis, stretching
from the Caspian Sea and Astrakhan in the west to the oasis of Kumul
and the Gobi Desert in the east. Khan Tenri (Tk. "Lord of Heaven") is,
at over 24,000 ft., the dominant peak of the Tien Shan, situated right
on the current Sino-Soviet frontier.
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xINTRODUCTION
The central theme of this study is the development and nature of
Mu.slim separatism in Sinkiang during the chaotic years between the .fall
of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911 and the establishment of the Chinese People's
Republic in 1949. An ancillary but closely related theme is the consistent
Soviet effort to penetrate Sinkiang during the three decades following the
Bolshevik Victory in the Rtlssian Civil War; the local and national Chinese
response to this challenge; and the impact which continuing Soviet influence
in Sinkiang had upon the indigenous Muslim peoples of Northwest China
during this period.
Where detailed studies of Republican Sinkiang exist - and there are
few in any language - there has been a perhaps inevitable tendency to
concentrate on great power politics; on the supposedly pivotal role
played by Sinkiang in the "Great Game" between Russia and China or Russia
and Japan, just as earlier 19th century studies of the region tended to
interpret Sinkiang politics in terms of the contemporaneous "Great Game"
betWeen Russia and Great Britain. Thus, previous analyses of Sinkiang's
recent history have tended to set political developments within the
province against a background of Chinese, SOViet, :British, Jallanese and
even American interests, whilst the local and regional Islamio element has
been almost completely ignored.
Perhaps the best examples of this perfeotly legitimate approach
are to be found in Lattimore's Sinkiang: Pivot of Asia (1950); Whiting's
Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?; and Nyman's Great Britain and Chinese, Russian
xi
~~anese Interests in Sinkiane, 1918-1934 (1977), all of which
concentrate primarily on the strategic significance of S1nkiang in
.global power politics to the exclusion of Muslim political developments
within S1nkiang and of that region's position in relation to the wider
Muslim world. This is, perhaps, hardly surprising. During the years
1911-1949, Sinkiang was directly affected by (and, no doubt, played
some small role in), the emergence of the Soviet Union; the rise of
Fascism; the Sino-Japanese struggle and the Second World War; the
decline of the British Einpire; the emergence ·of India and Pakistan as
independent nations; and the seizure of power in China by the.CCP.
During the same period, moreover, the Muslim world appeared largely
quiescent - even supine - crushed by the overwhelming political and
mili tary power of its French, British, Dutch, Italian, American, Russian
and Chinese colonial masters.
It is self-evident that the situation has now changed. The
world communist movement is openly and bitterly divided; western
colonialism is virtually at an end; and the Soviet Union stands revealed,
monolithic and conservative, as the last bastion of EUropean colonialism
in Asia. In marked contrast, few would contest that in recent years the
Islamic revival has emerged as one of the most driving and least
predictable forces in the shaping of world affairs. No longer can the
Muslim world safely be forgotten or ignored. In the past decade this
faotor has been forcibly brought home to the west by the emergence of
Arab oil power, the Palestinian problem, and the Muslim fundamentalist
revolution in Iran. still more recently, the Soviet Union has clearly
manifested both its fear of Muslim revivalism and its inability to
lim!t or control its continuing spread, throuen the Red Arrrry'sDecember,
1979, invasion of Afghanistan.
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Today, a plethora of Muslim separatist and revivalist movements
span the map of Africa and Asia from the Atlantio to the Phillipines.
Nor are there any. indications that this phenomenon has reached its
apogee. When viewed in this context, the recent history of Muslim
separatism in Northwest China must assume new signifioance. Thus,
between 1931 and 1949, Sinkiang was racked by f"ourmajor and numerous
minor Muslim rebellions. as well as by two quite distinot Hui Muslim
invasions from neighbouring Kansu, Yet in previous studies of Republican
Sinkiang. these events have either been passed over oompletely, or at
best have received the most cursory and inadequate of examinations,
whilst comparatively great attention has been paid to the maohinations
of great power politics in the area.
It is the purpose of the present study to redress this balance;
to chart and analyse in detail and for the first time the oourse of
Muslim separatism in Republican Sinkiang, both for the subject's
considerable intrinsic interest and, hopefully, as a contribution to
our greater knowledge and understanding of the politioal and social
faotors underlying the Muslim revival in Central Asia in recent years.
*
In recognition of the complexity and inte~isoiplinary nature
of"the subject under discussion (which falls somewhere between Chinese
and Islamic Studies), it has been deemed desirable to include a fairly
extensive introductory seotion (Chapters 1 and 2) detailing the
geographical, ethnic and historioal background of Republican Sinkiang.
It is hoped that this introductory section, which is not intended to be
definitive, will be of some value to the Islamioist who is not tully
acquainted with the Central Asian periphery of the Muslim world, to
the Sinologist who is not fully acquainted with the nature of Central
:l:1ii
Asian Islam, and to all those who, like the present author, have never
travelled in Sinkiang - irom 1949 until very recently, a region almost
completely closed to the outside world.
The main body of the present study is divided into seven
chapters, arranged in chronological sequence, examining the economic
and political factors affecting the MUslimpopulation oi Sinkiang between
1911 and 1949, and analysing the various Muslimresponses to these
iactors.
Chapter 3 (1911-28), examines the rise to power and administration
of YangTseng-hsin, governor of Sinkiang during these years. Newlight
is cast upon Yang's personal economic activities, upon the true nature
of his "benevolently despotic" rule and, most particularly, on the pliL1lt
of the Muslims of southern Sinkiang during this period.
Chapter 4 (1928-31), examines the administration oi Yang's
sucoessor, Chin Shu-jen, and conoentrates in detail on the KumulRebellion
of 1931 and the First Tangan Invasion of Ma Chung-ying.
Chapter 5 (1931-33), breaks almost oompletely new ground in
setting out in detail, and for the iirst time, the series of events in
southern S1nkiang leading to the area's briei secession from China under
the short-lived "Turkish-Islamio Republic of Eastern Turkestan".
Chapter 6 (1933-34), continues the themes examined in Chapter 4, detailing
the conclusion of the KumulRebellion, the course oi the Second Tungan
Invasion of Ma Chung-ying, and the overthrow of Chin Shu-jen. As in Chapter
4, these events have never beiore been examined in depth. The Chapter
conoludes with the rise to power oi Sheng Shih-ts'ai, the Soviet intervention
of 1933-4, the deieat of Ma Chung-ying, and the collapse of the TIRET.
Chapter 7. (1934-44), provides the first full acoount both oi the
,'_ _, ,<,,_,,_~_,~_·_·.T"_'~' ,.,. ......,,~,~
nui satrapy oi "TUnga.nistan"and of the 1931 11u.slimRebellion in southern «"
xiv
Sinkiang. Special attention is paid to Sheng's relationship with the
Soviet Union; the true nature of his "progressive" period; and the
impact of his ten years of power upon the Muslims of Sinkiang. The
chapter concludes with an analysis of Sheng's gradual downfall and the
parallel emergence of KMT authority in Sinkiang.
Chapter 8 (1944-46), examines KMT policies in Sinkiang between
1942 and 1946; the Kazakh revolt in Dzungaria; and the birth and
expansion, under Soviet auspices, of the secessionist "East Turkestan
Republic". New evidence of Soviet complicity in this revolt is provided.
Chapter 9 (1946-49), examines the KMT administrations of WU
Chung-hsin, Chang Chih-chung, MasCUd Sabri and Burhan Shah!dI, as well
as the subsequent entry of the PLA into S1nkiang and, between 1949 and
1955, the elimination of both "right wing" and "left wing" Muslim
separatism. Special attention is paid to the "Pei-ta-shan Incident",
and to anti-Soviet Muslim separatism beyond the frontiers of the "~ee
Regions".
The study concludes with an analysis of the nature of Muslim
separatism in Sinkiang between 1911 and 1949, with particular emphasis
being placed upon regional (as opposed to ethnio) divisions within Sinkiang.
Special attention is paid to the role of external influences (Soviet, pan-
Turanian and Tungani) in shaping Muslim separatist history within the
region.
*
It is axiomatic that it cannot be possible to arrive at elaborate
theories or analyses of events until the main facts surrounding those events
.'~ -
have been established. Indeed, to establish such a sequence_of facts and
events for the first time and in an orderly way has been one of the chief
purposes of the present research, primarily because there exists no previous
:xv
souroe from whioh they oan be gleaned in even remotely oomparable detail.
To ~~is end, extensive use has been made of unpublished diplomatio
and intelligenoe reports held in either the India or Publio Reoords
Offioes in London. Sinoe these reoords are subjeot to the thirt,r year
offioial seoreoy rule, many documents relating to the latter part of
the Chinese Republioan period have only reoently beoome available and,
presumably, have never been studied before. The greater part of these
reoords are derived from the British Consula ta-General at Kashgar, which
was established in 1908, and from the British Consulate at Urumchi,
whioh was established in 1943. The scope and extent of these reoords -
based on a network of informants funotioning throughout southern
S1nkiang and running to many dozens of both bound and unbound volumes -
is truly astonishing, and their value in the preparation of the present
study has proved inestimable.
Extensive use of other primary sources has also been made, most
notably in the form of oontemporary news reports, reoords of personal
interviews, travellers' acoounts and memoirs. Perhaps the most significant
or these have been the works of Cable and Frenoh, Chang Ta-chun, Fleming,
Hedin, l-1aillart,Petro, Schomberg, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Skrine, Vasel,
Wu. Ai-chen and YUlbars Khan (as oited in the bibliography). Through the
agency of Allen S. Whiting's Pawn or Pivot, referenoe has also been made to
unpublished Japanese aoureea (held in the archives of the ~l1nistry of
Foreign Affairs, Tokyo), and to unpublished Kuomintang souroes (held in the
arohives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taipei). Similarly, in the
earlier part of the present study, use has been made of referenoes to un-
published German and Swedish souroes examined by Nyman with painstaking
thorouglmess in his 1977' study. In all instances, direct references to these
sources have been included in the footnotes, together with speoifio references
to the secondary studies from which they have been drawn.
Secondary studies of Republican Sinkiang are, as might be
expected, far fewer in number - indeed, the chief secondar,y works
employed in the present study (by Lattimore, Whiting and Nyman), have
already been cited. To these may be added the works ot Clubb (which are,
in tact, at least partially primary, being based to some extent on the
author's personal experiences as US Consul in Urumchi during the last
years of Sheng Shih-ta'ai's rule), Hayit, Kazak and Norins. Mention might
also be made ot Chen's Sink lang story, much of which is based on travels
and interviews undertaken within Sirikiang, but which is seriously flawed
both by the lack ot source references, and by the author's overt political
commit~~~ which, on occasion, makes his reliability doubtful.
Finally, attention should be drawn to the detailed and useful
studies of Yang (on Yang Tseng-hein), and ot Chan (on Sheng Shih-ts'ai),
both ot which are largely based on primary Chinese souroes, as well as to
the more reoent studies of Sinkiangunder the Chinese Communists by Lee
Fu-hsiang and McMillen, which take up the continuing story ot Northwest
China from the point where the present etudy ends.
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1CHAPTER 1
THE CHINESE PROVINCE Of SINK lANG
1·1 The Geographical Setting
Sinkiang, the province of China which provides the setting for t~e
major part of the present study, is a peripheral land. In a political sense
it is a part of China, as it has been at times of Chinese strength and
prestige since the Han dynasty first conquered this region of Central Asia
more than two thousand years ago. In B cultural sense, however, Sinkiang
belongs to the Muslim world, as it has done since the Islamicisation of
the Turkic and Iranian peoples of Central Asia displaced the Indo-Buddhistic
civilization which dominated the area until the eleventh and twelfth
1centuries A.D.
In a geographical sense Sinkiang can also be defined as B peripheral
land. Isolated from Western Asia by the massed ranks of the Hindu Kush, the
Pamir massif and the Tien Shan; from South Asia by the Karakoram, .Ku~-lun and
Himalaya ranges; and from China by the Gobi Desert, Sinkiang - and particularly
its southern section, the Tarim Basin - is Central Asian in the broadest
geographical sense of the world, belonging fully neither to the east, nor
to the west.
2The province of Sinkiang, the largest and most sparsely populated in
1. It must be noted that since the CCP came to power in 1949 massive Han
immigration, the construction of improved lines of communication between
Sinkiang and China proper, and the severance of links with Soviet Central
Asia, Afghanistan and (to a lesser extent) with the Indian subcontinent,
have all worked to strengthen Sinkiang's ties with China. Sinkieng is
certainly more "Chinese" today than it has ever been.
2. The total area of Sinkiang is 550,579 sq. miles. This should be compared
with the area of Tibet ..(463,320 sq. miles) and of Britain (94,207 sq. miles).
2China, lies in the very centre, the "dead heart" of Asia.3 It can properly
be divided into two main regions, the Tarim Basin and Dzungaria, and two
lesser but economically and politically significant regions, the IIi Valley
and the Turfan Depression. The Tien Shan range, runningly approximately
eastwards from the Pamir massif, forms a formidable wall between Dzungaria
and the Tarim Basin, making direct communication between the two areas
extremely difficult. The IIi Valley, cut off from Ozungaria by a northern
spur of the Tien Shan, is physically isolated from the rest of the province
and is easily accessible only from the west - from the area which fell under
Russian domination during the mid-nineteenth century, and which today forms
a part of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.
1·1a The Tarim Basin
A glance at a map of the physical geography of the Tarim Basin is
enough clearly to establish the inhospitable nature of the region. The Basin,
a roughly oval-shaped depression 800 miles long and 400 miles broad et its
widest point, is s~arplydefined by the vast mountain ranges which surround
it closely cin three sides, and which come close to cutting it off on the
fourth, eastern side, at the point of access from Kansu.
The Tien Shan (Ch. "Heavenly Mountains"), rising to an average height
of 12,000 ft., but in some cases to peaks of 24,000 ft., form the northern
longitudinal rim of the Basin. The Pamir massif, a knot of mountains which has
earned the designation "Roof of the World" from generations of travellers,
rises sharply to peaks in excess of 24,000 ft. immediately to the west of
Kashgar, linking the Tien Shan with the older and still less penetrable kun-Iun
range. The Kun-lun mountains are in turn backed by the precipitous folds of
the Karakoram range, the Tibetan plateau, and the Himalayas. To the east of
3. The Share Sume/Altai region of Sinkiang is further from the seB than
any other region in the world.
the Kun-luns lie the little-known peaks of the Altin Tagh (Tk. "Gold
Mountains"), cutting off the Tarim Basin from the great Tsaidam marshes of
Tsinghai. finally, at the eastern end of the Basin, the Altin Tagh in the
south face the Kuruk Tagh (Tk. "Dry Mountains") in the north across a
narrow corridor of desert. Even this narrow neck of land is largely blocked
by the inhospitable salt wastes of lop Nor, an area of shifting lakeland
,"
currently used by the Chinese as a nuclear test site. Access to the Tarim
Basin from China has traditionally been by way of the northern road, a
desert highway thrusting between the Tien Shan and the Kuruk Tagh ranges at
Karashahr. A lesser southern route passes between the foothills of the
Altin Tagh and the marginal lands around lop Nor to the east of Chark11k.
In the past both routes have served as sections of the Silk Road, the position
of the road depending on the fluctuating position of lop Nor.4
Access to the Tarim Basin from the Ili Valley, the Soviet Union,
Afghanistan, the Indian sUbcontinent and Tibet is only possible by a number
of difficult passes,S all of which are subject to seasonal closure.
4. See: Hedin, S., The Wandering lake (london, 1940), pp. 231-54.
5. The chief passes to the Tarim Basin (all of which are referred to,
either directly or indirectly, in the present study), are as follows:
1) from the IIi Valley to Aksu:
the Muzart Pass, 11,450 ft.
2) from Naryn (Kirghiz SSR) to Kashgar:
the Torugart Pass, 12,760 ft.
3) from AndiJan (Kirghiz SSR) via Irkeshtam to Kashgar:
the Terek Pass, E!. 12,200 ft.
4) from Wakhan (Afghanistan) via Tashkurgan to Kashgar:
the WakhJir Pass, 16,200 ft.
5) from Hunza (Kashmir) to Kashgar or Yarkand:
the Mintaka Pass, 15,600 ft., and the Kilik Pass, ~. 15,000 ft.
6) from Leh (Ladakh) to Khotan:
the Karakoram Pass, 18,290 ft.
7) from western Tibet to Keriya:
the Kuchkach Sulak Pass, 16,198 ft., and the Shalgan Pass, 17,572 ft.
[Information variously compiled from: Schomberg, R.C.f., Peake and Plaine
of Central Asia (london, 1933); Shipton, E., Mountains of Tartar (london,
1950); Chisholm, G.G. (ed.), The Times Gazetteer of the World London,
1899)j Przheval'skii, N., from Kul a Acrose the Tian Shan to lob Nor
(London, 1879); Stein, Sir M.A., Ruins of Desert Cathay London, 1912)] •
4The Tarim Basin has been described by Tregear as being comprised
of a series of concentric belts:
In the heart of the region is the Taklamakan Desert,
a howling wilderness, true desert for the most part
utterly devoid of life and vegetation, a place of
desolation of sand and rock. Ringing this desert is
belt of piedmont gravel of varying width and thickness.
This belt has been built up by the detritus brought
down by the fast-running streams, which fan out on
reaching the plain.6
The mountain ranges which ring the Tarim Basin rise steeply above the belt
of piedmont gravel.
The single major river of the region, from which the Basin derives
its name, is the Tarim. This river rises from a series of streams high in
the Pamir and western Kun-lun ranges; these headwaters join together to form
the Varkand Darya (Ir. "river") which curves around the north-eastern edge
of the Basin towards Aksu. Near Aksu it is joined by the waters of the
Khotan Darya, the only river with its source in the central Kun-lun to succeed
in crossing the sandy wastes of the Taklamakan, and the combined rivers become
the Tarim. The Tarim is fed by a number of comparatively large left bank
tributaries originating in the Tien Shan before it curves sharply south-
eastwards near Korla and loses itself in the salt desert around Lop Nor.
Within this huge region the area capable of supporting sedentary
agriculturalists is limited to a string of oases which surround the central
desert like beads on a necklace. In the south-east at Keriya, Niya and Charchen,
these oases are situated below the belt of piedmont gravel on the very edge
of the Taklamakan. The major oases of the Basin (Khotan, Yarkand, Kashgar,
Aksu, Kuch~r, "and Korla)are situated on a narrow ribbon of fertile land
immediately above the gravel belt.
rurther up the slopes of the surrounding mountains, especially in the
Tien Shan and Pamir ranges, pastorel nomadism flourishes. little contact Is
6. Tregear, T.R., A Geography of China (London, 1965), p. 286.
5possible between the <relatively few) pastoral nomads of these isolated
uplands end the sedentary agriculturalists of the oasis belt, as the well-
watered plateau region used by the nomads is cut off from the cultivated
lowland strip by steep, barren gorges and impassable loess-covered
moraines:
"KUN-LUN SHAN
desert and nev';
Well-watered plateau, rich grass;
nomads with numerous flocks
Impassable slopes and gorges,
loess-covered moraines
fertile, loess-covered strip
< f) Oasis Taklamakan
Desert••••••<e> Piedmont
gravel
rig. 1 Tarim Basin: section from Kun-lun to Taklemakan,.,
The substantial differences existing between pastoral nomad and sedentary
agriculturalist in the Tarim Basin have resulted in a continuing disjunction
of political interest between the two groups; hostility between nomad and
egri~ulturalist, despite a shared Islamic faith, features prominently in the
history of Sinkiang, and is an underlying theme in the present study.
7. Tregear, op.cit., p. 287.
\
61·1b Dzungaria
An extensive plain, some 2,000 ft. lower than the Tarim Basin,8 lies
to the north-east of the Tien Shan; this is the region known as Dzungaria,9
a vast, wind-swept, roughly triangular basin some 400 miles from north to
south and rather further from east to west. Dzungaria, representing
approximately 30% of the total area of Sinkiang, is bounded in the north-
east by the Altai Mountains and the Mongolian People's Republic; in the
north-west by the AlaTau and Tarbagatai ranges on the frontiers of Soviet
Kazakhstan, and in the south-west and south by the Tien Shan and Bogdo Ula
ranges. In the south-east, on the borders of Kansu, the region terminates
in the arid Barkol Tagh range and the wastes of the Nomin Gobi.
Access to Dzungaria from both the Tarim Basin and from China proper
10 ..
is via the Turfan Depression and the pass at Dawan Ch'eng, leading over
the col between the Tien Shan and the Bogdo Ula. The pass at Dawan Ch'eng,
which is about 12,000 ft. high, cannot be described as an easy route;
nevertheless, it is considerably easier than any of the passes leading out
of the Tarim Basin, and is open for most of the year. No major routes lead·
over the border from Dzungaria to the Mongolian People's Republic, but in
the north-west, between the Ala Tau and a spur of the Tarbagatal range, lies
B. The Tarim Basin is on everage 2,000 ft. ebove sea level, rising slowly
to nearly 6,000 ft. at its western end.
9. The name Dzungaria (more correctly but less commonly Jungaria), is
derived from the Jungar Mongols, a tribe of the Oirot Confederacy,
known as Kalmu~ in the West. In the 17th century the Oirat Confederacy
became powerful enough to pose a threat to the growing power of the
Romanov tsars in.Moscow; in the 18th century, however, the ~ungars
were all but exterminated by the Ch'ien Lung emperor (see main text,
pp. 62-3 ). Samolin, W., East Turkistan to the Twelfth Century (The
Hague, 1964), p. 9, fn. 1.
10•.Dawan Ch'eng is an interestingly hybrid Turkic-Chinese name; (Tk. dewan
• pass; Ch. c('eng • city), thus "City of the Pass". Lattimore, 0.,
High Tartary Boston, 1930), p. 149.Many such hybrid names are found in
Sinkiang.
7the Dzungarian Gate,ca narrow valley giving direct access to the steppe of
the Kazakh SSR, and through which ideas, arms end trade have flowed for
centuries. In the far west of Dzungaria the Talki Pass (6,260 ft.) crosses
between the Ala Tau and a northern spur of the Tien Shan to provide the
only satisfactory route between the IIi Valley and the rest of China.
Dzungaria shares many of the characteristics of the Tarim Basin, but
is less arid. The central area is desert, though of 8 less forbidding nature
than the Taklamakan. The lands which border this central desert area receive
11a low annual rainfall, but still considerably more than the oases of the
Tarim Basin. Dzungaria is also ~atered by numerous rivers and streams flowing
down from the surrounding mountain ranges. As a result of this comparatively
generous supply of water, Dzungaria is better suited to pastoral nomadism than
the Tarim Basin. Pasture is hardly adequate, however, and life is hard for
the nomadic population. Large herds of sheep, goats, cattle, horses and camels
are maintained in Dzungaria, 12 but, in order to survive, both the herds and
the men who tend them have to keep constantly on the move. In the high mountains
which surround the central desert region, most notably in the Altai, rainfall
is appreciably heavier;'3 as a consequence of this the upper reaches of these
mountains are well forested with willow, poplar, alder, birch and larch. Kirghiz
and Mongol trappers work these regions for the pelts of fox, sable, ermine, wolf,
bear and wolverine.
The Tien Shan range, which forms an all-but-impenetrable arc across
north-central Sinkiang, divides the arid deserts and settled oases of the Tarim
Basin from the nomadic steppe of Dzungaria; the former region is akin to Soviet
Turkestan, whilst the latter is 'a cold, bleak land, resembling Mongolia and
11. Less than 10 in. per annum. (Tregear, op.cit., p. 292).
12. In 1943 there were 11,720,000 sheep and goats in Sinkiang, 1,550,000 cattle,
870,000 horses and 90,000 camels. Most of these were pastured by Kazakh and
Mongol nomads in Dzungaria. (Chang Chih-yi, in Lattimore, Pivot of Asia,p.15S).
13. 20-30 in. per annum (Tregear, ~.).-- ..
814and Siberia more than Turkestan'.
1·1c The Turfen Depression
To the east of the Tarim Basin, situated between the Bogdo Ula to
the north and the Chol Tagh (Tk. "Desert Mountains") to the south, lies the
Turfen Depression, en oval-shaped fault trough some 3,000 sq. miles in area,
15which descends at its lowest point to 505 ft. below sea level. The Turfan
Depression consists of two main valleys of differing height divided from
each other by the low but arid Atash Tagh (Tk. "fire Mountains"). The
higher, northern valley is an arid and uninhabited waste of piedmont gravel;
only the lower, southern valley is habitable.
Bogdo
Ule
South
Habitable
Plain
NorthCholTagh
Sea
level
fig. 2 Turfan Depression: Section from Chol Tagh to Bogdo Ule.~6
I The climate of the Turfan depression is, to say the least, inclement.
Temperatures vary from 125-1300 f. in the shade during mid-summer, to sub-
zero during the winter; the debilitating heat of summer forces the Turfanliks17
18to withdraw to underground rooms during the blisteringly hot mid-day.
14. Teichmann, Sir E., 'The Motor Route from Peking to Kashgar', Geographical
Journal, LXXXIX, 4 (April 1937), p. 304.
15. Tregear, op.cit., p. 291.
16. Huntington, E., The Pulse of Asia (Boston, 1919), p. 307.
17. i.e. the inhabitants of Turfan; -~ is a common East Turki suffix which,
together with e place name, indicates origin - hence Kashgarlik· an
inhabitant of Kashgar. .
18. Younghusband, f.E., The Heart of a Continent (London, 1896), pp. 138-9.
9Rainfall is practically unknown in the depression, yet Turfan is renowned
throughout China and Central Asia for the quality of its melons, grapes
19and other fruit. Cotton and various grain crops also flourish in the region.
This unexpected abundance in the midst of sun-blasted desolation is due to
the widespread application of the kariz irrigation system (see below).
The Turfan Depression, like the Tarim Basin, is an area of inland
drainage. It has no rivers of any size, but many small streams run down to
the habitable plain from the southern slopes of the Atash Tagh. These
streams provide surface irrigation to the northern edge of the habitable plain,
but as the latter dips to the south surface irrigation is replaced by kariz,
long underground irrigation channels which are the most characteristic
feature of Turfan. It seems likely that this sophisticated end costly technique
for irrigating areas of extreme aridity was introduced to Sinkiang from the
Middle East; certainly underground irrigation channels are common in north-
west India and Iran (where they are known as ganets), similarly the famous
"aqueduct" which supplies water to Mecca and which is said to have been built
on the instructions of queen Zubayda, wife of the cAbbasId Caiiph Harun al-
RashId, is in fact a kariz.20
To the south-east of the Turfan Depression an empty, uninhabited waste
stretches away towards Lop Nor and the borders of Tsinghai and Kansu. Directly
due east of Turfan lies the important and historic oasis of Kumul (Ch. Ha-mi),
19. Schomberg, R.C.r., 'The Turfan Depression', JRCAS, XV, 3 (1928), p. 301;
Chang Hun-wen, 'Grapes in the "Land of rire"', nhina Reconstructs, June
1963, pp. 2..-30.
20. Schomberg, 'The Turfan Depression', p. 302. for kariz (Ar. kharaza, to pierce,
bore) irrigation in Iran see: Stevens, R., The Land of the Great Sophy
(London, 1965), p. 6; also Smith, A., Blind White fish in Persia (London,
1953), passim. The kariz of north-west India were clearly visible to the
present writer when he flew over the Thar Desert in 1976; the regularly-
sited maintenance shafts leading down to the subterranean canals looked
like long rows of craters, snd gave the desert through which the kariz passed
a strangely lunar appearance. for Queen Zubaydah's kariz in the HiJaz see:
Philby, H. st.J., Arabian Jubilee (London, 1952), p. 116. An extensive
discussion of the origins of the kariz system may be found in Lattimore,
Pivot of Asia, pp. 159-61.
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which features prominently in the present study •.Kumul is the last major
settlement in Sinkiang before the frontier with Kansu. The climate is
similar to that of Turfan, though somewhat less severe. Some kariz irrigation
". 21
is also praotised there •.
1·1d The Ili Valley
The Ili Valley, or more precisely the upper third of the Ili Valley,
is the most prosperous region of Sinkiang; it is cut off from the rest of the
province by the main body of the Tien Shan, and by a northern spur of the
same range, the Boro Horo Ula. Ili faces westwards, towards the Soviet Union,
and indeed the lower two-thirds of the valley lie within the frontiers of the
Kazakh SSR. Because Ili faces westwards, it receives-a generous rainfall, and
consequently the region is rich in agricultural land, pastoral land and
forest. Ili has traditionally been used by successiva Chinese administrations
as a penal colony - as a kind of Chinese Botany Bay situated far beyond the
confines of China proper - and the population is consequently very mixed. There
are Kirghiz and Kazakh nomads, Han and Hui settlers (often the descendants of
exiles), small groups of former Manchu Bannermen,22 and a major group of Uighur
agriculturalists known locally as Taranchi (Tk. "cultivators-), who in noway
differ from their fellow Uighurs of the Tarim Basin, but who were forcibly
deported to the Ili Valley from the Kashgar region after the Ch'ing conquest
of Sinkiang in the mid-18th century.23 The main town of the Ili Valley is
Kulja, known to the Chinese as I-ning.
21. Before the CCP victory in 1949, kariz irrigation in Sinkiang was limited to
Turfan, Kumul and (on a much lesser scale) to Guma (Ch. Pi-shan). lattimore,
_Pivot of Asia, p. 160.
22. Afte~ the Ch'ing conquest of Dzungaria and Ili in the mid-18th century,
military settlements were established in these areas. Under the Ch'ing
Hen Chinese settlements were not normally permitted to form a part of those
military settlements establlahed beyond the Great Wall. The Manchu troops
who garrisoned these distant posts were known as Bannermen (Ch. Ch't-Jen or
Ch'i-hala) and formed a partaf the Pa-ch'i, or "Eight Banners" into which
the Manchu army was divided.
23. lattimore, Pivot, p. 126.
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1·1e Communications
After the CCP victory in 1949, the Sian-Lanchow railway line was
extended by over 700 miles in the epic construction of the "Sinkiang friendship
Line", a single track link between Urumchi, the capital of Sinkiang~ and
Kansu.24 f th i d d b thi t d h Si ki ti 1or e per 0 covere y s s u y,owever, nang was en re y
without railways.
During the period 1911-33 air communications within Sinkiang were
virtually non-existent; after 1933, however, a German company, the Eurasia
Aviation Corporation, established a flight route to the far East which crossed
Sinkiang with transit stops at Chuguchak and Urumchi. This service was cut short
by the outbreak of full Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1937, though a new service
was instituted under the auspices of the Sino-Soviet Aviation Company in 1939.
The SSAC service offered a series of short-distance hops between China and the
Soviet Union 'with brief transit stops at Kumul, Urumchi and KulJa before
terminating in Alma Ata, the capital of the Kazakh SSR.
The development of aviation within Sinkiang was also given a boost by
Sheng Shih-ts'ai's use of Soviet warplanes in his conflict with the Tungan
warlord Ma Chung-ying.25 for the latter part of the period covered by the
present study (i.e. from 1933-49) there were, therefore, minor airfields at
Urumchi, 'Kumul, Chuguchak and Kulja; rudimentary air strips also existed at
Aksu and Kashgar in the Tarim Basin. It should be noted that the antiquated
biplanes generally in use within Sinkiang during the pre-CCP period were
usually capable of landing on any suitable strip of ground which had been
26cleared of stones and other obstacles. It was shortage of aircraft rather
than lack of suitable landing strips which limited the impact of aviation on
24. Tregear, T.R., An Economic Geography or China (London, 1970), p. 159.
25. See below, pp. 241-58. . for Governor Chin Shu-Jen's attempt to purchase
an aeroplane in 1932, see: IOL~L/P&S/12/2340, Purchase of an
Governor of Sinkian 22nd A ril - 24th Au ust 1932 •
26. This is vividly. illustrated in G. Vasel's My Russian Jailore in China,
(London, 1937),-pp. 58-60 'J Vasel was employed by the Eurasia Aviation
Corporation as a surveyor of possible air strips. He was probably also a
German agent.
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Sinkiang during the Republican period.
Sinkiang has been traditionally dependent on road transportation.
This was true for both the Imperial and Republican eras, and it remains true
today under the CCP.27 The fertile oases ringing the Tarim Basin between
Kashgar in the west and Kansu in the east are linked by permanent highways
running through the intervening desert. In the north a major route runs between
the Tien Shan and the Taklamakan Desert, linking Kashgar with An-hsi in Kansu
via Maralbashi, Aksu, Kuchar, Korla, Karashahr, Turfan and Kumul. In the
, ,
south a lesser route runs between the Kun-lun Shan and the Taklamakan Desert,
linking Kashgar with An-hsi viayangi Hissar, Khargalik, Khotan, Keriya, Niya
Charchen, Charklik,and Tun-huang. The chief highway of Dzungaria, in Republican
times a muddy and frequently impassable quagmire, runs from Turfan across the
Dawan Ch'eng to Urumchi; from Urumchi it continues to the Russian frontier at
Chuguchak via Manass. Between Manass and Chuguchak an important route branches
off to the west, crossing the Talki pass to the Ili Valley. A lesser route
from Ozungaria to the south leads from Urumchi via Kitai and Barkal to Kumul.
At Kumul all the roads leading from Sinkiang to Kansu, whether from Dzungaria
or the Tarim Basin (with the single exception of the comparatively unimportant
Charkli~-Tun-huang route to An-hsi) come together before crossing the western
Gobi on the Sinkiang-Kansu frontier. Kumul is thus of considerable strategic
significance, as any army which controls the oasis dominates communication
links between Sinkiang and the rest of China. Other areas of obvious strategic
significance are Turfan, BarkBl and Kerashahr within Sinkiang, and Tun-huang
and An-hsi in north-western Kansu.
27. Today Sinkiang remAins primarily dependent on road communications, but this
should not be allowed to obscure the considerable developement of the
province's communications infrastructure which has taken place under the
CCP. Roads have been improved, extended and metalled, and a major route
has been opened~between Khotan end Lhasa,·,tha capital of Tibet, across the
disputed Aksai Chin. The "Sinkiang Friendship Line" has been pushed through
the Turfan Depression as far as Urumchi in Ozungaria, and many new airfields
have been opened, notably at Kuchai,Kashgar and Khotan in the Tarim Basin.
Since the mid-1970's Sinkiang has been linked with Pakistan by the
Karakoram Highway. '
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1·1f The Geographical factor in the History of Sinkiang _
Sinkiang, despite its forbidding physical geography, has always
bean a "land of passage" par excellence. This is especially true of the
Tarim Basin, of which Stein, the Indian archaeological commissioner who
devoted the greater part of. his life to the study of Chinese Central Asia,
wrote:
It might well seems as if this vast region ••• had
been intended by nature far more to serve as a barrier
between the lands which have given our globe its great
civilizations than to facilitate the exchange of their
cultural influences ••• (but) ••• that region is
singularly fitted to illustrate ••• how geographical
features may invest even the least attractive parts of
our globe with very real importance for the history of
civilization·2B
The harsh geography of the Tarim Basin has made it unsuitable for
pastoral nomadism. In the oasis belt at the foot of the surrounding mountain
ranges only intensive agriculture is possible, so that a permanent "chain" of
sedentary farmers has linked China throughout the ages with the pamir and
Karakoram routes to southern and western Asia. Nomads might descend from their
pasture lands in the Tien Shan to raid these caravan trails, but 'nature, by
denying grazing grounds to the vast basin between Kunlun and Tien Shan, has
protected it against ever becoming the scene of great migratory movements and
29of such upheavals as are bound to accompany them'. The sedentary agricultural
population of the Tarim Basin has thus provided a stable factor in the
fluctuating history of Chinese Central Asia by contributing not only fixed
caravanserais on the desert trade routes of the region, but also by providing
a human medium far more suited to the transmission of political, religious
and cultural influences, whether emanating from the East or the West, than
a nomadic population could possibly provide.
The situation in the Tarim Basin, where fixed trade routes pass from
28. Stein, Sir M.A., 'Innermost Asia: Its Geography as a factor in History',
The Geographical Journal, LXV,S, p. 378.
29. 1£!£., p. 403.
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oasis to oasis both north and south of the Taklamakan, contrasts sharply
with that in Dzungaria. The routes of the Tarim Basin have been characterised
by Lattimore as "true roads":
They are adapted, wherever possible, to wheeled traffic,
and to the orderly supervision of officials and tax
collectors. They follow lines of least physical resistance.
Shelter for travellers is not limited to tents, but is
provided at inns, at regular stages. food for travellers
does not have to be carried, nor do transport animals have
to depend on grazing, but provisions and fodder are gathered
from agricultural communities situated along or near the
road and made available at regular halting place&3D
North of the Tien Shan, in the Dzungarian Basin, conditions differ radically:
In these regions we depart altogether from the canons of
the normal road. Routes, in fact, are no longer roads
designed to communicate between fixed centres of population.
They become, rather, general directions of march. Each
direction of march is determined by the needs of a migrant
population, moving not from one oasis to another but between
vaguely defined areas. The areas themselves are determined by
prevailing geographical conditions. They are not selected in
the first place with regard to the potential development of
trade, but because they meet the needs of flocks and herds.
Men go where their cattle and sheep must go, and such trade
as later develops must be able to follow the wandering men.31
In Dzungaria, therefore, trade is entirely subordinate to pasture.
The sedentary nature of agricultural life in the Tarim Basin has
traditionally provided some degree of identity of interest between the
indigenous oasis-dwellers and the Chinese conquerors who extended their
control over the area at times of dynastic strength. for the inhabitants
of the oases Chinese control meant an inevitable loss of personal, cultural,
commercial and religious freedom; on the other hand Chinese control might
also mean stability,.efficient administration, protection from the nomads
of the Tien Shan and Dzungaria - all necessary elements for the profitable
pursuit of trade and agriculture. However, when Chinese imperial power grew
30. Lattimore, 0., 'Caravan Routes of Inner Asia', The Geographical Journal,
LXXII, 6, p. 517.
31. !2!.!!.
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excessively oppressive or corrupt, this identity of interest between
oasis-dweller and Han Chinese diminished; correspondingly a common interest
in throwing off the Chinese yoke developed between the sedentary
agriculturalist of the Tarim Basin and the pastoral nomad of Dzungaria.
It must be stressed, however, that common hostility to Chinese rule -
and more recently a common religion in Islam - has failed to overcome the
radically differing Weltanschauung of pastoral nomad and oasis farmer. This
has .resulted in a continuing split in the ranks of the indigenous peoples
of Sinkiang which successive Chinese administrations have been.able to
exploit with great success.
1·2 The Ethnic Background
It must be emphasised from the outset that there has been a great
change in both the size and ethnic composition of the population of Sinkiang
since the Communist victory in 1949,32 a transformation due primarily to a
32. The CCP disclosed some sporadic information on the settlement of Han
Chinese immigrants in sinkiang during the 1950's, but these figures
ceased after 1959. It is known that the population of Sinkiang totalled
4,040,000 in 1950 (Jen-min shou-ts'e, Shanghai, 1950, I, p. 1). Allowing
for a population growth of circa 2% (based on estimates given in Aird, J.
5., The Size, Composition and Growth of the Population of Mainland China
(Washington, 1961) and Chandrasekhar, 5., China's Population: Census and
Vital Statistics (Hong Kong, 1959), the population of Sinkiang should
have risen to 5,437,396 by 1964. In fact the actual population of Sinkiang
by 1964 was B,OOO,OOO (China Reconstructs, XVII, 12 (Dec. 1968), p. 32).
It is known that the national minority population of Sinkiang did not
increase by as much as the 2% national average during the period 1950-64;
in fact the Turkic minority peoples increased at a mere 1.8% (Ulanfu, 'To
Promote Uninterruptingly the Solidarity of Nationalities in Our Country',
cited in ru-hsiang Lee, The Turkic-Mos1em Problem in Sinkiang (Ph.D.,
Rutgers University, New Jersey, 197~, p. 316), yet the population of
Sinkiang rose by almost three times the national average during the same
period. The difference must, therefore, have been made up by largely Han
Chinese immigration from outside Sinkiang. The number of Han Chinese who
emigrated to Sinkiang during the period 1950-64 can thus be estimated at
2,572,706. A Radio Moscow broadcast of 31st May, 1967, announced that the
ratio of Han Chinese in Sinkiang had risen to 45% by 1966 (roreign Broad-
cast Information Service Dai1 Re art (Washington), no. 107, 1967 CSune 2nd,
1967 , p. 8814). The rate of Han settlement in Sinkiang during the period
1964-78 has certainly not declined, and it may now be confidently/(see over)
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massive, CCP-inspired influx of Han immigrants. However, for the period
with which the greater part of this study is concerned - that ia the
Republican period from 1911 to 1949 - Han Chinese settlers represented a
tiny minority amongst a sea of diverse nationalities. It will be convenient
at this point to divide the population of Republican Sinkiang into three
groups, namely the Muslim minority peoples, the non-Muslim minority
peoples, and the ruling Han Chinese. Together, the Muslim peoples numbered
some 3,439,000 out of an estimated total population of 3,730,000; this
figure includes, besides Turkic and Iranian Muslims, approximately 100,000
Tungan, or Chinese-speaking Muslims from Northwest China. A further 200,000
were Han Chinese settlers, soldiers and officials, whilst the remaining
75,000 to 100,000 were made up of Mongols, Manchus, Russians and a few
33Tibetans, Afghans and Hindu money-lenders.
1·2a The Muslim Peoples
Uighurs: The Uighurs are a Turkic people, closely related to the
Uzbeks of Soviet Central Asia. They comprise the single largest national
grouping in Sinkiang. Lattimore gives a provisional figure of 2,941,000 for
,(continued)/ assumed that Han Chinese significantly outnumber the
indigenous inhabitants of Sinkiang. The importance of this factor
for Turkic nationalism in Sinkiang cannot be overstated. (Details
from fu-hsiang Lee, op.cit., pp~ 311-17).
33. The figure of 3,730,000 is derived from a survey of the total
population of Sinkiang made by the Office of the Provincial Police
in 1940-41. Lattimore considered this figure to be the 'best available
until a more precise survey is conducted' (Pivot of Asia, 1950, p.
103). The figure of 3,439,000 for the total Muslim population of
Sinkiang was secured by Chang Chih-yi, and is published in Lattimore,
Pivot, p. 104. figures for the Tungan and Han populations are derived
loosely from the 'unscientific' list of the nationalities of Sinkiang
issued during the administration of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, and cited in
lattimore, Pivot, p. 110.
19
34the total Uighur population of Sinkiang in the late 1940's; this compares
35with a CCP figure of 3,900,000 based on the 1953 national census.
The Uighur Turks, originally a tribal confederacy of pastoral
nomads living along the banks of the Selenga River in what is now the
36northern part of the Mongolian People's Republic, first came to dominate
Dzungaria and the Tarim Basin in the mid-9th century. The Uighur conquerors
were absorbed by the indigenous Indo-European people, a group who may be
37loosely classified after their language as "Tokharians"; the resulting
tribal union retained the name "Uighur", but largely accepted the predominantly
Mahayana Buddhist faith of the original inhabitants. It was not until the
10th century that Islam began to penetrate the Tarim Basin, starting in the
Kashgar region. By 1500 the area may be considered to have been fully
Islamicised.
The great majority of the Uighur people live in the oases south of
the Tien Shan, dominating the Tarim Basin, Turfan Depression, and Kumul
region. Uighurs are also to be found scattered throughout Dzungaria, and
in large numbers in the IIi Valley (the Uighurs of IIi are frequently
referred to as Taranchis or "cultivators" (Tk.) in documents dating from
the Ch'ing and Republican eras. In fact there are no ethnic or cultural
distinctions between the Taranchis of Ili and the Uighurs of the rest of
34. Population figures for Sinkiang during the late Republican period
:throughout sections 1.2a, 1.2b and 1·2c are based on unpublished
figures secured in Sinkiang by Chang Chih-yi and cited in Lattimore,
Pivot of Asia, p. 106. Where national groups are not included separately
in Chang's figures (e.g. Tungan, Sibo and Solon), but are grouped
together collectively as "Chinese" or "Manchu", figures are taken from
the 'unscientific' list of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, cited in Lattimore, Pivot,
p. 110. In fact the figures given by Chang and in the 'unscientific'
list are remarkably similar, especially when it is remembered that the"
"Taranchi" of the latter source are in fact Uighur, and should more
properly be classified as such.
35. CCP figures taken from the Hsin-Hua tzu-tien {Peking, 1957}.
36. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 122; Samolin, W., East Turkistan to the
Twelfth Century (The Hague, 1964), pp. 72-3.
37. Samolin, op.cit., p. 52J Von Ie Coq, A., Buried Treasures of Chinese
Turkestan (London, 192B), pp. 20-1.
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Sinkiang; the terminology was originally adopted by the Ch'ing as a
political device to promote disunity amongst the ranks of their rebellious
Uighur subjects}. It should be noted that the Uighur population of the
IIi Valley extends across the Soviet frontier, and that Uighurs form
sizeable communities in both the Kazakh and Kirghiz SSR's.38
The Uighurs speak a dialect of the Chagatai branch of the Turkic
group of languages. Uighur is the main language of Sinkiang and is
39generally referred to in European scholarly works as "(astern Turki".
The Uighur people are fond of drama and music, and poetry is a highly
respected cultural activity. The Uighurs of Kashgar, Yarkand and
especially Khotan are famous for their skill in weaving oriental carpets,
many of which have been exported to the West and are today highly valued
40for their richness of colour and rarity.
41With two minor exceptions, the Uighurs are uniformly sedentary
intensive agriculturalists. Authorities on Imperial and Republican Sinkiang
almost universally describe the Uighurs as being quiet, easy-going, peace-
. 42loving farmers. They are a.ll_orthodox StnmI MIlan,ms, followers of the 1-->- "_
38. Wheeler, G., Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia (London, 1967), p.
66; also The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia (London, 1966), p. 117.
39. See, for example, the works by Jarring, G., and Raquette, G.R., in
the bibliography.
40. Bidder, H., Carpets from Eastern Turkestan (London, 1964), passim.
41. The two minor exceptions are: (a) a group known as the Oulani, who live
largely by animal husbandry along the banks of the Yarkand and Tarim
Rivers, and (b) the Lopliks (i.e. inhabitants of the Lop Nor region) who
live largely by fishing. (Lattimore, Pivot, p. 127).
42. Sunn! (Ar.): an orthodox Muslim. Sunn! Muslims, who constitute some 80%
of the world Muslim population, consider themselves to be followers of
the sunna (Ar. "trodden path") of the Prophet Muhammad. In particular,
SunnI Muslims accept the legitimacy of the first' three Caliphs (Abu 8akr,
cUmar and CUthman), and reject the shIca doctrine of a hereditary
caliphate founded in the family of the Prophet Muhammad through his son-
in-law CAli. •
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~anafI madhhabi43 in religious matters they are generally reckoned, both
by other Muslim peoples and by non-Muslims, to be rather lax. They are
44renowned for their easy-going attitude towards marriage and divorce, .and
more orthodox Muslims from the area which is now Soviet Central Asia have
traditionally viewed their Uighur co-religionists as promiscuous and even
degenerate in their adherence to the Islamic way of life. Uighur observance
of the external ritual of Islam is certainly rather half-hearted, and this
is probably a reflection of long-term popular awareness of the >corruption
which waswid.espread amongst the culama' 45 of Sinkiang. Lat~imore
records B common Uighur proverb which runs: 'Do what the mullah says, not
what he does,.46 This is clearly indicative of the low esteem in which many
members of the religious establishment were held by the general populace. It
should, however, be stressed that despite a certain lassitude in the observance
of formal Islamic ritual, Uighur loyalty to the Islamic cultural identity
was, and remains, strong. The Uighurs have time and again shown themselves
to be capable of rising en masse over a religious or religio-cultural slight,
Just as they have shown themselves capable of rising against their Han
Chinese rulers whenever the ruling regime has become 8xcessiv.ely harsh or
corrupt.
43. Sunnl Muslims are subdivided into four separate schools of Jurisprudence
(Ar. madhhab, pl. madhahIb). The largest and probably the most liberal of
these schools is the Hanaf! (named after abu-HanIfa al-Nucman ibn-Thabit,
a Jurist of Kufa, southern Iraq, d. 767). For· further details see: Coulson,
N.J., A History of Islamic Law (~dinburg~, 1964). for a map showing th! __
distribution of the various Sunoi madhahib in the Muslim world, see: faruqi
and Sopher, Historical Atlas of the Religions of the World (N.Y., 1974),
map 56, p. 261, 'Islamic Schools of Law, Sects and Reform Movements'.
44. It is, however, clearly an exaggeration to state that amongst the Uighurs
'the family as an institution is unstable to B degree unsurpassed among
peoples of Islamic faith' (Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 127), as this fails
to take into consideration the instability of marriage in the Malay
Archipelago, the matrilineal Islamic societies of Sumatra, South India and
south-central East Africa, and the institution of temporary marriage (Ar.
mutCa) as practised amongst the shIca of Iran.
45. cUlama' (Ar.), those who are trained in the religious science of Islam;
learned theologians, etc., in practice a member of the Islamic religious
establishment.
46. Lattimore, D., Pivot of Asia, p. 128.
22
Kazakhs: the Kazakhs are a Turkic people inhabiting the vast steppe
region stretching between the Caspian and Aral Seas, and the western
frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic. They form the second largest Muslim
national grouping in Sinkiang, and the third largest group in China (after
the Uighurs and the Hui), but the Kazakhs of Sinkiang are in fact nothing
more than the rump of the Kazakh nation, the great bulk of which lies
within the frontiers of the Soviet Union. There are approximately 3,600,000
Kazakhs in the USSR; this compares with a figure of 319,000 Kazakhs in
i 47 i5 nkiang during the 1940's; and a CCP f gure of 530,000 Kazakhs in Sinkiang,
48Kansu and Tsinghai at the time of the 1953 national census.
Within Sinkiang Kazakhs dominate the Chuguchak and Shara Sume areas,
and form a substantial part of the population of the IIi Valley. The total
Kazakh-inhabited area of Sinkiang amounts to some 130,000 sq. miles (an
area roughly equivalent to that of the British Isles), whilst the area of
the neighbouring Kazakh SSR is 1,073,000 sq. miles {an area greater than
that of the Sudan, the largest country in Africa, and only some 15% less
than that of India).49 This territorial and population imbalance in favour
of the Kazakhs of the USSR has inevitably meant that the Kazakhs of Sinkiang
have tended to look to the Soviet Union in general, and to the Kazakh SSR
in particular, for political and cultural inspiration.
The Kazakhs are primarily pastoral nomads of the steppe. They own
vast flocks of sheep, goats, cattle, horses and camels, end have always
wandered at will over the almost limitless expanse of the Central Asian
steppe. This harsh but self-sufficient existence has made of the Kazakhs a
47. figures of Chang Chih-yi, cited in Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 106.
48. Hsin-Hua tzu-tien, 1957, cited in Nagel, Encyclopaedia-Guide China
(Geneva, 1968), pp. 62-4.
49. Area of Kazakh SSR taken from Caroe, 0., Soviet Empire: The Turks of
Central Asia end Stalinism (New York, 1967), p. 2. The area of the Sudan
is 967,500 sq. miles, whilst that of the Republic of India is 1,229,215
sq. miles.
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fiercely independent people who have traditionally opposed all outside
interference in their affairs. The unwillingness of the Kazakhs to accept
foreign tutelage of any sort has led them into open and bloody conflict
with the forces of both Russian and Chinese expansionism at various times
over the past two hundred years.
As a separate and distinct nation, the Kazakhs appear relatively
late in history; their origins cannot be traced back beyond the fifteenth
century with any degree of certainty. The first recorded use of the Turkic
word Kazakh - meaning "riders of the steppe" - dates from the eleventh
century, but it appears to have been used as a general term, and not to
have designated any particular people. The ancestors of the Kazakhs were
probably a constituent tribe of the Chagatai Khanate; it is believed that
after the disintegration of Chagatai they were absorbed by the rising might
of the Uzbek Confederation. In the mid-fifteenth century a dissident
section of the Uzbek Confederation broke away from the ruling Khan and
migrated to the area between Lake Balkash and Dzungaria.
In the sixteenth century the emergent Kazakh nation formed itself
into ·three hordes which came to dominate a large part of the area which
tOday forms the Kazakh SSR; these were the "Lesser Horde" (Tk. Kishi Zhuz)
in the region of the Caspian Sea; the "Middle Horde" (Tk. Oria Zhuz) in the
central Kazakh steppe, and the "Greater Horde" (Tic. Ulu Zhuz) in the region
of Lake Balkash and the IIi Valley.50
The Kazakhs speak a dialect of the Tatar branch of the Turkic group
of languages which is almost identical to Kirghiz. There Is no difference In
the language of the Soviet and Chinese Kazakhs. The Kazakh people excel in
the skills and handicrafts associated with pastoral nomadism. like the
sedentary Uighurs they are fond of poetry, music and dancing. Their women
50. Wheeler, G., The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (London, 1964),
pp. 11-12; Hambly, G., et al., central Asia (London, 1969), p. 143.
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weave and embroider intricate yurt-hangings, saddle cloths and numda-
like carpets.~1 Kazakhs are famous throughout Central Asia for their skill
as horsemen, and they have traditionally been employed by military
authorities in the region as crack cavalry troops, a role which they
continue to fill with considerable~ in both the Soviet and Chinese
armies.
The Kazakhs, like the Uighurs, are Sunnr ~uslims of the Hanafr
.'~';;';";;'
madhhab. They were Islamicised much more recently than the sedentary
Uighurs; a superficial conversion began in the sixteenth century, and was
52largely completed by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Islam,
however, continues to sit lightly on the Kazakhs. Lattimore records that:
They neither veil nor seclude their women, because
the conditions of nomadic life requir& active kinds
of work which would be hampered by the veil. Men and
women mingle in many kinds of work around the camp~
They are also lax about the details of the Moslem
dietary laws, except for the prohibition against pork;
they do not adhere strictly to the hours of prayer or
the seasons of fasting, and frequently neglect to
circumcise their sons. 53
Kazakh customary law ('ada) has never been fully superceded by
I 1 -c -s amic shari a law; indeed ~ remained a powerful force in the Kazakh
regions of Sinkiang until the CCP victory in 1949, and probably remains so
today. It may be that their recent and comparatively superficial conversion
,
to Islam has left the Kazakh people (and their close kinsmen, the Kirghiz)
more open to new ideas than the settled and more deeply Islamicised
Uighurs. Certainly modern concepts of nationalism and socialism seem to
have developed first amongst the nomadic ~uslims of Chinese Central Asia,
and only later amongst their sedentary bretheren.
51. Yurt: a collapsible circular skin or felt-covered tent (from the Russian
yurta). Numda: a carpet or coverlet of compressed felt, frequently
embroidered (from the Sanskrit namata, "felt").
52. Bennigsen, A., and Lemercier-Quelquejay, C., Islam in the Soviet Union
(London, 1967), p. 6.
53. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 132.
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Kirghiz: The Kirghiz are a Turkic people inhabiting the Tien
Shan and Pamir regions of.Sinkiang, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The
Kirghiz form the fourth largest Muslim national grouping in Sinkiang
(after the Uighurs, Kazakhs and Hui), and the fifth largest in China
(after the Tung-hsiang of Kansu); nevertheless the Kirghiz of Sinkiang,
like their Kazakh kinsmen, are just the rump of the Kirghiz nation. There
are 970,000 Kirghiz in the USSR (primarily in the Kirghiz SSR); a further
30,000 live high in the remote Afghan Pamirs. The Kirghiz of Sinkiang,
54 55numbering an estimated 65,000 in the mid-1940's and 68,000 in 1953,
are distributed across the Tien Shan from the Ili Valley to Aksu; Kirghiz
also dominate the mountainous hinterland of the Tarim Basin along the
Sino-Soviet frontier to the Pamir and Karakoram mountains in the far west.
like the Kazakhs of Sinkiang, the Kirghiz draw much of their national and
cultural inspiration from their more numerous, more prosperous, and better
educated fellows in the Soviet Union.
The Kirghiz, like the Kazakhe, are pastoral nomads. They specialise
in cattle, goat, sheep and horse ferming. In contrast to the Kazakhs,
however, they are Alpine and not steppe nomads. In the summer their herds
range over the high pesture lands of the upper Pamirs and Tien Shan; in the
winter both the Kirghiz and their animals descend to the river banks of the
Pamir and Tien Shan foothills.
Little is known of the origin and early history of the Kirghiz.
According to their own legends they sprang from a group of forty maidens
(Tk.kirk kiz) who became pregnant and so gave birth to the Kirghiz
people. According to one version of this legend, the forty maidens had
intercourse with a red dog; another version explains that they became
pregnant after dipping their fingers in a magic stream; the third - and
54. Chang Chih-yi, cited in lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 106.
55. Hsin-Hua tzu-tien, 1957, cited in Nagel, op.cit., pp. 62-4.
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surely the most symbolic - version holds that they were fertilised by
"the foam of the Issik Kol, a lake long sacred to the Turkic peoples, and
56 (which has become a symbol of Turkic nationalism and independence; in
this context, see the poem of the Kazakh national poet MaghJan Jumabay
at the beginning of this study).
Kirghiz tribes are known to have settled along the upper Yenisei
57River between the sixth and ninth centuries A.D.; Lattimore states that
the earliest Chinese references to the Kirghiz date from the beginning
of the Christian era.58 During the ninth century, Kirghiz warrior bands
attacked the Uighurs of Mongolia and precipitated Uighur emigration into
the area which is now Sinkiang. In the tenth century the Kirghiz were in
turn defeated by the Kara Kitai •. A part of the Kirghiz people turned back
towards the Yenisei where they were encountered by the Russians in the
sixteenth century, but the main body emigrated en masse towards the south-
west and into the region which they inhabit today.59
The Kirghiz speak a dialect of the Tatar branch of the Turkic group
of languages.60 There is no difference in language between the Kirghiz of
Sinkiang and the Kirghiz of the Soviet Union, furthermore the Kirghiz are
easily understood by both their Kazakh and Uighur kinsmen.
The Kirghiz are renowned horsemen and fighters, but their prowess
has traditionally lain in the swift raid or razzia, and not in organised
military conquest. Kirghiz of both sexes enjoy falconry; the men also hunt
S6. Norins, M.R., Gateway to Asia (New York, 1944), p. B8.
S7. Wheeler, G., The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, p. 13.
58. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 133.
S9. lattimore, ibid.; Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, p. 13.
60. Czalpicka, M.A., The Turks of Central Asia (london, 1918), p. 24, citing
,I the Turkologists Beresin and Kasem Beg, states categorically that
Kirghiz belongs to the Tatar branch of the Turkic group of languages.
lattimore, on the other hand, states that Kirghiz is a Turkic language,
more closely related to Chagatai Turkish and Uighur than to Kazakh
(Pivot of Asia, pp. 133-4); this ",ould make Kirghiz a dialect of the
Chagatai rather than the Tatar b£aReh.~of the ~Turkic group of languages.
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larger game, especially the rare avis poli or long-tailed mountain sheep,
and the wild yak. Like the Afghans and the Uighurs, the Kirghiz are avid
players of the game of baiga (in Afghanistan known as buz kashi), a violent,
no-holds-barred contest between some fifty mounted men who compete for the
61possession of a sheep or goat carcass. The handicrafts of the Kirghiz are
essentially similar to those of the Kazakhs; the women weave end embroider
intricate saddle-cloths, yurt-hangings and felt carpets.
The Kirghiz are SunnI Muslims of the ~an8fI madhhab. Like the Kazakhs,
they are comparatively recent converts to Islam, and shamanistic traits
retain some small significance in Kirghiz cUltom.62 'The Kirghiz themselves,
however, have long considered their practice of Islam to be exemplary; they
are fiercely conscious of their identity as Muslims, and are proud of their
links with Dar aI-Islam, the Islamic world.
TaJiks: The Tajiks are an Iranian people, of Indo-European rather
than Turkic ethnic origin. They inhabit a remote and impoverished area of
the Pamir-Karakoram ranges in south-western Sinkiang. Their numbers are very
small, and their influence on the course of events in Sinkiang has always
been slight.
The Tajiks of Sinkiang are primarily concentrated in the mountainous
63valleys of the Tashkurgan region. Tashkurgan is also known as Sarikol, as
a c~nsequence of which the Tajiks ~re frequently referred to as "Sarikolis"
in European works of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
I 64n the mid-1940's there were an estimated 9,000 Tajiks in Sinkiang. CCP
61. Norins, op.cit., p. 89.
62. Mote, V.L., 'Kirghiz', in: Weekes, R.V., Muslim Peoples (London,1978) p. 218.
63. Iashkurgan (Tk. "stone tower"), almost certainly the "Tower of stone"
reported by Ptolemy to mark the half-way point between east and west
on the ancient Silk Road. See Boulnois, L., The Silk Road (London, 1966),
Pp. 62-3.
64. Chang Chih-yi, in Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 106.
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figures published in 1953 put the Tajik population of Sinkiang at the much
higher, but in political terms still marginally significant figure of
15,000.65
The Tajiks are a settled people, cultivating oats, barley and
legumes under very difficult climatic conditions - at no point does the
Sarikol region drop below 10,000 ft. The TaJik agriculturalists live in
close and relatively friendly contact with the surrounding pastoral
Kirghiz. They frequently supplement their meagre agricultural source of
income by acting as porters and guides for caravans and individual travellers
crossing the 15,600 ft. Mintaka Pass between Sinkiang and Hunza. During
the Republican period, however, it is doubtful whether this difficult and
dangerous task made more than a marginal contribution to the financial
position of the impoverished TaJik community. Lattimore, an authority who
travelled extensively in Sinkiang during the Republican period, records
that the Sarikolis were resentful of Chinese rule 'especially because of
the burdens imposed upon them for supplying men and animals, without pay
or for insufficient pay, to keep open a high mountain route between Sinkiang
and India' .66
The TaJiks may have been the original Iranian inhabitants of the
Afghanistan East Turkestan area. Chinese sources from 128 B.C. describe
the people of Bactria as being shrewd traders and poor fighters who lived
in walled towns and did not follow a nomadic way of existence. These people
were first conquered by the Arabs and later by the Turks sweeping down from
Transoxiana, but they retreated into the Pamirs and Hindu Kush where they
67succeeded in maintaining a precarious foot-hold. The rrench orientalist
GrenardbBlieved the TaJiks of Sarikol to be the descendants of the
Tokharian inhabitants of Khotan, 8 people who dominated the Tarim Basin in
65. Hsin-Hua tzu-tien, 1957, cited in Nagel, op.cit., pp. 62-4.
66. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 138.
67. Wilber, D.E., (ed.), Afghanistan (Human Relations Area riles, New Haven,
1956), p. 45.
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the first centuries of the Christian era, but who were later conquered
by the invading Uighur Turks.68 Whatever the true origin of the Sarikoli
Tajiks, it is apparent that they belong ethnically and culturally to the
impoverished "Mountain Tajik" community of Afghan Badakshan, and not to
the urbanised and sophisticated plains-dwelling Tajik community which
69constitutes in excess of 30% of the total population of Afghanistan, and
, 70the overwhelming majority of the population of the Tajik SSR.
The Sarikoli Tajiks speak an Iranian dialect of which lattimore,
writing in 1950, commented:
There are two Iranian languages spoken in adjoining
districts. One is the Pamir group of dialects, spoken
in the Wakhan Valley of Afghanistan and in the Mountain
Badakshan Autonomous Region enclosed within the Tajik
Soviet Socialist Republic. The other is Tajik. Thus
the question whether the Sarikolis speak Tajik or Pamir
Iranian is important, but there is as yet no authoritative
answer·71
Although no published philological research has been undertaken in the
Tajik region of Sinkiang since the CCP victory in 1949, it may be
tentatively suggeste~ that the Sarikoli Tajiks speak an-archaic Iranian
dialect corresponding to lattimore's "Pamir Iranian" which differs markedly
from modern Persian •.This conclusion is suggested by the Human Relations
Area file on Afghanistan (1956), which states that:
In the high mountain valleys of Badakshan, and in
Wakhan, the tongue of Afghan territory which extends
between Kashmir and Soviet Tajikistan to meet Chinese
Turkistan, dwell the mountai~ TaJiks. They speak an
archaic Iranian lenguage.7~
The plains-dwelling Tajiks, on the other hand, speak a dialect of Persian
which is almost indistinguishable from that used in eastern Iran. There are
no plains-dwelling Tajiks in Sinkiang.
The Sarikoli Tajiks are an extremely poor people, a condition shared
68. Cited in Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 138.
69. Wilber, op.cit., p. 46.
70. Wheeler, The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia, p. 117.
71. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 138.
72. Wilber, op.cit., p. 46.
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73with their fellows in Afghan Badakshan and in the Mountain Badakshan
A t . 74u onomous Oblast of the Tajik SSR. One reason for this poverty is
that in an area which is overwhelmingly SunnI Muslim, the "Mountain Tajiks"
(in contrast to the plains-dwelling Tajiks) are ShIca Muslims; almost
certainly this religious difference has contributed to the present isolation
and povert~ of the "Mountain Tajiks" in their remote and inhospitable
valleys.7S The Tajik Shica of Sinkiang are, in fact, NizirI IsmecIli, or......
76followers of the Aga Khan;· as such they are a minority within a minority.
They are regarded as heretics (Tk. refizi) by the Turkic and Hui SunnI
Muslims of Sinkiang, and consequently have suffered a double persecution,
firstly at the hands of successive corrupt Chinese administrations (cf.
Lattimore, fn. 66 above), and secondly at the hands of their more orthodox
co-religionists. This isolation helps to explain the continuing poverty and
political impotence of the Sarikoli Tajiks in both Ch'ing and Republican
times.
73. The present writer travelled in Afghan Badakshan during September 1976.
74. The Tajik SSR has a total area of 55,600 sq. miles, with its capital at
Dushanbe. Within the Tajik SSR lies the little-known Mountain Badakshan
Autonomous Oblast, area 24,900 sq. miles, capital at Khorog in the Pamirs).
The population of the Mountain Badakshan A.D. was 73,000 in 1959; this
figure is made up of "Mountain Tajiks" in the west, and Kirghiz in the
east. Utechin, S.V., Concise Encyclopaedia of Russia (London, 1961), p. 361.
75. The position of the "Mountain Tajiks" may best be compared with that of
the Mongloid Hazara inhabitants of Afghanistan. Like the "Mountain Tajiks",
the Hazara are shIca Muslims (though not IsmeCIlI), and are reviled as
heretics by the Sunn! majority in Afghanistan. The Hazara inhabit the
infertile uplands of central Afghanistan, known as Hazarajat.
76. The Sarikoli Tajiks are in fact a faction- (NizerI) within a minority
(IsmaC!l!) within a minority (shICa); furthe~;;-all Muslims are, of
course, a minority within China. Little research has been undertaken on
the religious background of the Sarikoli Tajik community, and most
reference works on Sinkiang content themselves with describing them as-c j"Shi itea". Lattimore, however, states that the Sinkiang Ta iks acknowledge
the Aga Khan as their spiritual leader (Pivot of Asia, p. 138). A short
explanation of the term NizarI IsmacIII is appended to the present study
so that the sectarian affIiiations of the Sarikoli Tajiks may be clearly
understood, particularly by the Sinologist who Is not en Islemicist. (See
Appendix II at the end of this studT).
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UZbeks: There are only a handful of Uzbeks living in Sinkiang;
figures from the mid-1940's show an estimated Uzbek population of 8,000.77
Chinese Communist statistics from the 1953 national census put the figure
at 11,000.78 Unlike the various Muslim peoples who have been examined so
far, the Uzbeks have no territorial base of their own within China. Most
Sinkiang Uzbeks live in the cities, particularly Kashgar, KulJa and
Chuguchak, where they work as merchants and traders.79
The Uzbeks "of Sinkiang must be seen as an outpost of the cultured
and sophisticated Uzbek nation. The Uzbek homeland is in an~ around the
Zeravshan Valley in the area which is now Soviet Central Asia. Within the
Soviet Union there are more than 6,000,000 Uzbeks, most of whom live within
the Uzbek SSR. Uzbeks are the fourth most numerous nationality in the USSR
after the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians; they are the largest
Turkic group in the USSR, and the second largest Turkic group in the world
eoafter the Osmanli Turks of Turkey. ."Outside the USSR there are about
1,000,000 Uzbeks in Afghanistan.
The Uzbeks probably derive their name from Uzbek, a Khan of the
Golden Horde who adopted Islam and whose name gradually became associated
with the Islamicised elements of the Horde. The Uzbeks came to dominate
the area between the lower Volga and the Aral Sea during the fifteenth
century. During the sixteenth century the predominantly UZbek Shaibanid
Dynasty conquered the formerly Timurid lands around Bukhara, Samarkand and
TaShkent. These are the areas inhabited by the great majority of the
Uzbek people today.
After their conquest of the Zeravshan Valley, the Uzbeks became
an increasingly sedentary people. The Turkic Uzbeks also absorbed many .
77. Chang Chih-yi, cited in lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 106.
78. Hsin-Hua tzu-tien, 1957, cited in Nagel, op.cit., pp. 62-4.
79. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 149.
80. Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, p. 10.
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elements of the advanced Iranian culture which flourished in and around
Bukhara and Samarkand. The Uzbeks became influential standard-bearers of
Islam in Central Asia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
c -and during this period Uzbek traders and members of the ulama' crossed
the Tien Shan and settled in small numbers in Eastern Turkestan.
The Russian conquest of the ancient Khanates of Khiva, 8ukhara
and Khokand during the nineteenth century caused a further emigration of
Uzbeks to Sinkiangj finally the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the civil
war in Central Asia which followed created a constant flow of refugees
from Russian to Chinese Central Asia; most of these refugees were "White"
\Cossack troops and their suppo~ters, but it is clear that many Uzbeks,
Kazakhs and Kirghiz also fled to Chinese territory.
The Uzbeks speak a dialect of the Chagatai branch of the Turkic
group of languages. They are easily understood by the Uighurs, a people to
whom they are closely related. Like the Uighurs, they are SunnI Muslims
of the Hanaf! madhhab. The Uzbeks are probably the most conscientiously. ,,~.~
observant Muslims in Sinkiang, and also the most orthodox. Their chief
contribution to the historical development of Sinkiang has been political
and cultural rather than military; they have helped 1n the spread of Islam,
and particularly in the propagation and development of pan-Islamic
sentiment through the Nagshband! 18'1fa, a ~ufrorder based in 8ukhara.
The role of the Uzbeks in Sinkiang during the twentieth century, however,
seems to have been more muted.
.
Taters: The Tatars are the smallest Muslim nationality in Sinkiang,
yet they have exercised (and continue to exercise) an influence on events
in Sinkiang out of all proportion to their numbers. In the mid-1940's there
81were an estimated 5,000 Tatars in 5inkiang; the CCP census of 1953 puts
81. Chang Chih-yi, cited In Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 106.
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g2the number of Tatars even lower, at 4,300 (this may well be explained by
a possible return of Tatars to the Soviet Union after the CCP victory in
1949; the Tatars of Sinkiang tend to live along the Sino-Soviet frontier,
and such an exodus would have proved comparatively easy).
Like the Uzbeks, the Tatars have no fixed territorial base in China;
rather the Tatars of Sinkiang are concentrated in the northern cities ofKulja
and Chuguchak. Lattimore estimated in 1950 that over 80% of all Sinkiang
Tatars lived in these two cities; however even here they form a small
83minority of the population. There are virtually no Tatars in the Tarim
8asin. Like the Uzbeks of Sinkiang, the Tatars are primarily an urban
community. They work as merchants and traders, and have made a sUbstantial
contribution to the administration of the province, under the CCP BS well
as during the Republican period.
~ost Tatars trace their descent to the Khanate of Kazan, which was
founded after the collapse of the Golden Horde in the Volga Area in 1438.
In 1552 Kazan, which had emerged as the pre-eminent centre of Islamic
civilization north of the Caucasus, was conquered by Ivan t~e Terrible.
The Tatars were treated with singular brutality, and many fled eastwards.
As the frontiers of the Russian state expanded inexorably eastwards, so the
great mass of the Tatar people found themselves subjects of the Tear. Tatar
refugees and political dissidents gradually spread throughout the Russian
dominions in Central Asia, and even into Siberia and Sinkiang. As with the
Uzbeks, a further wave of emigration occurred during the 1917 revolution and
the subsequent civil war. Today there are at least 5,000,000 Taters in the
Soviet Union (where they constitute the fifth largest nationality, after
the UZbeks);84 they are scattered throughout the various national republics,
though the majority live in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
82. Hsin-Hua tzu-tien, 1957, cited in Nagel, op.cit., pp. 62-4.
81. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 150.
84. Utechin, S.V., op.cit., P. 431.
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(RsrSR) and the Uzbek SSR.es
Tatars speak Tatar, a Turkic dialect which has given its name to
the north-western group of Turkic languages amongst which are included
Kazakh and Kirghiz. Like the Uighurs, the Kazakhs, the Kirghiz and the
Uzbeks, the Tatars are Sunn! Muslims of the Hanar! madhhab. They are•
orthodox Muslims, and proud of their Islamic faith and culture; however
they are probably less conscientious than the Uzbeks in their observance
of Islamic ritual. If the Uzbeks of Sinkiang played an important role in
the dissemination of pan-Islamic ideas in Sinkiang, the bitterly anti-
Russian Tatars made a similar contribution in the spread of pan-Turanian
concepts. Driven to flee the Russian Empire by Tsarist persecution, Tatar
emigres came to 5inkiang as representatives of one of the most intellectually
developed and culturally advanced Muslim communities in the world. Originally
inhabitants of Kazan, the great'northern seat of Islamic scholarship, the
Tatars were driven by Russian conquest and persecution to spread throughout
Russia and even to Sinkiang; in this diaspora they maintained contact with
each other and with Kazan through literally hundreds of news sheets and
information bulletins which were circulated between the scattered
communities. Because of their intellectual sophistication and political
organisation the Tatars have always been in the forefront of the Turkic
national movement ~ithin both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union; this
Turkic nationalism spilled across the frontier into Sinkiang, and it is no
coincidence that Burhan ShahIdI, first chairman of the provincial government
of Slnkiang under the CCP, was a Tatar.
~: The seventh and last Muslim nationality of Sinkiang, the Hui,
differ markedly from the previous six Muslim nationalities already discussed;
85. Bennigsen and lemercier-Quelquejay, op.cit., p.:S; Wheeler, G., Racial
Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia , pp. 65-6.
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indeed the Hui have so little in common with the Uighurs, Kirghiz, Tajiks,
Uzbeks and Tatars that they should really be grouped in a separate
category of their own. They are Muslims, and they are a national minority
people. Here the similarities end.
The Hui are the largest Muslim national minority 1n China. Chinese
Communist statistics from the 1953 census show that there were 3,930,000 Hui
scattered throughout China at that time. The graatest concentration of Hui
is in Northwest China, especially in Kansu,T$inghai_~~~~ingsia. Provinces,
where they are frequently referred to as Tungans., (Under the CCP :Ningsia
Province has been reconstituted as the Ningsia , Hui Autonomous Region). In
Sinkiang, however, the Hui have always been a small, though politically
significant, minority. Statistics from the mid-1940's show an estimated Hui
86
population in Sinkiang of 92,146; unfortunately CCP statistics from the 1953
census do not give figures for the Hui population of Sinkiang as' distinct
from the Hui population of China as a whole.
Within Sinkiang the Hui live primarily in the towns and villages of
Dzungaria and the IIi Valley. There are aleo emaIl Hut communities in
several of the oases situated along the northern rim of the Tarim Basin
(notably in Karashahr and Aksu) as well as in Kashgar and Khotan. Within
Sinkiang many Hui have traditionally owned agricultural smallholdings; others
maintain inns and lodging-houses which have a reputation for cleanliness
and efficiency. As in much of north and north-western China, the Hui of
Sinkiang dominate the caravan trade-routes and have figured prominently as
soldiers~
Although the Hui are now recognised by the CCP as a separate
nationality, in Ch'ing and Republican times their position was far less
clear. The Ch'ing administration responsible for the supression of the mid-
nineteenth century Muslim rebellions in Northwest China tended to rega~d
B6. Chang Chih-yi, cited in Lattimore, pivot of Asia, p. 110.
Hui rebels as "traitors", whilst Turkic rebels were regarded as misled
minority peoples. Consequently in areas reconquered by the victorious
armies of the Ch'ing general Tso Tsung-t'ang, defeated Turkic peoples were
treated with a considerable measure of leniency. Hui prisoners, on the
87other hand, were frequently subjected to a policy of extermination.
With the overthrow of the Ch'ing and the establishment of the
Chinese Republic in 1911, the separate national identity of the Hui was
still not acknowledged. Sun Yat-sen, the father of the Chinese Republic,
argued that in China the terms "state" and "nation" meant the same thing.
Sun advocated a policy of assimilation and eventual Sinification for all
the national minorities. He wrote as follows:
'Although there are a little over ten million non-
Han in China, including Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans
and Tatars, their number is small compared with the _.
purely Han population ••• China is one national! ty.e8
Sun elsewhere argued that:
The name "Republic of rive Nationalities" exists
only because their exists a certain racial
distinction which distorts the meaning of a single
republic. We must facilitate the dying out of all
names of individual peoples inhabiting China •••
we must satisfy the demands of all races and unite
them in a single political and cultural whole. 89 .
As June Dreyer points out, Sun seems to have subsumed all the Turkic
Muslims of China under the term "Tatar"; similarly he does not mention
the Hui, apparently assuming that they were a religious rather than an
ethnic mi~ority.90
87. 'The record in bloodiness was set by the armies of Tso Tsung-t'ang. When
they took Uighur towns, surrender was usually accepted without massacre •••
When they defeated Chinese Moslems, however, they massacred women and
children as well as men, because these communities were regarded as not
only political rebals, but traitors to the Chinese blood' (Lattimore,
Pivot of Asia, pp. 143-4).
"8B. Hsu, L. Shih-lien, Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals (Los Angeles,
1933), p. 168.
• h:., .• ,);....,...• _.__ ,_~, ..-~_._ ..._.__ <, __ -""-'--,:,*_ ..... '~- "'-... -.r-" _ '_'-~'·_·-'·"'.71""- "..8""" ..,..• "-~"- ".<- .,- -
89. Sun·yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary (Taipei, 1953), p. 180.
90. Dreyer, June,' China's forty Millions (Cambridge, Mass.,-1976), pp~16-17.
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Sun Yat-sen had little or no opportuni~y to implement his plans
for the integration of all minority peoples in China within a single race;
indeed it is doubtful whether he had any real plans beyond vague theorising.
His Kuomintang (KMT) successors, however, embraced Sun's ideas whole-
heartedly, and indeed took them one stage further. In Chiang Kai-shek's
opinion:
Our various clans actually belong ••• to the same
racial stock ••• that there are five peoples
designated in China ••~ is not due to differences
of race or blood but to religion and geographical
environment. In 'short the differentiation among
China's five peoples is due to regional and religious
factors, and not to race or blood.~~ ~
Chiang's statement, which is entirely without scientific foundation, is a
fine example of the assimilationist policy known as Ta-Han chu-yi ("Greater
Han-ism"). Before the CCP victory in 1949 the Hui nationality were the
most frequent victims of Han attempts to assimilate the Muslim national
minority peoples. This is because the Hui have frequently been officially
considered as Han Chinese who have adopted the Muslim religion, and not as
a separate natIonalIty. At first glance this view might not seem too
unreasonable. The Hui speak Chinese (a few can speak 80me Arabic; the
majority are able to recite the fatIh~ and various other suras from the
, , 92Qur'an, generally without fully understanding the, meaning) •. In general
terms - at least to the outsider - the Hui ~ Chinese, though their
appearance may differ widely according to their locality. (It must be
pointed out that this apparent similarity between Hui and Han is strenuously
+denied by those fortunate enough to have been abl. to travel In the north-
western Hui areas; most such authorities describe these Tungan Muslims as
being larger and more hirsute than the Han; pronouncedly Semitic features
91. Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny (N.Y., 1947, translation by Wang Chung-
hui), PP. 12-13. " ",
-.';-~... --....-:-........ -........ - _ .. '- __ --._ ~.,--... ----~--.......--. --_.
92. ling, Cawood C.M., 'Islamic Culture in China', in Islam: lhe Straight
~ (N.Y., 1958), p. 366.
are also widespread. A. Ooak Barnett, an American correspondent who travelled
widely in Northwest China during the Second World War, records that:
In appearance these people (the Hui) are clearly
distinguishable from other Chinese. The men's skull
caps and women's hoods are identifying marks, but,
in addition, their facial features are quite distinctive.
Their noses are larger and their eyes rounder than
those of typical Chinese (i.e. Han Chinese), and the
men wear luxuriant beards and bushy sideburns. Some
have features and coloration so Occidental that they
are startling in a remote Oriental setting.93 .
Similarly Owen Lattimore, who was appointed political adviser to Chiang Kai-
shek in 1941 on the nomination of President Roosevelt, recalls that a Hui
warlord from Northwest China whom he met during the war years 'looked more
like a Sikh than a Han Chinese~94 It is certain that Hui are not simply
Han Chinese who have adopted Islam. This point has now been accepted by
both Chinese and non-Chinese authorities, as well as by the CCP Government
in Peking. The Hui, of course, have long insisted on this separate identity.
Who, then, are the Hui? It would seem that they are the descendants
of Muslim merchants and soldiers (primarily of Arab and Persian, and later
of Turkic origin) who came to China between the seventh and seventeenth
9Scenturies. These soldiers and merchants took Chinese wives and were
gradually absorbed by the indigenous population. The process of assimilation
was never fully completed, however, as the newcomers passed on their religion
and various cultural and ethnic traits to their descendants. The nascent Hui
community gradually expanded as a result of further intermarriage. The
conversion to Islam and subsequent absorption of sections of the surrounding
peoples must also have played an important role in the growth of the Hui
nationality.
As time passed, certain Hui territorial bases emerged, most notably
93. Barnett; A.O.~ China·on·the Eve of the Communist Takeover (London, 1963),
p. 182.
94. Owen Lattimore in conversation with the author during 1976.
95. forbes, A.O.W., 'The Muslim National Minorities of China', Religion
. VI, 1 (Spring 1976), PP. 70-2.
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in the south-western province of Yunnan and in the north-western provinces
of 'Tsinghai Kansu and Ningsia •. Other smaller groups of Hui emigrated along
the trade routes of China towards Peking and the three north-eastern
provinces (Hui have always been active as caravaneers and traders; because
of Islamic dietary laws it is desirable for Muslim travellers to have access
- 96to ~~ foodstuffs, thus the predominance of Hui in the North China
caravan trade created a need for small, settled Hui communities at intervals
along the trade routes to service the needs of their itinerant co-religionists).
It is not known when the first Hui entered Sinkiang. No doubt numbers
of Hui had passed through the region either en route for Mecca to perform
the hajj, or on some mercantile enterprise, almost from the time of their._
inception as a national group. The policy of systematically settling Hui
in the area dates from the eighteenth century conquest of Dzungaria and the
Tarim Basin by the Ch'ing Emperor Ch'ien-lung. In his conquest of Dzungaria
Ch'ien-lung sought permanently to break the power of his Mongol enemies by
97implementing a policy of genocide., Dzungaria was to be re-settled by Han
and Turkic immigrants; Machu bannermen were to rule over these immigrants and
to safeguard the western frontier for the Ch'ing. The emigration of Hui
Muslims was also encouraged. This served the dual purpose of removing some
of the warlike and fiercely independent Hui from China Proper, and gave
additional military muscle to the Ch'ing presence in the stiJl debatable
lands of Central Asia. Many Hui fled westwards to Sinkiang before the
advancing Ch'ing armies of Tso Tsung-t'ang in the mid-nineteenth century;
however it is unlikely that these refugees added appreciably to the number
of Hui in Sinkiang, as the victorious Ch'ing forces inflicted terrible losses
on the Hui community already established in the area. During this period a
96: ~alal (Ar.) - "permitted"; Ch. equivalent, ch'ing, - "pure". Han Chinese
are great eaters of pork, a foodstuff which is, of course, strictly
• forbidden to Muslims. See, however, the possibly apocryphal story
concerning this matter related by Lattimore in his The Desert Road to
Turkestan (Boston, 1930), p. 204, fn. 1.
97. Chu Wen-djang, The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China, 1862-1878 (The
Hague, 1966), pp. 1-2.
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number of Hui fled across the Tien Shan to Russia, where they were given
political asylum by the Tsarist Government. Today the descendants of these
Hui refugees number 21,000 and constitute a narodnost' within the Kazakh
and Kirghiz SSR's.98
The Hui, like the Turkic Muslims of Sinkiang, are Sunn! Muslims of
the ~anaf! madhhab. They are strongly conscious of their Islamic identity,
but their observance of formal Islamic ritual tends to be both lax and
somewhat unorthodox. Dawood Ting, a Hui by nationality, comments that:
Only the Ahunds (sic) and country people of strong
faith observe the five daily prayers. Others observe
only two or three prayers and make the rest up at
home and others go to the mosque only for the friday
service, but the largest grouB go to the mosque only
for the two great festivals ( id al-fi~£ and Cid al-
adha). Some Muslims never go to the mosque except for
~relative's funeral and then they disappear as soon
as the ceremonies are finished; this is a large group.
Not many men go to the mosque to worship and even
fewer women gO.99
100Hui women generally do not observe purdah, though in some parts of the
northwest they may wear the veil; observance of fasting during Ramadan is
i - 101 Irregular, and payment of zakat is rare y made. The pilgrimage to roecca,
theoretically obligatory on all Muslims who can afford to make the journey,
is long and difficult, thus comparatively few Hui are able to make the ~aJJ.
Hui marriage and funeral ceremonies are widely influenced by Han Chinese
customs, and this has often led to criticism of the heterodox nature of
Hui Islam by pan-Islamicists and religious reformers.
The Hui of Northwest China and Sinkiang (who are known as Tungans in
contrast to the Hui of Yunnan in Southwest China, the latter being sometimes
98. Wheeler, G., The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia, p. 118.
99. Ting, D., op.cit., p. 366; "Ahund" • a-hung (Ch.), a mulla, from the
Persian akhund. . .
100. Purdah (Hindi, from the Persian par~a, a curtain - hence the association
with the veil); the Islamic custom of secluding women.
101. Zak;t (Ar.) - alms tax of 2t% of personal income theoretically payable.
to the poor by all rich Muslims.
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102 'referred to as Panthays) are noted for their love of horses, their
business sense, and their martial spirit. A. Doak Bernett, one of the most
informative and observant war correepoRdents active in Northwest China
during the late Republican period, described the troops of General Ma Pu-
fang, Tungan warlord of Chinghai, as b.ing:
•••• among the best soldiers in the country. The
bivouacs and camps of these troops are spotless, and
the soldiers era well-dressed and disciplined. Ona
sees these troops throughout the eastern districte
of tha province, and they help to create a general
atmosphere that is very martial.103
Harrison rorman, another American correspondent who travalled and worked
in Northwest China at this time, was similarly struck by Tungan military
ability:
Renowned for their prowess under normal circumstances,
the Hui become formidable when engaged in holy war
against the infidel •••• outnumbered and armed only
with swords, they have been known to charge Han machine-
gun barrages and win. 104
A final example from the many which would serve adequately to illustrata
this aspect of the character of the Tungan community may ba takan from the
writings of Robert (kvall, an American who lived in the Kansu-Chinghai~
Tibet border region for much of the later Republican period:
The Moslems make first-rate soldiers. In difficult
places ~oslem troops are supported by a sort of
religious frenzy. I have seen them fighting the
Tibetans, and I have seen them fighting the Chinese;
once, when I was being held prisoner by them, I saw
about two thousand fight thair way out of a trap
·formed by six times as many Chinese regulars, taking
machine-gun nests and making a way through sheer
102. Penthay: A word of presumed Burmese origin (Burmese: path! • Muslim)
which has come to be applied to the Muslims of Southwest China,
particularly of Yunnan province. See: Taw Sein-ko, 'The Derivation
of the Word Panthay', The Indian Antiguary, XXX (1901), pp. 39-40;
also Yule, H., and A.C. Burnell, Hobson-Jobson: A Glosser of An 10-
Indian C0110guial Words and Phrases London, 1968), pp. 669-70.
103. Barnet~, A. Doak, op.cit., p. 186.
104., Dnyer, op.cit., P~ 27, ci.ting f()rman. See, elso forman, H., •China' 8
Moslemia', Canadian Geographical Journal, XXVII, 9 (1948), pp. 134-43,
p88e1m,~~, Horizon Hunter (London, 1942), pp. 69.;.e9o
courage and superior daring. It is interesting to
nota that the last general to etand against the
Japanese in ~anchuria, in 1931, was the Moslem Ma
Chan-san ••••• 105
The Tungan military tradition recurs constantly in the present
study, particularly in 106tha parson of Ma Chung-ying, the young Hui
warlord whose armies devastated Sinkieng in the 1930's. Two of the three
sources given abova refer to a 'sort of religious frenzy' which is said to
grip Hui troops when 'engaged in holy war against the infidel'. In fact Hui
military prowess originates ~or. from a combination of their experience as
as a persecuted religious and national minority, as well as fro. the
adventurous and dangerous nature of their pref.rred profassional calling
as 10ng~di8tance caravaneers and ~erchants, than from adherence to the Muslim
faith; after all, the Uighurs of Sinkiang are alao Musli~s, yet they have
no comparable military tradition. References to "holy war" are also misleading.
To be sure, holy wars against the infidel have, from time to time, swept
Northwest and Central China, but Tungan ermi •• have not opereted against Han
Chinese, Tibetans and Mongols alone. The career of Ma Chung-ying serves well
to illustrate that Tungan armies may equally be turned against fellow-Muslims
(the Turkic Muslims of Sinkiang) at ti~es of political expedience. Similarly
Turkic Muslims from Sinkiang have shown themselves prepared to attack their
c -Hui co-religionists (the ~ost notable case of this ~ay be found in Ye qub
Beg'8 pyrrhic victory over the Tungans during the 1B60·s).107 Traditionally,
little love has been lost between the Turkic and Hut Muslims of Chinese;
Central Asia, and the pre.pect of an all-embracing Muslim holy ~ar 8~eeping
Central Asia - a spectre which has long haunted political strategists in
105. Ekvall, R., Cultural Relations on the Kensu-Tibaten Border (Illinois,
1939), p. 18. .
106. Nyman, Lars-Erik, Great Britain end Chinese Russian and Ja anese
Interests In Sinkiang. 1918-1934, pp. 101-4 "General Ma Chung-ying
a. the Bearer of the Militant Tungan Tradition").
107. Boulgar, D., The life of Yakoob Beg (london, 1878), pp. 119-36 ("Wars
With the Tungani").
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both Moscow and Peking - has ~ever shown signs of materialising.
,1·2b The Non-Muslim Peoples
Sibo, Solon and Manchu: rollowing his crushing victory over the
Jungar Mongols in the mid-18th century, the emperor Ch'ien-lung determined
to consolidate his hold over the newly-conquered Turkic and Mongol peoples
of the far western frontier by settling groups of Manchurian soldiery
throughout the frontier area. Ch'ien-lung envisaged the permanent absorption
of Sinklang within the Ch'ing empire, and to this end he established a new
city, Hui-ynan (later to become known as "Little Kulja" Dr "New Kulja" in
contrast to the old Jungar capital of Kulja which stood slightly to the
108east) within the strategic III Valley. In Hui-yHan, and throughout the
frontier districts of Dzungaria and IIi, Ch'ien-lung settled the demobilised
soldiers from Manchuria who had been instrumental in overthrowing the power
of the Jungars. In contrast to the established Ch'ing practice, these
militiamen were encouraged to engage in agriculture in en attempt by Ch'ien-
lung to establish permanent, self-sufficient, and loyal sattlements of
Manchurian troops in these remote regions of Central Asia. The Ch'ing military
colonists chosen for this purpose were drawn from tha Sibo, Solon and Manchu
peoples of north-eastern China.
The Solons, a Tungusic people from the banks of the upper Nanni
River in north-western Manchuria who belonged to the Manchu tribal coalition
but were not, strictly speaking, true Manchus, ware given the rich lands on
the right (northern) bank of tha IIi Rivar. Lattimore notes that the Solons
were famed archers.109
The Sibos, another group of Tungusic people from central Manchuria
~ who were akin to the Manchus but nonetheless not Manchus in the strict sense
108. rletcher, J., 'Ch'ing Inner Asia c. 1800', p. 58, in: Fairbank, J.K.,
(ed.),The Cambridee History of China, X, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, I.
~ . -...., ..,... _r-o_,.,.
109. Lattimore, Pivot'or Asia-:;'p-: '148.
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of the term, were given the equally rich lands on the left (southern)
bank of the Ili River. lattimore notes that the Sibos had a reputation
for not succumbing to Han Chinese influence and for retaining command of
their own language and customs; they were frequently employed by the
110Ch'lng authorities as scribes and clerks.
It seems Ch'ien-lung broke with the established policy of
forbidding Ch'ing garrison troops to engage in agriculture and trade
because of the extreme remoteness of north-western Sinkiang. It was felt
that a series of permanent, self-sufficient military colonies would
safeguard imperial interests in Central Asia even in the event of a
Tungan rebellion in Kansu or Shensi; no doubt the Ch'ing authorities also
had their eye on the expanding power of Tsarist Russia, and wished to
stabilise the western frontier as Boon as possible. rurthermore the
reputation of the Sibos for resisting Sinicisation - no easy feat, as the
Manchus themselves were to learn - was correctly interpreted as 8"sign
that they would also resist Islamicisation or voluntary assimilation by
the Turkic peoples of Central Asia. In the event, the Sibos, Solons and
Manchus proved equal to the task; they remaineq ethnically and culturally
distinct from the surrounding Muslims (though less so from each other) and
until the fall of the Ch'ing in 1911 they seem to have refrained from making
common cause with the Turkic peoples. Certainly one Ch'ing garrison at
Chuguchak held out for the Imperial government throughout the great mid-19th
c - 111century rebellions ofYa q~bBeg and the Dzungarian Tungans.
During the 1911 Revolution most of the city-dwelling Manchus in
Sinkiang were killed, but the majority of the Manchu, Sibo and Solon
villages which had ,developed from the original Ch'ing military colonies
managed to survive. As a result during the mid-1940's there were an
110. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 148; Norins, M.R., Gateway to Asis, pp. 84-5.
111. Bales, W.l., Teo Tsung-t'ang (Shanghai, 1937), map, p. 356.
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112estimated 670 Manchus, 2,489 Solons and 9,023 Sibos in Sinkiang; the
total Tungusic population of Sinkiang was thus a mere 12,362.
During their long period of isolation in the far north-west, the
Manchus, Sibos.and Solons managed to preserve their Tungusic racial
exclusiveness; they did not intermarry to any measurable extent with Han,
Hui, Mongol, or any of the Turkic peoples, but (as might be expected under
the circumstances) divisions between the three groups gradually diminished.
By Republican times the Sibo, Solon and Manchu languages as spoken in
Sinkiang had become mutually comprehensible. Sheng Shih-ts'ai continued to
classify the three peoples separately, no doubt as an extension of his
113policy towards the Muslims of divide and conquer, but despite this
Lattimore felt able to comment that 'the points of similarity are such that
the three groups must be considered as essentially one people,.114 CCP
statistics dating from the 1953 census are unhelpful. The Solons appear
to have been merged for statistical purposes with either the Manchus or
the Sibos, and no distinction is made between the Manchu and Sibo population
of Sinkiang and that of China a8 a whole. Thus we learn that in the early
1950's there were 21,000 Sibos in Sinkiang and the north-eaat; similarly
there were no less than 2,430,000 ethnic Manchus in the north-east, Peking,
Inner Mongolia and Hopei. No mention i. made of their presence in Sinkiang,
yet despite their small number it is only in Sinkiang that the Manchus have
been able to preserve those characteristics which distinguish them from
115other peoples - most notably the Han Chinese.
112. LattiAlore, Pivot o( Asia, p. 110.
113. Similarly, it will be recalled, the Uighurs of Ili were designated
"Taranchi" in an attempt to divide them artificially from their fellow
Uighurs in the remainder of the province.
114. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 149.
115. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 147; Hsin-Hua tzu-tien, 1957, cited in
Nagel, oe.cit., pp. 62-4
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The Manchus, Sibos and Solons of Sinkiang have to a large extent
preserved their traditional way of life. They continue to exist a8 small
farming communities, though they also hunt and have preserved something of
their martial spirit. With the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911, any
inherent loyalty to the central government in Peking seems to have
disappeared; there is no record of Tungusic backing for the anti-Han risings
of the early 1930's, and indeed this is hardly surprising given the pan-
Islamic nature of the struggle. Tungusic backing for the general rising in
the Ili Valley against the oppressive KMT regime of WI1 Chunga-hsin was. however,
clearly forthcoming. The Sibos in particular figured prominently in the
struggle of the East Turkestan Republic against WU and his KMT suooessors.
Lattimore notes that during this period the Sibos and other Tungusic peoples
lIIere:
In the forefront of current developments in the
province. Many speak other languages besides their
own, including Russian. At on. time there was evan
talk a~ong the~ of replacing their Manchu writing
with a script based on the Latin alphabet. The
Sibos In particular have been praised for distinguishing
themselves in carrying out the tasks assigned them by
the Kulja regime (i.e. the ETR) such as delivering ,
grain and clover •••• They appear to have adopted a
position in support of the KulJa program against the
former Chinese administration. 116
,Mongols: According to figures dating from the mid-1940's, there
were approximately 63,000 Mongols scattered throughout Sinkiang at that time.117
Unfortunately CCP population statistics based on the 1953 census do not
distinguish between the Mongols of Sinkiang and thOle of the rest of China.
It is clear, however, that Mongols form one of the most important national
minorities in China - their total number in 1953 (1,640,000), puts them in
118eig~th place after the Chuang,'Hui, Uighur, Yi, Tibetan, Miao and "Manchu". '
116~ Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 148-9.
117. 1£!£., p. 106.
118. Hsin-Hua tzu-tien, 1957, cited in Nagel, op.cit., pp. 62-4.
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This figure, however, belies their true importance. ~ongols inhabit a
vast tract of land (the Inner ~ongoli8n Autonomous Region) stretching
from the Sinkiang-Kansu frontier area to the far north-eastern province
119of Heilungkiang; they are also scattered throughout Sinkiang and
Tsinghai. last but not least, a major part of the ~ongolian people (just
under 1,000,000 people, together ~ith 23 million horses, cows, yaks and
120camels) succeeded in breaking away from the Chinese Republic after
the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911; as a result of this secession,
the Mongolian Peoples's Republic ~as set up, with Soviet assistance, in
1924. The continued existence of an independent Mongolian state outside
the sphere of Chinese political influence (and firmly within the sphere of
the Soviet Union) has .ade the issue of China's ~ongol national minority
particularly sensitive.
Within Sinkiang the Mongols inhabit a narro~ strip of land along
the north-eastern border with the ~ongolian People's Republic. Mongol
communities also exist in Chuguchak and Ili, and in the highland region
to the north of Karashahr.The ~ongols of Sinkiang do not hold a particularly
influential position in the province; this is partly due to their comparatively
8mall number, but still more to the "league and banner system" by ~hich the
Ch'ing sought to weaken political and tribal unity amongst the Mongols (see
below). It is because of the league and banner system that the Mongols of
Sinkiang tend to be split up into small communities, with major concentrations
of Turkic peoples interspersed between them.
The ~ongols of Sinkiang are divided into three main tribal·
groups, ~t
1) The Western Mongols (including Bl~ts, Torguts and Khoshots)
2) The Chahar Mongols
3) Tha Urianghai Mongols
119. It should be noted that administrative changes implemented in 1969 reduced
considerably the area of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.
120. Lattimore, 0., Nomads and C~mmi8sars (N.Y., 1962), p. 23.
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Tribal units do not correspond to political units as established under
the Ch'ing league and banner system, thus the Mongols of Sinkiang were
organised (in Ch'ing and Republican times) into three leagues and two
special groups. These were:
1) The Unen SUluktu League, comprising ten baAners
of Torgut Mongols scattered rrom the slopes or tha
southern Tien Shan across Dzungaria to the Altai.
2) Tha Ching Setkhiltu League, comprising seven banners
of Urianghai Mongol. and three banners or Khoshot
Mongols, all located in the Chuguchak-Altai area or
northarn Sinkiang.
3) The Beto Setkhiltu League, co.rising three banners
or Khoshot Mongols inhabiting the Yulduz Plateau in
the central Tien Shan.
The two special groups or Mongols were the Chahars, living in Borotala
Valley between Urumchi and KulJa, and the Bl~ts, living in the Tekes and
121Kash river valleys or the Ili region.
The Mongols or Sinkiang, like Mongols everywhere, are primarily
pastoral nomads. In Sinkiang they share this way or life with the Kazakh
peoples among.t who. they are interspersed. In Republican Sinkiang the
social and economic position or the Mongol. was, generally speaking, vary
.low indeed. lattimore notes that:
In their social organization, the hereditary princes
of the Mongols enjoy a much stronger and much more
institutionalized feudal power than the sultans of the
Kazakh tribe •• On. result of this difference i. that
poor Mongols are much poorer than poor Kazakh.. In
addition, the lama Buddhist religion of the Mongols
is institutionalized to the point or constituting an
ecclesiastical feudalis., with the result that the
payment of due. and the Making of special gifts for
the upkeep of la.a monasteries i. another principal
cause of the impoverishment of the Mongol. a. compared
with the Kazakh •• 122
The political and religious power of Mongol hereditary princ •• in Sinkiang
should be borne in mind by the reader when considering the impact on local
politics caused by Chin Shu-jen's murder of Tsetsen Puntasg Gegeen, regent
121. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 134-7; Norine, op.cit., pp. 85-8.
122. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 136.
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and "living Buddha" of the Torgut Mongols, on May 21st, 1932. Under the
Ch'ing administration a mutual distrust existed between the Mongols of
123Sinkiang and the various Turkic peoples, most notably the Kazakhs. The
heavy-handed policies adopted by Chin Shu-Jen and his successor Sheng Shih-
ts'ai ~ere to reverse this state of affairs (~hich had been carefully
encouraged bY,the Ch'ing), and by the latter half of Sheng's period of
J
control the Mongols were beginning to make common cause with their former
Kazakh rivals; by the time of the IIi rising in 1944-49, many Mongols of
the province ~ere prepared to support the revolutionary leadership of the
ETR.124
The Russians: During the Chinese Republican ere some 13,400 Russians,
mostly -White" refugees from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the civil
war which followed, lived in Sinkiang. Under the CCP this figure had fallen
125to 9,700 by 1953; today it is certainly still lower. A certain number of
Sinklang Russians resided in the province before 1917, and they were trapped
by the events which followed. The bulk of the White 'migra population,
however, fled to Sinkiang after the collapse of Admiral Kolchak's anti-
Bolshevik forces in Siberia. Perhaps the most renowned of these White refugees
was General Annenkov.
In NoveMber 1918 the Chinese High Commissioner at Chuguchak received
a request from the Russian consul on behalf of the Cossack General Annenkov.
Annenkovls White forces were hard pressed by the Bolsheviks, and he needed
the permission of Yang Tseng-hsin, absolute ruler of Sinkiang at the time,
to withdraw into Chinese territory before re-entering Russian territory
further to the east. Yang demurred, but by the end of 1919 streams of
defeated White troops were fleeing across the Sino-Soviet frontier into
123. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 137.
124. ibid •..........
125. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 145; Nagel, op.cit., pp. 62-4.
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Sinkiang. By mid-1920 it was estimated that over 7,000 White troops and
refugees had entered Sinkiang.126 Annenkov finally retreated to IIi, with
some 1,500 troops, in ~ay 1920. Accounts of the White general's fate differ.
Yang records that ha a9reed to surrender his arms, but plotted against Yang
Tseng-hsin after the latter had refused him permission to withdrew to India.
Annenkov was finally put down on January 28th, 1921, after Soviet troops
had threatened to intervene; he was detained in Sinkiang until his death
at an unspecified date.127 Nyman, on the other hand, suggests that Annenkov
never had any intention of surrendering his arms, but that he hoped to
continue his war against the Reds from Chinese territory:
When confronted with Governor Yang's strict policy
of neutrality, General Annenkov marched against
Urumchi with hi. following of Russian Cossacks and
Manchurian brigands. After some time of roving around
north of the provincial capital, Annankov was lured
to the governor's yamen (official residence) for a
week-end. I~mediately upon their arrival Annenkov and
his staff were seized and chained. According to British
sources, General Annenkov'. health was gradually under-
mined by his addiction to Opium before being released
to Kansu, where the pro-Soviet warlord reng turned
Annenkov over to the Soviet Union for execution. 128
Whatever the true circumstances surrounding Annenkov'. death, it is
clear that despite Yang Tseng-hsin's policy of encouraging Russian 'migr'.
to return to the Soviet Union, a sizeable White Russian community became
established in Sinkiang as a result or the Bolshevik victory. ~ost of the.e
Russians lived in Kulja, Chuguchak and Urumchi. A few crossed over the
Tien Shan and found their way down to Kashgar, usually a resting point
befora attempting to enter British India. Within Sinkiang the White Russians
were of considerable value to a succession of Chines. warlords, but 8S
stateless refugees they had no diplomatic protection and were open to
considerable abuse. In times of peace the Whites were useful technicians who
could keep the transport system of the province moving by ••rving the
126. Yang, R., 'Sinkiang Under Yang Tseng-hain, 1911-28', ~, VI, 1 (1961),
p. 310.
127. Yang, op.cit., pp. 314-5.
128. Nyman, op.cit., p. 39.
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administration as mechanics; in times of war (and this was much of the
time in Republican Sinkiang) the Whites provided the most disciplined and
experienced troops in the province whether they liked it or not - for any
sign of hesitation on the part of the Whites led to the threat of immediate
repatriation to Stalin's Russia.
The technical and military skills of the White Russian ~mi9r'8
were to lead, on occasion, to the apparently anomalous situation of their
fighting indirectly on the part of the Soviet Union; thus White Russians
were an important factor in Sheng Shih-ts'ai's victory over the Tungan
warlord Ma Chung-ying, when White and Red Russians, both carrying Soviet
arms, fought side-by-side on behalf of Stalin's prot'g' in Urumchi. The
Whites, who received precious little thanks from their Chinese overlords,
rap~~ly tired of~this si~uation •.Asthe passage of time dulled the hatreds
of civil war, and as a new generation of Russians grew up in Sinkiang under
the oppressive rule of a succession of warlords, a new identity of interest
developed with the Soviet Union. By the time of the IIi rising in 1944, the
White Russians of Sinkiang, like the various other non-Muslim minorities of
Sinkiang, had become so disenchanted with the provincial government in
Urumchi that they were prepared to back the ETR despite its strongly pro-
Soviet orientation.
The Han Chinese: Although Han Chinese now form a sUbstantial part
of the popUlation of Sinkiang, and may indeed outnumber the indigenous
inhabitants,129 for the period with which this study is concerned the Han
Chinese, although rulers of the province, formed a tiny proportion of the
population. Statistics dating from the mid-1940's show that there were an
129. See Introduction, fn. 32. Jack Chen, in his The Sinkiang Story (N.Y.,
1977), p. 284, states that there are currently 5,027,000 Uighur. In
Sinkiang (45.7%) whilst the Han number 4,554,000 (41.4%). Unfortunately
no source is given for these figures. By contrast, the figures given in
,this section, fn.32, would tend to suggest that the Han now outnumber
the various minority nationalities of Sinkiang taken collectIvely. In
either case, it is clear that Han Chinese immigration to Sinkiang .ince
1949 has been both consistent and massive.
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130estimated 202,239 Han Chinese in Sinkiang somewhere between 3% end
4% of the total population of the province. It is important to note that,
although sizeable communities of Han Chinese naturally existed in the main
administrative centres, there were no significant territorial enclaves in
which the Han predominated.
It may be assumed that a Chinese presence, often extremely small,
has existed in the area which is now Sinkiang since the early years of the
Western Han Dynasty (S.C. 206-24 A.D.). It is interesting to nota, however,
that thesa Han remained an administrative minority. They did not put down
permanent roots, but returned to China after the completion of their tour
of duty. There was no significant Han emigration towards Central Asia, and
no territorial enclaves were established there - a situation which contrasts
strongly with the south-west. In Sinkiang: 'in between their periods of
ascendancy they either remained an alien minority, returned to their home-
land, or disappeared in the savage massacre. which they often invited by
their own misrule,.131
The Han Chine.e who entered Sinkiang after Ch'ien-Iung's conquest
in the mid-18th century were, in the main, massacred during the great mid-
19th century Muslim risings. No doubt a few isolated Han managed to survive
this terrible period and were present to witness the savage Ch'ing counter-
massacres, but for the period dealt with in depth in the present study (1911
to 1949), the Han Chinese population of Sinkiang dates almost exclusively
from TsoTsung-t'ang's reconquest of the area in the mid-1870's. They may
b. conveniently divided into fiva groups: the·criminal exiles; the Hunanese,
the Tientsin Han, the Shansi Han, and the Kansu Han.
The Criminal Exiles: The far western regions have long been associated
with exile in Chinese history. Criminal (and often political) offenders wire
sent off under escort to live out their days far from the boundaries of
130. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 110.
131. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 139.
53
China proper. Sinkiang, and especially the I1i Valley, represented the
most distant area or Chinese political control; Ili in particular was
used as a sort of Chinese Botany Bay. The Han exiles in IIi were forbidden
to intermarry with the local peoples, and considerable effort was made by
the authorities to prevent any collusion between the two groups. The
presence of exiles in 5inkiang had little relevance to event. taking place
during the Republican era, but it is interesting to note that soma of
the Han inhabitants or the IIi Valley were to give their support to the
ETR during its struggla with Wu Chun8-hsin and his Kuomintang
successors during the 1940's.
The Hunanese: Tao Tsung-t'ang, the military commander who reconquered
Sinkiang in 1876-77, was a Han Chinese from Hunan province. The army which
he employed to crush Muslim separatists in the north-west was largely made
c -up of his fellow Hunanese. After the final collapse of Ya qub Beg's Kingdom
in 1877, many of Tso's Hunanese followers elected to settle in Sinkiang -
a course of action which was encouraged by the Ch'ing administration. Tso
gave these Hunanese large tracts of the best land in the province, and
appointed them to the most powerful and prestigious positions in the provincial
administration. As a result, the major landowners of Sinkiang during the
late 19th and early 20th centuries were predominantly Hunanese. Lattimore
notes that this phenomenon was so pronounced that Sinkiang became known 8S
a "Hunanese Colony".132
The Tientsin Han: Tso's army may have been largely made up of Hunanese,
but his supply lines were dominated by Han Chinese merchants from Tientsin.
Like the Hunanese, many of these Tientsin Han chose to settle in Sinkiang.
Tso's administration ensured that ravourable positions were mad. available
to them, and throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries these Tientsin
merchants were able to dominate the economy of the province. Both the Hunan
132. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 140.
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and Tientsin Han were later joined by families and relatives, a continuing
process which helped to secure their position and to tighten their grip on
the province.
The Shansi Han: Chinese from Shansi province have established a
position of strength throughout Northwest China in the caravan trade. Their
success in this role is due to Shansi's geographical position (the province
lies across the lines of communication between Peking and the Northwest), as
well as to a traditional Shansi specialisation in trade and transport
extending into Mongolia and the north-eastern provinces.-The Shans! Han had no
great patron in Sinkiang, and therefore their position cannot be compared
with that of the Hunanese (and to a lesser extent the Tientsin merchants),
both of whom benefited from the patronage of Tso Tsung-t'ang.
The Kansu Han: Kansu province, a narrow "pan-handle" of land extending
between Mongolia and the Tibetan plateau which links Sinkiang with China
proper, has provided Sinkiang with Han colonists in the truest sense of the
word. The Hunanese and Tientsin Han were, in a sense. a transient factor on
the ethnic map of Sinkiang; they lived primarily in the big cities, and might
return to their native provinces at any time. The Shansi caravaneers were
transient in a purer sense of the term; most of them visited Sinkiang in the
Course of transporting goods from China proper, though a few settled in the
province to manage the caravan business at that end. The Kansu colonists,
however, were generally impoverished farmers seeking a new future in China's
far west. They were squeezed out of Kansu - one of China's poorest provinces
by harsh economic factors, and they clung tenaciously to any land which they
acquired within Sinkiang. The heyday of the Kansu settlers came during- the
administration of Chin Shu-jen between 1928 and 1933. Chin was a Kansu man
himself, and he encouraged and aided the immigration of his fellow provincials
fleeing famine and warlordism in the east. Chin's policies led to the
resettlement of a number of Kansu Han on expropriated Uighur land in the
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ancient oasis of Kumul. Chin's action was to result in the Turkic Muslim
rising of March, 1931 and the accompanying Tungan invasion of Ma Chung-ying,
events of central importance to the present study.
Besides the groups of Han Chinese already mentioned, three smaller
but distinct provincial groups existed within Sinkian9 during the Republican
period. These were the Yunnan ese, the north-easterners, and the Honanese.
Many of the Yunnanese came to Sinkiang during the administration of Yang Tseng-
hsin, governor during the first years of the Republic from 1911 to 1928. Yang
was himself a Yunnanese, and he surrounded himself with a coterie of relatives
and fellow provincials. The north-easterners consisted of a group of some
2,006 troops forced out of Manchuria by the Japanese invasion, and repatriated
by the Soviet authorities to Sinkiang. Under the command of Sheng Shih-ta'ai,
133the warlord IIIhocontrolled Sinkiang from 1933 to 1944, these "Manchurian"
troops became a powerful force in the province. The Honanese Han arrived
in Sinkiang during 1944, fleeing famine in their native province. Sheng Shih-
ts'ai expropriated land from the indigenous Kazakh Muslims, and gave this to
the Honanese to settle on. His action was to prove as disastrous for the
.--_.
peace and security of Sinkiang as had that of his predecessor, Chi~Shu-Jen, in
settling Kansu Han on Uighur land.
finally. brief mention should be made of a very different group of Han
Chinese who entered Sinkiang during the late 1930s; these lIIeremembers of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCp), amongst them Mao Tse-min, the brother of Mao
Tse-tung. United by ideology rather than by provincial origin, the Han Chinese
communists were an influential group in Sinkiang until 1942.
133. Sheng Shih-ts'ai came to Sinkiang'in 1929 or 1930. 'lIIellbefore the 2;000
north-eastern troops, to serve as Chin Shu-jen's Chief-of-Staff. See .....-below, p. ~231'-
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CHAPTER 2
AN OUTLINE HIS'roRY OF SINKIANG TO 1911
2.1 Pre-Ch'ing History (o.BC 206-1644 AD):
For the greater part of the first millenium BC, the region of
central Asia approximately oonterminous with present-day Sinkiangwas
dominated by various shifting Saka-Soyth, YUeb-Ohih,W'U-BUIl and Hsi1.lll€-
nu nomadio allianoes. Throughout this period, the various warring Chinese
states were oertainly aware of the great nomadio federations of Central
Asia, yet they were unable to adopt a satisfaotory "forward polioy" in
the region until after the Ch'in unifioation of China in :BC221. The
Ch'in ~sty did not long survive this achievement, however, and it fell
to the Western Han (BC 206-24 AD) to take the first deoisive steps towards
a HanOlinese conquest of Inner Asia.
By the end of the third century BC, the Hsiung-nu had emerged as
the dominant force in the l'!:ongolian steppe area, and as a distinct threat
to the Chinese state. Aooordingly wu. Ti, the fUth western Han Enperor,
conceived the idea of forming an allianoe with the Yuen-chih, a long-
standing enemyof the Hsiung-nu living beyond the Tarim Basin, in the region
of the Ili and Fershana Valleys. In about 135 :BC,wu. Ti despatched an
.imperial officer, ChangCh'ien, as his emissary to the Yuen-chih. Chang
was captured by the Hsi\Ul8"-nUwhilst crossing the Tarim Basin, and spent
ten years in their custody before making good his escape and es~blish1ng
contact with the. Yueh-chih. only to discover that the latter, atter years
~ ~ y ~. " • ..
of destruotive warfare against the Hsi'Wl8"-nu,were not pre:pa.red to enter
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into an offensive alliance with the Chinese.
Chang Ch'ien's diplomatic mission was thus a failure. Yet his
epic journey did not prove entirely truitless. Thus, he brouBbt back
to China the first accurate information available concerning the peoples
and regions lying to the west, as well as tales of the fabulous wealth
and natural resources ot Cr:mtral Asia which served to increase Wu Ti' a
determination to launch a western expedition even without Yueh-ohih
support. That expedition set out shortly after Chang's return, resulting
in the de!'eat of the Hsiung-nu and the extension of Han Chinese rule
over Central Asia as far west as the Pamirs and Fer~ana by the beginning
of the tirst centur,r ]c.
OVer the next 1,750 years successive Chinese dynasties were to
strive to emulate WU Ti by extending or maintaining the ~ate ot Heaven"
in Hsi-yu, or the "Western Regions" lying beyond the Gobi Desert. Yet the
course ot this "mandate" was rarely to run smoothly. Thus, western Han
oontrol over the oases of the Tarim :Basin collapsed during the reign of
the last Western Han Emperor, Wang Mang, during the second and third decades
AD, only to be re-established between 58 and 76 AD by his Eastern Han
suocessor, the Emperor Ming Ti. Almost immediately, a !'urther period of
decline set in, oulminating in the fragmentation ot the Chinese state and
the collapse of Han power in Central Asia by 220 AD. Over the next four
centuries Chinese power was excluded from the Tarim region, which remained
under the cultural influence of ]Uddhist India, but was gradually settled
by the T'u-ohu9h, or western Turks.
By the end of the 6th century AD the Chinese, under the short-lived
Sui Dynasty, were onoe again unified. However, the SUi emperors were too
weak to reassert Chinese hegemony in Central Asia, and it tell to T'ai
Tsung, the seoond emperor of the T'ang Dynasty, to subdue the western Turks
in 0.630 AD. Despite a brietperiod of Tibetan domination between c.670 and
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0.690, the T'angwere to remain more or less securely in control ot
the Tarim Basin until the mid-8th oentury" AD. During this period the
indigenous Indo-EUropean Buddhist civilisation ot the Tarim oases was
largely undermined, whilst turther to the north-east the Khanate ot
the Eastern Turks collapsed (c.741 AD), setting in train the gradual
migration of the Uishur Turks trom their ancestral homeland in the
Lake Baikal region towards the t1ongolian heartland and, ultimately,
towards the region of present-day Sinkiang.
Meanwhile the T'ang armies, having recaptured the Tarim Easin
trom the Tibetans by 694, were gradually expanding their influenoe to
the west. In 714 they subdued Dzungaria. and began to operate with
relative impunit,y to the west of the Issik Kol. This period represents
the apex of T'ang power in Central Asia, with the T.ransoxianan centres
of Tashkent, Etikhara and Samarkand falling, albeit briefly, under the
influenoe of the Chinese oourt. yet this period of maximum T'eng e:q>ansion
from the east was paralleled by a still more specta.cular expansion ot
Arabo-Islam1c power towards Central Asia from the west. With the penetration
of Chinese forces into Transoxiana following 714, a clash between the
T'ang and the Arabs became inevitable. Thus, in 751, the Chinese forces
of Kao Hsien-chih, numbering an estimated 30,000 men, were decisively
defeated by the Islamic foroes of Ziyad ibn salih on the banks ot the•
Talas River in the only major battle ever to have taken place between the
Chinese and the Arabs. Four years later, in 755, the An Lu-shan Rebellion
rocked the Chinese Empire to its foundations. These twin disasters, oombined
with contemporaneous Chinese defeats on the South-East Asian frontier,
signalled the final collapse of T'ang authority in the Sinkiang region,
which was subsequently divided between the Tibetans and the Qarluq Turks.
Han Chinese authority was not to be re-established over the Tarim
Basin and Dzunearia for the best part of 1,000 years. During the intervening
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period. the region in question - which was to become known to the Huslim
world as Mashrig rrm-kistan, or "Eastern Turkestan" - was to be settled
by the Uighur TUrks (0.850 AD), and then gradually to become Islamicised
under a series of Qarluq, Uighur and Karakhanid rulers in a process which
was largely complete by the mid-12th century.1
2.2 SinkiangUnder the Ch'ing (1644-1911):
Between c.1130 and the establishment of the Ming Dynasty in 1368,
both Dzungaria and the Tarim Basin were to fall under the control of the
Mongols. Yet, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, the sedentary Mtlslim
civilisation of Eastern Turkestan served gradually to Islamicise its
Mongol conquerors, so that the region's historical and cultural links
with Transoxiana and the Middle East were strengthened, rather than weakened,
during the period of Mongol domination. Even under the Ming, moreover,
,
Chinese power proved unable to assert itself rurther to the west than the
anoient oasis kingdom of Kumul.
During the 15th and 16th oenturies Eastern Turkestan - effeotively
divided into the three regions of Dzungaria, A1 tishahr (the Tarim Basin)
and Uighuristan (the ~fan-Kumul area) remained under the increasingly
nominal suzerainty of the Chasatai Khanate. During this period numbers of
saintly Muslims - sayyids and khojas - migrated eastwards from Transoxiana
to the Tarim Basin. One such was the charismatio MakhdUm-i AOzam, a•
NaqshbandI shaykh who settled in the Kashgar region under the patronage
of the ruling Chagatai Than, and who died in 1540, the object of widespread
popular veneration. Over the following 200 years, the oases of Altishahr
1. See, in particular: Samol1n, w.. East Turkestan to the 'tWelfth Century
('!heHague, 1964), p(ssim. Similarly: TIarthold, W•• Turkestan Down to
the Mon~l Invasion London, 1928), and Grousset, R., The Empire of the
Steppes New Brunswick, 1970).
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came increasingly to be dominated by the theocratio influence of this
khoja and his descendants - split, from the time of Makhdum-i ACzam'B•
grandsons, into Isl]aqiyya (Karataghlik) and Araqiyya (Aktaghl1k) factions2
- so that in the latter part of the 17th century, 0.1678, the Akta@llik
leader Hazrat-i Iraq was able to assume power in Kashgar under the
suzerainty of the neighbouring Oirot (Dzun€;arian) chieftain, Caldan.
Some 35 years earlier, in 1644, Manchu invaders from north-eastern
Asia had suoceeded in establishing the Ch' ing Dynasty in China. For the next
five deoades, as Manchu power was gradually oonsolidated throughout China
proper, Ch'ing relations with Eastern Turkestan were to remain primarily
commercial. In 1688, however, Galdan 's Oirot warriors invaded Mongolia,
and by 1690 they were openly at war with the Ch'lng. In Kashgar, Hazrat-i
Iraq took advantage of Galdan' s preocoupa tion with the Ch'ing to throw off
01rot suzerainty and to establish himself, albeit briefly, as undisputed
ruler of the Tarim Basin until his death in c.1693-4. TWo years later, in
1696, the Ch'ing finally succeeded in expelling the Oirots from Moncolia
as an extension of which, in the same year, the oasis of Kumul formally
wbIn! tted to the K' ang-hsl Emperor. Finally, during 1697, Galdan himself
died.
During the resulting period of Oirot confusion, Yarkand emerged as
a centre of Karataghlik power, whilst Kashgar remained firmly committed to
the Aktaghliks. It was not until 1713 that the reorganised Oirots were
able to reimpose their authority over the Tarim Basin and to remove the
leaders of both khoja'factions to their capital in the IIi Valley. '!Woyears
later, in 1715, fighting between the Oirots and the Ch'ing recommenced,
signalling the start of a 40-year period of intermittent warfare which
2. See, in particulara Fletcher, J••.• Ch'1n8 Inner Asia 0.1800',' inl Fairbank,
J.X. (ed.), The Cambridge History of China, X, Late eb'ing, 1800-1911, I,
PP. 87-90; also Sohwarz, R.G., 'The Ebwajas of Eastern Turkestan', ~,
XX, 4 (1976), pp. 266-95.
was not to end until the final defeat of the Oirots at the hands of
the Ch'ien-IungEmperor (plate 1) in 1155.
Amongst those taken captive during the Ch'ine sack of the Oirot
capital were the two leading Aktaghlik khojas, Durhan aI-DIn and Kboja
Khin, whohad been held hostage by the Oirot leader, Amur-Sana, as a
guarantee of the continuing submission of their compatriots and followers
in the Kashgar region. In the eyes of the Ch'ing, therefore, the Tarim
~asin - formerly a vassal of the Oirots - automatically beoamea Chinese
tributary state with the oonquest of the latter by the Ch'ing. This view
vas clearly not shared by the khojas and their supporters, however, tor
a Ch'ing mission sent to Kashgar in 1151 to arrange payment of tribute
was massacred by the Aktaghliks. Accordingly, one year later, Ch'ien-lung
despatched an a~ to the Tarim Basin to entorce submission. Kashgar duly
succumbedto Ch'ing force of arms, and :BurhanaI-DIn, together with Khoja
Khan, ned to the neighbouring mountain Xhanate ot l3adakshan. 'Under the
threat of Ch'ing invasion, the Badakshanf ruler reluctantly ordered the
execution of the fugitive Aktaghlik khojas, and sent their heads back to
the Ch'ing garrison commanderat Kashear. Several thousand supporters of
the khoja oause managed to flee, together with Burhan al-DIn's son, Muha.mmad•
AmIn, to the more distant Khanate of Khokand, where they were beyond the
reach of the Ch'ing armies. Here they settled, becoming the focus of both
exiled and internal opposition to Chinese rule in the Tarim Basin over the
next 110 years.'
lIeanwhile, within the Tarim Basin, the lCarataehlik faotion seems
to have accepted the inevitability of Chinese rule, just as it had that of
the Oirots. For the next 60 years the exiled Aktaghliks made little or no
3. Forsyth, T.D., ~port of a Mission to Yarkund (Calcutta, 1815), ppo
18o-a1.
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impact on their homeland, though indirect contacts with their supporters
at Kashgar were maintained, and they seem never to have abandoned their
determ1na.tion to win back pover from the Ch'ing. Muhammad !mIn died in•
Khokand c.1798, leaving three sons, l'hlhammadYiisur, Jahangir and naha' al-•
DIn. As early as 1797 the eldes t of these, Muhammad Yusur, appears to have•
led a Kirehiz force to attack the Ch'ing frontier, though apparently to
little avail. Meanwhile, the Ch'ing authorities continued to pay a sizable
stipend to the Khan of Khokand in a bid to limit Aktaghl1k actlvitles.4
Dy 1820, however, the political situation in Central Asia had been
transformed. No longer was Ch'ing power the immovable force it had represented
in 1757 - though it was still very great. Wi thin China, it had been challenged
by the ~lhite Lotus Rebellion and various other anti-~~chu movements. Food
was scarce, and the Ch'ing army was in decline. Accordingly, in 1820,
Jahang!r 1ert his base in Khokand and began to harry the borders of Eastern
Turkestan. He was Boon defeated by the Ch'ing, and fled back to Khokand.
He returned in 1824, however, and by 1826 had captured Kashgar, massacring
the entire Ch'ing garrison with the exception of the Tungani ~tusl1ms and
any other Chinese who embraced Islam. This success was short-lived, however.
The Karataghliks supported the Ch'ing status quo out or opposition to their
Aktaghl1k allies, and no sustained assistance was offered by Kbokand. In
1828 Kashgar was recaptured by the Ch'ing, and Jahangir was taken to Peking
where he was 'hacked into pieces and thrown ingloriously to the dogs,.5
Despite this 'success, Ch'1ng authority-in Central Asia remained
limited. Khokand had obviously been party to Jahingir's jihid, but Ch'ing _
_ . .~-_
reprisals against this state were limited, for reasons of military weakness,
_.. . -~,-- -
4. Fletcher, J.t 'Ch'!ng Imier'A&la 0.1800', pp. 87-9
"~~' 'T_' __ '~ ,,,,,-_.~. . '.-~ - _,
5. ~., 'China and Central Asia, 1368-1884', p. 222.
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to economic sanctions. Moreover, even this limited response sufficed
to provoke the Khan of Khokand into launching a new jihad aeainst the
Chinese in Eastern Turkestan, this time in 1830, under the nominal
leadership of the Aktaghlik khoja lfu1]ammadyusuf. Once again Kashgar
fell to the invading foroes, though the attaok, which was opposed by
the Karataghlik faotion, was olearly intended as a punitive raid rather
than aimed at an Aktaghlik restoration. Within three months the invaders
withdrew to Khokand, laden with booty. Their action had seriously damaged
the Aktabhlik cause in Eastern Turkestan, but had also served to establish
the tenuous nature of Chinese oontrol over the region.
The Ch'ing responded by permitting Khokand a virtual trade monopoly
over Eastern Turkestan, as well as, following a Khokandi inoursion into
, , 6
Sarikol in 1835, full extraterritorial rights within the Tarim J3asin.
Khokand undoubtedly benefited from these concessions, and for more than a
deoade relative peaoe reigned over China's Inner Asian frontiers. In 1841,
however, a further invasion of the Kashgar region was mounted from Khokand
by seven leading Aktaghlik khojas, inoluding two sons of l-Mlammad Yusur,
•
Wall Khan, the son of Jahangir, and Buzurg Yllan, the son of :Balla' aI-Din.
Once again Kashgar opened its gates to the Aktaghliks, and onoe again the
Karataghlik areas of Eastern Turkestan refused to participate in the jihaa.
After a few weeks, the Aktaghlik khojas withdrew to Khokand in the faoe
of advanoing Ch'ing troops, leaving the Xashe;arlik populaoe to faoe terrible
re:prlsals.1
This pattern of events was re:peated in 1857, when, in response to
a Muslim rising at Kuohar, the Aktaghl1k khoja vIal! Khin (who had partiCipated
in the 1847 "War of the Seven Khojas"), again entered Eastern Turkestan and
6. Fletoher, J., 'Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet', pp. 315-85.
1. ~., p. 388.
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seized control both of Kashgar and Yangi Hissar. Once again, the fighting
in Eastern Turkestan was characterised by fierce inter-}msl1m rivalr,y and
c -sectarianism. Thus, the Karataghlik ulama' pronounced the Aktaghlik
invaders "enemies of Islam", to be killed or taken prisoner, but not to
be assooiated with, whilst \.,rall Khan made it know that, as well engagine-
in a jihaa. to expel the Chinese, his objective was to punish the Karataghl1k
"betrayers" of his father, the khoja Ja.hangir. Meanwhile, the Tungani
~lllslims (north-western Hui) whohad been settled. in the region by the
Ch'ing, were llerseouted by both Turkic Muslim factions, with Wall Ehan's
partisans in particular slaughtering them 'on the same legal basis as
infidels,.8 Despite his initial successes, however, Wall Khan failed to
capture the (predominantly Karataeb1ik) oasis of Yarkand, and was forced
to flee Khokandafter only four months in power at Kashgar in the face of
Ch'ing armies advancing from the east.
The victorious Ch'ing, having recaptured Kashgar, demandedthe
extradition of Wall Khan from Khokandas a prerequisite for the resumption
of trade. Yet, as Fletcher has indioated, this demandwas primarily Ero
forma - Ch'ing military power being in serious decline - and a Khokandi
promise to place WalT Khin under arrest had to suffice to satisfy the
Chinese authorities.9 A situation of continuing stalemate had thus emerged
in Eastern Turkestan. The Ch'ing earrison forces were not powerful enough
to ensure uninterrupted Chinese control over the area, whilst the Aktaghlik
khojas based in Ehokand failed to commanduniversal support amongst the
Muslims of the Tarim Basin and, at best, could only capture Kashear and
the surrounding towns for a few short months at a time. This situation
oontinued into the 1860s, with minor Aktaghlik jihids being launohed in
1861·both by wall Khin and by a. son of ~urgKhan, neither of which-·
8. Fletcher, 'Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet', p. 392.
9. ibid., p. 393.
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achieved ~ success.
In 1862, however, with the eruption of the gTeat Hu! l-Iuslim
rebellion in Shensi, the equation of power in Central Asia was to change
completely. By 1863, the greater part of Shensi, 11ingsia and Kansu
provinces had passed under rebel control, and in 1864 the Tungans of
Dzungaria, under the leadership of Tuo Ming, rose in sympathy with their
co-religionists to the east.10 Eastern Turkestan was thus completely
isolated from China, and. in 1865 Buzurg Than, accompanied by an experienced
militar.1 officer and partisan of the khojas called YaOqUbBeg, invaded
c -Kashgar from Khokand. OVer the next twelve years Ya qub Beg, who rapidly
eolipsed BuzurC Khan and, in 1867, proclaimed himself Khan, succeeded in
establishing his control over the entire Tarim Basin as far as TUrfan in
the east. By 1871 he had crushed the Tungans of Dzungaria - thou&h he
was never able to extend his dominion over that region - and in 1873, in
a remarkable diplomatic coup, he succeeded in winning the recognition of
the Turkish Sultan, who bestowed upon him the title "AmIr" of Eastern
TUrkestan.11
lieanwhile, within China proper, Ch'ine control was e;radually beinG'
reasserted over the north-west by the ruthless and competent Han Chinese
general Tso Tsung-t'ang (see plate 2). By 1871 Tso had suppressed the
rebel leader Ma Sua-lung, and was advancing into Kansu.12 The reoonquest of
Kansu was to take a further five years, but, by 1876, the task was oomplete
and Tso's Ch'ing armies stood at the gates of Sinkiang. By the winter of
1876-7, Dzungaria had largely been pacified, and Tso was able to turn his
10.· See, in particular I ChuWen-djang( The MoslemRebellion in Northwest
China, 1862-1878 (The Hague, 1966); also Lee FU-hsiang, The Turkic-
MoslemProblem in Sinkiang (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Rutsers University,
1973), pp. 43-4.
11. Bouleer, D.C., The Life of Yakoob Beg (London, 1878).
12. Ch(:U,oP.Cjt., Forbes, A., 'MaHu.a-lung', Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1!E, V,
at press • .
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c -attention to the Tarim Basin. Six months later, in I'my, 1877, Ya qub
Beg died suddenly at Korla, almost certainly the victim of a political
assassination.13 'Vlith his death, the AmIrate which he had created came
rapidly to an end. By December, 1877, Kashgar was in Chinese hands, and
in Februar,r, 1881, Tsarist Russia reluctantly agreed to withdraw from
the STeater part of the IIi region which it had occupied in 1871, when
the ~slim rebellion was at its h1ght.14
By the end of 1881, therefore, Ch'ing authority had been fully
restored throughout the region. With this achievement, moreover, the
power of the Aktagblik: khojas was finally broken, as their former power-
base at Khokandhad been absorbed by the expanding Russian Dnpire in 1876.
Meanwhile, following the attainment of his military objectives by 1877,
Tso Tsung-ttang took steps to reorganise the administration of Dzungaria
and the Tarim Basin through a bureauoracy which was established at Ti-hua
(Urumchi). Finally, on November18th, 1844, the entire region was deolared,
for the f'irst time, a provinoe of China w1th the name of Sinkiang (Ch. Hsin-
chiang, the "NewTerri tory"). From this time until the collapse of' the
Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911, Sinldang was to remain peaceful under the rule
of a succession of generally able Han bureaucrats drawn from Tso Taun€-
t'ang'.s associates and supporters. Yet this apparent stability was to prove
deceptive. Sinkiang remained very mucha part of the l'hlslim world despite
the defeat of the Aktasblik khojas, and the entire province - charaoterised
by Fletcher as 'the most rebellious terri tory in the Ch'ine :Empire' during
the 19th century,15 was to prove no less troublesome to Republican China
during the 20th century.
13. statement of MuhammadYusuf Erfendi. CommandPaper 2470 (1680), 21-3,
LY~II, PP.95!7.
14. HaU, C.Y., The Ili Crisis (Oxford, 1965), passim.
15. Fletoher, 'Ch'ing Inner Asia 0.1600', p. 90.
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CHAPTER 3
SINKIANG, 1911-28: THE ADMINISTRATION Of GOVERNOR YANG TSENG-HSIN
The Republic is rew with youth. The wars of the five
Kingdoms, the battles of the Seven Heroes, they fight
them over again. But what care we how they fight?
for I have made an earthly paradise in a remote region.
The Muslims of the south, the nomads of the north,
I will rule them to live contentedly in the old ways.
Yang Tseng-hei", 1926.1
Under Governor Yang, Sinkiang became an extraordinary
backwater, cut off from the modern world •••There were
still no bookshops in 1926, no newspapers, no cinemas,
no telephones, not a mile of railway or even paved
roadway, no schools other than those attached to mosques
••• and those maintained privately by rich citizens or
officials. Opium was "forbidden", but it was the curse
of the land, slowly poisoning its people. Immured behind
its mountains and deserts •••Sinkiang was living in the
Middle Ages, and Yang did all he could to preserve this
anachronism.
Jack Chen, 1977.2
3.1 Yang Tseng-hsin's Rise to Power
Yang Tseng-hsin, (see plate 3), the firet Republican governor of
Sinkiang, was born in Meng-tzu, south-eastern Yunnan, in 1867. He
received a classical Chinese education, paseing his chin-shih degree in
1899 and entering the Imperial civil service in the 8ame year.3
1. from a scroll hanging on the gate of the governor's yamen, Urumchi.
Written by yang Tseng-hain in 1926, after 15 years of his rule. Wu,
Turkistan Tumult, p. 32.
2. Chen, The Sinkia"g Story, p. 172.
3. Boorman, H.L., and R.C. Howard, Biographical Dictionary or Republican
China (N.Y., 1967), Vol 4, p. 11. The chin-shih was Ch'lng China'.
highest literary degree.
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Over the next eighteen years yang served the Ch'ing government as a
district magistrate, and later as a circuit commissioner, in the north-
western provinces of Kansu and Ningsia. During these years he acquired
4a reputation for his ability to "manage" the local Tungan Muslim population.
In 1908 Yang was transferred to Sinkiang, where he was appointed tao-tla!
(circuit ~ommissioner) at Aksu. As a result of his years of experience in the
Tungan areas of Kansu, Yang's career prospered under YUan Ta-hua, the last
Ch'ing governor of Sinkiang. He rose rapidly to become tao-t'ai and
commissioner for ~udicial ~.ffairs at Urumchi, the provincial capital, a post
which he held at the outbreak of the Chinese revolution of 1911.5
The 1911 revolution had immediate repercussions in distant Sinkiang.
In December uprisings against the Ch'ing broke out in IIi and Urumchi under
the leadership of disaffected Han officers belonging to the Ko-Ieo-hui.6 In
Urumchi the rising was quickly suppressed. The ringleaders were beheaded or
slowly tortured to death, and many of their followers were sent to Join
garrisons in southern Sinkiang - an area which, as a result, became a hotbed
of Ko-Iao-hui activities.? In IIi, however, the rebels succeeded in seizing
power and in setting up a rival administration under the leadership of
Yang Tsuan-hsll.
The Ch'ing governor YUan Ta-hua was in a difficult position. He had
successfully put down the rebellion in Urumchi, and had the support of his
4. Skrine, C.P., and Nightingale, p. Macartney at Kashgar (London, 19?3),
p. 212.
5. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol IV., p. 11.
6. Ko-Iao-hui ("Elder Brothers' Society"): a powerful anti-Ch'ing secret
society introduced to Sinkiang in the latter half of the nineteenth
century by soldiers in the army of Tso Tsung-t'ang.
? Yang, R., 'Sinkiang Under the Administration of Governor Yang T8eng-
hsin, 1911-1928', CAJ, VI, 1 (1961) pp. 281-2.
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commissioner for judicial affairs, Vang Tseng-hsin, who commanded 2,000
Tungan troops from Kansu, the best military force in the province. It
soo~became apparent, however, that the wider rebellion in China proper
was succeeding. Events moved rapidly. On 1st January, 1912, Sun Vat-sen
was inaugurated as Provisional President of the Republic of China at
Nanking; on rebruary 12th the Empress Dowager Lung vD signed an abdication
"edict in the name of the child emperor Hsuan-t'ung, bringing to an end
268 years of Ch'ing rule; and on March 10th, after an agreement had been
reached with Sun Vat-sen, Vuan Shih-k'ai was formally installed as
president of the newly-established Republic of China.
The writing was clearly on the wall for VUan Ta-hua, and transferring
8his authority to Vang Tseng-hsin, he fled Urumchi. Vang was not the sort
of man to let slip an opportunity. He immediately declared his allegiance
to the Chinese Republic, and in May he was duly rewarded by receiving
YuanShih-k'ei'sconfirmation of his de fecto position es civil and military
governor of Sinkiang, with the concurrent post of military governor of the
9IIi region (at this stage still under the control of Vang Tauan-hsD).
ror the next three yeers Yang was kept fully occupied with efforts
to consolidate his internal position, threatened by both the IIi group
and the Ko-Iao-hui; and in repelling an external threat in the north-east of
the province posed by Mongol raiders.
The authority given to Vang by Peking (and by his 2,000 Tungan troops)
proved sufficient to bring the IIi group to the conference table. An
agreement was reached in June 1912, and a treaty was signed at Chuguchak by
which the rebel group recognised Vang Tseng-hsin as Governor of Sinkiang and
the IIi region was fully incorporated within the province. Brigadier Vang
8. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vel IV, p. 11.
9. ~.
13
"Tsuan-hsu, the titular leader of the IIi group, was correctly recognised
by Yang as a figurehead; consequently he was transferred to Kashgar where
he was appointed t'i-t'ai (military commander). Two "of Yang Tsuan-hsu's
fellow revolutionaries whom Yang Tseng-hsin considered especially dangerous
were given official positions in the provincial administration; shortly
after their arrival in Urumchi, however, they were arrested by Yang and
10sentenced to death for treason.
Yang next turned his attention to the Ko-leo-hui, especially in the
south where the provincial administration was in complete disarray. During
the last days of Yuan, Ta-hua's administration Ko-lao-hui adherents had
murdered the Ch'ing commissioner at Kashgar together with his wife,11 as
well as the magistrates of Kashgar, Kuchar and Karashahr. Yang, his political
stature considerably increased by the bloodless victory over the IIi group,
adopted an apparently conciliatory approach, pardoning and transferring to
other districts the most prominent Ko-leo-hui leaders. faced with the
alternatives of fighting Yang's Tungan soldiery, 'undisciplined, ignorant
and ferocious,12 but undeniably effective, or agreeing to their transfers,
the Ko-lao-hui leaders submitted; all were later secretly executed on Yang's
orders.13 After the Ko-lao-hui leaders had disappeared from the scene, Yang
strengthened his own position south of the Tien Shan by rewarding Ma Shao-wu,
a trusted lieutenant and a Hui Muslim from Yang's native province of Yunnan,
with the post of military commander at Kuchar.14
10. Yang, R., op.cit., pp. 276-7.
11. The murder is described in some detail in Skrine and Nightingale, op.cit.,
p. 178; see also Sykes, E. and P., Through Oeserts and Oases of Central
~ (London, 1920), p. 296.
12. Sir George Mccartney, British representative and consul-general at Kashgar,
1890-1918, cited in Skrine and Nightingale, op.cit., p. 243.
13. Yang, R., op.cit., p. 284.
14. ibid •..........
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Having consolidated his position in the south of the province, Yang
turned his attention to the north-eastern frontier, where Mongol troops
professing allegiance to the ::JebtsundambaKhutukhtu, "Holy Emperor" of
15the newly-independent Outer Mongolian state, were threatening to advance
into the Altai district. In August, 1912, these troops had stormed the
town of Khovd, until this time under Chinese jurisdiction. The victorious
Mongols looted the Chinese shops whilst in a grisly ceremony the living
hearts of Chinese prisoners were torn out, the blood being used to
16dedicate the war banners of the victorious Mongols. Yang reinforced
his garrisons at e string of north-eastern centres from Kumul to Chuguchak.
He also took the opportunity to strengthen his military control over
other strategic centres in Ili and to the south of the Tien Shan; as a
result the whole of Sinkiang was brought under his direct control.17
Yang had no desire for a prolonged struggle with the Mongols, not
least because he mistrusted the loyalty of the Mongol population in
Sinkiang. He was therefore content to reach an interim agreement with
their forces (through the offices of the Russian consul in Urumchi)
pending a solution to the Mongolian problem at international level.
The crisis on the north-eastern front was eventually defused by
the official Sino-Russian "declaration" of November 5th, 1913, by which
the Chinese Republic effe~tively recognised Out&r Mongolia's autonomous
15. At the time of the 1911 revolution Outer Mongolia proclaimed her
independence from China as a theocracy under the ::Jebtsundamba
Khutukhtu, primate of Mongolian Lamaism and "Holy Emperor"
(Bogd Khaan). Ewing, T.E., 'Revolution on the Chinese frontier:
Outer Mongolia in 1911', ~, XII, 2 (1978), p.101.
16. Bawden, C.E., The Modern History of Mongolia (London, 1968).
pp. 197-8.
17. Yang, R., op.cit., p. 299.
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1Bstatus. In March of 1914, both Sinkiang and Mongolia withdrew their
troops from the Altai front. At about the same time, efter three years
of struggle, Yang Tseng-hsin finally succeeded in crushing the Ko-Ieo-hui
in Sinkiang.
3.2 Yang's Maintenance of Power
Yang was now the undisputed master of China's largest province, and
could devote himself more fully to "making an earthly peradise in a remote
region". He made few changes to the basic Ch'ing administrative structure
of Sinkiang; however all former ties with Kansu were abolished, and IIi and
Altai were absorbed, adding two circuits to the four original circuits of
Urumchi, Aksu, Kashgar and Chuguchak. Similarly, the number of hsien in the
province was' increased from 40 to 47. Below hsien level, the Ch'ing system
19of native begs (ming-bashi, yuz-bashi and on-bashi) was retained.
Throughout his long rule, Yang was greatly troubled by fear of revolt.
20He mistrusted his subordinates, and he mistrusted his predominantly
21Muslim subjects. In an attempt to allay these fears, Yang surrounded
himself with a coterie of relatives and fellow-provincials from Yunnanj22
he also introduced a series of increasingly Draconian laws designed to
18. By this "declaration" China recognised and respected the autonomy of
Outer Mongolia, whilst in return the Russians recognised China's
sovereignty over all Mongolia. MacMurray, J., Treaties and Agreements
With and Concerning China (Oxford, 1921), pp. 1066-7.
19. Nyman, L.E., Great Britain and Russian, Chinese and Japanese Interests
in Sinkiang, 191B-1934,(MalmB, 1977) pp. 25-6.
20. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, pp. 46-7.
21•. In Yang's first report as Governor of Sinkiang to the Peking government,
at the very beginning of his rule, he stressed his fear that the pro-
clamation of Mongolian independence would stir up other peoples •••
'particularly the Muslims·in Sinkiang'. Yang R., op.cit., p. 271.
22. Yang built up a family hierarchy, posting his relatives from one end of
his domain to the other. In 1927 all the district magistrates in
southernmost Sinkiang, from Kashgar to Keriya, with two or three d
exceptions were related to him either directly or by marriage. Bosshar ,
W., 'Politics and Trade in Central Asia' JRCAS, XVI, 4 (1929) p. 436.
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isolate, divide, and maintain in enforced ignorance the peoples of Sinkiang.
He ruled as a complete autocrat, with all power gathered in his own hands.
Sven Hedin, who travelled extensively in Sinkiang at various times during
Yang's rule, said that nowhere on earth did there exist a more absolute
23ruler. Claremont P Skrine, the British consul-general at Kashgar from
July 1922 to September 1944, informed his superiors in New Delhi that Yang
had consolidated his personal power by the following means:
(1) Instituting a system of direct correspondence between himself
and the magistrates of even the most remote districts of southern
Sinkiang, thus reducing all tao-yin to the position of little
more than figureheads.
(2) Despatching officers on special duty (wei-yuan) throughout the
province to keep a close watch on the activities of all officials.
(3) Gradually replacing Peking-appointed officials with his own
relatives and fellow-provincials.
(4) Exercising a strict personal censorship over the mails and
correspondence of even his highest officials, whilst excluding
from the province all newspapers or printed ·matter·of any kind
connected with current events.24
When dealing with his own officials, Yang carried secrecy to obsessive
lengths. He accepted the necessity. of the telegraph, but reputedly kept,the key to
.the Urumchi telegraph office always on his own person, opening the door in
the morning and locking it again each night. 'Informative telegrams he
kept to himself; inconvenient ones he simply destroyed. His archives were in
his own meticulous mind, and even his closest subordinates could seldom follow
25his trend of thought'.
Yang was quite merciless when he discovered - or even suspected -
disloyalty. When, during January 1916, some of Yang's fellow Yunnanese
domiciled in Sinkiang sought to persuade him to join the movement against
23. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 39.
24. !QhR, L/P&S/12/2342. ~Kashgar Annual Reports, 1922-31),
P. 4839. 1924.
25. Davidson, B., Turkestan Alive (london, 1957), p. 104.
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Yuan Shih-k'ai which had broken out in their native province,26 Yang
would have none of it. Some days later Yang learned secretly that
several of the Yunnanese were still conspiring to bring Sinkiang into
the struggle on the side of yuan's·opponents. Yang immediately had his
informant executed 'to allay the fears of the plotters and to let them
27know that he trusted them'. The subsequent fate of the plotters, as
related to Wu Ai_chen28 by an eye-witness. bears quotation in full; it
casts interesting light on Yang Tseng-hsinls relationship with his 8ub-
ordinates, and is representative of descriptions of several similar events
which have come down to us:
It was the Mid-January restival. The Governor invited
his officials to dine with him. The Inspector of
Education from Peking was to be the guest of honour
and the Sinkiang Minister of rinance, Pan, an elderly
gentleman close upon eighty •••was also there.
The affair had every appearance of a formal function,
and there was not the least suspicion in the mind of
any guest that more was intended.
When the cups had been filled a few times the Governor
suddenly rose and left the hall. This action aroused no
suspicion, since it was known that Yang cared little
for wine. But in a few minutes he returned, followed
by a soldier who held concealed behind his back a long
curved sword. The Governor paused behind the seat of
Hsia Ting, one of the principal malcontents. Then in a
cold. even casual voice speaking typical Yunnanese
dialect, he said: "Behead Hsia Ting".
The knife flashed, and Hsia Ting fell dead. his blood
spouting on the robes of those who sat at table with
him. All cowered in horror, none daring to move; but in
calm tones the Governor reassured them: "This has nothing
to do with you. Come, more wine for my guests! " When
the cups were refilled the Governor again left the
chamber. but almost immediately returned. a second
26. On December 25th, 1915, Ts'ai 0 and various other south-western
generals declared Yunnan's independence from Peking and their
general opposition to Yuan Shih-klai's attempt to re-establish the
monarchy. Clubb, O.E., Twentieth Century China (London and N.Y.,
1965), pp~ 56-7.
27. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 43.
28. Wu Ai-chen is a source generally sympathetic to Yang Tseng-hsin.
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soldier at his side. Proceeding around the table they
halted at the chair of one Li Yin, and once again the
astounded guests heard the dread command •••The table was
in confusion, blood was everywhere. The Inspector from
Peking looked on, speechless with horror, the old finance
Minister Pan lay half-fainting in his chair. As for the
Yunnanese officials, they sat petrified with fear,
expecting at any moment that they too would meet an
awful end. Hsia Ting and Li:Yin had been two of the most
trusted officers in the Governor's service, his own
personal friends. Who then was safe if these were slain?
But there was no more bloodshed. Calmly the Governor
resumed his seat at the table, called for more wine, and
proceeded without the least trace of emotion to give
Judicial reasons for what he had done. Then, having
spoken, he applied himself to the dishes which were set
before him, and to the astonishment of the company he
made a hearty meal, finishing his two bowls of rice as
usual·29
In contrast, the careers of those who served Yang well were assured. By
these traditional methods ("generous in cultivating good will and severe
in punishing offences")30 Yang sought to ensure the loyalty of members of
his administration.
Yang's policy towards the various minority peoples of 5inkiang, who
constituted in excess of 90% of the population, rested on the twin
principles of accentuating regional and national differences, and excluding
external particularly Soviet - influences. Thus, in a deliberate
reversal of Ch'ing policy (formulated by Yang in response to the emergence
of an independent Mongolian state), the Kazakhs of Dzungaria were favoured
29. Eye-witness account of a Yunnanese official called Chang, as related
in Wu, Turkistan Tumult, pp. 43-4; This story is also recounted by
Hsieh Pin, the Inspector of Education who was present at the "dinner
party", in his Account of Travels in Sinkiang (Shanghai, 1925),p. 135.
It seems likely that Yang deliberately used theatrical effect to create
terror amongst his opponents; cf. Nicholas Roerich's description of
Yang's extravagant execution of an official who had angered him:'he
sent the dis favoured one to Hami and on the way the Amban was "pasted
with paper" and by this unique method strangled. In the Garden of
Tortures of Mirbeau this invention of evil was omitted'. Roerich, N.,
Altai-Himalaya (London, nd.), p. 280.
30. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 54.
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31over the Mongols of the region. Similarly, Yang did his best to
divide the oasis-dwelling Uighurs of southern Sinkiang from the pastoral
32nomads of Dzungaria and the Tien Shan. This well-tried technique, which
had served Yang's Ch'ing predecessors so wel~proved satisfactory when
applied to localised disturbances such as that faced at Kumul during the
first year of Yang's rUle,33 or at Kuchar in 1918.34 More disturbing to
the Han administration, however, was the rapid expansion of pan-Islamic,
pan-Turanian and pro-Soviet sentiment amongst the "minority nationalities"
of the province; these were doctrines which, if permitted to flourish
unchecked, could turn a purely local grievance amongst the Uighurs of
the south or the Kazakhs of the north into a generalised Turkic Muslim
rising against the provincial authorities in Urumchi.
Throughout his rule, Yang Tseng-hsin considered that the chief
external threat to the survival of his regime lay across the western
frontier, in Tsarist (later Soviet) Central Asia.35 During the 19th
century the Muslims of Sinkiang looked to the Central Asian Khanates of
Bukhara and particularly Khokand for inspiration - a factor which
certainly influenced Tso Tsung-t'ang's order for the execution of all
Khokandi Muslims apprehended by his troops in southern Sinkiang after
c 36the collapse ofYa qubBeg's kingdom. The Russian conquest of Western
31. Lattimore, 0., 'The Chinese as a Dominant Race' in: Studies in frontier
History (London, 1962) pp. 213-4.
32. Rossabl, M., China and Inner Asia (Landon, 1975), p. 221.
33. Yang, R., op.cit., pp. 289-90.
34~ ~., p. 291.
35. The emergence af e number of powerful, semi-independent Tungan satrapies
to the east, in the pravinces of Kansu, Isinghai, and Ningsia" must have
added to Yang's fear.
36. Mu~ammad Yussuf Effendi, a cavalry officer in the forces of the ottaman
Empire, was present in Sinkiang at the time of Tso Tsung-t'ang's reconquest
of the area. He notes that the victorious Chinese 'carefully selected the
men of Khokand, Bukhara and other foreign parts and put them to death,
whereas the natives (of Sinkiang) were treated kindly and allowed to
return to their homes', statement made by Muhammad Yussuf Effendi. Late
in the service of the Ameer of Kashgar, ,880, Cmd. 2470, Vol. 78, ,
pp. 95-7.
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Turkestan during the latter half of the 19th century temporarily relieved
the authorities in Sinkiang from the pressures of Khokandi political
influence,37 for the Tsarist authorities did all that lay within their
power to ensure the quiescence of their new Central Asian subjects. In a
policy which might have been formulated by Yang Tseng-hsin himself:
The Russians •••aimed at•••isolating the country
from all outside influence, and at maintaining it
in a state of medieval stagnation, thus removing
any possibility of conscious and organised national
resistance. As their religious and educational
policy, the Russian administrators sought to
preserve the archaic form of Islam and Islamic
culture •••Quranic schools of the most conservative
type were favoured and protected against any
modernist influence. 38
Yet despite assiduous Russian efforts to exclude pan-Turanianism and other
"dangerous thoughts" from their Central Asian empire, the spread of such
concepts was merely delayed and not halted. Indeed the victorious Russians
planted the seeds of modern Turkic nationalism when they first entered the
oases and deserts of Inner Asia. The presence of these Christian infidels
helped to unite the Muslim inhabitants of the various conquered Khanates;
in Western Turkestan the presence of Russian settlers and political
exiles contributed to the growth of Uzbek, Tajik and Turkoman national
consciousness; and in the Kazakh steppe the deliberate Tsarist attempt to
wean the superficially Islamicised Kazakhs and Kirghiz from their more
orthodox sedentary brethren to the south actively encouraged the spread
39of "Western" concepts of nationalism and egalitarianism. During the last
37. Before the Russian conquest of Khokand, the Ch'ing had been obliged to
pay an annual supplement to the Khan of Khokand to prevent his inter-
ference in Sinkiang. A treaty forced on the Ch'ing by Khokand in 1831
allowed Khokandi extraterritoriality in Sinkiang and permitted Khokandi
agents to collect taxes in this Chinese territory. Kuropatkin, A.N.,
Kashgaria (Calcutta, 1882), pp. 143-4.
38. Bennigsen, A., and C. Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union,
p. 15.
39. 2enkovsky, S.A., Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge, Mass.,
, , 1960), Pp.f.o.",.
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decades of the 19th century the Muslims of Russian Central Asia were
- 40increasingly influenced by reformist groups such as the Jadid movement.
-c-Under the leadership of the Tatar intellectual Isma il Bey Gasprinskiy a
series of religious, cultural and educational reforms were implemented
with the aim of uniting ~he various Turkic peoples of Central Asia in
41response to Russian domination.
By 1900 the Muslim inhabitants of the Russian Empire were already
the most "reformed" Islamic community in the world; from this centre
concepts of pan-Turanianism and religious reform spread rapidly to the
neighbouring Muslims of Ch'ing China, Qajar Iran, and even ottoman Turkey.
In 1904 the Tatar Islah movement, from which the first authentic Muslim
42communists were to spring, was founded. In 1909 a secret revolutionary
organisation called the "Young Bukharans" (drawing much of its inspiration
from the successes of the Young Turks in 1908) was formed in Western
43Turkestan, whilst in 1912 the Alash ~ nationalist movement was
44founded by dissident intellectuals in the Kazakh steppe. During this
period the JadTd movement continued to expand - by 1916 there were in
excess of 5,000 Jad!d-ist schools scattered throughout the Russian
45Empire - and to move rapidly leftwards. By the time of the Bolshevik
Revolution in 1917 the JadId movement, which dominated the Turkic
nationalist movement in Russian Central Asia, 'represented a revolutionary
element in the truest sense, being opposed to both the Russian presence
40. Hostler, C.W., Turkism and the Soviets (London, 1957), pp. 130-32.
41. Nor did Gasprinskiy forget the 'cameleer of Kashgar' in his scheme;
Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, op.cit., p. 39.
42. ibid .•pp. 42 -5i Zenkovsky,gp.sit .•pp. 24-36.
43. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, op.cit., p. 47.
44. !2!£., pp. 46-7.
45. ~., p. 39.
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46and to the reactionary Muslim clergy'.
Yang Tseng-hsin, the Republican governor of Sinkiang, was determined
to exclude from his domain all reformist· and egalitarian influences
emanating from the Russian Empire. He was in any case wary of Russian
intentions. During the Ko-Iao-hui disturbances of 1912 the Russians had
sent cossack troops to safeguard their interests in Kashgar, and Yang
47had had considerable trouble persuading them to return home. four years
later Yang had faced a major crisis when Tsarist conscription amongst the
Muslim peoples of Russian Central Asia had caused large numbers of
48Kazakhs to take refuge across the border in Sinkiang.
After the Bolshevik Revolution Yang's fears were redoubled. He
disliked foreigners, and was determined to isolate Sinkiang from their
influence in so far as this was possible; the realities of political
power In the region, however, necessitated a careful balancing act between
the Russians and the British. Yang responded to the Red victory in the
Russian civil war by adopting an overtly conciliatory policy towards the
victors, but he warned his Muslim subjects to 'beware of associating
themselves with a people who are entirely without religion and who would
harm them and mislead their women,.49
How justified were Yang's fears of the spread of Russian, and later
Soviet political influence amongst the Muslims of Sinkiang7 As early as
46. 1E!2., p. 48.
47. Yang, R., op.cit., p. 287; Skrine and Nightingale, op.cit., pp. 184;
203.
48. Yang, R., op.cit., pp. 305-8. According to R. Yang, Yang Tseng-hsin
calculated.~he total number·of Kazakh refugees inSinkiang to be over
300,000 - surely an over-estimate. W.A. Douglas Jackson ( The Russo-
Chinese Borderlands, Princeton, 1962,p. 51) puts the figure at
100,000, but gives no source reference.
49. !QW[, l/P&S/10/976, (Kashgar Diaries, October 1925), p. 4211.1925.
84
1909 Sir George Macartney, British consul-general at Kashgar, warned that
the Chinese would have to 'take into account' pan-Islamic influences
50which were awakening amongst the Turkic peoples of the province. Macartney's
warning must have been based in part on his knowledge of ~usayn Bai Batcha,
a "widely read" millionaire merchant of Artush who had travelled extensively
in Europe. ~usayn Bai Batcha was one of the first pan-Islamic activists
in Sinkiang. He endowed a charitable institution {Ar. wagf} in Artush
to build schools and libraries for the education of both girls and boys,
and he personally paid for certain promising young Turkic Muslims to
studyabroad.51 The outbreak of the first World War and Turkey's part in
it undoubtedly gave added impetus to the pan-Turanian movement in Sinkiang,
and in 1915 a Turkish subject, A~mad Kamal, started a school in Kashgar
where the local Turkic children were taught to look to the Sultan of
Turkey as their spiritual father. Yang Tseng-hsin initially closed the
school and imprisoned all those associated with it; it was later allowed to
re-open on the condition that all symbols of allegiance to the Sultan
of Turkey were removed, and that Chinese language instruction and
military drill were added to the curriculum. 52 With the defeat of Turkey
in the first World War and the establishment of the Soviet regime in
53Russia, however, the presumed threat from Turkey melted away, and was
replaced by mounting concern over the growth of Soviet influence in
50. Macartney, G., 'Eastern Turkistan: The Chinese as Rulers Over an
Alien Race', Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, 10th March
1909, pp. 18-19.
51. Macartney visited Husayn Bai Batcha at Artush in June 1908. Skrine and
Nightingale, op.cit., p. 157.
52. !E!£.,PP. 248-9.
53. 'After the first World War Pan-Turkism was discredited not only within
Turkey but in the world in general. There was no hope of finding support
for the movement in the new Republic of Germany, and Austro-Hungary had
ceased to exist. Great Britain, france and the United States were
unfriendly to the political conceptions held by the defeated ottoman
Empire and Germany, and Pan-Turkism was additionally held responsible
for the anti-Armenian atrocities'; Hostler, C.W., Turkism and the soviets
(london, 1957) p. 156.
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54Sinkiang.
Even during the course of the civil war the Bolsheviks were able to
score some notable successes in Sinkiang. In 1920 - the year in which the
White general Annenkov was driven across the Sino-Soviet frontier into
Ozungaria - an informal agreement was signed by Yang's administration
giving the Soviet authorities official representation at Kulja and special
trading rights in the fertile IIi Valley and Chuguchak. As a result of
this.agreement the Soviets were able to open a library at Kulja which,
according to one contemporary British diplomatic source:
Quickly became the nocturnal rendezvous far young IIi;
many hundreds of Chinese subjects were enrolled in
Bolshevik secret societies; tribal chiefs of the Kazakhs,
Kalmucks and Teranchis were subsidised; and agents,
including numerous women, were sent out in the districts
to preach the blessings of communism, domestic emancipation
and the new Islam. 55
Yang could nat tolerate this, and even at the risk of antagonising his
powerful Soviet neighbours, the library was closed down. He also attempted
to limit the numbers of his subjects visiting the Soviet Union. In this
he was nat very successful, especially in the north-west of the province
where Soviet influence continued to expand. Even in remote Kashgar, as
R.O. Wingate, a British consular-official who visited southern Sinkiang
during the mid-1920s, noted:
Several of the wealthier men are constantly travelling
to and fro in Russian Turkestan; some go on business
even as far as to Moscow. So their sons, even if
educated at home, eventually come to learn Russian,
and are much in contact with the ideas of Bolshevism
as understood in Tashkent (emphasis added). Like
the merchant families of Europe in the sixteenth
century, they are the first to be affected by new
ways of life, and amongst the foremost to criticize
54. Oespite this concern, Yang fully appreciated his own weakness vis-~-
~ the Soviet Government, and scrupulously avoided involvement in
the 8asmachi-Soviet struggle in Western Turkestan. Rossabi, op.cit.,
p. 227.
55. ~,l/P&S/12/2342. P.4839.1924.
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the conservative and "out-worn" views of the Mullahs.
But it is not only members of the wealthy families
that come into contact with Bolshevik propaganda. It
has attractions for many go-ahead young fellows in East
Turkestan •••The ambitious young workman from Kashgar or
IIi goes over to Russia to get a temporary job end at
once finds himself in a land of unveiled women, rail-
ways, motor-cars, cinemas, and all that he beljeves
to constitute the acme of modarn civilisation. 56
The growth of Soviet influence in - and around57 - Sinkiang was ae
worrying to the British as it was to Yang Tseng-hsin. C.P. Skrine, the
British consul-general at Kashgar in the mid-1920s, reported back to New
Delhi that,
Not only in Ili, but also to a less extent in the
south, the Soviet Government is doing what it can
by means of an insidious propaganda to awaken the
race - and class - consciousness of the Muhammadan
population. Chinese policy is directed towards· the
prevention of this awakening'S8
.Yang redoubled his system of internal surveillance. All publications in
59Turkic languages were banned, and restaurants throughout the province
56. Wingate, R.O., 'Education in Chinese Turkestan', JRCAS, XVI, 3 (1929),
p. 326. Wingate's point about railways is interesting - no doubt the
Turkic people of Sinkiang were very conscious of their isolation. In
1956 an old Uighur of Kumul said to Basil Davidson: 'I tell you that
generations have gone by, and we have not seen e train. It was promised
but one did not come. Now we shall see one. We shall see one early
next year, and it is the government of Chairman Mao that brings it'.
Davidson, Turkestan AlivB, p. 61j.cf. Lattimore, Studies in frontier
History, pp. 193-4.
57. four years after the Bolshevik Revolution, in 1921, the Mongolian
People's Republic was established under Soviet tutelage, on Yang's
north-eastern flank. In 1925 feng YD-hsiang, "Christian General" and
nominal warlord of Northwest China, suddenly stopped baptising his
troops with fire hoses, formed an alliance with the Soviet Union, and
moved into the north-western province in force. Yang, at this time
almost surrounded by the Soviet Union and its prot~g~sJ was obliged to
reinforce his eastern garrisons against potential attack from feng.
He also attempted to forge closer links with the British in Kashgar.
58. ~, L/P&S/12/2342. P.4839.1924.
59. Bosshard, W., 'Politics end Trade in Central Asia', JRCAS, XVI, 4(1929),
p. 438. According to the Scottish missionary G.W. Hunter, who lived in
Sinkiang for ever 40 years: 'Not one newspaper of any kind, Chinese or
Sart (i.e. Turkic), is allowed to be printed or circulated in the
whole of Chinese Turkesten, no doubt for political reasons', 'The
Chinese Moslems of, Turkestan', .!!:..!![., X, (1920)" p. 170.
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60were posted ~ith the sign 'no political discussions allowed'. Skrine
was somewhat troubled by these policies, but clearly felt that, on balance,
they were necessary and e~en desirable:
By means of censorship •••and other methods, not
only is all written or printed matter dealing with
current events excluded from the province, but the
dissemination of "news" in writing among the
inhabitants is effectively pre~ented. The same
policy is responsible for the official attitude
towards education: all schools except those
attached to mosques, at which nothing but reading,
writing and the Qur'an are taught by the Mullas,
are forbidden; even attempts by private individuals
such as Russian refugees to make a living by teaching
foreign languages are looked upon with disfavour.
This stifling of progress may be reprehensible from
the ideal point of view, but it at any rate serves
to keep an almost exclusively agricultural population
quiet and contented under Chinese rule; and after all,
if the greatest happiness of the greatest number is
the summum bonum for Chinese Turkistan as for less
secluded countries, there is much to be said for it.61
However Nicholas Roerich, who travelled through Sinkiang with the "Roerich
Expedition" in 1925-6, described the peace of the province as 'the peace
of death'. 62
3.3 The Situation in Southern Sinkiang
During the early Republican era the most powerful representative of
the pro~incial government in the area to the south of the Tien Shan - and
generally speaking the second most powerful figure in the province - was
the t'i-t'ai (~ilitary c.0mmander) of Kashgar. Isolated from Urumchi by
difficult terrain and poor communications, this official enjoyed considerable
autonomy, and was effectively able to make south-western Sinkiang into a
60. Cable, M., and f. french, Through Jade Gate and Central Asia (london,
1950), p. 263.
61.' .ll!!Ji, L/P&:S/12/2342.P.4839.1924; cf. 8enningsen &: lemercier-Quelquejay's
description of _Tsadst_ policies, in Western Turkestan, above, P.t' .
.,
62. Roerich," N., ,.Altai-Himalaya, p. 280.
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private fief. We have seen that Yang Tseng-hsin took initial steps to
establish his writ in southern Sinkiang (known to the Chinese simply as
Nan-Iu)63 during his campaign against the Ko-Iao-hui in 1912-14. In
January, 1913, Brigadier yang Tsuan-hs~, the titular leader of the IIi
revolutionaries whom Yang Tseng-hsin had transferred to Kashgar, arrived
in the city with 400 "new style" troops to take up the office of tli_tlei.64
Within e very short time Yang Tsuan-hs~ had usurped the authority of the
teo-tlai (circuit intendant),65 and had become the most powerful figure in
Kashgar. As a result of his successes against the Ko-Iao-hui in Nan-lu,
Yang Tseng-hsin ~as able to appoint Ma Shao-wu, a Hui Muslim from Yangls
66native Yunnan,to the post of commanding officer at Kuchar. This move
considerably strengthened Yangls grip on the south, but Kashgar, the chief
city of Nan-lu, as well as the still more remote oases of Yarkand and Khotan,
retained considerable independence. Yang Tseng-hsin did not regard Yang
"Tsuan-hsu as a suitable ally; his association with the IIi revolutionaries
counted against him, and he had only been appointed tli-tlal of Kashgar as
a device to isolate him from his supporters in IIi. Consequently Yang
Tseng-hsin took no steps to support Yang Tsuan-hsOIs position in Kashgar,
and when in August, 1915, thetli-tlai was forced to resign by his o~n
troops, Yang Tseng-hsin seized the opportunity to appoint another Yunnanese
Muslim, Ma rU-hsing (see plates 5 and 6) to the post of Military Commander
67at Kashgar.
.
63.i.e."South Road",from Tien-5han Nan-lu, "The road to the south of the
Tien Shan".
64. Skrine and Nightingale, op.cit., p. 214. "New style" troops supported
the 1911 revolution and had removed their queues.
65. In August 1914 the Chling title tao-t'ai was changed to the Republican
title tao-yin.
66. See above, p. 73.
67. Skrine and Nightingale, op.cit., p. 229.
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Ma fu-hsing's background is obscure. It is not clear when he first
came to Sinkiangj it may have been as one of Yang Tseng-hsin's Hui troops,
although most of these ~ere Tungans from Kansu, and not Yunnanese Muslims.
In 1911, at the time of the Republican Revolution, Ma fU-hsing was
appointed head of the Tungan levies that were raised by the Ch'ing
authorities in Urumchi under the command of Yang Tseng-hsin. from 1911 to
1915 he had remained in the Urumchi area 'shooting down Chinese sedition-
.mongers and riffraff,.6B It is difficult to say whether Yang Tseng-hsin
sent him to Kashgar because he trusted him, or simply to get him out
of the way. In either case, Ma fu-hsing's appointment was to prove a disaster
for the peoples of southern Sinkiang, whether Turkic or Chinese.
Ma fu-hsing - or Ma T'i-t'ai, as he is generally referred to in con-
temporary sources - arrived in Kashgar, accompanied by 300 Tungan levies, in
December 1915. He made his headquarters in Kashgar New City, about 2l miles
to the south of the much older Muslim town.69 The new t'i-t'ai was 64
years old and quite illiterate,70 but he had a torceful character and was
determined to establish his authority over the tao-yin as swiftly BS possible.
The pattern of Ma's eight-and-a-half year dictatorship over southern
Sinkiang was set on his first full day in Kashgar when, against the wishes
of the tao-yin, he ordered the arrest and execution gf three men who,
according to Skrine, 'appeared to be innocent of any possible crime,.71 On
68. !2!2., p. 243.
69. Kashgar, like most of the oasis towns of Sinkiang during this period, was
divided into two to~ns, the old Muslim city (Ch. Shu-fu) and the new
Chinese city (Ch. Shu-Ieh). At Kashgar, which had a population of about
40,000, both cities ~ere surrounded by moats and thick, crenellated walls
pierced by iron gates which were shut at 8unset. Skrine and Nightingale,
op.cit., p. 19.
70. Bailey, f.M., Mission to Tashkent (London, 1946), p.23.
71. Skrine and Nightingale, op.cit., p. 243.
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~arch 8th, 1916, the tao-yin, who had been completely outflanked by the wily
Ma Fu-hsing, was dismissed by the provincial authorities in Urumchi, and a
replacement was sent. In mid-September the new tao-yin arrived in Kashgar;
he proved to be an emaciated opium addict, none other than the brother of
Yang Tseng-hsin. The new tao-yin was never to be seen in public before 2 p.m.,
and he delegated most of hi. authority to the Kashgar District Magistrate, a
man named Ma who was yet another of Yang Tseng-hsin's Tungans.72 The
appointment of Yang's enfeebled brother as tao-yin served further to strengthen
Ma T'i-t'ai's position, and by mid-June, 1916, Macartney was able to report
to london that 'at present the Governor (Yang Tsen9-hsin) and t'i-t'ai wield
extraordinary powers •••and anyone, be his political creed what it may, who
attempts to disturb them, they will seize and summarily shoot down'.
Macartney continued with prophetic accuracy: 'I doubt if any Chinesa authority,
not even that from Peking, can remove them, barring the one derived from the
knife of the assassin,.73
In Macartney's opinion, Ma Fu-hsing realised that he had risen to as
high a rank as he could ever expect to reach; he now intended to maintain this
74position whilst lining his own pockets. Having secured his position at
Kashgar, he immediately set about exploiting the human and mineral resources
of his new domain. C.P. Skrine, a successor of Macartney who was British
consul-general at Kashgar during the height of Ma Fu-hsing's absolutist
power,75 has left an astonishing account of an official dinner party with
72. 1E!£., pp. 253-4.
73. 1£!g., p. 247.
74. 12!2., p. 246.
75. Macartney left Kashgar in August 1918, after 28 years service at this
remote post. He was replaced by Colonel P.T. Etherton, who was in turn
replaced by N. Fitzmaurice in May 1922. C.P. Skrine replaced Fitzmaurice
in July of the same year, and remained until September 1924. See
Appondix VII, ':Br!tish. Consul.';'General at Ka.shgax'.
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the t'i-t'ai ~ho, although nominally ~uslim, was an incorrigible drunkard.76
Skrine's description of his meeting with the t'i-t'ai at the Kashgar New City
yamen captures the half-comic, half-homicidal character of ~a fU-hsing very
well:
Passing through huge painted doors we were welcomed
in an inner courtyard by a short, grizzled, monkey-
like old man with a long wispy moustache and fierce
eyes, resplendently arrayed in a saxe-blue Chinese
field Marshal's uniform several sizes too large for
him, complete with plumed hat, several rows of stars
and medals and gold lace epaulettes the size of
hassocks flapping from his shoulders (see plate 5).
With the gold-encrusted tunic hanging about his wispy
old frame like a frock-coat on a scarecrow, and the
overalls, as usual in the 5inkiang Army, innocent of
braces, he looked a regular Chinese Count Hedzoff of
Paphlagonia; but there was a sinister feel behind the
opera-bouf;fe - or was it only because we knew about the
murders and torturings ~hich went on somewhere behind
the grim walls of his citad!~?77
~
But, as Skrine clearly indicates, there ~as nothing comic about Ma
fu-hsing in the eyes of his subjects. 'He made everybody call him padishah
(Ire, "king") on pain of death, and assembled a harem of the prettiest Turkic
Muslim women in Kashgar; meanwhile his agents roamed the country-side "looking
for new cows to milk" as the. Titai 'facetiously put it,.7B ~a was not con-
tentw1th the forced "loans", "subscriptions" and "presents" usually extorted
by corrupt officials in Kashgar, but turned to trade and the exploitation
by primitive methods of the mineral resources of Nan-lu. He claimed all the
mineral wealth of the country as the perquisite of the military authorities,
and exploited them for his own benefit. Thus he worked oil we~ls et Aksu .
76. Skrine, C.P. Chinese Central Asia, (London, 1926) pp. 86-8; Bee also
Blacker, l.V.S., On Secret Patrol in High Asia (london, 1922), pp. 15-16.
77. Skrine, Chinese Central Asia, p. 86.
7B. lE!Q., p. 85.
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and at Kanjigan about 30 miles west of Kashgar, copper mines also at
Kanjigan, jade mines at Tung on the upper Yarkand river, and coal mines at
various places throughout the region. As he employed forced labour and was
also able by force both to retain a monopoly of production and to prevent
competition in the local bazaars, he derived large profits from these concerns.79
In the local manufacturing sector he took over the carpet factories and
established jade workshops; according to one authority, he conscripted crafts-
men for these concerns, and forced them to 'live like slaves on the premises,.eo
The t'i-t'ai made further profits by drawing large sums from the Kashgar
treasury for the upkeep of his Tungan troops:
Needless to say, not a tenth of these sums was spent.
The nominal strength of the Titai's forces was between
4,000 and 5,000; the actual number maintained may have
been about 500. Most of these were quarter-trained,
opium-sodden wretches who received neither pay, rations
nor equipment, and lived on the country by virtue of the
fear inspired by their terrible chief, and the antiquated
(and in most cases quite useless) carbines they carried.a1
The fear inspired by Ma fu-hsing was very real. Descriptions of his
brutalities abound~ and at least one picture of his victims has come down
to us (see plate e). He had a large hay-chopping machine with which he used
to amputate the limbs of his victims, starting at the extremities and
e2proceeding joint by joint. P.S. Nazaroff, a White Russian refugee who
spent some time in Kashgar during Ma fu-hsing's rule, records how the
t'i-t'ai crucified, maimed and murdered all those who opposed his will
or even crossed his path when he was drunk. During the four years Nazareff
79. ~,l/P&9/12/2342. P.4839.1924; Skrine, Chinese Central Asia,
p. 261.
80. Chen, The Sinkiang Story, p. 173.
81. Skrine, Chinese Central Asia, p.262.
82. Skrine, Chinese Central Asia, p. 85; Nazaroff, P.S., Moved On! from
Kashgar to Kashmir, (london, 1935), p. 78; see also Etherton, P.T.,
In the Heart of Asia (London, 1925), pp. 66-7.
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lived at Kashgar he frequently saw 'bundles of men's amputated arms or
feet nailed to the city gates, with notices stating whose members they
were and why they were cut off. Sometimes the lawful owner of the arms or
legs would be chained to the wall with them,.83 Ma Tti-t'ai used some of
his ill-gotten wealth to build a large (and leaky) palace at 8akalyk,
84about 16 miles from Kashgar; however most of the gold, diamonds and other
moneys amassed were transferred to Mats superior, Yang Tseng-hsin, in
Urumchl.8S
Eventually Ma TIl-t'alts behaviour became too outrageous, and Yang
Tseng-hsin - who was in constant fear of reuolution or assassination -
decided it would be better to remove him. In the autumn of 1923 the
t'l-t'ai conceived the idea of forcing the citizens of Kashgar to buy a
fixed :quantity of paraffin wax (a largely unsaleable by-product of Ma ru-
hsing's oil refinery at Kanjigan) every month. Cobblers, who used paraffin
wax In their trade, were obliged to buy double quantities. When the head
of the cobblers' guild complained to the t'i-t'ai, he was beaten to death and
his wife was fined so heavily that she was forced to sell her home and driven
into penury.86 Apparently the paraffin wax episode (which earned the
t,i_t'a! the nickname "bald wax seller" in the bazaars of Nan-lu) was the
last straw as far as Ma ru-hsing's fellow officials were concerned. A
petition was sent to Urumchi, and Yang Tseng-hsln, who realised that the
ttl-tlal's depradations had gone too far, dismissed Ma ru-hsing and abolished
83. Nazaroff, op.cit., p.7S.
84. ibid., PP. 78-9.
85. Nyman, op.cit., P. 28.
86. Skrine, Chinese Central Asia, p. 262. The contemporaneous brutalities
of Ma Fu-hsing's son, who was made GOC Kashgar, must also have outraged
the Kashgarliks. For example: 'Returning one afternoon from a visit he
(Ma.'s son) was informed that three of the young (Turkic) girls of his .
..harem had been out for an unauthorised wa.lk. They were therefore taken
into the garden and beaten, their hands tied behind their backs at their
wrists, after which they were suspended by the latter from a tree and left
there throughout the night. In the morning when cut down, two were dead,
but the third afterwards recovered, although hopelessly crippled with the
arms wrenched completely out of joint at the shoulders'. Etherton, pp. 105-6.
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this· post ~hich might one day threaten his own. Ma refused to accept his
dismissal, and attempted to appease his subjects by arresting his own
paraffin wax agents, mutilating four of them with his hay chopper, and ex-
posing one at each of the four main gates of Kashgar Old City with their
limbs nailed to the walls behind them.87
However this time Ma fu-hsingls luck had run out. Yang Tseng-hsin
sent orders from Urumchi to the tao-yin of Aksu, who in turn despatched an
armed force of 600 men under the command of Ma Shao-wu, the Yunnanese Hui
whom Yang Tseng-hsin had appointed commander of the garrison at Kuchar in
1914 and who had since risen to the post of amban at Uch Turfan.ee A larger
body of troops was sent to Maralbashi to mislead the tlt-tlai, and Ma Shao-wu'a
force was thus able to approach Kashgar from the north ~ithout detection. On
31st May, 1924, Ma Shao-wu and 8 small band of picked men made their way into
Kashgar New City where the t'i-t'a!. lover-confident as usual, and imagining
that his enemies were still several marches from Kashgar, had omitted to
89take the most elementary precautionsl• Ma ru-hsing was asleep in his
elaborate new Kashgar palace (8 building quite distinct from the leaky palace
at Bakalyk), and his troops ~ere unprepared and for the most part under the
influence of opium. After a short skirmish the t'l-t'ei was captured, alive
but wounded in the arm, and his troops surrendered. An exchange of telegrems
between Ma Shao-wu and Yang Tseng-hsin in Urumchi sealed the ex-t'l-t'ai's
fate, and on the next day he was put up against the south gate of the New
City and shot. His body was leter tied to a crucifix end left for the
87. ~., p. 263.
BB. Skrine, Chinese Centrel Asia, p. 264. Uch Turfan (Tk. ICrooked Turfan'),
so called 'because of its long, straggling rows of houses, to distinguish
it from tha larger and more famous Turfanl about 300 miles further to
the east (Schomberg, R.f.C., A Turkestan Diary, 1926-29, p. 44).
B9.Skrlne, Chinese Central Asia. p.265., .
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people of Kashgar to insult and defile (see plate 6).90 Ma Shao-wu was
promoted to the office of tao-yin of Khotan as a reward for his loyalty
to Yang Tseng-hsin, and, the post of t'i-tlai having been abolished,
the incumbent tao-yin became the most influential official in Kashgar
almost by default. On the death of the latter in 1927, Ma Shao-wu was
transferred from Khotan to Kashgar, thus attaining the second most powerful
position in the province (see plate 7).91
3.4 The Economy of Sinkiang Under Yang Tseng-hain
Before 1911 Sinkiang had been heavily subsidised (to between two and
92three million taale annually) by the Chting Imperi~l Treasury. With the
overthrow of the Ch'ing Oynasty and the subsequent political fragmentation
of the Chinese Republic, this subsidy was ended and Sinkiang, under its
new governor Yang Tseng-hsin, was left to fend for itself. To make matters
worse, the outbreak of the first World War in 1914 seriously dielocated
economic relations with the Russian Empire, traditionally (and by geographic
necessity) 93Sinkiang's major trading partner. Before 1914 Sinkiang had
acted as a supplier of raw materials (chiefly cotton) to the Tsarist Empire,
90. Various unsavoury details surround the execution of Ma fu-hsing. According
to Nicholas Roerich (Altai Himalaya, p. 163), Ma Shao-wu personally shot
the tli-t'ei efter the latter had been crucified for two days; Skrine
suggests that his hands and feet were packed in a box and sent to
Yang Tseng-hain at Kashgar (oPjC.1t •., p , 269). The official repo.r.t ofthe British Consulate (IOLR, L P&S/12/2342. P.4839.1924. also .
written by Skrine) simp~tates that he was shot on 2nd June •.
91. An excellent photograph of Ma sbac-eu may also be found in Bosshard, W.,
Durch Tibet und Turkestan (stuttgart, 1930),.plate 79., .
92. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p.59.
93. Kuropatkin, A.N., Keshgaria, fr·bO"'~~'
~,~-.,(".
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94and had relied heavily on the importation of Russian manufactured goods.
In 1913, the second year of Vang's rule in Sinkiang, the value of Russian
exports to Sinkiang stood at 8,424,000 roubles, whilst imports in the
95reverse direction reached 9,846,000 roubles; Sinkiang was thus running e
healthy trade surplus of 1,604,000 roubles with the Russian Empire, and
to some extent this helped to offset the loss of the Imperial subsidy.
Between 1914 and 1917, however, trade declined disastrously, as did the
value of the Russian rouble; when the rouble fell, it dragged the Sinkiang
tael with it.96 By 1919, when the civil war was at its height, trade
97between Sinkiang and Russia was almost non-existent. The decline of the
Russian trade had disastrous effects for Sinkiang, especially in the
agricultural south where the area under cotton cultivation (which in 1913
had provided just over 25% of all Sinkiang exports to the Russian Empire)9B
was cut back by 50%, resulting in widespread hardship amongst the Uighur
farmers of Nan~u.99
It may fairly be said that, from an economic point of view, Vang
Tseng-hsin took over the administration of Sinkiang at a singularly in-
opportune time. Vet Vang had certain advantages working for him; he had
inherited a well-established provincial administration from his Ch'ing
predecessors, and his province was rich in potentially exploitable mineral
100resources. Some authorities have portrayed Vang as something of an
94. For detailed figures of Sinkiang-Russian trade in 1913 see Mu Ning,
'Su-lien yU Hein-chiang sheng ti shang-yeh kuan-hsi' (The Soviet Union's
commercial relationship with Sinkiang Province),Hsin Ve-hsi-ya (Nanking),
VI, 5 (Nov. 1933), pp. 42-3.
95. ibid., p. 43.
96. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 59.
97. According to Russian statistics, only 300 tons of goods were exported to
Sinkiang in 1920. Mu Ning, op.cit., p. 44.
9B. That is, by weight; by value the proportion must have been still higher.
(Based on figures-in Mu, oe.eit., p. 43).-
99. Mu Ning, op.cit., p.44.
100. See section on mineral resources (especially jade, gold, copper, oil and
coal) of southern Sinkiang, The China Vear Book, 1924-5 (Tientsin,1924)
Pp. 601-2.
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economic reformer. Thus Lattimore credits Yang with attempting (unsuccessfully)
to abolish the ~system of forced labour employed by the Manchus; with
limiting official rates of interest to 10%; and with preventing officials
from loaning public money to private money-lenders who then re-loaned it
101at steeply increased rates of interest. Similarly Morris Rossabi claims
that Yang 'maintained an effective system of controls over his government,
imposing harsh sanctions on those who illegally alienated the local peoples.
His economic policies were also designed to reduce the tax burden on the
102Uighurs, Kazakhs and others and to win their support'.
However, this view of Yang is seriously misleading. far from attempting
to modernise or advance the economy of Sinkiang, Yang made every attempt
to hold the clock back. Where reforms in the system were made (as with
the attempt to abolish ~), Yang was simply acting to prevent a possible
rising amongst his Turkic Muslim subjects; he realised (as with the case
of Ma T'i.t'ai) that there was a limit beyond which the indigenous peoples
of Sinkiang could not, safely, be pushed. In fact Yang judged this limit
very nicely - and for fifteen years he ran the economy of Sinklang largely
for his own benefit.
Shortly after consolidating his hold on Sinkiang in 1914, Yang sat
about establishing an efficient machine for stripping the province of its
assets. As has already been shown, whilst maintaining tha Imperial ad-
ministration almost intact, Yang surrounded himself with relatives
and fellow provincials from Yunnan. Rigorous censorship was introduced
to minimise unrest amongst the Turkic Muslims, and a sophisticated system
of economic checks was introduced to concentrate the wealth of the province
101. Lettimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 56-8. (~ is a Manchu term).
102. Rossebi, op.cit., p. 221.
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in Yang's own hands.
With the fall of the Ch'ing Empire in 1911, China's unified fiduciary
system disappeared. Securely isolated from the warring factions of the
new Republioby the wastes of the Gobi Desert, Yang Tseng-hsin was able -
indeed he was almost obliged - to issue his own currency. In fact he was
to issue four regional paper currencies, the Urumchi, IIi, Kashgar and
Aksu taels, each exchanging at different rates against the others.103
Except in south-westernSinkiang, where some silver and gold specie was in
104circulation, the province relied exclusively on paper and copper
currency, quite unbacked by official reserves. Yang introduced this
complicated system as a safeguard against revolution - 'for no insurrection
could come to a head unless it wera financed, and with several currencies
in use unusually large transfers of money can be detected. rurthermore,
the value of paper would at once fall in any region in rebellion against
the Governor, leaving the rebels without funds,.105 The various local
currencies were adequate for local and intra-provincial trade, but for
trade with Russia or the rest of China a system of controlled barter
was necessary, with merchants roughly balancing the value of their imports
to, and exports from, Sinkiang. In this way locally-resident Chinese
merchants were prevented from exporting profits to China without importing
in return; the same criteria applied to Turkic Muslims trading with
Western Turkestan. As a result of this policy it was extremely difficult
for indigenous inhabitants of Sinkiang of whatever race, to invest their
profits other than in further trading activities or in property within the
103. lattimore, 'The Chinese as a Dominant Race', in: Studies in rrontier
History (london, 1962), p. 209.
104. ibid •..........
105. !£!£., cf. lattimore, 'Chinese Turkistan', in Studies in frontier
History, p. 193.
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province. Naturally this problem was not faced by Han Chinese officials
temporarily resident in Sinkiang and planning to return to their native
province at the end of their period of service; they were able simply to
export merchandise, to sell it in China (or Russia), and to bank the
proceeds against their retirement. Other locally-based merchants wishing
to export profits in China, or companies based outside China and wishing
to export their profits from trade with the province, were only able to
do so through a semi-official system of.peculation. controlled and
exploited by Yang himself.
Owen Lattimore, who travelled through Sinkiang during the last years
of Yang Tseng-hsin's r~gime, was clearly impressed with the results which
Yang's economic and fiscal policies appeared to be yielding. In a paper
published in 1928 he noted that:
The use of peper money for concentrating wealth in
the hands of the ruling power is a favourite device
in contemporary China. Every regional potentate
issues paper money, the acceptance of which is
enforc~d at the point of a bayonet, while for payment
of taxes and other government receipts only silver is
accepted, or the notes of sound banks. In Sinkiang
there is no such maintenance of bletantly false values.
In the first place, the government accepts its own
paper. In the second place, ell the nominel velues ere
in taels, whereas in China there are no paper taels,
and silver taels have been superseded for the most part
by silver and paper dollars. for this reason, and
because of the great distance between the province and
China, and the slow transit of goods, it is not affected
by the money market in China. The extent of local
confidence in the paper currency is reflected by the
steady rate of exchange between the Urumchi teels and
the few silver dollers that arrive by way of the caraven
route at Ku-Ch'eng-tze. In the third place, there is not
a single bank, not even a provincial bank (that favourite
engine of Chinese governors) to complicate exchange with
credit transactions. The province is hermetically sealed·106
But the province was not, in fact, hermetically sealed, Throughout
106. Lattimore, 'The Chinese as a Dominant Race', p. 209.
102
the province Chinese officials (and in the south-west, Indian money-
lenders as well)107 assiduously hoarded all the precious metal they could
lay their hands on, with the object of transferring it to private bank
accounts outside Sinkiang. furthermore, since there was not enough
precious metal to go around, the ruling group (chiefly composed of Han
Chinese, but including the more affluent sections of other national groups)
transferred wealth out of the province in merchandise. Lattimore,
measuring Yang's Sinkiang against the yardstick of contemporary Republican
China, was impressed with the free trade economy which this system eeemed
to have created:
The wisdom of the Chinese in Sinkiang is in not bleeding
their subjects (by excess taxation). As the civil service
is not paid by the Republican Government, so the revenues
of the province are not remitted to Peking. Revenue is
therefore sufficient without undue taxation. The governing
class combine to exploit the trade rather than the fiscal
revenue. Every great firm leans on official aid. The
gratifying result is that business, instead of being
hampered by tolls and levies, often flourishes by going
tax free.108
But C.P. Skrine, who, as British consul-general at Kashgar had access to
information which was not readily available to Lattimore, saw things
rather differently. In an official report on the trade of Chinese Turkestan
(Sinkian'g) for the period 1924-5, he reported that:
The value of exports exceeds that of imports including
specie (emphasis added) by no less·than Taele 366,825,
or 75.2%. The explanation of this is that when -
merchants from Inner China bring specie to Chinese
Turkestan to pay for goods exported from the south of
the province, they are obliged by order of the Governor
to deposit their money in the Government Treasury at
Urumchi, and are issued cheques on treasuries in
Southern Sinkiang in exchange. These cheques are
107. Nyman, op.cit., p. 30.
108. lattimore, 'The Chinese as a Dominant Race', p. 210. In this 1928
article lattimore fails to make clear the important role played by
tax on cultivated land (almost all of which was Uighur-owned).
However, in his Pivot of Asia (1950, p. 59), it is made quite clear
that land tax was, in fact, the major source of provincial revenue.
cashed by the officials in Yarkand, Kashgar, etc.,
for local paper currency, with which the goods are
bought·109
In other words Yang Tseng-hsin's economic policy, in both its
mercantile and fiscal aspects, was bleeding Sinkiang to death. Moreover
there is every indication that Yang realised this, that he ectively
encouraged it in the interests of personal profit, and that he was planning
a swift personal departure before the inevitable d~bacle. Certainly Yang
showed no desire to re-establish commercial links with the Russians after
the Red victory in the civil war; he feared Soviet economic penetration
of Sinkiang, and between 1919 (when trade with Russia was almost nil) and
1925 (by which time Russia, in its new Soviet guise, was once again firmly
established as Sinkiang's chief trading partner) every improvement in
commercial relations between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union was forced on
110Yang by Moscow. According to some sources Yang was also loath to permit
the establishment of a modern industrial base within Sinkiang. In a move
aimed at excluding the Soviet ideological penetration of the province (had
Yang been reading some of the Soviet prop~anda material he confiscated?)
'factories and large commercial enterprises were strictly forbidden, for
they necessitated the employment of large bodies of workmen, who might form
the nucleus of a workers' class in Sinkiang, and thus endanger the social
111structure of the province'.
109. The China Year Book, 1924-5, p. 605.
110. Yang was effectively compelled to signtt~e IIi Trade Agreement of 1920
under the unspoken threat of Soviet occupation of the IIi Valley (Nyman,
op.cit., p. 36). Similarly it seems likely that Yang extended further.
trade facilities to the Soviets, including the right to establish a
motor service from Kazakhstan to Urumchi, in return for Soviet restraint
being placed upon their protege in Kansu, the "Christian General" .fang
Y~-hsiang (lattimore, 'The Chinese as a Dominant Race', p. 216).
111. Roerich, G.N., Trails to Inmost Asia, p. 118. cf. Roerich, N., Altai-
Himalaya, p. 280.
In effect, Yang was not concerned with developing the indigenous
economy of Sinkiang, but only with exploiting its resources - especially
gold.112 His primary aim lay in maintaining the movement of bullion
caravans and foreign bank drafts from Sinkiang to Peking or Tientsin. The
imported specie which visiting merchants were obliged to pay into the
Urumchi treasury was rapidly re-exported, reportedly to Manila in the
Phillipines where Yang is said to have maintained a personal bank account
under the protection of the American flag.113 Deals were also struck by
which Yang was saved the trouble of importing and re-exporting specie.
ror example, when the Sino-Swedish Scientific Expedition was preparing to
travel to Sinkiang in 1927, an arrangement was made whereby Yang T8eng-
hsin agreed to supply the expedition with local paper currency to a face
value of 60,000 Mexican silver dollars (an enormous sum) on its arrival
in Urumchi; Sven Hedin, the leader of the expedition, agreed to pay the
counter-sum (in silver) to Yang's son-in-law in peking.114
Yang's attitude towards the economy of Sinkiang was followed, to 8
greater or lesser degree, by the entire administration. Whereas under
the Ch'ing many Han officials attained office through success in the
Imperial examinations, under Yang the passport to an official appointment
became money. Administrative salaries were quite inadequate, and it was
understood that an incumbent official, having bought hi. way to office
112. Nyman (op.cit., p. 31), says that the provincial authorities were un-
willing to introduce modern methods of gold-mining because they
'feared the political consequences of a goldrush'. According to C.P.
Skrine, however, the Turkic peoples often knew of gold deposits, but
'kept them secret to prevent the Chinese starting mines and forcing
the local people to work In them' (The China Year Book, 1924-5, p.602).
113. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p.5S. Bosshard, op.cit., p. 436.
114. Hedin, Sven, Across the Gobi Desert (london, 1931), p. 348.
1~
was free to make as much as he could from bribes and "taxes", leaving his
Bubordinates to fend for themselves and thereby extending corruption to
the lowest levels of the system. 'The only upper limit for taxation existed
in open rebellion or complaints directly to the governor, who himself
115constituted the last step to this pyramid of spoils'. In the words of
the Swiss traveller, Walter Bosshard, who accompanied the Trinkler Asian
Expedition to Sinkiang during the last years of Yang's reign:
In Chinese Turkestan, where corruptness permeated all
classes, advancement, like other marketable commodities,
was bought and Bold •••The result was that nothing was
done which was not specially paid for, and the people were
plundered in order that their rulers might grow rich. Such
was the way in which villages and towns were vampired.116
3.5 The Assassination of Yang Tseng-hsin
During his sixteen years of absolute power, Yang Tseng-hsin established
himself as a singularly competent autocrat, a mandapin of the old school,
accurately described by Lattimore as the most able of the feudal bureaucrats
117to administer Sinkiang. Despite his policy of long-term economic
exploitation, the inevitable result of which was the impoverishment and
exhaustion of the province, Yang realised that there was a limit to the
official rapacity which the indigenous population were prepared to endure.
His solution, as we have seen, was to tolerate corruption in his edminis-
tration provided it remained within acceptable limits - that is, providing
it did not spark off a Muslim rising. Yang also realised that the most
prominent members of the Turkic Muslim population must be permitted a share
of the takings. By retaining the Ch'ing administrative structure which
115. Nyman, op.cit., p. 26.
116. Bosshard, W., 'Politics and Trade,in Central Asia', p. 437.
117. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 52.
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employed local Muslims as junior officials - ming-bashis, yuz-bashis and
the like - he was thus able to kill two birds with one stone. On the one
hand, the Chinese administrative officials were insulated from the great
mass of the indigenous Muslim peoples by a layer of junior Muslim officials
who would bear the first brunt of any popular anger; on the other, the
Muslim officials maintained a vested interest in protecting the system
which provided them with a degree of power and affluence. Similarly Yang realised
'the great men of the oases must be ellowed to accumulate land, end the
118great men of the nomads to accumulate herds'. By such methods, as well
as by the extensive use of censorship, informers and seoretpolice, yang
was able to minimise the chances of a Turkic Muslim rebellion. When unrest
did occur, it was possible to isolate and cauterize the source.
As a result of Yang's judicious policies, Muslim opposition to his
rule remained limited and ineffectual. Little is known of Turkic or
Tajik ; Muslim political organisation in Sinkieng during this period.
According' to R.f.C. Schomberg, a British political officer who made in-
vestigative tours of the province in 1927-29 end 1930-31, the Turkic
Muslims (or at least the settled Uighur populatIon) were still divided into
the Aktagbl1k 119and Karataghl1k factions found as early as the 16th century,
although the original political distinctions 8eem to have disappeared or
"become blurred. At the time of Schomberg's tours, the Aktagblik. or White
Mountaineer faction, rema.~ed the Pa."rty of· Turkic natioDalism,. with ~ts power
120base in Kuchar. Known as sayyId-parast, or "sayyid-followers", its
118. Lattimore, 0., Inner Asian frontiers of China (Boston,1962), p. 189.
119. See above, pp. 61-9.
120. sayyid (Ar.) a descendant of the prophet Mu~ammad through the line of
his grandson, Hussein.
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supporters were strongly anti-Chinese. In marked contrast the Karataehllk,
or Black l'!ountaineer faction, was content to let Sinkiang remain under
Chinese rule. With a power base at Artush, its followers were eenerally
referred to by the Uigburs as Rhitai-rarast, or "followers of China".
According to Schomberg, followers of the two groups did not intermarr,r. A
further traditional distinction was that adherents of the Aktaehlik
faction always cut the top off a melon and said "bismil18b" (Ar. 'in
the name of God') before slioing it, in oontrast, the less pious Kara-
tagbliks would slice up the melon at once, without saying "bisrnillah".121
Whilst it is interesting to note the continuation of these pett,y Uighur
dirference~ ~ the oases of the Tarim Basin well into the 20th centur,y,
it is clear that they posed no serious threat to Governor Yang in Urumchi.
Nevertheless, discontent was growing amongst the indigenous peoples of
the province. The Chinese authorities were unable to stem the annual flow
of workers from southern Sinkiang to Soviet Central Asia, largely because
of the higher wages paid in the USSR.122
Atter such a sojourn, many a Kashgarian saw his
country- in a new light. Aocording to Swedish
missionaries (based in Ehotan and Yarkand), much
indoctrination with Soviet propaganda did occur on
these stays intended to have .ru.ture use in the 1930s.123
Nor "as Yang's system of censorship entirely successful in stopping the
spread of Soviet influenoe within his domain. The Sinkiang rumour mill,
Itt .
knownto the local Turkio Muslims as the "long-eared telegraph", was very
121. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2336, P.1349.1930.
122. 1~, or.cit., p. 30.
123. ibid, citing interviews with missionaries Sigf'rid Moenand Georg
Roberntz.
124. Schomberg, R.F.C., A Second Turkestan Diary, 1930-31 (unpublished Ts.
in the library of the Royal Society for Aslan Affairs (London), p. 82.
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125effective. As a result of this age-old method of disseminating news,
Soviet land reform was to have a considerable impact on the Uighur peasantry
of Sinkiang. As one contemporary french source commented:
The "Agrarian reforms" implemented according t~ communist
principles in (West) Turkestan had their echo in Sinkiang.
The peasants did not fail to notice these events and to
speak of Soviet power which, they said, had "divided the
land into equal parts in order to offer it to the
peasants of Turkestan".126
But it was Yang's less able successors who were to reap the harvest of
Turkic Muslim discontent. Throughout his rule Yang faced a far more
serious threat from his own subordinates - not eo much from the Tungans,
who were generally unpopular with both Han Chinese and Turkic Muslim, and
who owed much of their position to Yang's patronage - but from his fellow
Han Chinese. Some of the latter were simply ambitious for personal power,
but others (witness the Yunnanese conspirators at the time of the Te'ai 0
rising)127 felt strongly that Sinkiang should be more closely involved
with events in China proper.
There are indications that, after the bloody dinner party which ended
the attempt to bring Sinkiang into the Ts'ai 0 affair, the mistrustful
Yang deliberately surrounded himself with opium addicts on the grounds that
'the inveterate opium smoker thinks more of his own comfort and convenience
128than of stirring up unrest among his subordinates'. Nevertheless,
125. See, for example, Vasel, G., 'Durohdr1ngungspol1t1k~1n zentralaslen';
Eerichte des Asiens Arbeitkrelses, . I (Feb., 1939), p.·15.
126. Castagn~, Joseph, 'Le Probleme , Revue,
des ~tudes Islamigues, VII, 2
127. See above, pp. 77-8.
128. Bergman, folke, in: Hedin and Bergman, History of the Exeedition in Asia,
1927-1935 (4 vols, Stockholm, 1934-45), Vol I, p. 246, fn.
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during the last years of his rule the ageing Butocrat was seriously to
alienate certain of his senior officials. Perhaps Yang was becoming
over-confident - it was in 1926 that he penned his rather self-indulgent
129claim to have 'created an earthly paradise in a remote region'. In
the same year Yang turned on his Tungan supporters; many were accused
of conspiring with the Tungan warlord of Hsi-ning in Tsinghai, and were driven
from Urumchi.130 Did f hi f 1 1 1 T Y tapr ve 0 s ormer y oya ungans, ang seems 0
have become increasingly isolated. When the Roerich Expedition visited
Urumchi during 1926, G.N. Roerich noted that:
The Governor's residence consisted of several well-
isolated buildings and enclosed courtyards. The gates
were carefully guarded by patrols of heavily armed men •
••• The Governor's yamen seemed to us to be.In a very
dilapidated condition. The glass in many of the windows
on the ground floor was broken and dirty papers and rage
had been pasted on the window frames. Numerous retainers
roamed about the courtyards and villainous bodyguards,
armed with Mauser pistols and swords, were on duty at the
entrance to the yamen.131
It may be that Yang was already preparing to leave Sinkiang. He had
'made his pile',132 and by some accounts his immediate family had been sent
133out of the province, either to China proper, or, as seems more likely,
129. See above, p. 70.
130. Roerich, G.N., Trails to Inmost Asia, p. 115-119; according to Roerich,
Yang's mistrust of the Tungans dated from the execution of Ma fu-hsing,
T'i-t'ei of Kashgar, in 1924. Apparently Ma fu-hsing was a'cousin of
Ma Ch'i, frontier Commissioner and Governor of Hsi-ning in Tsinghai. During
Roerich's stay, Ma Ch'i was believed to be preparing to invade Sinkieng.
Roerich's account may be factual, but it is worth noting that Ma Ch'i
was a genuine Tungan, i.e. a Hui Muslim of the north-west, whilst Ma
fu-hsing was a Hui Muslim of Yunnan. This does not preclude the
possibility of their having been cousins, but it diminishes the likeli-
hood.--- -
131. Roerich, !E!2., pp. 116-7.
132. Anon, 'His Excellency Yang Tseng-hain', JRCAS, XVI, 1 (1929), p.89.
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1~to Manila, ~here Yang is said to have maintained a personal bank account.
Possibly as a grandiose gesture of his leave-taking, Yang erected a statua
of himself In the public gardens at Urumchi. According to Nicholas
Roerich, this memorial ~as paid for ~ith forced contributions 'from the
grateful population'j135 all authorities agree that the statue ~as in
execrable taste.136 finally, after the completion of the second stage of
the Northern Expedition and the entry of the Nationalists into Peking in
June 1928, Yang ordered that the Kuomintang flag should be raised In
Sinkiang, thereby ackno~ledging the authority of the new National Govern-
137ment under Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking. This last uncharacteristic
gesture, taken together with Yang's advancing years and the eigns already
mentioned, must have convinced many of his subordinates that his departure
was imminent. The most ambitious of these subordinates, a Han Chinese
called fan Yao-nan, determined to act.
138fan Yao-nan was a "modernist", an ambitious official who had been
educated in Japan and whom Yang Tseng-hsin 'distrusted on eight'~ Ha was
appointed to the post of tao-yin of Aksu by the Central Government in
Peking - an appointment which yang could easily have ignored, but it
134. Bosshard, W., 'Politics and Trade in Central Asia', p. 436j cf •
.._.Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p."64. According to Mildred Cable and
francesca french, Yang sent his wealth end family to the safety of
the British concession"atrTientsin.- See their description of how,
in 1926, Yang smuggled his eldest son out of sinkiang in disguise in
the company of these missionaries. The Gobi Desert (London,1943),
pp. 232-3.
135. Roerich, N., Altai-Himalaya, p. 280.
136. Roerich, ibid., describes the statue as 'an ugly little copper figure
with gilded epaulettes and stars'. cf. Hedin and Bergman, History of
the Expedition in Asia, Vol I, p. 252.
137. Boorman and Howard, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, Vol. IV •
It seems most unlikely that the autocratic Yang ~ould ever have agreed
submit to Chiang Kai-shek, and it therefore seems probable that he was
preparing to leave sinkiang permanently.
138. According to Nyman (op.cit., p.73), ran favoured the industrialisation
of sinkiang and wished to improve the living conditions of the in-
digenous peoples.
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appears that he was impressed with Fan's abilities.139 Fan must have
proved useful to Yang, for he rose to the position of tao-yin of Urumchi,
140and was made Sinkiang Provincial Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.
Nevertheless, it would seem that neither Yang nor Fan respected each
other; Yang Tseng-hsin told his Industrial Commissioner Yen Ting-shan,
who claims to have warned Yang against Fan on numerous occasions, that
he kept Fan 'chained like a tiger',141 whilst in March 1926 Fan Yao-nan
142suggested to the German scientist Filchner that Yang was mad. Together
with a small group of like-minded officials, amongst whom were included
the engineer at the Urumchi telegraph station and the dean of the local
school of law, Fan determined to assassinate the aged autocrat. Nyman
has suggested that Fan may have wished to gain the favour of the Kuomintang,
143to which party he is reported to have belonged. In any event, on July
7th 1928, 6 days after Yang had officially assumed the post of Chairman
of the Sinkiang Provincial Government under the Kuomintang, Fan struck.
On the day in question, Yang was invited to a banquet to celebrate
a graduation ceremony at the Urumchi law school. ran had arranged the
banquet, and eighteen of his soldiers were present, disguised as waiters
144'with red bands round their arms and Browning pistols in their sleeves'.
139. Wu Ai-chen, Turkistan Tumult, p. 46.
140. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol. IV , p. 13.
141. Wu Ai-chen, op.cit., p. 47. Yen remarked to Yang that 'tigers were
awkward beasts to handle'; Yang replied 'not to a tiger trainer'.
142. In his conversation with Filchner, Fan criticized Yang bitterly,
and pointed meaningfully at his head. Filchner, W., Om Mani Padme
~ (Leipzig, 1938), pp. 40-41.
143.
144. Anon, 'His Excellency yang Teng-hsin', p. 87.
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During the course of the meal fan proposed a toast to the health of Yang
Tseng-hsln, at which time
shots rang out simultaneously, all aimed at the Governor.
Seven bullets in all were fired, and all reached their
mark. Yang, mortally wounded, but superb in death, glared
an angry defiance at his foes, 'who dares do this?' he
questioned in the loud voice which had commanded instant
obedience for so many years. Then he fell slowly forward,
his last glance resting upon the face of the trusted Yen,
as though to ask forgiveness that he had not listened to
the advice so often given to him.145
According to Yen Ting-shan, who was himself wounded, fan Yao-nan later
146finished Yang Tseng-hsin off with two further shots.
Immediately after the assassination, in which some fifteen or sixteen
people were killed or wounded, fan went to Yang's official residence to
seize the seals of office. Once inside the building he,sent a letter
summoning Chin Shu-jen, commissioner for civil affairs in ~inkiang and
Yang's second in command. Chin called fan's bluff by refusing to come
and sending soldiers of his own to arrest fan. In the power struggle
which followed, Fan, who had seriously miscalculated the strength of his
personal support, lost out. After a short gun battle he was arrested by
Chin and subsequently executed, together with a number of his accomplices,
on July 8th.147
The outwardly dignified and austere manner of the dead Yang Tseng-
145. from the eye-witness account of Yen Ting-shan ("the trusted Yen");
Wu Ai-chen, op.cit., p. 49. See also the detailed account of Yang's
assassination,. together with a photograph of Yang, fan, Yen end the
other main protagonists in Sven Hedin's Riddles oft~.Gobi Desert
(London, 1933), pp. 60-70.
146. ibid •..........
147. According to G.N. Roerich (op.cit., p. 119), 'fan Yao-han (sic) and
his daughter were condemned to the ling-chi, a torture of being cut
alive into 10,000 pieces. fan was made to witness the horrible death
of his daughter'. See also the lurid account of fan's execution in
Hedin's Sino-Swedish Expedition, Vol II, p.4.
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hsin had made a favourable impression on many visitors, both Chinese and
Western, to his province - especially when seen against a backdrop of
contemporary China. Yet Yang's seventeen years of power, still widely
portrayed as a pariod of comparative calm and justice for the indigenous
148peoples of Sinkiang, were in reality no more than an ossified version
of the Imperial administration where 'economic rapacity was brought to
perfection,.149 The .eeds of Muslim revolt sown by yang between 1912
and 1928 were ultimately to be reaped by his less able successor, Chin
Shu-Jen, during the early 1930s.
148. See, for example, Richard Yang's 'Sinkiang Under the Administration
of Governor yang Tseng-hein', an informative but uncritical
eulogy or Yang's policies.
149. Nyman, op.cit., p. 28.
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CHAPTER 4
SINKIANG, 1928-31: THe REBELLION AT KUMUL AND THE fIRST TUNGAN INVASION
He was like the rider on the pale horse, which
appeared when the fourth seal was broken: "And
I looked, and behold a pal. horse; and his name
that Bat on him was death, and Hell followed
with him. And power was given unto them over
the fourth part of the earth, to kill with the
sword, and with hunger and death, and with the
beasts of the earth.
1Sven Hedin, on ~a Chung-Ying.
He was a silly boy. He went mad. He murdered
everyone.
2Rewi Alley. on ~a Chung-ying.
4.1 The Administration of Chin Shu-'en
Yang Tseng-hain's successor, Chin Shu-jen (see plate 4), was a
Han Chinese of Kansu, born in Tao-ho haien, near Ho-chou (the modern
Lin-haia) circa 1883. After graduating from the Kansu provincial
academy, he served for a time as the principal of a provincial normal
school. He then entered the Imperial civil service, where he came to
the attention of Yang Tseng-hain, then district magistrate at Ho-chou.
Chin must have made a favourable impression on Yang, for when the
latter was transferred to Sinkiang in 1907, Chin followed him to serve
1. Hedin,S., Big Horse's flight (London, 1936), p. 17.
2. Davidson, B., Turkastan Alive, p. 109. Rewi Alley is a New Zea-
lander, who has lived in China for over forty years and who knew
~aChung-ying personally.
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3as a hsien (district) magistrate. following the collapse of the Ch'ing
in 1911, Chin rose steadily in rank throughout Yang Tseng-hein'e long
period of absolute power (in the light of Yang's known tendency to
. 4surround himself with opium addicts and sycophants, a sure sign of
mediocrity). In 1927, Chin became provincial commissioner for civil
affairs at Urumchi, a post which he held at the time of Yang's assassin-
Sation in July 1928.
After his elimination of fan Yao-nan, Chin, who was already in
effective control of Sinkiang, sent a telegram to Nanking seeking
official KMT recognition of his position. faced with a fait accompli
Nanking had no elternative other than to confirm Chin in office, though
under the new KMT terminology he was appointed Provincial chairman
(Ch. chu-hsi) and commander-in-chief (Ch.tsung -sBu-ling) in contrast
to his predecessor, Yang Tseng-hsin, whose official titles had been
provincial governor (Ch. sheng-chiang) and military governor (Ch. tu-cnun).
Immediately following his seizure of power ChIn took step. to
secure his position. Aa a first step the secret police force was sub-
3. Boorman and Howard, Bi~9raphical Dictionary 0' Republican China, Vol I,
p. 381. In later years Chin was to claim that ha never wished to go to
Sinkiang: 'when Governor yang of Sinkiang first sent for ma to Join him
••• 1 twice refused to go. On the third occasion he added the taunt
that I was afraid to leave my quiet country life for that dangerous
region, and I could refuse him no longer'. Hogg, C., I See a New
China (London, 1945), p. 118.
4. Two sources which indict Chin as an opium addict are: Cable, ~., and f.
french, The Gobi Desert (London, 1943), p. 219. Nyman, op.cit., p. 80.
Georges Le fevre, who mat Chin during the CitroSn Expedition's stay in
Urumchi (in 1931),does not mention opium, but describes a dinner party
at which Chin, 'sunk deep in his chair, eyes half-closed, preserved his
habitual mask, turning his head towards a speaker without llatening,
looking without seeing, nodding without understanding, end smoking
innumerable cigarettes, ~hich were lit and inserted into his long Jsde
cigarette holder by one of his guards'. An Eastern Odyssey (London,
1935), pp. 260-61.
5. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol I, p. 381.
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6stantially increased, salaries for all ranks in both the army and police
7force were doubled, and new uniforms were issued. later the army was
8expanded, and Chin took steps to acquire new weapons. The administra-
tive system employed by the late Ch'ing governors end Yang Tseng-hsin
9 .
was retained almost unchanged, whilst in the appointment of provincial
officials Chin followed the example of his ~entor Yang Tseng-hsin by
surrounding himself with a coterie of relatives and fellow-provincials.
Under the new regime, therefore, Yunnanese followers of ~eng (both Hen
and Hui) were rapidly repleced by Han Chinese from Chin's native Kansu -
10especially from the Ho-chou region. Chin's~younger brother, Chin Shu-
hsin, was appointed provincial commissioner for military effairs et
Urumchi, and another brother, Chin Shu-chih, was given the senior military
11post at Kashgar. Similarly Chin's orderly and bodyguard, Te'ui Chao-
chi, was promoted to the position of brigade commander at Urumchi.12
Chin maintained and expanded Yang Tseng-hsin'. system of internal
..
surveillance and censorship. According to H. french Ridley of the Chine
Inland Mission at Urumchi, people were executed for 'merely making in-
6. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 65.
7. lQbE, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933. (Report of R.P. Watts. British Vice-
Consul Kashgar, dated 21st October 1932).
8. Hedin, S., 8ig Horse's fli9ht (London, 1936), p. 3; lQha, l/PlS/12/
2342. PZ.5695.1931. (Kashgar Annual Report, 1930-31),
9. In another change of terminology under the new KMT system the eight
tan -yin (circuit intendants) became known as hsiang -chung ch' ang-kuan
(executive chief officials). for ease of reference the term tao-yin
will be retained in the present stUdy.
10. A lampoon current in Urumchi during Chin's rule ended with tha couplet
"In the morning learn the Hochow dialect, and you'll gat s fat Job in
the evening". Hedin, S., Big Horse's flight, p. 171.
11. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol 1, p. 381; Chan, fook-lam Gilbert,
'The Road to Power: Sheng Shih-ta'ai's Early years in Sinkiang,
1930-34', Journal of Oriental Studies, VII (1969), p. 230; cf•.
Lattimore, Pivot, p. 65.
12•. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol I. p. 381.
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13discreet remarks in the street during ordinary conversation'. Besides
increasing the strength of both the secret and ordinary police forces,
Chin introduced a system of internal passports 80 that any journey per-
formed within Sinkiang needed an official passport (signed, according to
14Jack Chen, by Chin himself), thus tightening internal security and,
incidentally, providing a further source of official revenUB for the venal
provincial edministration. Travel outside the province became well-nigh
impossible, especially for Han officials and merchants wishing to travel
to China proper. Yet despite thesB precautions, Chin clearly faIt
insecure in his position as provincial chairman; several sources report
that he hardly ever left his yamen, and when he did so it was only under
15the tightest security.
Under Chin Shu-jen the economy of Sinkiang continued to deteriorate
as the new chairman followed the example set by his predecessor in single-
mindedly eccumulating a personal fortune, only less discreetly, and
, "6'
at a. greatly increased, rate. .:. Aa; has been shown, with
13. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.5443.32. According to member. of tha Citroen
Expedition, who were detained by Chin in Urumchi for some months
during 1931, the provincial chairman maintained an incinerator at hi.
yamen where ell imported printed matter was burned. Le favre, G., ~
Eastern Odyssey, p. 173. for other details of censorship aee: Hedin,
S., Big Horse's flight, p. 3; History of the Expedition in Asia,
Vol II, p. 202; Nyman, op.cit., p. BO.
14. Chen, J., The Sinkiang story, p. 174. It i8 difficult to sea how Chin
could have signed internal passport. for the Kashgar region, whil.t
several hundred milas ewey in Urumchi. See however, Hedin, History
of the Expedition in Asia, VallI, p. 202, whare it ia etated that
travel within S~nkiang was impossible ~ithout 8 permit bearing Chin
Shu-Jan's parsonal eeal.
15. La favre, G., An Eastern Odyssey, p. 261; Hedin, S., History or the
Expedition in Asia, VallI, p. 25.
16. Chin almost certainly realised that, in contrast to Yang Teeng-hein'.
time, contemporary political conditions militated against 8 prolonged
period of personal power; for this reason he was enxious to make 8
sUbstantial fortune end to return to China proper as aoon aa poasible.
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the collapse of the Ch'ing in 1911, Yang Tseng-hsin introduced a provincial
fiduciary system based on the issue of four regional paper currencies. His
initial issue of unbacked paper currency had a faca value of 10 million
taels. Chin Shu-Jen took this process several stages further by axpanding
the issue to 145 million taels, thus fuelling the already considerable
, 17inflation within the province., Under Yang Tseng-hsin land tax was already
established as the major source of provincial revenue, though Yang took
care not to push the Turkic peasantry into open revolt; under Chin, however,
caution was thrown to the winds and land revenues were collected to almost
18double the legal amount. Yang had been prepared to settle for a share -
albeit substantial - in the profits made by private enterprise within his
domain. Chin, however, emulated Ma rU-hsing, the barbarous t'i-t'ai of
Kashgar from 1916 to 1924, in establishing "government" monopolies on
various profitable enterprises, notably the working of gold at Keriya and
Jade at Khotan. Chin also established a monopoly on the valu2bla wool
and pelt trade of Sinkiang (notably karakul); and with the backing mf the
expanded police force and army he was able to force the sale of lambskins
19at a mere 10% of the market value. Officials of Chin's administration
also prospered. According to one contemporary Russian source, under Chin's
17. Chiang Ch~n-chang, Hsin-chiang chin-yin lun (Chungking, 1939), p. 136.
lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 66; cf. lQhE, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933.
18. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 66; Nyman, op.cit., p. 81. According to
an anonymous article published in the Tashkent edition of Pravda
for 8th August, 1930: 'It is not possible to define accurately the
limits of the taxes paid by the Tien Shan peasants, since they ara
collected not only in the form of a land tax (5 to 10% of the crop),
but also by means of forced work, by tha collection of money for the
use of officials, by the surrender of a fixed number of days work to
to the priest (sic), by the r~ral administration, etc.'(Translation
from the Russian in IOlR, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.477.1931, 'Tien Shan on
the Verge of a Crisi~
19. lQbfi, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933; lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 66;
Hedin, S., History of the Expedition in Asia. Vol II, p. 202.
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regime only 12% of trade capital held in Urumchi belonged to local
merchants, whilst 37% belonged to the ncompradore bourgeoisie" (i.e.
Han and foreign merchants), and a massive 51% belonged to Chinese
officia1s.20 As in Yang Tseng-hain's time, wealth flowed out of tha
province in a continuous stream, much of it to banks in China proper.
Chin was deeply involved in the export of gold bullion - indeed
according to Sven Hedin, the provincial chairman maintained a personal
21monopoly on the export of gold dust. Naturally Chin Shu-Jen left no
official records of his dealings in bullion, but indications of his
involvement do exist. Georg Vasel, a German engineer {and Nazi agent)22
who was active in the construction of airfields in Kansu during tha
early 1930s, records a meeting in Su-chou with a German pilot, Rathje,
who had been employed by Chin to fly one million dollars' worth of
23bullion from Urumchi to Peking. That Chin exported gold bullion by
air is confirmed by Schomberg, a British colonel who travelled extensively
in Sinkiang on behalf of the British intelligence services during the leta
20. Nemchenko, M., 'Kglonial'nvi rezhim i egrarnxe otnosheniya v Sin'
tsyane' (The Colonial Regime and Agrarian Relations in Sinkieng),
Problemy Kitaye VIII-IX, 3-4 (1931), p. 187.
21. Hedin, S., History of the Expedition in Asia, Vol II, p. 202. This is
in contrast to Nyman's 8u9gestion that 'even Governor Chin indulged
in gold export by air to China proper' (implying widespread bullion
export by Chin's subordinates) op.cit., p. 85; It should bs borns in
mind, however, that Hedin knew Chin personally, whilst Nyman is
anxious to present Chin Shu-jen in a more favourable light than is
usual.
22. Vasel, the author of two travel books on Northwest China, is clearly
author of the anonymous, but overtly National Socialist article
'Ourchdringungspolitik in Zentralasien', Berichte des Asiens Arbeit-
kreises, I (1939), pp. 5-30. r am obliged to David Gordon for pointing
this out to me.
23. Vasel, G., My Russian Jailers in China (London, 1937), p. 97. According
to Nemchenko,between 2 and 3 million dollars' worth of gold and Mexioan
silver dollars was exported from Sinkiang annually during Chin'. regime.
'Kolonial'nyi rezhim i agrarnye otnosheniya v Sin'teyane', p. 182.
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241920& and early 1930s. Chin also attempted to obtain hard currency from
the Citro:n Expedition, using much the same method as Yang Tseng-hsin had
employed in his dealings with the Sino-Swedish Expedition in 1927.25
Le Fevre records that the chairman had made an agreement with Haardt, the
leader of the Citro:n Expedition, to 'advance any sum in Sinkiang currency
against payment in silver dollars to his account in Tientsin'. Once
again, however, Chin proved more inept than his predecessor; the rate of
r:
exchange he offered Haardt was so prohibitive that the Frenchman had
secretly to resort to the Urumchi black market.26
From the moment of his seizure of power, Chin Shu-Jen did his best
to exclude all foreigners and foreign influence from his domain.27 His
barely-concealed hostility to those Westerners who did manage to visit
Urumchi is generally attributed to Chin's supposedly deep-seated Xeno-
28phobia. Indeed it seems highly probable that Chin had little love for
Europeans, whether capitalist or communist. It should be noted, how.ver,
that many of the "diplomats· and "explorers· active in Sinkiang during the
24. £BQ, Fa 371/16214 - F 3035/340/10. Schomberg, R.F.C., (Report on Sin-
kiang. 1930-31), esp. pp. 2,4; see also IOLR. L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.5443.
32 (Information supplied by Revd. H. French Ridley. China Inland
Mission, recently returned from Urumch1).
25. See above, p. 104.
26. Le Fevre, G., An Eastern Odyssey, p. 263. The rate demanded by the
avaricious Chin Shu-jen was 250% that asked by the Urumchi representa-
tives of the various Tientsin firms operating in Sinkiang.
27. Chin forbade the British Consul General at Kashgar to visit Urumchi;
IOLR/L/P&S/10/976,.P.3679.1929 (Kashgar Monthly Diaries, Feb. 1929);
he made considerable difficulties for the citroin Expedition (Le Fevra
An Eastern Odyssey, pp. 253-68, 'In the Trap of Urumchi'),and for
Hedin's Sino-Swedish Expedition (History of the Expedition in Asie,
Vol II, pp. 25-31).
28. Hedin, S., Big Horse's Flight, p. 3. See, however, Lattimore, 0.,
High Tartary, pp. 304-6, for an alternative view.
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1920s and early 1930s were, in fact, in the employ of foreign powers
29seeking to influence the course of events in Central Asia. Nor was
Chin's "xenophobia" limited to Westerners; he imposed strict limits on
contacts between Sinkiang and China proper, and excluded KMT function-
aries from the province whenever possible. It has been suggested that
30Chin sought to conceal from Nanking the extent of his misgovernment,
but it ia more probable that ha simply wished to keep the K~T ignorant
of his operations and thus less able to interfere; besides, in
Republican China misgovernment by warlord governments, including the
K~T at Nanking, was the established norm.
Doubtless Chin Shu-Jen sought to emulate his ~ore able predecessor
by maintaining in Sinkiang a closed, almost medieval society, and he would
probably have been content to limit external trade to the exchange of
31long-distance caravans with China proper. However, by the late 1920s
this was no longer possible. Under normal conditions a transport from
Urumchi to Tientsin took from 120 to 180 days,32 but following reng
"Yu-hsiang's occupation of eastern Kansu and tha resultant increase in
33civil disorder, trade along this route was completely disrupted. This
29. Most notably It.Col. R.f.C. Schomberg and Georg Vasal, both of whom
have already been cited. Hedin, the leader of the Sino-Swedish
Expedition, was later (in 1933) employed by the Nanking Government
to study the possibility of improved road links with Sinkiang.(Hedin,
S., The Silk Road (London, 1935),pp. 9-14). Nyman characterises
Chin's period of rule as a time when 'Sinkiang became the target of
political influence from Great Britain, the Kuomintang, Japan, Germany
and Turkey' (op.cit., p. 79). Chin's reaction was to exclude a8 many
foreigners as possible.
30. Hedin, S., Big Horse's flight, p. 3.
31. See above, p. '0+.
32 Camel caravans travelling from Sinkiang to China proper left Ku-ch'eng
-tze ,for the railhead in Sui-yuan via Inner Mongolia, a distance·
of over 1200 miles; alternatively cart. left Kumul for the railhead
in Shensi via Kansu, an even greater distance. Lattimore, Pivot of
E.!!!, p. 172.
33. Barber, A., and N.D. Hanwell, 'The Emergence of China'. far West',
far Eastern Survey, VIII, 9 (April 26th, 1939), p. 103.
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severing of the traditional trade route to China coincided with the re-
emergence of Russia, in its Soviet guise, as Sinkiang's major trading
34partner. In 1926 the Soviet government decided to construct a new
railroad linking frunze, the capital of the Kirghiz SSR, with Semipal-
atinsk in western Siberia. This railroad, to be known as the Turksib,
was aimed primarily at the development of Western Turkestan and at it.
fuller integration within the Soviet economic system. However it was
made clear by Artemi Khalatov, a leading official in the Soviet Railway
Commissariat, that the new railroad (which ran parallel to the Sinkiang
frontier for over 400 miles) was also designed to 'prevent the pene-
35tration of western European capitalism into Sinkiang'. With the
completion of the Turksib in 1930 the Soviet economic stranglehold on
36Sinkiang became all but complete. China's share of the Sinkiang market
dropped to a mere 12.5%,37 and the value of Soviet trade with the provine.,
which at the time of Russian Civil War had fallen to almost nil, ross to
38over 32 million roubles during the course of 1930. Moreover, the ex-
tension of a virtual Soviet trade monopoly over Sinkiang adversely affected
34. See above, p. 103. also Nyman, op.cit., pp. 35-8 • .!.Q!J1, l/P1S/2/2336.
PZ.3394.1932 (Soviet Trade with Sinkiang) contains 8 detailed report on
"Sovsintorg", the Soviet-Sinkiang Trading Company.
35. Khalatov, A., 0 Turkestano-Sibirskoi Zheleznoi Dorog8 (1927), pp. 29-31;
cited in Dallin, D.J., Soviet Russia and the fer [est (New Haven, 1948),
p. 91; cf. Cheng lien-fang, A History of SinO-Russian Relations (West-
port, Connecticut, 1975), p. 168.
36. Chan, fook-lam Gilbert, op.cit., p. 231; Lattimore, Pivot of ASis, pp.
66-7. ls'eng Wen-wu, 'Su-o tui Hsin-chien chih chin -chi ch'in-lueh'
(Soviet Russia's Economic Aggression Against Sinkiang , Hs n Ya-hs -ya,
VII, 2 (feb 1934) p. 50.
37. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 172.
38. ~., pp. 66-7. According to the anonymous article 'Tien Shan on the
Vergs of a Crisis' (Pravda, 8th August 1930), trade b.tween the USSR
and Sinkiang increased eightfold between 1925 and 1930. (IOlR, L/P&S/12/
,2331, PZ.477.1931).
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the local merchants and cotton farmers, who found themselves unable to
compete. The resultant decline in the fortunes of these Sinkiang
merchants was reflected in a fall in revenue which, in an all-too
familiar Jvicious circle, led to additional forms of taxation baing
devised by the provincial authorities.39 The completion of the Turk-
sib also co~tributed substantially to the growth of Soviet political
influence in Sinkiang. It became faster and easier to travel from
China proper to Sinkiang via Vladivostok, the Trana-Siberian and the
40Turksib than across Northwest China; besides adding to Soviet prestige
in the eyes of the Turkic Muslims of Sinkiang, this naturally gave the
Soviet government a degree of control over Nanking's relations with
Urumchi through its right to withold visas, and thu8 to control the
aceessibility of Sinkiang to KMT officials.41
4.2 The Annexation of the Khanate of Kumul
Chin Shu-jen's policies towards the Turkic Muslims of Sinkiang, as
well as towards the Tungans and Mongols, were singularly misconceived
from the very beginning of his rule. According to Mildred Cable and
francesca french, two British missionaries long resident in Northwest
China at the time of Chin's seizure of power:
Chin Shu-jen, Governor of Chinese Turkestan,
had none of the qualities essential to good
rule or wise administration. He was a man
beset by fears, alternately too feeble or
39. Beloff, M., The foreign policy of Soviet Russia (London, 1966),
Vol. I, pp. 231-2.
40. Wu Ai-chen travelled to Sinkiang on behalf of the Nanking guvernment
during 1932 by this route. lurkistan Tumult, pp. 5-20.
41. Beloff, op.cit., Vol I, p. 231; cf. Cheng lien-fang, op.cit., p. 169.
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too harsh, dealing out leniency to the rich
and severity to the poor, and showing that
combination of tyranny and vacillation which
is the most fatal characteristic that an
autocrat can possess.42
According to Nyman, Chin was prejudiced against ~uslims 'because of
43unpleasant experiences in his home province of Kansu'. Whatever the
truth of this assertion, Chin rapidly antagonised both his Turkic and
Tungan Muslim subjects by introducing a tax on the butchering of all
44animals in the province, and by forbidding Muslims to perform the ~aJJ
45to Mecca, 'probably to stop money leaving the country'. Clumsy
attempts by the provincial administration to impose Han Chinese officials
on the Kirghiz and Mongol nomads of the Tien Shan led to armed demonstra-
tions against Chin and ~he death of a number of Mongols during 1929.46
As a result of these and other similarly short-sighted policies, the Muslim
majority of the province, as well as the militarily important Torgut
47Mongols of the Tien Shan, came to despise Chin Shu-jen.
Despite this widespread hostility towards Chin, the first challenges
to his autocratic rule came not from the various minority peoples of the
province, but from ambitious Han officers under his command. In May,
1929, the Tao-yin of Altai attempted to .tage a coup against Chin's regime,
but the provincial chairman had been forewarned, and was able to confine
42. Cable, M., and f. french, The Gobi Desert (london, 1943), p. 220.
43. Nyman, op.cit., p. 80.
44. ~,l/P&S/12/2342, PZ.5695.1931 (Kashgsr Annual Report. 1930-31).
45. lQhft, l/P&S/2/2336, (Lt.Col. Schomberg's Report on Sinkiang. 1930-31),
p. 21.
46. ~., p. 9 ('Action Against the Nomads').
47. Lin Tung-hai 'Impressions of Sinkiang', People's Tribune, NS, V (1933),
p. 534.
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48any fighting to the Shara Sume area. In the spring of 1931 troubles
broke out in Urumchi itself, as discontented Han Officers and soldiers
launched an attack on Chin's yamen. The attack failed, and the in-
49stigators of the plot were summarily executed.
Chin finally pushed the Turkic Muslims of Sinkiang into open
rebellion in 1931 as a result of his annexation of the Kumul Khanate,
known to the Chinese as Ha-mi. After T80 Teung-t'ang's reconquest of
Sinkiang in the 1870s, a few local principalities were permitted to
survive on a semi-autonomous basis, rather like the "native states" of
the British Indian Empire. Kumul, the most important of these .emi-
autonomous principalities, was ruled by a royal family which dated back
to the Ming Oynasty and which may have been descended from the Chagatai
50Khans. The Khanate of Kumul, which dominated the chief road from
Sinkiang to China proper and was therefore of Gonsiderable strategic
importance to the Chinese, extended from I-wan-ch'Uan northwards to the
Barkol Tagh, thence along the tops of the mountains to Bai and south-
eastwards to Hsing-hsing-hsia on the Sinkiang Kansu frontier. To the
south the Khanate was bounded by the barren wastes of the Ghashun Gobi
48. fEQ, fO 371/14270 - f 2031/416/10 (Schomberg, 'Memo on Chinese Turkes-
tan'), p. 3.
49. ~.
50. Matsumura Jun, 'Mindai Hami oke no kigen' (On the origin of the Royel
family of Kumul during the Ming PerIod), TOYo Gakuho, XXXIX, 4 (March
1957), pp. 32-48. Less important "princely states" existed in Sinkiang
at Lukchun, Aksu and Kuchar. Hedin, S., History of the Expedition in
~, Vol I, p. 225. According to Von Ie Coq, who visited Kumul 1n
1906, only the rulers of Kumul and Lukchun were mamlakat wang, or
"Kings of the realm", whilst the ruler of Aksu was merely a khizmat-
kar-wang, or "titular king". Von Ie Coq, A., 8uried Treasures of
Chinese Turkestan (London, 1928), p. 150.
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( 51see Map No.5).
At the time of the 1911 revolution Maqsud Shah, then aged about 47
years, was on the throne of Kumul - known to the Chinese as the Ha-mi
wang (king), to his subjects as Khan Maqsud or Sultan Maqsud, and to•
European travellers as "the King of the Gobi". He was the 'last
independent Khan of Central Asia •••who had seen his fellow rulers sll
52flung into the stew-pot of progress'. Yang Tseng-hsin, who cama to
power in 1912, waa content to let Kumul ratain its semi-autonomous
status; besides, Maqsud Shah was friendly towards the Chinese.53 He
spoke Turkic with a marked Chinese accent, and wore Chinese clothes;
on the other hand, he had a long white beard and always wore a turban or
a Uighur cap.54 A staunch Muslim, the Khan ruled his petty oasis kingdom
from an ancient and ramshackle palace in Kumul proper - one of the three
towns making up the capital of the Kumul oasis and known to the Chinese
as tha Muslim City (Ch. Hut-ch'eng). The Khan had a bodyguard of 40
Chinese soldiers armed with mausers, and was able to callan the services
of a Chinese garrison billeted in the fortified Chinese town, or Old
City (Ch. Lao-ch'eng). The third town, known as New City (Ch.Hsin-
ch'eng) had a mixed Chinese-Turkic population and contained the main
bazaars.55 By 1928, shortly after the assassination of Yang Tseng-hsin,
53.
54.
Schomberg, R.F.C.,'Hami or Kemol',JRCAS, XVI, 1 (1929), p. 91. The
8ai referred to lies to the north-east of the Karlik Tagh, in
approximately 94095' east, 43030' north, and should not be confused
with the much larger Bai in the central Tien Shan foothills.
Schomberg, R.r.C., A Turkestan Diary, 1926-29 (unpublished Ta.in the
library of the Royal Central Asian Society), p. 45.
Mannerheim, C.G., Across Asia, 1906-8 (Oosterhout, 1969), p. 382.
Schomberg, R.r.C., 'Hami or KomOl', p. 91; also Peaks end Plains of
Central Asia (London, 1933), p. 82.
See Map No.6, based on a map in Mannerheim, op.cit., p. 386.
51.
52.
55.
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-it was estimated that the ageing Maqsud Shah ruled over a population at
between 25,000 and 30,000 Kumulliks. The Khan was responsible for levying
taxes and dispensing justice; his administration rested on 21 begs. 4 at
whom were responsible for Kumul itself, five others being responsible for
the plains villages, and the remaining twelve administering the mountain-
ous regions of the Barkol and Karlik Tagh.56 Maqsud Shah also maintained
a Turkic militia which was reputed to ba better trained than its counter-
5?part in the predominantly Chinese Old City. Throughout Yang Tseng-
hsin's long period of power Kumul remained relatively peaceful and
prosperous. 58 Maqsud Shah paid a small annual tribute to Urumchi, snd in
return the Sinkiang government paid him a formal subsidy of 1,200 silver
taele each year - no doubt in Yang Tseng-hein's opinion a small enough
sum for ensuring the continued obedience of the strategically vital
Khanate. for the Uighurs of Kumul autonomy meant freedom from 'the
59usual swarm of rapacious Chinese officials'. The only tax paid by the
citizens of Kumul was a small one of sheep or goats annually to the Khan.
The soil of the oaeis was rich and well-cultivated, and the condition at
the Kumulliks before 1929 was one of relative contentment end prosperity.60
According to Mildred Cabla and francesca french, both of whom knew Maqsud
Shah personally, the continued existence at the Khanate of Kumul was elsa
56. Schomberg, 'Hami or Komul', p. 92.
5? • lli.!:!.
58. Yang did experience some slight troubles at Kumul during the first
year of his rule. See above, p. eo ; also Yang, R.,'Sinkiang
Under the Administration of Yang Tseng-hsin', pp. 289-90.
59. !Q1.B., l/P&:S/12/2331,PZ.1B1.1933 ('Khanate at Hami'), p. 3.
60. lli.!:!., Note, however, that both Mannerheim, op.cit., pp. 380-5; and
Cable and french, The Gobi Desert, pp. 220-1, state that the Khan
sometimes overtaxed his subjects.
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of psychological importance to the Uighurs of Turfan and the Tarim
Basin:
The Moslem elements in the important oases,
always so difficult to conciliate, were only
tolerant •••so long as their own seat of
government was firmly established at Hami
under Khan Maksud Shah, a man of their o~n
race, religion and speech, who still held the
proud title of King of the Gobi.61
Whilst Yang Tseng-hsin appreciated the importance of Kumul's auton-
omous status for the continuing peace of the province, his successor, Chin
Shu-jen, clearly did not. for the first 19 months of his rule Chin Shu-
jen was content to maintain the traditional status quo, although when
Schomberg visited Kumul in February 1928 (only seven months after Chin's
seizure of power), the area was under martial law, presumably because of
. 62Tungan warlord activities in neighbouring Kansu. Then, in March, 1930
Khan Maqsud Shah died of old age. Maqsud's eldest son and heir, Nasir,•
should have inherited the throne of Kumul, but Chin Shu-jen and his Han
subordinates stationed in Kumul Old City had other plans for the future
of the Kumulliks. Shortly after his father's death NasIr travelled to•
Urumchi, the provincial capital. There is some doubt as to the reason for
his presence in Urumchi. Both Lattimore and Hai state that Nasir was un-•
popular and that he went to Urumchi to seek Chin's aid in imposing himself
on the people of Kumul.63 According to several other sources, however,
NafIr together with his chief counsellor Yulbars Khan (see plate 12),
61. Cable and french, op.cit., p. 220.
62. Schomberg, 'Hami or Komul', p. 92.
63. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 67-B; Hai, Badruddin Wee-liang, Muslim
Minority in China (unpublished MA thesis, Columbia University, NY,
1956), p. 100. Hai's information, at least, must be treated with
caution, as ~e calls Maqsud Khan's successor 'Shakir'.
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was ordered to Urumchi by Chin Shu-jen in order to make formal submission
to the 64provincial government. Chin's subsequent behaviour and the fate
of the Kumul Khanate would seem to indicate that the latter version of
65events is nearer the truth.
At the time of Maqsud Shah's death Li Hsi-ts'eng, a Han Chinese
divisional commander stationed at Kumul, suggested to Chin Shu-jen that
the Khanate should be abolished and its inhabitants brought under the
66direct control of the provincial administration. There can be little
doubt that Chin welcomed this advice - control over Kumul would offer the
possibility of increased revenue and new positions for Han Chinese
officials.67 He therefore took up the suggestion, ordered NasIr and
, .
Yulbars to Urumchi, and rushed a resolution through a meeting of his
ministers abolishing the Khanate and dividing Kumul into three separate
administrative districts, Ha-mi (centred around the capital), I-ho and
68I-wu. When NasIr arrived in Urumchi he was given the position of•
"senior adviser" to the provincial government and forbidden to return to
69Kumul; he remained in Urumchi es e virtual prisoner, and according to
64. lQbE, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933 (Watts), p. 3; Wu Ai-chen, Turkistan
Tumult, p. 62; Cable and french, The Gobi Desert, p. 220; Cheng lien-
fang, op.cit., p. 169; Chen, Gilbert rook-lem, op.cit., p. 234.
65. It i~.unfortunatel~almost impossible to establish the true course of
events, since no eccount is entirely reliable. All western sources ere
secondary. Chinese and Turkic sources are strictly limited end equally
strictly unreliable. Even when retrospective first-hand accounts of
events taking place in Re~ublic!n Sinkieng are evaileble - ~ works by
Sheng Shih-ta'ai and Yulbars Khan in the bibliography - they invarialy
attempt to whitewash the activities of their respective euthors.
66. Chan, rook-lam Gilbert, op.cit., p. 234.
67. Schomberg, 'Hami or Komul', p. 93.
68. Wu Ai-chen, Turkistan Tumult, p. 62. The names I-ho end I-wu dated from
the Han dynasty, end were presumably adopted by Chin Shu-Jen in an
attempt to provide historical legitimacy for hia actions. ru Tung-hsien,
Chung-kuo Hui-chiao shih (Shanghai, 1940), p. 174.
69. Chen, op.cit., p. 234; Wu, op.cit., p. 62.
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70one Chinese source only escaped ~ith his life by bribing Chin heavily.
Yulb;rs, on the other hand, was sent back to Kumul with a group of
Chinese officials who had been instructed by Chin to set up the new
71administrative machinery.
It has been suggested by Lattimore, no doubt with Bome justification,
that the Kumulliks had little love for their Khanate, and that only a
minority of the population wished for NasIr to inherit his father's•
position.72 It is true that the old Khan had, on occasion, over-taxed his
73people and earned their ire as a result. There ware other fectors,
however, which suggest that Lattimore's analysis (which relies primarily
on Tu Chung-yUan, a pro-Chinese source) may overstate the disregard in
which the Kumulliks held their Khan; besides the quastion of Uighur national
pride, already mentioned above, the Khanate is said to have held some
74religious significance for the Turkic ~uslims of Sinkiang. There was
also an important economic factor - elsewhere in Sinkiang Han Chinese
immigrants were permitted to settle on untilled land; with the abolition
of the Khanate traditional restrictions on Han settlement in the region
were lifted, a development which found absolutely no approval with the
Uighur citizens of Kumul.75 Whatever the original attitude of the
Kumulliks to NasIr, Chin Shu-jen was shortly to learn that - in the words•
70. ~, L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933 ('Khanate of Hami'), p. 3. Tu
Chung-yuan, Sheng Shih-te'ei yO hsin Hsin-chiang (Shanghai, 1938),
p. 65, states that Na~Ir bribed Chen to avoid harm.
71. Wu Ai-chen, Turkistan Tumult, p. 62; Cable and french, The Gobi
Desert, p. 220.
72. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 68.
73. See, for example, Cabla and french, The Gobi Desert, pp. 220-1.
74. Wu Ai-chen, Turkistan Tumult, p. 63.
75• .!.!!!.&.
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of the Nanking official Wu Ai-chen - 'subject peoples obstinately prefer
If t t t' ,76se -governmen 0 good governmen • Since Chin's government of Kumul
was anything but good, the bitterness with which the Kumulliks regarded
the passing of their Khanate may be easily imagined.
The newly-appointed Chinese administration upset the people of Kumul
almost from the minute of its installation. It was announced that the
privilege of exemption from direct taxation by Urumchi was to be abolished;
moreover, to add insult to injury, one year's "arrears" of taxes were to
be collected from the Uighur Kumulliks. Meanwhile Kumul was thrown open
to Chinese settlement, and it was announced that settlers taking up this
77offer were exempt from taxation for two years. To make matters worse,
Kumul, which is situated on the chief road from north-western Kansu to
Sinkiang, was at this time subjected to a flow of refUgees from famine
78and warfare in the former province. A column of these unfortunate emigrants
was seen by Berger Bohlin of the Sino-Swedish Expedition in April 1931;
his account makes it clear 'that people in Kansu were well aware of Chin's
opening of the Kumul region to Han settlement:
During my stay at Hua-hai-tze I witnessed e curious
spectacle. The Chen-fan region had for a number of
years been visited by failure of the crops and famine,
and large numbers of people therefore emigrated to
more prosperous tracts. Such an emigration-wave now
passed Hua-hai-tze. It consisted of a caravan of 100
camels, transporting 150 persons with all their baggage
to Sinkiang, where it was said that land was being
76. .!E!E..
77. Chan, Ope cit., p. 234.
78. ror accounts of conditions in contemporary Kansu see: Harris, C.K.,
'The Rebellion in Kansu', Moslem World, XIX, 3 (1929), pp. 291-8;
Ekvall, R.B., 'Revolt of the Crescent in Western China', !!!!,
XXIX (1929), pp. 994;7; 1004-7; also Sheridan, J.E., Chinese Warlord:
The Career of reng Yu-hsiang (Stanford, 1966), pp. 193-7 ('The
KuominchDn in Kansu').
135
thrown open.79
The refugees clearly were not entirely destitute, however, for Bohlin
emphasizes that all were 'carefree and happy' and seemed 'fairly
prosperous'. Chin Shu-jen, a Kansu man himself, was anxious to settle
in Sinkiang as many of these refugees as possible - yet land was not as
plentiful, nor Sinkiang as prosperous as the refugees had been led to
80believe. Chin solved the problem by ordering Lung Hsieh-lin, the
Chinese amban in charge of I-ho district, to provide land for the would-
81be settlers from Kansu. Lung responded by forcing his Uighur subjects
to leave their own cultivated land and handing it over to the Kansu
Chinese. The expropriated Uighurs were "compensated" with untilled
lands on the fringe of the desert where the soil was barren.82 According
to Lattimore the re-settled Uighurs were then assessed for land tax on
the basis of their old holdings (despite the fact that it was customary
in Sinkiang for previously untilled land to be exempted from taxation
for the first two years of cultivation), whilst the Kansu settlers who
had been given the expropriated Uighur land were excused payment of tax
83for three years. The Kumulliks, sorely tried, organised a petition
79. Bohlin, B., 'Palaeontological and Geological Researches in Mongolia
and Kansu, 1929-33' in History of the Expedition in Asia, Vol IV,
p. 285. See also Bohlin's plate 7a, op.cit., p. 284.
BD. According to one contemporary Russian source, the fertile acreage of
Sinkiang amounted to between 750,000 and 850,000 hectares, but only
5% of this was under cotton or scientific cultivation; failure to
develop agriculture was blamed on excessive land tax. The same source
indicates that famine threatened. large parts of Sinkiang in 1930,
with the mass of the peasantry subsisting on maize cake. ~,
L/P&'S/12/2332, PZ.~47_.~931.
, '
81. Chan, op.cit., p. 234; Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 68.
82. Wu Ai-chen, Turkistan Tumult, pp. 63-4.
83. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 68; According to Badruddin Wee-liang Hai
(op.cit., p. 181), expropriated Uighur land was also given to Han
officers in Chin's army.
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which was duly despatched to the chairman's yamen in Urumchi. No
acknowledgement was received, and nothing was done to redress the
84grievances of the dispossessed Uighurs. Instead the settlement of
Kansu Chinese was continued, and the price of food in the Kumul region
began to climb steeply as a result of the large numbers of provincial
85troops billeted in the oasis and on the Kansu frontier. for the
moment the Turkic Muslims of the region remained peaceful, perhaps
lulling Chin Shu-jen into a sense of false security, but according to
Sven Hedin, whose Sino-Swedish Expedition remained in Sinkiang and Kansu
during Chin's period of control:
Discontent increased;tha people clenched their
teeth and bided their time; the atmosphere was
tense and gloomy. Inflammable matter accumulated,
and only a spark was needed to fire the powder
magazine·S6
4.3 The Kumul Rebellion
The explosion at Kumul began as the result of a religious and
cultural slight which offended the sensibilities of the whole Muslim
population, both Turkic and Tungan, and united them against the Chinese
authorities. As a result of the administrative reorganization which
accompanied Chin Shu-jen's annexation of the Kumul Khanate, a young
84. According to two Chinese sources, Lung Hsieh-lin witheld the petition
from Chin Shu-jen. Chan, op.cit., pp. 234-5; Wu, Turkietan Tumult,
p. 64.
85. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933, p. 3. According to Lattimore the
Kumulliks were further angered by a decree issued by the new admin-
istration requiring every citizen to purchase a Bet quota of salt
daily from the Kumul Salt. Bureau; alternatively they might pay cash
for a "salt certificate". Pivot of Asia, p. 68.
86. Hedin,S., Big Horse's flight, p. 3.
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MAP 6. Kumul or Ha-mi: Based on a map drawn by Field Marshal C.G.
Mannerheim in 1907.* The oasis was divided into three towns
and numerous villages. The Muslim City and surrounding
villages were predominantly Uighur, whilst the New City was
mixed, and the "Old City" (in fact, much newer than the Muslim
City), was dominated by the Chinese.
* op.cit., p. 386.
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87Chinese called Chang Mu, from Chin's native district in Kansu, ~as
appointed tax-collector and chief of police to the small village of
Hsiao-p'u, located to the north of Kumul.8e According to Wu Ai-chen
89this Chang was a 'wastrel' ~hose conduct soon became a public scandal.
Early in 1931 Chang's attention was caught by a pretty Turkic Muslim
girl of Hsiao-p'u. He attempted to makeuaeof his position to force
- 90the girl's father, a Uighur called Salah, to give him the girl in• •
marriage. ':"CIslamic shari a law specifically prohibits marriage between
91Muslim women and men of any other religion, a proscription which is
92rigorously observed by ell Muslims, regardless of sect. Two versions
of the subsequent events exist. According to Hai, who relies primarily
on fu Tung-haien, on the night of April 4th, 1931, Chang was invited to
87. According to Gilbert rook-lam Chan, Sinkiang Under Sheng Shih-te'ai,
1933-44 (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1965,
p. 87, fn. 15), the full name of "tax collector Chang" i! not given
in any source; in the recently published memoirs of Yulbars Khan,
however, Chang's name is given in full as Chang Mu; Yao-lo-po-shih
(Yulbars), Yeo-lo-po-shih hui-i lu (Taipei, 1969), p. 78.
88. Hai, op.cit., has "Shiao-pu", whilst Wu, Turkistan Tumult, has "Sieo-
pun. Aomani~ations of place-names at Kumul used in the present study
are taken from the Chinese forms used in Wu'a Chinese work, Hsin-
chiang chi-yu fu Su-l1en yu-chi (Shanghai" 1935), pp. 173-9, hence
Hsiao-p'u, etc. .,
89. Wu Ai-chen, Turkistan Tumult, p. 65.
90. IOLR, L/P&'S/12/2392, Ext. 4910.1941 ("Who's Who in Sinkiang to 15th
April 1940") p , 19 (Saleh Lu Cheng). Hai, op.cit., pp. 101-2, calla
. the girl's fatherCAbdullah. The two names are not mutually exclusive.
91. Schacht, J., An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, 1964). -
92. The story of Chang's attempted ~srriage to a Muslim girl grew almost
out of recognizable proportions as it spread ~estwards from Kumul
across the Muslim ~orld. In 1933 the British Consul-General at Kashgar
heard that Turkic girls ~ere demanded as wives by all the Chinese
officials at Kumul (~, l/P&'S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933. p. 3), whilst
according to an Iranian source dated Teheran, 1960, 'Thousands of
Chinese were moved en masse into Turkestan, and the people of
Turkestan ~ere forced to give their daughters in marriage under the
threat of prison and torture', Isma'il, M.S.,Moslems in the Soviet
Union and China (~, 3936, 1960), p. 8.
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eat at the girl's house, apparently in honour of the forthcoming wedding.
During the course of the meal Chang was attacked by Uighur conspirators,
93and was killed along with 32 members of his 'bodyguard'. Wu Ai-chen
i c -mplies that Chang had already seduced the girl, and that the ulama'
never had any intention of permitting the marriage to take place. Instead,
on the night of the proposed ceremony, a mob appeared in the streets of
Hsiao-p'u. Chang and his soldiers had been drinking, and were easily
overcome by the infuriated Uighurs; all were killed, including the un-
fortunate Uighur girl, and between 20 and 30 rifles were captured. The
rebels next turned their attention to the Kansu Chinese said to have
numbered about 100 families, all of whom were massacred 'and their heads
buried in the soil of their farms,.94
following these successes the rebels turned their attention to the
Chinese outposts at Tu-lu-hu and Lao-mao-hu; at both centres the Chinese
garrisons and tax collectors were killed, and the small arsenals were
captured.95 Armed with weapons taken from Chin's soldiers, the rebels
felt strong enough to move against Kumul itself. It seems that Kumul
.
Muslim City, with its overwhelmingly Uighur population, fell into the
hands of the rebels with little or no fighting; most of the Han Chinese,
however, withdrew into the fortified Old City and barred the gates. Those
96Chinese caught outside the Old City were apparently massacred wholesale,
93. Hai, Badruddin Wee-liang, op.cit., pp. 101-2. According to Hai the
girl was already betrothed to the son of_'a Tu!kish chief called
Yalbuz'. This possible reference to Yulbars Khan must be treated with
caution, and probably represents a later embellishment of events.
Yulbars makes no mention of such a relationship in his memoirs.
94. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 66. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 69, confirms
that the settlers from Kansu were killed. ror an account of the ~Hsiao-
p'u incident" in Arabic see: Hai, Badruddin, Ta'r!kh al-Muslim!n f! al-
~ln (Tripoli, A.H. 1394/1974 A.D.), pp. 122-3.
95. Wu, Turklstan Tumult, p. 66.
96. ~. According to R.P. Watts, the British Vice-Consul at Kashgar,
many Chinese soldiers in outlying districts were amongst those killed.
~, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933, p. 3.
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but when the fighting died down it was clear that a stalemate had been
reached. The rebel forces controlled Kumul Muslim City and the surrounding
countryside, but the provincial forces remained secure within the fortified
Old City, retaining control of its important arsenal. Kumul Ne~ City,
which seems to have had no fortifications worth speaking of, was probably
abandoned to the rebels.97
It is not clear whether the Hsiao-p'u incident was a carefully
planned challenge to the Chinese authorities, or whether it was simply a
spontaneous outburst·by a small Uighur community pushed beyond the limits
of tolerance by a corrupt Chinese official. There are indications, however,
that the troubles at Hsiao-p'u sparked off a much larger rebellion before
the insurgent leaders were fully prepared. According to Mildred Cable
and francesca french, who were resident in the Kumul area during and
shortly after Chin's annexation of the Khanate, a rising against Chin Shu-
jen was being systematically planned by certain prominent Kumulliks:
While officials surreptitiously transferred their
wealth to a place of safety, the instigators of
trouble were equally persistent in their secret
preparations for war. Camels and mules were
requisitioned to transport weapons, ammunition
and stocks of food over little-known tracks, that
they might be stored in mountain caves known only
to the few. Steady streams of small caravans
carrying ammunition to the mountains came from the
South Road, from Tunhwang and across the most .
lonely tracks of the desert connecting Kansu with
8arkul. All these converged on the Khan's summer
"palace grounds in Aratam, and the stronghold of
97. According to Mannerheim, who visited Kumul in 1907, the· walls of
the New City were small and neglected, being pierced in two places
by gateways without gates (Across Asia, p. 386). Repairs may, of
course, have been made during the 24 years intervening between his
visit and the 1931 rising, but the Chinese authorities were
probably more concerned with maintaining their fortress at Kumul
Old City.
Bardash ~as stocked with huge supplies of food and
firearms·98
If this was indeed the case, then after the Hsiao-p'u incident
the leaders of the planned rising were faced ~ith a fait accompli.
Vulbars Khan, the former chancellor of Maqs~d Shah, claims to have been
in the Tien Shan 'escaping from the heat' when the fighting started.99
Whether he ~as at Bardash, secretly preparing an uprising, must remain
open to speculation. Certainly he ~as soon to emerge, together ~ith
Khoja Niyas HajjI - (a prominent Uighur ~hose name indicates that he
•
had made the pilgrimage to Mecca, see plate 11) - as joint leader of the
Muslim insurgent forces. Cable and french indicate that the Tungan
100population of Kumul also joined the revolt at this stage - indeed it
is likely that a prominent Tungan Kumullik, referred to by the missionaries
as "Wang the Merchant", was party to the planned rebellion and may have
helped to finance the arms purchase. He is described ss being 'a man of
means', with business links which extended to China, India, Iran and the
Soviet Union, as ~ell es to the ownership of a string of caravanserais
101scattered throughout the oases of Sinkiang. Besides the Tungans, the
Uighur insurgents of Kumul ~ere Joined by the neighbouring Kirghiz
98. Cable and French, The Gobi Desert, p. 223; the two missionaries go on
"to describe how they met a party of gun-runners at Aratam, and how the
gun-runners took flour from them to feed their exhausted camels; cf.
Cable and french, A Desert Journal (London, 1934), p. 137. The Khans
of Kumul maintained three palaces, one at Kumul Muslim City, one at
Arat~m, and one at the natural fortress of Bardash set high in the
Karlik Tagh.
99. Veo-lo-po-shih, oe.cit., p. 78.
100. 'Having gone thus far, the revolt had to run its course, led by the
excitable, turbulent, bloodthirsty Turki. and backed by the ~ealthy,
astute, calculating Tungans'. Cable and french, 0e.cit., p. 221.
101. According to Cable and french, Wang, 'like all Tungans •••was made for
revolt and ~as deeply conscious of racial and religious inadaptability
to Chinese rule', 0e.cit., p. 247.
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of the Karlik Tagh who held a grudge against Chin because of his attempts
to impose Chinese officials on them during 1929;102 according to Wu
Ai-chen troubles also broke out at Barkgl, and the Kazakhs of that area
103joined the insurgents 'to a man'. Chin had clearly succeeded in
alienating all the Turkic peoples of north-eastern Sinkiang, and great
skill in diplomacy was needed if a full scale Muslim rising was yet to
be avoided.
Unfortunately, Chin decided that the situation demanded strong action.
Blind to the limited power of his own military forces, and rejecting the
advice of Liu Wen~lung, his commissioner for education, and Yen Yu-shan,
his commissioner for reconstruction, both of whom advocated a policy of
104conciliation, he ordered troops to proceed against the rebel areas where,
according to Wu Ai-chen, they were instructed to 'act with the utmost
severity,.105 Meanwhile the Muslim insurgents, unable to breach the
fortifications at Kumul Old City, fanned out through the surrounding
countryside looking for Han settlers and soldiers. According to R.P. Watts,
the British Vice Consul-General at Kashgar, an initial detachment of 300
soldiers sent by Chin to relieve the beleaguered troops at Kumul Old City
were surprised by the insurgents and killed almost to a man, their rifles,
ammunition and a machine gun being captured by the Muslim forces.106
102. See above, p. _125.
103. Wu Ai-chen, Turkistan Tumult, pp. 66-7.
104. Chan,' 'The Road to Power', p. 235.
105. Wu Ai-chen, Turkistan Tumult, p. 66.
106. ]jllJ[, L/P&S/12/2331,·PZ.181.1933, p. 3. Watts is the only source to
mention this battle; there is therefore the possibility that he has
made e chronological error in placing it before the Tungan invasion
and is referring to Ma Chung-ying's defeat of Chin's troops at
Ch'i-chiao-ching later in the year. See below, ~. 157.
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Many of the troops thus slain were said to have been sleeping off the
effects of opium, the probability of which is borne out by Schomberg's
1930 report which describes the officer in command of a key garrison at
Kumul 'laying stretched on the kang, smoking his opium in a jade pipe,.107
Oespite this initial success, the insurgent forces were unable to prevent
provincial forces under the command of Chu Jui-ch'ih, the teo-yin of
Aksu, from marching to the relief of Kumul Old City.108 In late April
the siege was lifted. Chu occupied the Old City fortress and ordered
his second-in-command, Hsiung fa-yU, to hold Kumul Muslim City.109 The
Muslim insurgents retained control of the countryside and were able to
harass Chu's fo~ces whenever they strayed too far from their fortified
citadel, but they were unable to offer a serious challenge to the
provincial troops in Kumul Old City_ In the meantime the Chinese troops,
under the leadership of Hsiung fa-yu, began a series of reprisal massacres
against Muslim non-combatants in Kumul Muslim City and the surrounding
villages.110
In an attempt to break this stalemate the Uighur leaders determined
to seek external help in their struggle against Chin Shu-jen. According
to Yulbars Khan a decision was taken to send an appeal to the Kuomintang
government in Nanking. Accordingly "one day in June" 1931 Yulbers, who
was probably chosen because of his fluency in Chinese, set out secretly
107. 1!llJ!, L/P!S/12/2336, ColI 12/5, (Col.Schomberg's Report of 1930-31).
A kang is a mud bed warmed by flues from a stove. The system is
widely used throughout north China.
108. Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 235.
109. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 67.
110. lE!2-, pp. 66-7.
111for Kansu, ostensibly en route for the Chinese capital; whether he
genuinely intended to appeal to Chiang Kai-shek must remain uncertain.
Yulb;rs claims that he travelled directly toSoochow, an important
town in north-western Kansu which was at that time under the control of
Ma Chung-ying (see plate 17), the youngest and most volatile of the
"Five Ma" Tungan warlords and a man destined to play a vital role in the
history of Republican Sinkiang.
4.4 The Involvement of Ma Chung-ring
Little is known of Ma Chung-ying's early years. He was born c. 1910
at Ho-chou in south-eastern Kansu. 112Almost nothing is known of his father,
but Chung-ying shared the same paternal grandfather as the Kansu/Tsingha1
warlords Ma Pu-ch'ing and Ma Pu-fang, and was thus a scion of the extremely
powerful Ma family of Pieh-ts'ang, a small village some 30 kma. 80uth~est
of HO-chou.113 He was also distantly related to the Kansu/Ninghsia war-
lords Ma Hung-k'uei and Ma Hung-pin. Together these warlords came to be
known as the "five Ma" (Ch. Wu Ma) - warlord clique. Ma Chung-ying first
entered military service in 1924 when, at about the age of 14, he Joined
the local Muslim militia. One year later the Kuominch~n forces of Feng Y~-
hsiang, the so-called "Christian General", invaded eastern Kansu. The
111. Yao-Io-po-shih, op.cit., p. 81•.;Yulbirs 'does not remember clearly'
on which day he set out. Yulbars was unusual for a Uighur Turk in
being fluent in Chinese; folke Bergmann of the Sino-Swedish
Expedition even suggests that he may have been half Chinese. History
of the Expedition in Asia, Vol I, p. 221 fn. 1.
112. According to Cable and french,Chung-ying's father was 'a certain
general Ma'. The Gobi Desert, p. 222. See also Andrew, G.f., 'Islam
in North-West China Today', JRCAS, XIX (1932), p. 95, where Ma's
father is called "Ma Tong".
113. Mei, Y.P., 'Stronghold of Muslim China', t!!!, XL (1940), p. 660.
See also appendix III, 'The "Wu Ma"(five Ma) Warlord Clique'.
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Tungan warlords of western Kansu remained, for the most part, aloof
from the struggle. Ma Chung-ying, however, who had been appointed an
officer in the forces of his uncle, Ma Ku-chung, is said to have laid
siege to and captured the important city of Ho-chou on his own
initiative. Ma easily defeated the troops (under the command of Ma Lin,
a great uncle) which were sent to recapture the city. As a result of
these victories Ma Chung-ying, still only 16 or 17 years old, won a
reputation as a military strategist and the nickname "Ga Ssu-ling" or
"Little Commander". Ma Chung-ying's triumph was short-lived, however,
for Ma Ku-chung' had not ordered the occupation of HQ-chou, and pro~ptly
dismissed his nephew for insubordination. Tha "Little Commander"
learned this lesson well; ha withdrew to theHBi-ning area ot Tsinghai
114and began to build up his own privata army.
I
The KuominchDn "pacification" of Kansu left large areas of the
province devastated, but failed to break the independent spirit of its
people. In 1927 north-weatern Kansu was racked by a violent earthquake;
this, combined with the increased use of good arable land for the
cUltivation of opium by reng Y~-hsiang'a regional commander, Liu Y~-fen,
caused widespread famine. Early in the spring of 1928 the patience of the
north-western Tungans ran out, and the s~andard of revolt was raised
against the Kuominch~n by the Muslim general Ma T'ing-hsiang. Ma Chung-
ying rapidly became involved in the fighting, leading three separate
attacks against KuominchDn forces in Ho-chou. According to Robert
(kvall, an American who travelled in south-eastern Kansu at this time:
The revolt had by this time assumed all the
aspects of e holy war. Chanting prayers,
114. Forbes, A.D.W., 'Ma' Chun8-ying', The Dlcyclopaedia er Islam (Leiden),
NE, V· (at press). -.. _
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forty or fifty thousand fighters went into battle
with fanatical zeal •••the young rebel leader Ma
Chong-ing (sie) seemed to bear a charmed life and
by his reckless courage gained the utmost in
obedience and devotion from his ~ffian troops.
The Chinese were panic-stricken at the desperate
courage of the Moslems, but eventually, by ~achine
gun fire and light artillery, p~oved euperior'115
According to American diplomatic reports the ravages of war and famine in
Kansu reduced some people to cannibalism; between 1926 and 1929 as many
as 2 million people may have died.116 One casualty was Ma Chung-ying's
father, who was executed by Liu yO-fen as a reprisal against Chung-ying
during the winter of 1929.117
In 1929 Ma Chung-ying, his position strengthened by several
" 118victories over the Kuominchun, travelled to Nanking, where he enrolled
briefly'in the military academy. It has been suggested that during his
short stay at Nanking Ma offered his services to the nationalist government
on the understanding that, if he could win control of Sinkiang, he would
be recognised by the KMT.119 After leaving Nanking Ma made his way to
Chung-wei on the Yellow River where he rejoined his troops. He then
marched his forces across the southern fringes of the Ala Shan desert to
north-western Kansu where he assumed control over the four districts of
115. (kvall, R., 'Revolt of the Crescent in Western China', ~, XXIX
(1929), pp. 946-7.
116. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, p. 252.
117. Boorman and Howard, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China,II, p.463.
See also Andrew, op.cit., p. 98. Andrew informed Ma of his father's
execution.
118. Andrew, 0R.cit., pp. 87-8.
119. Petro, W., 'Mongolia, Kansu and 5inkiang as seen by a member of the
Haardt-Citroen Expedition', JRCAS, XX, 2 (1933), p. 210, cf. Chan,
'The Road to Power', p. 238, where it is stated .that Ma Chung-
ying joined the KMT.
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120Tun-huang, An-hsi, Soochowand Ken-chou,
Ma Chung-ying was thus the Tungan warlord chieftain controlling
north-western Kansu at the time of the Kumul rising in April 1931.
According to Vulbars Khan, who claims to have set out for Nanking in
~une, 1931, he arrived in Soochow en route for the national capital and
was, apparently by chance, invited to go and eat with the "little
Commander" (who was still only some 21 years of ege). According to his
recently-published memoirs, Vulb;rs was entertained by Ma Chung-ying
and a number of senior Tungan officers of his command including Ma Shih-
ming, Ma ru-y~an, Ma Shih-lu.and Ma Ho-ying. (Vulbars comments that there were
80 man~ "Mas" in Ma Chung-ying's army that it was familiarly known as .
the "Ma Household Army">.121 After the meal Chung-ying dismissed his
officers and began to question Vulbara about the origins and progress
of the Kumul rebellion, and about the present state of affairs of the
Kumul administration. Yulbars claims that he was careful not to criticize
Chin Shu-jen because he was unsure of Chung-ying's purpose •• At this
stage the "Little Commander" began to curse Chin Shu-jen ·and to say that
he was unfit to govern Sinkiang. Yulbars claims that on hearing this he
realised for the first time that 'not all Kansu people were supporters
of Chin'; he therefore took Chung-ying into his confidence and explained
the purpose of his mission to Nanking. Ma Chung-ying immediately asked
VUlbars what he expected to gain from such an appeal to the KMT. On
being told that the Kumulliks wanted Nanking to replace Chin with a new
governor, Ma sat silently for some time, apparently considering the
120. According to Petro (op.cit., p. 211), Ma laid siege to Ningsia,!!!
route for Kansu and only withdrew after receiving a substantial
ransom. This is not mentioned elsewhere.
121. Vao-lo-po-shih, op.cit., pp. 87-8. ·vulbars calls Ma's army the "KMT
36th Division", but·in fact it did not receive this designation until
1932, whilst Vulbars' meeting with Ma at Soochow took place in 1931.
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matter. He then asked whether Yulbars had any personal contacts in the
Nanking government, and on receiving a reply in the negative he advised
Yulbars in the strongest terms not to go to Nanking 'or he would be dis-
appointed'. He gave three reasons for this:
1) The Kuomintang had just finished its Northern Expedition
and needed peace; it was therefore in no position to
replace its frontier governors, whatever their faults.
2) Even if the Nanking government were to agree to Chin Shu-
jen's replacement, it would take two or three years to
put the decision into effect because of the distances
involved.
3) Because of Chin's avarice, he would be disinclined to
comply with an order to step down and might well turn
to a foreign power to bolster his position. In such
circumstances Sinkiang might fall under foreign domination.
Yulbars listened to this advice but then pointed out to Ma that he had
been chosen by his people to go to Nanking. What would happen if he
failed to go? Ma replied:
I have a way ••• l can meet the needs of the Uighurs
of Ha-mi •••In the name of Muslim brotherhood, I
shall take my army into Sinkiang. rirst I shall
alleviate the suffering of the Uighurs of Ha-mi,
then I shall drive Chin Shu-jen from the stage by
force of arms'122
Despite Yulbars version of events - not surprisingly the only
record of the discussion known to exist - it is highly unlikely that Ma
conceived his invasion of Sinkiang over a spontaneous dinner with the
123Uighur leader in the yam en at Soochow. There is a possibility, though
122. l2!£., pp. 88-91.
123. According to Cable and rrench (The Gobi Desert, p. 234), a group of
six Kumulliks was sent to appeal to Ma Chung-ying for aid (the
missionaries watched their departure); moreover the deputation is .
said to have met Ma Chung-ying in Kan-chou, not, Soochow (op.cit.,
pp. 223-4). By June 1931, when Yulbars claims to have set out for
Kansu, Ma had already vacated Kan-chou which had subsequently been
occupied by the troops of his uncle, Ma Pu-fang (Le fevre, op.cit.,
pp. 140-1). Perhaps two separate appeals were sent by the Kumullik
i~surgents, one to Ma Chung-ying, led by the six riders mentioned by
Cable and rrench, and the other (that of,Yulbars), to Nanking? In
such a case would nat Yulbars, one of the two most prominent Kumullik
leaders, have been aware of the earlier mission to Ma Chung-ying?
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no more than that, that even in his memoirs, written almost forty years
after the Kumul rising, Yulbars was anxious to conceal the existence
of a carefully-planned Uighur rising against Chin Shu-jen to which the
Tungans of north-western Kansu were also party.124 Ma Chung-ying was
certainly interested in the Kumul rising before Yulbars' arrival in
Soaohow; moreover Yulb;rs was aware of this interest, for he tells us
elsewhere in his memoirs that Ma Chung-ying had sent messengers to him
seeking information, but that he was unable to help because he "knew
nothing".125 Ma must also have received information on the political
situation in Sinkiang from two Turks, both apparently originating from
Istanbul, who travelled to north-western Kansu from Urumchi early in
1931.126 Both men subsequently became attached to Ma's military head-
_o 127
quarters and one, Kamal Kaya Effendi, became Ma's chief-of-staff. A
possible indication of Ma Chung-ying's earlier involvement in Sinkiang
affairs may also be found In the gun-runners of Bardash. According to
the British missionaries Cable and french, the arms caravans reaching
124. Yulbars' memoirs were published in Taiwan in 1969, at a tim a when he
held the post of governor-in-exile of Sinkiang in the KMT government.
It is therefore unlikely that he would have edmitted to conspiracy
with the Tungan warlord Ma Chung-ying, albeit in a scheme to oust the
widely-discredited Chin Shu-jen.
125. Yao-lo-po-shih, op.cit., p. 87.
126. According to Cable and french these men had travelled to Urumchi with
a view to going into business there; however, they were arrested by
Chin Shu-jen and imprisoned, presumably on suspicion of spying. When
they were eventually released from prison they had lost their caravan
of trade goods and were bankrupt. They subsequently fled from Sin-
kiang to Kansu, where they are said to have approached Ma Chung-ying
with the offer of their military services. (The Cobi Desert, pp. 224-
5). Cable and french seem to have been unaware that both Turks entered
Sinkiang from the Soviet Union. 'Durchdringungspolitik in Zentralasien',
Berichte des Asiens Arbeitkreises No.1 (Vienna),february, 1939, p. 7.
127. Kamal Kaya Effendi seems to have had considerable military experience,
both during the first World War, and later during the Russian Civil
War. See App~ndix I, 'Who Was Who in Republican Sinkiang' for further
details.
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Kumul came from the south and east - that is, from north-western Kansu.
Such traffic would have been all but impossible without Ma Chung-ying's
acquiescence, if not his active participation. Moreover the important·
Tungan community of Kumul is known to have backed the rising, chiefly with
funds. Certainly a Tunganlike"Wang the Merchant", with business contacts
as far afield as Iran, India and Siberia, might reasonably be expected to
have approached his fellow Tungans in neighbouring Kansu for aid in the
planned rebellion.128
Ma's unstable military and financial position in north-western
Kansu would also s~m to indicate a premeditated rather than a spontaneous
movement into Sinkiang. His power base in Kan-chou was strictly temporary.
According to Mildred Cable and francesca french, both of whom were resident in
north-western Kansu under Ma Chung-ying, the young warlord's strategy was
based on the essumption of the paralysing effect
of frightfulness in action, and as a method of
temporary invasion it answered his purpose well,
but it never served him as a basis of true conquest,
. nor did he ever establish rule over one single acre
of the lend which he invaded. His was the method
of the locust •••and his army was always viewed as a
plague. It came, it devoured, and when it had
passed over, the patient, constructively minded
peasants instantly began to repair the damage done
to their fieldS, and to beget sons to replace those
who had been swept eway in his train.129
In 1931 Ma Chung-ying's personal army was by no means large - despite some
,. 130exaggerated reports it probably numbered no more than 1,000 men. Yet
128. See above, p.'~.
129. Cable and french, The Gobi Desert,_ pp. 222-3.
130. According to Hedin, Ma had en army of 10,000 men in north-western Kansu.
Big Horse's flight, p. 5). In view of the fact that Ma's initial invasion
force thrown against Kumul numbered no more than 500 cavalry, Hedin's
figure is likely to be grossly exaggerated. It is difficult if not im-
possible to provide accurate estimates of military strength for the remote
north-west, but according to the China Year Book for 1935 (Shanghai, 1935),
p. 430, the combined military forces for Kokonor (Tsinghal) totalled 5,000.
No doubt Ma's forces attracted large numbers of camp-followers end hangers-
on; this may have misled Hedin, whose colleague, Gerhard Sexell, was
attacked by stray members of a group of Ma's "troops" said to be 1,500
strong in April 1931. History of the Expedition in Asia, Vol IV,
pp. 220-1.
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by the very nature of its modus operandi - aptly described by Cable and
french as 'that of the locust', Ma's army needed to move ever onwards.
Besides, Ma Chung-ying was a highly ambitious young warlord who was to
dream, in his wilder moments, of creating a Muslim empire which would
131include the whole of Soviet, as well as Chinese, Central Asia. In
the spring of '1931, however, Ma Chung-ying, as warlord of north-western
Kansu, had only two possible directions in which to move. One was back
towards China, but this would have involved an attack on his uncle, Ma
Pu-fang, with whom he was conducting a vigorous propaganda war, but 'who
132may have been his secret ally; the other was into Sinkiang, where his
Muslim co-religionists were apparently ready to welcome him as a liberator
from the corrupt Chin Shu-Jen. It is therefore at least certain that,
whether or not Ma Chung-ying was party to a planned Kumullik rebellion
which was sparked off prematurely by the Hsiao-p'u incident, and whether
or not Yulbars Khan really intended to travel beyond north-western Kansu
to Nank!ng,133 the 1931 rising at Kumul occurred at a most opportune
moment for the young Tungan warlord from Kansu.
4.5 ,The first Invasion of Ma Chung-ying
Although Ma Chung-ying had clearly been contemplating an invasion of
131. Hedin, Big Horse's flight, pp. 223-4.
132. Cable and french, The Gobi Desert, pp. 235-6. little or no actual
fighting seems to have taken place. One possible explanation, advanced
by a member of the Citro~n Expedition who knew Ma Chung-ying personally,
is that Chung-ying had reached a secret agreement with Pu-fang by which
the latter would stage a mock attack on Soochow and Kan-chou, occupy
the towns during Ma's attack on Sinkiang, and incidentally provide
some legitimate reason for Chung-ying's move against Chin Shu-Jen.
Petro, op.cit., p. 211. See also le fevre, op.cit., pp. 140-1.
133. According to Wang Wen-hsuan, 'I-yueh-lai chih hsi-pei', K'el-fa hsi-pei,
I, 4 (April 1934), p. 84. Ma actually restrained Yulb~rs to prevent
his trevelling to Nanking.
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Sinkiang for some time, he did not move directly against Kumul, but began
a series of manoeuvres within Kansu which may have been designed to
confuse the Sinkiang authorities or may alternatively have reflected
continuing indecision on the part of the young Tungan warlord. According
to Cable and french Ma Chung-ying made an impetuous decision to move
against Ningsia, but was advised by Kamal Kaya Effendi to turn suddenly
against Sinkiang, thus taking the provincial authorities off their guard.134
Having taken the decision to attack Chin Shu-jen's forces in Sinkiang, Ma
Chung-ying wasted no time making his move. After assembling a force of
135SOg Tungan cavalry, he made a swift crossing of the desert between An-
136hsi and Kumul in the full heat of mid-summer, arriving in the oasis on
June 28th, at almost exactly the same time as the french Citro:n Expedition.
An initial encounter between the venguard of Ma'a Tungan cavalry and a
Chinese machine gun detachment took place at the village of Vi-k'o-shu.
le fevre's account of,the ensuing fighting would seem to indicate that
the Chinese forces included a number of Mongol soldiers.137 After the
Tungans had been beaten back by the Chinese machine guns, the citr08n
134. Cable and French, The Gobi Desert, p. 225.
135. According to Hedin, Big Horse's Flight, p. 5; and Cable and french,
The Gobi Desert, p. 225, Ma's initial invasion force consisted of
500 Tungan cavalry. According to lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 69;
and Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 235, the size of the initial
invasion force was nearer 400. le fevre's figure of 4,000 (op.cit.,
p. 158) is certainly exaggerated, and probably includes the insurgent
Kumullik forces. Cf. Nyman, op.cit., p. 105.
136. All sources cited agree that this was a remarkable feat; it is
interesting to note that preparations for the desert crossing had
been made when Ma's army was billeted at Sooohow, where 'every small
artisan was busy making tin mugs, kettles and water-bottles out of
disused oil tins, or goatskin.bellow8 for blowing up camp fires for
his army', Cable and french, The Gobi Desert, p. 224.
137. Note Le fevre'S description of the butchery of a Muslim prisoner at
Vi-k'o-shu, with the living heart torn from the body, op.cit., pp.
154-5; cf. Chapter-3, p. 74 ,fn. 16 above.
Expedition was able to continua to Kumul Old City, which they found in a
state of turmoil, feverishly organising its defences. The french were
immediately taken to see the Chinese'commandant, Chu Jui-ch'ih. in
route through the muddy streats of the town, packed with military convoys
and soldiers of, all kinds, they saw the faces of anxious Muslims peering
from their shuttered homes, and hanging from a telegraph pole the head,
138heart and liver of an insurgent. Chu gave his permission for the french
to continue towards Urumchi at their_own risk. The Expedition accordingly
set out on July 1st, 1931; however three of their number, including a
European engineer called Petro, were left behind to await the arrival of
further supplies from Kansu. They were thus to witness the first stages
of Ma Chung-ying's siege of Kumul Old City.139
On or about July 3rd Ma Chung-ying sent two messengers to Chu Jui-
ch'ih bearing, according to Petro, the following message:
By order of National Government of China I have
been appointed commander-in-chief of all military
forces of Kansu~and Sinkiang. Having assumed my,
new post on this date, I allow you to petition
for your resignation and larder you to hand over
to me command of the Ha-mi garrison. Urgent order.140
Chu Jui-ch'ih replied by ordering the execution of one of the messengers,
and sending the head back to Ma by means of the other. On the 8Bme night
Ma began a fierce attack on Kumul Old City. However,his Tungan cavalry
were ill-suited for siege warfare, and the Chinese appear to have been
well armed. According to Petro, the garrison had an 'immense stock' of
138. le favre, op.cit., p. 156.
139. See le favre, op.cit., pp. 240-52 ('Petro's story), also Petro, W.,
'Mongolia, Kansu and Sinkiang as seen by a member of the Haardt-
Citroen Expedition', JRCAS, XX, 2 (1933), pp. 205-19. Note that in
the latter source, p. 215, Petro gives June 3rd as the date when Kumul
was attacked by Ma Chung-ying; this is an error, which should read
July 3rd (cf. le f~vre, op.cit., pp. 240-1). .
140. Petro, op.cit., p. 215.
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modern rifles and ammunition, four machine guns, two Krupp 65 mm. howitzers,
141and a number of old brass cannons. Kumul Muslim City had been abandoned
to the insurgents, and the Chinese garrison had withdrawn within the walls
of the Old City. No contemporary description of the Old City forti fica-
tions would appear to exist, but Field Marshal Mannerheim, who visited
Kumul in 1907, has left a detailed account of the fortifications at that
time.142 They appear to have been strong enough to pose a serious
problem for Ma's Tungan cavalry, a force which was to prove itself all but
invincible when facing Chin Shu-jen's troops in the open field.
Petro's description of Ma Chung-ying's first ettack on Kumul Old
City is worth quoting at some length, as it presents a rare picture of
warfare"on Sinkiang's eastern front during the first Tungan invasion. It
is immediately apparent that Ma Chung-ying's struggle with Chin Shu-Jen's
troops was hard and brutal - not at all like some of the mock "battles"
fought out between rival warlords in some parts of contemporary Republican
China. On the night of July 3rd Petro was awoken by cannon, machine-gun
fire and savage yells. He climbed to a point of vantage on the city
walls from where he had a commanding view of the western and northern
approaches to the city:
rrom numerous points on the wall the Chinese were
firing flares which gave a certain amount of light.
There were no enemy on the glacis, but a little
distance beyond, among the bushes, could be seQn
the flashes of their muskets. Suddenly, to the
141 • .!!?!£!•
142. 'laocheng, the actual town, is surrounded by a wall, 31 fathoms high,
with a crenellated parapet and a fosse, about 21 fathoms wide and
1-1t fathoms deep, which is flanked by the gate projections and partly
by other wall projections. Covered clay buildings, 2 between the wall
projections, 3 between the corners and gate projections and 1 on each
wall projection, all with a gun embrasure facing outwards, are built
on the ramparts. -Above the gates the usual towers of wooden lattice
work. The wall is of unbaked bricks and in good preservation. The gates
are of logs with iron fittings, enclosed in arches of baked bricks. In
the archway from gate to gate 44 paces. The Nand S walls of the
fortress are 680 paces in length, the E and W walls 620. Infantry
barracks in the NE corner. The Yamen of the district near the W gate'.
Mannerheim, op.cit., pp. 386-7.
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.beating of drums and the blowing of trumpets, the
glacis swarmed with men rushing towards the high
city wall. The front rank consisted of Chinese
peasants (conscripts from Kansu) carrying scaling
ladders, who were driven forward by Tungan soldiers
armed with huge curved swords.
The air was rent by the shrill battle cries of the
Tungans and the yells of defiance of the defenders.
In spite of e murderous fire, ladders were placed at
different spots, and the rebels •••began to climb up
one after the other. Then the defenders discarded
their firearms for pikes and axes, and hurled down on
the attackers heavy rocks, blazing tow soaked in oil
and hand-grenades •••Notwithstanding the stubborn
defence, several scaling ladders were placed against
the wall, and the Tungans clambered up one after
another. Many were speared or pushed away, but as
they fell to the ground others took their place.
Then the cannonade ceased, and only the clash of steel,
the cries of the wounded, and en occasional pistol
shot could be heard as hand-to-hand fighting began on the
wall itself •••Just when the place seemed to be doomed
a machine gun, which up to this had been silent •••
suddenly came to life. Emplaced in a blockhouse flanking
the wall, it opened fire, mowing down the assault, and
the glacis was soon cleared except for heaps of corpses.143
It is clear that the attacking Tungans lacked heavy artillery for
breaching the city walls. Three separate attacks were made on the night
of July 3rd, but all were beaten back. Chu Jui-ch'ih, a military
veteran, had no intention of surrendering to the "little Commander" whom
144he dismissed contemptuously as a "thieving cub". Ma Chung-ying clearly
had little enthusiasm for this sort of siege warfare, besides which his
forces needed more armaments. On July 5th he led the greater part of his
Tungan cavalry away from Kumul Old City leaving some 2,000 provincial
troops under siege by an estimated 1,000 Uighur insurgents and a handful
145of Tungans. Chu Jui-ch'ih, who was unaware of Ma Chung-ying'a real
143. le f~vre, op.cit., pp. 241-2.
144. Ch. Tsei wa-tzu. le r~vre, op.cit., p. 244.
145. lQkE, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.1S1.1933, p. 11; Petro's figure of 6,000
regular troops comprising the Kumul lao-ch'eng garrison is certainly
exaggerated. le f~vre, op.cit., p. 242.
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146purpose, decided against making a sortie because he feared a trap.
Meanwhile the "Little Commander" led his highly mobile forces over the
Karlik Tagh to Barkol, a move which was quite unexpected by the provincial
authorities. raced with an imminent Tungan attack, Barkal surrendered
without a struggle. According to Hedin, the local commandant went over
to Ma, who seized 2,000 rifles and a large store of emmunition held in
147Barkal arsenal. Leaving a garrison of 1UO men to occupy the capturad
town, Ma turned back to the south.148 According to Wu Ai-chen, with Ma's
already considerable charisma much increased by the desert crossing and
the subsequent capture of Barkol, Kazakhs and Tungans from the region
149to the north of the Karlik Tagh flocked to join his forces. By mid-
July Muslim insurgents were in effective control of the whole territory
of the old Kumul Khanate, from Hsing-hsing-hsia on the Kansu-Sinkiang
frontier to the vicinity of I-wan-ch'Oan on the road to Turfan; groups of
invading Tungan troops from Kansu, in alliance with the insurgent Sinkiang
Muslims, held Hsing-hsing-hsia and Barkal and were participating in the
siege of Kumul Old City; moreover at this time Ma Chung-ying seems to
have enjoyed the full support of the indigenous Muslim peoples, whether
Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz or Sinkiang Tungan.
146. le ravre, op.cit., p. 242.
147. Hedin, 8ig Horse's rlight,p."S. According to Petro, Ma killed most
of the Chinese garrison at Barkol,{op.cit., p. 217).
148. According to Lattimore (writing in 1935), Ma Chung-ying took Barko I
on his return journey to Kansu, and not at the beginning of the
invasion; 'Chinese Turkestan or Sinkiang', The China YearBook, 1935
(Shanghai, 1935), p. 44. This does not agree with the accounts of
Hedin (Big Horse's Flight, p. 5); Cable and rrench (The Gobi Desert,
p. 225); Wu (Turkistan Tumult, p. 67); and Petro (op.cit., p. 217),
all of which agree that Ma took Barkal soon after invading Sinkiang.
149. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 67.
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Chin Shu-jen's initial response to this first Tungan invasion
seems to have been precipitate and ill-Judged. On hearing that Ma Chung-
ying, backed by· the main body of his Tungan cavalry, was approaching Ch'i-
chiao-ching, Chin appointed his chief secretary, lu Hsiao-tsu, commander-
in-chief of the provincial forces; Tu Chih-kuo and Sheng Shih-ts'ai (of
whom more later) were appointed joint chiefs-of-staff. lu Hsiao-tsu was
a civilian with little or no military experience; moreover, according to
Chan fook-lam, he was a bitter rival of Chin Shu-hsin, the younger
brother of Chin Shu-jen and commissioner for military affairs at Urumchi.150
lu hurriedly mustered a force of about 1,000 men, almost ell of whom were
151lacking in military training or experience. Under the command of Tu
Chih-kuo this quite inadequate force was sent to Ch'i-chiao-ching where
it was ordered to stem the Tungan advance pending the despatch of further
reinforcements. In the event, the promised reinforcements never arrived
(being delayed, according to Chan, by Chin Shu-hsin, who seized this
152opportunity to isolate his rival.Tu Chih-kuo). Shortly efter their
arrival at Ch'i-chiao-ching these troops were surprised in a night attack
by Tungan forces and killed almost to a man-153 The commander, Tu Chih-kuo,
154 -is reported to have committed suicide. According to Kamal Kaya Effendi,
150. Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 236.
151. According to Sheng Shih-ts'ai many of these troops were incapable of
even firing a rifle. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 69.
152. Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 236.
153. According to Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 69, only the advance guard of
Tu's troops were attacked by the Tungans, causing the others to 'fall
back in dismay having been ordered to burn all stores which might fall
into enemy hands' - almost certainly a euphemism for the total dis-
integration of the provincial forces. le fevre's statement that 10,000
Chinese troops were mustered at Ch'i-chiao-ching is certainly grossly
exaggerated (op.cit., p. 163; cf. Petro, op.cit., p. 217); similarly
le fevre's figure of 8,000 Chinese dead as a result of the engagement
(op.cit., p. 189).
154. Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 236; Petro, op.cit., p. 217. Elsewhere
Chan states that Tu was killed in battle (Sinkiang Under Sheng Shih-
ts'ai, p. 66). le fevre, op.cit., p. 189, states that the commanding
officer "General Kiu" committed suicide.
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Ma Chung-yingls Turkish chief-of-staff, the Tungan force that defeated Tuls
troops at Chli-chiao-ching was commanded by Ma Chung-ying in person, the
young warlord having approached Chli-chiao-ching by little-known trails
through the Karlik Tagh and Bogdo Ula after his successful capture of Barkol.155
Certainly such a crossing of the mountains would have been possible, for
. ~
although Ma Chung-ying can have~o personal knowledge of the area, Kirghiz
and Kazakh insurgents who knew the Karlik Tagh and Bogdo Ula intimately
were attached to his forces and could have guided him to Tuls encampment at
Chli-chiao-ching.
Following his victories at BarK61 and Chli-chiao-ching, Ma Chung-ying
is believed to have left a detachment of troops guarding the road to Urumchi
before returning to Kumul with the intention of capturing the besieged Old
City. It is difficult to know why Ma failed to follow up his annihilation of
Tu Chih-kuols forces with an advance on Urumchi. It may be that he over-
estimated the strength of Chin Shu-jenls forces defending the provincial
capital; alternatively the Tungan commander may have been unwilling to
advance further into Sinkiang without first eliminating a garrison which might
conceivably • were military fortunes to be reversed - block his retreat to
the security of north-western Kansu. It has been suggested by Wu Ai-chen that
Ma Chung-ying was wounded during the engagement at Chli-chiao-ching and that
106this prevented him from marching on the capital. No mention of such a
wound is made by Petro, however, who spent a week at the Tungan H.a. at
Kumul shortly after the Muslim victory at Chli-chiao-ching and who claims
to have seen and spoken with Ma Chung-ying at this time;1S7 Wu is therefore
155. Petro, 0p.cit., p. 217 (in conversation with Kamal Kaya Effendi); cf.
Le Favre, op.cit., p. 189.
156. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 69. Wu also claims that Ma was surprised by the
number of troops opposing him at Chli-chiao-ching, but considering the
overwhelming nature of his victory over Tu Chih-kuo this claim must be
viewed with some sceptioism.
157. Petro, op.cit., p. 217.
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likely to have written in anticipation of a wound received by Ma on the
western front later in the autumn of 1931.
Both during and after the Tungan campaign in the west of the old
Kumul Khanate, the insurgent Uighurs maintained their pressure on the
forces of Chu Jui-ch'ih besieged within Kumul Old City. After Ma Chung-
ying's return to Kumul the siege proceeded with renewed vigour. Between
July 3rd and October 16th, during which time Petro was present at Kumul
either in the besieged Old City or the Tungan H.a.,158 Ma's forces are
reported to have staged 43 separate attacks on the besieged Chinese
garrison. The Tungans dug trenches and built barricades in their attempts
to storm the walls; meanwhile the besieged troops were forced to eat their
camels, horses and mules. By October 1st the defending troops were
reduced to a per capita ration of 3/4 of a kilo of kaoliang flour daily,
and this was due to run out by the end of the month. Ammunition was also
running very low, and Chu Jui-ch'ih resorted to the use of archaic weapons -
"fire arrows" and "big swords" - preserved in an arsenal established by Tso-
lsung-t'ang during his Sinkiang campaign in the latter half of the nineteenth
century. Petro reports that nothing but opium was available for sale in
the bazaar. Supplies of oil were gradually exhausted - partially as a
result of its being hurled, boiling, on the heads of the attackers. The
Tungans made several attempts to mine and blast the walls, but they lacked
sufficient supplies of powder. On one occasion a breach was made in the
walls, but the attackers blocked it with bales of wool before the attackers
could force an entry. A ditch was subsequently dug around the walls,
flooding the Tungan trenches and preventing further mining. By mid-October
the defending garrison was reduced to desparate straits. According to
158. Petro was employed as a messenger by both sides, and was thus able ~o
visit the Tungan H.C. where he conversed with Ma Chung-ying and Kamal
Kaya Effendi; he later returned to the besieged Old City.
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Petro who, after 108 days in Kumul, broke out of the encircled town on
October 16th in a (successful) attempt to reach Urumchi:
What sustained the men was opium. They could not
have held out without it, and so long as it lasted
and no strenuous effort was dumanded of them, they
could get along on practically no food. At night the
opium lamps of the sentries could be seen sparkling
like little stars the length of the ramparts. The
whole garrison was in fact intoxicated. It was
fantastic!159
It is equally likely that the predominantly Han garrison was driven
to continued resistance by the thought of their probable fate at the hands
of the Tungans should they succumb. Ma Chung-ying refused to accept any terms
other than unconditional surrender, and since the struggle in Sinkiang had
taken an overtly racialist tone neither side had shown much inclination to
take prisoners. In any case, the unexpectedly fierce resistance of Kumul
Old City delayed the Tungan advance on Urumchi and enabled Chin Shu-jen to
begin a hasty reorganization of the provincial forces. As a first step, which
was to prove singularly unsuccessful, Chin ordered Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen,
regent and "Living Buddha" of the Sinkiang Torgut Mongols (see plate 10),
to lead his famed Torgut cavalry against the Tungan forces at Kumul. These
Torgut troops were undoubtedly the best available to the provincial
government, and were probably the only indigenous Sinkiang force capable of
160facing Ma Chung-ying's formidable Tungan cavalry. Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen
was still smarting, however, from Chin Shu-jen's ill-considered attempt to
159. for Petro's description of the siege see his 'Mongolia, Kansu and
Sinkiang as seen by a member of the Haardt-Citro~n Expedition',
pp. 217-8; also Le fe~re, op.cit., pp. 242-9. See also Wu, Turkistan
Tumult, pp. 67-8.
160. for details of the Targut cavalry and their remarkable fighting abilities
see Haslund, H., Men and Gods in Mongolia (London, 1935), 208, 212,
243; also 3 plates facing p. 245. A description of Tsetsen Puntsag
Gegeen may be found in Haslund's Book II, Chapter 5, 'The strong roan of
the Torguts' (op.cit., pp. 240-7).
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force Chinese officials on the Sinkiang Torguts in place of their own
161leaders; moreover a plot had recently been discovered by which the
regent was to have been assassinated by members of his own confederacy
at Karashahr. Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen suspected Chin Shu-jen'scomplicity
in this plot, and when the would-be assassins fled to Urumchi and Chin
refused to surrender or bring them to justice, these suspicions were
largely confirmed.162 The "Living Buddha" accordingly refused to become
involved in the hostilities at Kumul, taking his forces instead to
Karashahr in a demonstration of power which he hoped would be noticed and
understood by Chin Shu-jen. Chin understood very clearly, but for the
present he was preoccupied with the deteriorating position in the north-
east of the province.
Lacking sufficient numbers of reliable Han Chinese troops, Chin
turned next to the sizeable White Russian community which had been estab-
163lished in Sinkiang, especially in the IIi Valley, since the communist
victory in the Russian civil war. Lu Hsiao-tsu, who had proved incompetent
as provincial commander-in-chief, was consequently replaced by Chang P'ei-..yuan, the military commander of the IIi region. Chang immediately began to
build up a force of White Russian "volunteers" - in effect, refugees who
refused to fight for the Chinese authorities at Urumchi until threatened
164with forced repatriation to stalin's Russia. In late September or early
October Chang P'ei-yuan's forces, headed by a force of some 250 White
161. See above, p. 125.
162. lQhli, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933, p. 6; Anon, 'Recent Events in Sinkiang',
JRCAS, XXI, 1 (1934), pp. 82-3.
163. lQhfi, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933, p. 13; Schomberg, R.r.C., 'The IIi
Oistrict', JRCAS, XVI, 4 (1929), p. 457.
164. ~,L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933, p. 13. cf. Chen, 'The Road to Power',
p. 236.
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Russians under the leadership of Colonel Pappengut, a former staff officer
of the Russian Imperial Army, left IIi with the object of relieving the
besieged garrison at Kumu1 Old City. According to British diplomatic
sources, almost all these Russian troops were experienced soldiers who had
served with both the Tsarist and White Russian forces - military experience
which was to make the Russian ~mi9r~ army (Ch. Kuei-hua), the most competent
165force in Sinkiang. It is not clear whether Ma Chung-ying was informed
of the approach of Chang P'ei-yUan and Pappengut, or whether, as indicated
by Cable and french, he simply became tired of the siege at Kumul Old City
166and decided to march on the provincial capital. Whichever might be the
case, he drew most of his Tungan cavalry away from Kumul and rode westwards
along the road to Ch'i-chiao-ching and the advancing Russians. What happened
next is not certain, but it is clear that no major battle between Pappengut's
forces and the Tungan forces took place at this time. It seems probable
that during one of the initial ~kirmishes, according to one report at the
village of Liao-tun (some 60 kms. east of Ch'i-chiao-ching), Ma Chung-ying
167was quite serioUSly wounded, being shot through both legs. Casualties
appear to have been minimal, with the White Russians sustaining losses of
168one dead and two wounded.
As a result of the injury sustained by Ma Chung-ying, a large part of
the Tungan forces present in Sinkiang retreated to north-western Kansu taking
165. ~, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933, p. 4.
166. Cable and French, The Gobi Desert, p. 226.
167. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol 2, p. 464.
168. ~, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933, p. 4; according to Cable and French,
however, the provincial forces sustained a crushing defeat and were
almost wiped out during this engagement (The Gobi Desert, p. 226). All
sources, including Cable and French, agree that Ma Chung-ying was
wounded and subsequently withdrew to Kansu.
their wounded leader with them. It has been suggested that Ma was "bought
off" for a substantial sum by Chin Shu_jen,169 but there is no real evidence
for this, and Ma's injuries were certainly serious enough to merit a pro-
170longed period of recuperation away from the front line. Once safely
back across the Kansu-Sinkiang frontier Ma Chung-ying was given control of
the four districts of An-hsi, Tun-huang, Y~-men and Soochow by his uncle Ma
Pu-fang, a development which suggests that the two Tungan warlords had
indeed been acting in concert at·the time of Chung-ying's original invasion
of Sinkiang.171
Meanwhile the advancing forces of Chang P'ei-yuan, still spearheaded
by Pappengut's White Russian troops, moved further into the territory of the
old Kumul Khanate, relieving the besieged garrison at Kumul Old City on or
about November 1st, 1931.172 The victorious Chinese troops were given
permission to sack Kumul, a "reward" denied to the White Russians but not,
apparently, to Chang plei-yUan himself.173 The provincial forces then set
about the systematic destruction of large parts of the Kumul Khanate, levelling
whole villages and terrorising the inhabitants. Chi Jui-ch'ih, tha commander
of the besieged garrison, returned to Urumchi; however his lieutenant, Hsiung
fa-yu, remained at Kumul and began a series of mass executions. These
reprisals were on such a scale that even those Uighurs who had remained neutral
169. IOlR, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.1232.1932. HMCGK Fitzmaurice - Govt. of India, 11th
Nov. 1931; cf. Nyman, op.cit., p. 106.
170. Cable and french, The Gobi Desert, p. 241.
171. See, however, Wu Ai-chen's suggestion that Ma Pu-fang was forced to make
a deal with Ma Chung-ying because of 'other troubles' (Turkistan Tumult,
p. 70).
172. Le Fevre, op.cit., p. 286. Chan dates the raising orthasiega in September
1931 ('The Road to Power', p. 236), but Petro's record of the siega show
that this j8 a chronological impossibility.
173. ~,L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933, p. 4.
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174felt bound to join the rebellion. Refugees poured westward towards
Turfan, whilst the Uighur insurgents withdrew to the Karlik Tagh, especially
to their well-stocked mountain fastness at Bardash, which was to prove
impregnable. From Bardash, according to Cable and French, they organised a
widespread guerilla war against Chin's troops in collaboration with units
of Ma's Tungan forces who remained in Sinkiang pending the recovery of
their leader. Messages were regularly exchanged between Bardash and An-hsi
by means of the desert track leading from Barkol.175 Meanwhile, secure
in his stronghold of north-western Kansu, Ma Chung-ying nursed his wounds
and began to expand and re-equip his forces.
174. Wu Ai-chen, Turkistan Tumult, p. 71; Hedin, Big Horse's rlight, pp.
23-4; 34-6.
175. Cable and french, The Gobi Desert, p. 226.
CHAPTER 5
SINKIANG, 1931-33: THE TURKIC ~USLIM REBELLION IN THE SOUTH1
It will be remembered that the origin of the present
rebellion •••was the general discontent of the people
oftha Province of Sinkiang with the corrupt end
inefficient rule of their Chinese overlorda. It i.
now clear that the complicated struggle which ensued
and still continues soon resolved itself into two
entirely separate conflicts: the one, north of the
Tien Shan, centring round Urumchi, the provincial
capital, the other round Kashgar, the seat of the
British consulate-general, in the aouth-west.2
5.1 The Development of Pan-Turanian Nationalism in Southern Sinkiang
rollowingtheexecution in 1924 of Ma ru-hsing, the barbarous t'i-t'ei
of Kaahgar, end the subsequent appointment of his executioner, Ma Shao-wu, to
3the poat of tao-yin at Khotan in the aame year, the situation in southern
Sinkieng remained peaceful until several years aftar the assassination of
Governor Vang TaBng-hsin in July, 1928. During the last year. of Vang's
rule southern Sinkia~g often known aa "K8ahgaria", remained vary much a
British sphare of influence~ 8 state of a'fairs which had existad sinca tha
1. It is necessary to present a detailed atudy of the complex sequence of
events occurring in southern Sinkieng during 1931-33 as this pariod of
Sinkiang history remains virtually unstudied in both Eastarn and Western
language works. The present chapter draws particularly haavily on un-
published British diplomatic sourc.a.
2. ~,l/PIS/12/2356, PI.4894.1934 (Confidential Memo Respecting tha
Sinkiang Rebellion, r.o., May 30th, 1934).
3. Se. above, Chapter 3, p. 97 J ~a Shao-wu proved to be 8 tough teo-xin
who ruled with an iron hand - sea, for exa~pl., Boashard, W., Hazards of
Asia's Highlands end Deserts (london, n.d.), pp. 111-2 - but hia regime
lacked the corruption and wanton brutality of hi. predecessor's.
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collapse of Russian influence at the end of the First World War and the
, 4subsequent closure of the Imperial Russian Consulate-Genaral at Kashgar.
In August, 1918, Sir George Macartney,'8ritain's long-sarving Consul-
General at Kashgar, finally left Sinkiang to go into retirement. He' was
succBeded by Col. P.T. Etherton, a convinced anti-Bolshevik who, 1n lina
with contemporary British policy, co-ope~ated with tha anti-soviet Basmachi
guarillas in Western Turkestan whilat working to limit the spread of Soviet
5influence in ita eastern counterpart. yang Tseng-hain, who correctly
perceived that British policy in Sinkiang aimed et excluding Soviet
influence by encouraging the continued survivel of (his own) ,table Chinase
administration,6 was content to permit Etherton and hi. Buccessors the
exercise of considerable politicel influ~nce to the .outh of the Tian Shan.
Moreover, as Soviet prestige and influenca increesed in Ili and Ozungaria,.
so Yang increasad discreet co-operation with the British In Kashgar in en
attempt to counter the gtowth of Soviet power in the north of the province.7
By 1924 a combination of miiitary realpolitik and the re-emergence of
(Soviet) Russia as Sinkiang's major trading partner had forcad Yang to
incline politically away from Britain et.provincial leval. Following the
signing of the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924 (Article 1 of which providad
for the re-establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Peking end
4. Skrine and Nightingale, Macartney et Kashger, pp. 258-9.
5. Nyman, op.cit., p. 63. Saa a180 Etherton, P.T., In the Heart of Asia
(London, 1925), passim.
6. Support for a strong Chinese government in Sinklang 1. a recurrent thema
in the British Foreign Office's Secret and Political filea throughout
the period of ~aintenance of a British Consulat.-Cenerel at KSBhgar -
indead it might almost b. aaid to have bean the first duty of every
HMCGK from Macartney to Shipton (1908-48).
~ It : '
7. Sea Nyman, op.cit., pp. 135-6.
8Moscow), the Soviet government at Omsk sent an envoy to Sinkiang to discuss
the question of mutual consular representation with Yang Tseng-hsin. As a
result of this mission an agreement was aigned on October 6th (bilaterally,
without the participation of the Chinese Government), providing for the
exchange of consulates-general between Tashkent and Urumchi, a. well 8S for
the establishment of Soviet consulates in Sinkiang at Chuguchak, KulJa,
9Share Sume and Keshgar. Yang Tseng-hain seems to hav_ eccepted the
increased Soviet presence in the north of the province with resignation if
not with equanimity. The Soviet presence at Kashger was, however, another
matter. It upset the carefully-maintainad balance of power between Britain
and the Soviet Union to too great an extent; Moreover, e. Yang was well
aware, it permitted direct Soviet access to the densely-populated oases of
the Tarim Basin - the source of nearly all provincial revenue in Sinkiang.10
Shortly after the official opening of the Soviet Consulate at Ka.hger
on October 10th, 1925, a locel power struggle began to develop between
Max Ooumpiss (the Soviet Consul - e Lett by origin), Major Gillan (the
British Consul-General at this time) and the teo-yin of Kaahgar. Sino-Soviet
relations in southern Sinkiang began inauspiciously with the discovery
in November 1925 of large quantities of silver bullion concealed 1n 34 boxes
11of Soviet "diplOMatic bags" en route to the Kashgar consulate. The
Ksshgar tao-yin, who was a180 reportedly .ffrontad by the 'baraly-concealed
B. ~u Ai-chen, China and the soviet Union (London, 1950), p. 252.
9. In exchange tha Sinkiang authorities were permitted to establish con-
sulates at Semipalatin8k, Alma Ata, Andijan and laysan.
10. This was graphically statad by Schomberg in a letter to the ro froM
Gilgit dated June 27th, 19331 'The los. of the 80uthern part meana the
10s8 of ell revenue, aa Kaahgaria ia the tail that wags tha dog'. ~,
L/P1S/12/2331, PZ.4690.33. '
11. l!llJ!, L/P1S/10/976, P.403.1926 (K8shgar Diaries, November 1925).
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dissemination of Soviet propaganda' in the southern oases, retaliated by
12ordering the expulsion of a number of suspected Russian agents. In
March, 1926, serious riots broke out in Kashgar which were blamed by the
Chinese on an interpreter employed by the Soviet Consulate, by name Akbar
c~li. The rioters were suppressed by a force of 400 (local) Tungen troops
and Akbar CAli was thrown into prison; subsequent Soviet demands for his
13release were ignored by the tao-yin. The Chinese authorities wera also
seriously disturbed et the rapid expansion of Soviet consular staff of
European origin from about 15 persons in 1925 to between 30 and 40 persons
in 1927.14 All these fectors must have been brought to the notice of
Governor Yang Tseng-hain in Urumchi. Yang was doubtless faced with a
series of similar developments around the new Soviet Consuletea at KulJa,
15Chuguchek end Share Sume. It seems that in Keshgar, with the discreet
support of the British, he determined to take action to limit the spread
of Soviet influence.16
The Kashgar teo-yin accordingly adopted a strong anti-Soviet line.
Censorship, already severe, was tightened still further. Moreover, Yang
12. l£ha, L/PlS/10/976, P.960.1926 (Kashger Diaries, December, 1925). The
Chinese were aleo offended by the Soviets' May Day party in Kashgar
during 1976 at which a call was made for the people of Turkestan to
unite. Nyman, op.cit., p. 67; cf. Suydam Cutting's personal re-
collections of the occasion in hi. The fire Ox and Other Years (London,
1947), pp. 57-8.
13. ~,L/PlS/10/976, P.1730.1926 (Kashgar Diaries, March 1926).
14. ~,L/PlS/12/2342, P.6188.1928 (Kashgar Annual Report, 1927-28), p. 3.
15. See, for example, Jaokson, W.A., The Russo-Chinese Borderlands,
p. 51. . -'.-_ .-.-
16. In 1926 yang Tseng-hsin 8sked the British to sell him 2,000 rifles end 1
million rounds or ammunition. The Government or Indie and the India Orfic.
in London· approved the sale (PRO, rO/371/11696, f.4632.4632.10), but,lt
was eventually decided by theifOreign Office that this course of action
~ould contravene the hina Arms Embar 0 A reement of 1919; the proposed
sale was accordingly barred. (£BQ, fa 371/12442, r.819.100.10; foreign
Office to India Orfice, 8th february, 1927).
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Tseng-hsin's 'favourite nephew', the officer in command of the Chinese
troops on the Sino-Soviet frontier north of Kaehgar, became a frequent and
17friendly wisitor to the British Consulate General at Chini Bagh in Kashgar.
With the death of tha old tao-yin in 1927 and the subsequent transfer of
Ma Shao-wu from Khotan to take his place, anti-Soviet measures in southern
Sinkiang were substantially increased. Ma Shao-wu'sfirst actions included
the Jailing of a group of 60 alleged local communists and the tightening.
18of Chinese control over the Sino-Soviet frontier to the north of Kashgar.
Subsequently the freedom of the Soviet Consul to travel within southern
Sinkiang was severely curtailed, and Kashgar citizens suspected of pro-
Soviet sympathies became liable to the confiscation of their property and
19deportation to other oases. yang Tseng-hain reinforced Ma Shao-wu's
attempts to limit Soviet influence in the Tarim Basin by imposing a
swingeing new tax on Muslims leaving southern Sinkiang to go on ~aJJ via
the Soviet Union. Similar new legislation required merchants visiting the
Soviet Union to deposit a substantial Bum with the Chinese authorities at
Kashgar which was forfeit if the depositor failed to return to Sinkiang
20within 60 days.
These policies failed entirely to isolate southern Sinkiang from Soviet
influence,21 but they did ensure that at the ti.e of Yang Taeng-hsin's
assassination in 1928 the southern part of the province, and particularly
Ma Shao-wu'. fief around Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan, retained considarable
17. Nyman, op.cit., p. 68.
18. ~,rO/371/12485, r.6067.1752.10; r.6708.1572.10 (K8shgar Diary. April;
May, 1927).
19. ~,L/PIS/10/976, P.2428.1928; P.5434.1928 (Kashg8r Diaries, Jan-reb;
May-June 1928). Cf. Bosehard, 'Politics end Trada in Central A.ia·,pp.
pp. 441-2.
20. Persson, C., in ~iS8iDn9f8rbundet.(Stockhol.), XXVIII (1928), p. 434,
cited in Ny.an, op.cit., p. 68.
21. Sea above, p. 107.
independence from the Soviet Union. This was in marked contrast to the
Ili Valley, Chuguchak and Share Sume (whare Soviet influence became para-
mount 800n after 1925), and aven to tha provincial capital at Urumchi,
where, by the spring of 1928, the Soviet Consul-General wielded considerable
influence.22
It was perhaps dUB to ~a Shao-wu'a anti-Soviet stance end the continuing
dominance of British influence in southern Sinkiang during tha last year.
of yang Taeng-hain's rule that Kashgar was to emerge 's a centre of con-
servetlva pan-Turenian reaction to Chinese rule during the 1930s. Because
of Yang Tseng-hainla deliberate ettempt to isolate southern Sinkiang from
Soviet influence, the Uighur. (and to 8 lesser extent the Kirghiz) of the
Tarim Basin were less influenced by the progressive nationalist proPQQanda
emanating'fro. (Sovietised) Weatern,Turkestan than were the Turkic Muslims
of the IIi Valley and Ozungaria. This is not to suggest that the Turkic
socialist nationalism advocated by tha Jadrd-ists after 1917 feiled to .aka
any headway Bouth of the Tien Shan; navertheless Kashgar, which lay outside
the Soviet sphere of influence in north-westarn Sinkiang, providad e
natural haven for right-wing Turkic nationalist. and 'Islamic traditionalists
who rejected Chinese rule but were atill more bitterly opposed to the
advance of "atheistic communism" and its Soviet champions in Central Asie.
~any of these right-wing Turkic nationlists were defeated Bssmachi guerillas,
chiefly of Uzbek, Kazakh and Kirghiz nationality, but including a number
ot Osmanli Turks and,according to Olaf CaroB, 'old men who had fought
23against the ChinesB et Keshgar'. Perhaps the most prominent Basmachi
22. For anti-Soviet feeling in Kashgar see: 'Central Asie from Within',
JRCAS, XXII, 1 (1935), p. 109; for the risB of Soviet influence in
lli Bee: Nyman, op.cit., pp. 69-72.
23. CarOB, Soviet Empire. p. 12B. See elso 'The Rebellion 1n Chinese
Turkestan', JRCAS, XXII, 1 (1935), p. 101.
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leader to flee to Kashgar was Janib Beg, a Kirghiz who was to play an
important role in the politics of southern Sinkiang during tha Barly
1930s. After Yang Tseng-hsin's assassination in July, 1928, Soviet
influence in southern Sinkieng began rapidly to increasa} navertheless,
at the time of the Kumul Rebellion in 1931, rumours of forced collecti-
visation end the suppression of nomadism in Western Turkestan sufficed
to make many Turkic Muslims of southern Sinkiang suspicious of Soviet
motives.
If, during the lata 1920s end early 1930s, the Turkic Muslims of
southern Sinkiang were divided in their approach towards the Soviet Union
and the newly-emergent Turkic (and TaJik) SSRs in Wlstern Turkestan, they
were at least united in their attitude towards their Tungan co-religionists
to the east. Unlike the Turkic Muslim rebels of Kumul, the Uighurs and
Kirghiz of southsrn Sinkiang were too far distant from Kansu to sppeal for
assistance from the Tungan warlords of the "rive Ma- clique. Beside., Han
Chinese rule in the oases of the Tarim Basin had long been maintained by
Tungan troops and officie18.24 Ma ru-hsing, the t'i-t'ei of Kashger who
had so ruthlessly exploited hie Turkic Muslim subject. between 1916 and
1924,had been a Hui MusliM from Yunnan} similarly Ma Shao-wu wes him.alfa
Yunnanese Muslim. The Turkic Muslims of southern Sinkiang therefore enter-
tained no illusions of "Muslim brotherhood" with their Tungan co-religionist ••
It was Tungan troops who intervened to suppre•• any demonstration against
Chinese misrule. The Tungan. of tha Terim Besin were the ellies or the Han
Chines. administration and .s such the enemias of the Turkic ~uslim peoples
at least until they proved themselves otherwise.
24. Han Chines. employment of Tungan troops in southern Sinkiang dated beck
(at least) as far BS yang Tseng-hsin's transfer froM Ho-chou to Aksu 1n
1907. Sea above, p. 72. See alsol Kazakh, rued, osturkiatan
"zwischen den Grossmachten, p. 19.
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The Tarim Basin, and particularly its western rim, was tharefore
unique in Sinkiang politic8 during the latter half of Yang Tseng-hsin'.
rule in that a large part of its Turkic Muslim population looked neither
to the "progressive" Muslim leadership of Western Turkestan nor to the
Tungen warlords of Kansu; instead attention seems to have been focused on
the conservative reformist regimes in Turkey and Afghanistan. Contact.
between Turkey and southern Sinkiang were never strong, though the
,
Sinkiang Muslims doubtless recalled that between 1873 and 1877 the ottoman
flag had flown over Kashgar and coin. had been minted which bore the nama
of the Turkish Sultan cAbd sl_cAZ12.25 Since the time of the Ch'ing re-
conquest tenuous links had been maintained through the activities of pan-
Turanian idealists such as Husayn Bai Batcha of Artush,26 but with the•
defeat of the ottoman Empire during the rirat ~orld War contact. ceased
almost completely. Emotional links remained strong, however,27 and the
nationalist revolution of Atat~rk (who had little parsonal interast in
pen-Turanianism) represented a Turkish national renaissance which inspired
all shades of Turkic opinion from the Crimea to Kumul.
Political and religious contacts with Afghanistan, which share. a
common frontier with southern Sinkiang, were rather more concrete than the
links with distant Turkey. In 1919 A.ir Amanullah, the last Muhammadzai•
ruler of Afghanistan. seized the throne of the country on the death of his
father. Amanulleh was an impetuous ruler who was ultimately to bring
25. See above, P.- 68. '
26. ~., p•. 84.
1
27. In this context note the poem addrassed to Turkey by the Kazakh nationalist
Maghjan Jumabay at the end of World War II
My brother, far away, 80 greatly suffering,
My brother, like 8 tulip broken,
Is not Altai our common mother?
(for a full translation see Caroe, op.cit., p. 228). Although M8ghjen
Jumabay came from the Issik K81 region, his sentiments were echoed by many
Turkic Muslims in Sinkiang - hence the leaders of the conservative nation-
alist movement at Kashgar during the early 1930. turned to Turkey for moral
support. See below, pp. 26'-4.
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about his own downfall through the implementation of a 8erie8 of drastic
and forced reforms which were to result in the revolution of 1928.28 In
1919, however, shortly after his seizure of power, Amanullah won widespread
support amongst the Muslim peoples of Central Asia by launching, in the
Third Afghan War against the British, a combined Jihad and struggle for
Afghan independence. As a result of this conflict the British were forced
to acknowledge Afghanistan's 'right to an independent foreign pOlicy.29
During the decade following the outbreak of the First World War there
emerged widespread support for pan-Islamic and even pan-Turanian sentiment
in Afghanistan.30 In 1915 a joint Turco-German mission under the leader-
ship of the German Von Hsntig travelled to Kabul where, by emphasising
pan-Islamic links between Afghanistan and the Ottoman Empire (a8 well, no
doubt, as Kaiser Wilhelm's claim to be the defender of the Muslim World).
it attempted to persuade the AmIr HabIbullah to declare war on the British•
in India. HabIbull8h, though no friend of the British, was too cautious•
to commit himself; accordingly the miss!on left Kabul in Mey, 1916,31 end
Von Hentig, together with two German colleagues, travelled to Yerkand in
southern Sinkiang. Once in Yarkand. Von Hentig is reported to have intrigued
with members of the city~s influential Afghan population until his arrest
by Ma Shao-wu and subsequent deportation to China proper cut short these
activities.32 Despite the failure of the Von Hentio Mis.ion. Afghan support
28. As a result of the 1928 revolution Amanulleh was forced into abdication
and exile. Wilber, D.N., Afghanistan, p. 74.
29. ~., cf. Griffiths, J.C., Afghanistan (London, 1967), p. 31.
30. Caroe, op.cit., p. 118, 124-5, 127; Mecmunn, Sir G., Afghanistan: from
Darius to Amanullah (london, 1929), pp. 286-8 ('pan-Turk and Beamachl).
31. Swinson, A., North-West frontier (london, ~967), p. 314.
32. Skrine and Nightingale, Macartney at Kashgar, pp. 250-3.
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for the ottoman cause remained strong at popular.level throughout the first
World War, and with tha·defeat of Turkey this support seems to have been
transferred to the Basmachi guerillas, under the leadership of [nver Pasha,
33in their struggle against the Soviets. Moreover, in 1919, soon after the
conclusion of the short-lived Third Afghan War, [nver Pasha's brother,
Jamal, arrived in Kabul. Jamal, who may have been receiving Soviet backing,
immediately established the "Islamic Revolutionary league", an organisation
34purportedly dedicated to the freeing at India trom British domination.
A'manullah thus came to the throne of Afghanistan at IS time of consider-
able religious and political ferment. He is known to have been influenced
by the pan-Turanien Basmechi movement, and during the first years of hi.
rule he is said to have toyed with the idea ot creating an Ialamic Con-
federacy which was to have included Afghanistan, Bukhara, Khiva and Khokand.35
Certainly Amanullah was interested in promoting Afghan influence in Sinkieng,
where numerous Afghan merchant. (particularly tram Sadak.han) had long
resided undar British protection. following Britain'a recognition ot
Afghanistan's right to an independent foreign policy by the treaty of Peshawar
in 1919, British diplomatic protection of Afghan citizens in Sinkiang waa
withdrawn. Amanullah accordingly datarmined to establiah indepandent
diplomatic links between Kabul and Urumchi, and following negotiations with
a$inkian~ Chinese delegation sent to Kabul by Yang Taeng-hain in the aummar
of 1922, an Afghan mission under Mu~ammad SharIf Kh;n wes despatched to
Yarkand, arriving in the autumn of the aa•• year. Th. Chinas. authorities
regarded the Afghan mis8ion 8S a trade delegation, but Mu~ammad SharIf khan
33. Macmunn, op.cit., p. 288.
34. Caroe, op.cit., p. 123.
35. Nyman, oe.cit., p. 58.
116
carried printed visiting cards styling himself "Afghan Consul-General in
Sinkiang"; moreover he submitted a draft agreement to the Chinese
demanding full extraterritorial rights and other privileges for Afghan
subjects in Sinkiang, BS well as the right to import opium freely into
the province. Hardly surprisingly, yang refused to agree to these demands,
restricting his recognition of the Afghan mission to the level of that
enjoyed by the Soviet representative at Kulja. An acrimonioua dispute
between Muhammmad SharIf Khan and the provincial authorities dragged on•
throughout the remainder of Yang's rule, but the Afghan mission refused
to leave Sinkiang, remaining at Yarkand as a focus of Turkic Muslim dis-
content. As a result of this Afghan presence something of an Afghan cult
began to develop et Yarkand, and the Chinese authorities at Kashgar were
disturbed to hear that soma local Turkic peoples were studying Pushtu.36
Certainly links were established between the Afghans and Turkic nationali.t
circles in southern Sinkiang during this period; both Brit'~k end Germen
diplomatic sources report that in february, 1927, a deputation came from
Sinkiang to Kabul where it sought the backing of the Afghan government for
a projected Muslim rising against the Chinese. Amanullah, beset by problems
of his own, held out no prospect of aid for the intended insurgents, but
apparently indicated hie willingness to accept Muslim refugees from
.~Sinkiang in Afghanistan.r Despite this rebuff, many Turkic Muslims of
southern Sinkiang continued to look to Kabul (and in 80me caaas beyond, to
Ankara) at the time of Yang Tseng-hein's assassination in 1928.
36. ~,rO/371/9209, F.2933.278.10 (Kashg8r Diary, July 1923).
37. ~,L/P&S/12/2355, Call 12/23 (Chinese Turkestan: Afghanistan), P.794.
1928 (British Legation, Kabul, to Government of India, latter dated
6/1/1928}J cf. Ausw3rtlges Amt (Bonn) IV, Chi 1475/8. Juni 1921,
Deutsche Gessndtscheft, Kabul, den 29 April, 1927 (the latter cited in
Nyman, op.cit., p. 52).
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Throughout the initiel stBges of the Kumul rising and the subsequent
Tungan invasion, Chin Shu-Jen made every .effort to prevent news from the
north-eest of the province reaching the Muslim population of the still• ,...0 _. ,
quiescent south.38 However contemporary British diplomatic reports (as
well as subsequent events}39 indicate that all attempts to isolate the
south ended in failure; rumours and reports from the rebellious north-east
continued to flood into the OBses of the Tarim Basin, inflaming anti-
Chinese feeling amongst sn indigenous population already indignant at the
imposition of increased ta~es and the forcedia.ueof huge quantities of
40unbecked paper currency to pay for Chin'. war effort.
Chin Shu-jen was doubtless awere of the tensions existing in the
south of the province, but encouraged by hi. apparent victory over Ma
Chung-ying as well as by the delivery of 4,000 rifles and 4 million rounds
41of ammunition from British India, he determined to maintain his uncom-
promising stance. This decision was to prove most unwise. The rebellion
at Kumul, fer from being crushed, continued to smoulder; moreover the
brutalities inflicted on the MU8Ii~ inhabitants of the Kumul area by Hsiung
ra-yu following the relief of Kumul Old City in November, 1931, caused
widespread Turklc anger and a constant movement of refugee. westward toward.
Turfan. In or about May, 1932, Ma Chung-ying s.ent one of his lieutenants,
38. IOLR,-L/P&S/12/2331 (Chinese Turkestan. Internal Situation Sept. 1930 -NOV7 1933), PZ.6313.31 (HMCGK to FPD India, 4/e/1931); cf. L/PlS/12/2332
(Kashgar Diaries, Jan. 1931 - Dec. 1938), PZ'.416.1932 (Sept., Oct., 1931),
para. 147; PZ.7339.1932 (Sept. 1932), para. 348.
39. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.1232.1932 (HMCGK to FPD India, 11/11/1931).
40. ~,L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.2331 (Report of HMVCGK Watts, 21/10/32),p. 7.
41. In 1929 the Government or British India, disturbed by Chin Shu-jen'.
slipping hold on Sinkiang and by the rapid expansion or Soviet influence
in the province, raised the ban on erms sales to China which had existed
(by international egreement) aince 1919~L8ttimore, 'Chinese Turkestan or
~inkiang', The China Yearbook, 1935, p. 43; IOLR. L/P&S/12/2342 (Kashgsr
Annual Reports, 1922-31), PZ.5695.1931. ----
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a young Tungan called Ma Shih-ming, to take command of the Tungan forces
42remaining in Sinkiang. Ma Shih-ming established his bas. near Turfan,
probably in the mountains to the north of .the to~n. From here he worked
in close co-operation with the Turkic Muslim insurgents owing allegiance
to Yulbars khan and khoja Nlyas HajJI; he is also likely to have made•
contact with Ma Fu-ming, a Tungan officer in command of the Sinkiang
provincial forces at Turfan.43
By coincidence, it was also during May 1932 that Chin Shu-Jen decided
to revenge himself upon Tsetsen Puntsag Gegesn, regent of the Torgut Mongols
inhabiting the Tien Shan north of karsshahr, for the latter's refusal to
commit his Torgut cavalry to the struggle against Ma Chung-ying's invading
Tungans. Tsetsen Puntsag Gageen waa accordingly invited to trawel to
Urumchi where it was understood that he would be able to attend en inves-
44tigation into the assassination plotted against him. On May 21st, shortly
after his arrival in Urumchi, Taetsen Puntsag Gegeen, together with two
Torgut officers and the young Torgut prince (who was under age), wers.
invited to an official banquet at Chin Shu-Jen's yemen. Once egain, in the
best tradition of yang Tseng-hsin, the banquet wae to become a bloodbath.
According to R.P. Watts, the British Vice Consul-General at kashger who
chanced to arrive in Urumchi on the very day of the murders:
While drinking the usual preliminary cup of tsa
42. Chan,'The Road to Power', p. 238. According to Wu Ai-chen, Me Shih-ming
led en abortive mission to Turfan without Ma Chung-ying's permission in
1930. The resulting "revolt" is said by Wu to have 'petered out', although
Ma ru-ming is also said to have been impliceted;(Turkistan Tumult, pp. 58-
9). Wu's 1930 revolt does not aeem to be mentioned in any other source,
and probably rests on chronological confusion with tha 1932 revolt in his
account. Certainly Ma Shih-ming is report.d by Yulbar8 to have baan in
Kansu during the aummer of 1931; apparently on good terms with Ma Chung-
ying. See ebove,p. 147.
43. Wu, Turk1stan Tumult, pp. 71-2. cf. Chan, Sink lang Under Sheng Shih-ts'ai,
pp. 68-9.
44. See above, pp. 160-61.
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the regent and the two military officers were led
out into a courtyard and executed. According to
Chinese custom in such matters proper observance
was accorded to the high rank of regent even at
the moment of execution. A red carpet was spread on
the ground on which he was invited to seat himselt.
He was then killed by being shot, through the head
from behind by one of the governor's special
executioners. His two companions being men of
inferior rank were not given the privilege of a
red carpet to sit on whilst being executed.45
The young prince was later permitted to return to Karashahr. No doubt
Chin intended, by his harsh action, to remove the .tubborn and powerful
Torgut regent whilst terrifying the young Torgut prince with a display
of ruthless power. In the event, Chin'. treachery and brutality merely
served to alienate the Torgut Mongola - the one minority nationality in
Sinkieng which might normally have been expected to side with the Han
46Chinese egainst the Turkic Muslims of the province. With trouble about
to break out amongst the Uighurs end Tungans of Turfan, es well as amongst
the nomadic Kirghiz of the Tien Shan, Chin Shu-Jen could hardly have
chosen a worse time to anger the Torguts.
Early in 1932, Turkic Muslim opposition to the forced collectivisation
and suppression of nomadism pursued by stalin in the Kazakh and Kirghlz
regions of Soviet central Asia, began to spillover the Sino-Soviet trontier
45. ~, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.2331 (Watts' Report), 7. ct. accounts of
the Torgut'regent's murder in~, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.5443.32 (Account
of the Revd. H. french Ridle of the China Inland ~ission); Anon,
'Recent Events in Sinkiang', JRCAS, XXI, 1 (1934 , 82-4; Heslund, ~
end Gods in Mongolia, p. 325.
46. According to the anonymous author at 'Recent Event. in Sinkiang', the
Torgut Mongols 'feel they have more in common with their Chiness
rulers than with their Moslem fellow-nomads', JRCAS, XXI, 1, p. 83.
It i. interesting to note, however, that even the Buddhist reg!nt of
the Torguts was deeply interested in ths activities of Amanullah of
Afghanistan. Haalund, op.cit., p. 246.
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into Sinkiang.47 In March, 1932, large numbers of Kirghiz were driven
across the Sinkiang frontier by pursuing Soviet forces. A series of
guerilla counter-attacks against the Soviets were mounted from Chinese
territory, and in raids on Koksu and two other Soviet posts a total of
4837 Russian troops were killed. The "Soviet" Kirghiz refugees naturally
received aid and support from their "Chinese" Kirghiz brethren, and in
June, 1932, a Chinese official was killed by Kirghiz insurgent. in the
Tien Shan. The Chinese were reportedly 'much incensed' at this develop-
ment, and Ma Shao-wu despatched 300 troops from Kashgar New City and
200 troops from Kashgar Old City to the frontier area~ Thes. units were
joined by a further 100 troops from Opal, 25 miles south-west of Kashgar,
end 200 troops from the Uch Turfan area, tha combined forcas being placed
under Brigadier Vang, Vang Tseng-hsin's "favourite nephew", reportedly
49one of the few competent officers in the Kashgar region. In July, 1932,
Vang's force began joint operations with the Soviet forces against the
c- -Kirghiz insurgents under the leadership of Id Mireb. The Chinese forces
'who are said to hava been suffering badly from want of opium', reportedly
behaved very badly towards the Kirghiz, a number of whom were driven to
take refuge in Russian territory. In an attempt to ensure future Kirghiz
submission to Chinese.rule, vang's forces took about 70 hostages from s
wide number of Kirghiz families; these unfortunate individual. were carried
off from the high Tien Shan and held prisoner in the lowland oa8es of
47. Collectivization of Kazakhastan began in 1929. ror Soviet policies
towards the Kazakh and Kirghiz nomads at this time see: Caroe, op.cit.,
pp. 180-8. ror initial impact on Sinkiang see: lQb!, L/p&S/12/2332
(Kashgar Diaries), PZ.2867.1932 (rebruary 1932).
48. lQhB, IIp&S/1212332, PZ.3451.1932 (Kashgar Diaries, March 1932).
49. IOLR, L/p&S/12/2332, PI.5241.1932 (Kashgar Diaries, June 1932); L/p&s/
12/2331, (Chinese Turkestan Internal Situation Se tember 1930 - November
1933), PZ.1979.1933 HMCGK-GOI, 9 2 1933).
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50Khotan, Keriya and.Ch~rch~. Chin Shu-jen and Ma Shao-wu thus succeeded,
within a few months of Ma Chung-ying's withdrawal to Kansu, in alienating
both the Turkic and Mongol nomads of the Tien Shan. Nor can the lesson
of joint Sino-Soviet action against the Kirghiz and emerging Soviet
military backing for Chin Shu-jen's regime have been lost on the Turkic
51Muslims of southern SinkiangJ indeed it is likely that these develop-
ments strengthened the p08ition of the conservative pan-Turanian nation-
alists at Khotan, Yarkand and Kashgar.
Meanwhile tha influence of the continuing Turkic Muslim rebellion
at Kumul spread rapidly westwards. In the autumn of 1932, some months
after Ma Shih-ming's arrival in the Turfan region, Ma fu-ming, the
Tungan officer in command of the provincial garrison at Turfan, went over
52to the rebel forces together with hi. troops. Wu Ai-chen implies that
that Ma fu-ming's decision was based on the continuing flow of Turkic
Muslim refugees from Kumul to Turfan combined with reports of the mass
ti i t i th K I i b ' f - 53execu on9 being carr ed au n e umu reg on y Hs~ung 8-YU;
however, it is st least as probable that Ma fu-ming cama to an arrangement
with his fellow Tungan Ma Shih-ming, and decided to throw in his lot with
the Kansu Tungan forces threatening Turfan. According to Wu Ai-chen, Ma
fu-ming's first action was to send a telegram to Chin Shu-jen at Urumchi
requesting the despatch of reinforcements; ha also sent a latter to
Hsiung fa-yu at Kumul, asking him to come to Turfsn a. swiftly a8 pos8ible.
A detachment of troops was duly despatched from Urumchi to Turfan; they
50. ~, L/P!S/12/2332, PZ.6134.1932 (Kashgsr Diaries, July 1932).
51. for Chin's increasing dependence on Soviet military end financial aid,
see below, pp. 227-8.
52. Wu Ai-chen, Turkistan Tumult,p. 71.
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entered the oasis without suspecting treachery and were shot down 'to the
54last man' by Ma ru-ming's forces as they passed the city gates. Soma
days latar a detachment of just over 100 men under ths command of Hsiung
ra-yU reached Turfan from tha east and Buffered tha 8ams fate. Hsiung
was teken prisoner and later 'tortured to death in public with every
55refinement of cruelty end vileness of method'. rollowing Ma fu-ming's
defection,'the Turfen depression became the main centre of ~uslim
rebellion in north-eestern Sinkieng; Kumul, which had been largely destroyed
by the vengeful Chin Shu-jen after Ma Chung-ying's withdrawal to Kansu,
was left to the Turkic Muslim insurgents and 8 handful of Tungan troops,
but the greater part of the Tungan forces opposed to Chin Shu-jan, whether
rebels under the ~reneg8de general" Ma ru-ming, or invaders from Kansu
under the command of Ma Chung-ying's adjutant Ma Shih-ming, massld at
Turfan in preparation for an attack across the Dawan Ch'eng on Urumchi
itself, a mere 100 milas to the north-wast.
The developments at Turfan, following closely on tha Turkic Muslim
rising at Kumul, were shortly followed by a serias of apparently unco-
ordinated risings amongst the Turkic Muslims of southern Sinkiang. It
was doubtless apparent to the Uighurs of the Tarim Basin and the Kirghiz
of~the Tien Shan that Chin Shu-jen'e grip on tha provinc. was slipping;
moreover, the presenca of rebel Tungan forcas in Turfan st the southarn
end of the Dawan Ch'eng effectively isolated the oase. of the south from
the provincial capital at Urumchi and Chin Shu-jen's Whit. Russian troops -
54. lE.!!!.'
55. ~., p. 72; cf. Chan's account (Sinkiang Under Sheng Shih-te'ai,
pp.6B-9), which holds that Hsiung was murdered by Uighurs end his
body mutilated by forces owing allagiance to Ma Shih-ming; the
varying accounts or Hsiung'. death would at least 8eem to confirm
the reported co-operation between Ma fu-ming end Ma Shih_ing during
tha troubles at Turfen in lata 1932.
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a force which might otherwise have intimaded the Uighurs and Kirghiz of
Nan-lu. As it was, however, the White Russian and other provincial forces
were hard-pressed by the combined Tungan forces of ~a fu-ming and ~a
Shih-mingj reports that ~a thung-ying would shortly re-enter the fray in
person were rife, and Chang P'ei-yuan, the military commander at Ili,
had fallen out with Chin Shu-Jen and could no longer be relied upon by
the Urumchi authorities. 56 The Turkic ~uslim8 of southern Sinkiang were
thus in a better position to rebel against Chinese rule than et any time
c -since the rising of Ya qub Beg in the early 1660s.
(vents moved with startling rapidity. In the winter of 1932-33
successful risings occured at Pichan (Ch. Shan-shan) to the east of Turfan,
57end at Karashahr some 175 miles to the south-west. . Lack of Torgut
support at Karashahr following the murder of.Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen sealed
the fate of the Chinese forces in that city, end a naw Tungan leader, ~e
than-ts'eng, emerged as commander ofths rebel forces in this ares.58
Ignoring the increasingly bitter struggle between ~a Shih-ming and the
provincialtorceson the Turfan-Urumchi road, Ma than-ta'ang marched WBSt-
wards, capturing Bugur in early february and advancing to Kuchar where
he entered into an alliance of convenience with Timur, the local Uighur
leader, described by Wu Ai-chen as 'en able fellow who had been head of the
56. Chang P'ei-yUan's struggle with thin Shu-Jen is described in section
5.4, f, below.
57. Chang Ta-ch~n, Szu-shih-nien tung-lusn Hain-chiang (forty Years of
Turmoil in Sinkiang), Hong Kong, 1956, pp. 33 ft. ; cf. Wu Ai-chen,
Turkistan Tumult, p. 240.
58. According to Wu (Turkistan Tumult, p. 240), ~a Chen-ts'Bng wes B Tungen
from Kashgar; according to the GOI, however, he originally came from
Kansu (IOLR, L/P&S/12/2392, (XT. 4910.1941& Who's Who in Sinkleng
Correct"SdUp to 15th April, p., 17 ).on balance, the GOI Bource is more
likely to be correct, as it is based on information derived from
Kashgar - and had ~a Chan-ts'eng been a native of that city the British-
Consul-General would probably hava known. Sae also Appendix I, "Who
Wae Who in Republican Slnkisngn.
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59mule ~aggon service'. Having occupied Kuchsr ~ithout hostilities, the
joint forces of Ma Chan-ts'ang and Timur then advanced towards Aksu,
taking the small town of Bai en route.60
Ma Shao-wu, the Yunnanese Muslim tao-yin of Kashgar and the second
most powerful official in the provincial administration after Chin Shu-
jen, thus found himself cut off from the provincial capital at Urumchi
by two separate armies of Muslim rebela, each composed of separate but
allied Tungan and Turkic factions. One such army, apparently comprising
a small but militarily competent Tungan force under Ma Chan-tsl angand a
much larger but poorly-armed mass of Uighur peasants owing allegiance
to Timur, ~as advancing south-westwards to~ards AksuJ the other army, a
loose alliance of extremely competent Tungan troop. under Ma Shih-ming and
Ma ru-ming fighting alongside a predominantly preasant army of Turkic
Muslims o~ing allegiance to Khoja Niyas ~aJJI and Ywlbars Khan, continued
to press its attack across the Oawan Ch~~ng on Urumchi.
In rebruary 1933, completing the confusion in the south (aa ~ell 8S
the isolation of Ma Shao~u at Kashgar), the rebellion against the Chinese
spread southwards across the Tarim Basin to it. southern rim. ritzmaurice,
the British Consul-General at Kaahgar, blamed this development on Tungan
. 61agitators sent to the Khotan and Keriya oases from Kuchar. Whatever
the ttwth of this assertion, risings against the Chin ••e administration
broke out almost simultaneously amongst the gold-miners of Surghak, near
Keriya, and of Karakesh, neer Khotan. The gold-miners of tha southern oases
hed long resented the imposition by the provincial government of a fixed
rate for the purchase of gold throughout SinkiengJ moreover conditions Df
59. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, pp. 240-1.
60. ibId •..........
61. ~J L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.2693.1933 (Kashgar Diaries, reb. 1933), para. 17,
cf. ~, L/P1S/12/2356, PZ.8042.1933 (r4845/456/10, No.1), Memorandum
Respecting'SinklangRebellion, 1933, pp. 1-2.
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62employment were extremely harsh. As a result of the spiralling
inflation which resulted from Chin Shu-jen's unrestrained issue of un-
backed paper notes, the miners of Surghak and Karakash were forced to
63exchange their gold for increasingly worthless paper currency. 8y
the spring of 1933 their patience with the provincial authoritiee had
-c,. -clearly run out, and Uighura under the leadership of Isma ~l Khan Khoja
saized control of Karakash, killing the amban and a number of other
Han Chinese; at the same time rebellious Uighurs at Keriya seized control
of the Surghak mines and threatened to take over the whole oasis. Rebel
notices displayed at Karakash and subsequently conveyed to the British
Consul-General at Kashgar indicate that rebellion broke out as 8 result
of economic unrest in the gold-mining community. Prominent rebel demands
included the lifting of government-imposed trade monopolies, the intro-
duction of 8 fixed price for the purchase of gold and silver, and pro-
hibition on the purchase of precious metals with peper currency. Mora
general demands included the lowering of taxes, 8 prohibition on usury, an
end to government tyranny, the introduction of Islamic eharrca law, and
the stationing of Muslim soldiers 'in every city,.64 The notices indicated
62. See above, 1).104fn.112. for a detailed study of the gold industry in
Sinkiang at this tima see: Kazak, ruad, Ostturklsten zwischen den
GrossmBchten (Konigsberg, 1937), pp. 37-44. According to Kazak, gold-
mining was carried out in extremely primitive conditions in mines which
were often surprisingly deep - he cites a figure of 80 metres for Surghak;
elsewhere gold was panned for on the surface. Working conditions were
reportedly 80 hard that 'the whole business of mining extraction (became)
a kind of forced labour or punishment', with miners heavily in debt to
local usurers. In 1873 the Surghak gold mines employed c. 3000 men;
Kazak gives no employment figures for the 19308, but states thatcworking conditions ~ere even worse than they had been under Ya qub Beg,
when workers had been driven to work in the mines to finance ware against
.the Tungans and Chinese.
63. '!Qh.!!t LIp&.si 12/2331 (!:.Ch~i;.;n~e:;8;.e~T;.::u!!r.;k.;e;:st::.::a~n~~~~~r; :;:~~:.:.a..~:.t:.:,;~;'::':'
1930 - November 1933), PZ.2652.1933 HMCGK-GOI, 9 3 1933).
64. .!Qhfi, L/P&'S/12/2331, PZ.2794.1933 (HMCGK-GOI, 23/3/1933).
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a willingness to compromise with the Chinese authorities, promising that,
if their demands were met, the rebels were 'ready to live as peaceful
bJ 65 .su ects'. Moreover it is noteworthy that, although the gold-miners of
Karakash represented a rare example of a genuine proletariat in Republican
Sinkiang, there was no indication of Soviet or socialist influence in the
66terminology employed by the rebel leadership; rather the tone wss
distinctly Islamic, adding weight to the theory that the south Sinkieng
rebellion of 1933 was, at least initially, pan-Islamic and not pro-Soviet.
Thus the anonymous author of one of the Karakash notices addressed the
Chinese authorities in the following terms:
A friend for the sake of friendship will make known
a friend's defects and save him from the consequences
of his defects. You, who are supposed to rule, cannot
even realise this, but try to seek out the supporter
of Islam to kill him. foolish infidels like you are
not fit to rule. If you had understood my meaning,
you would have rewarded me. How can an infidel, who
cannot distinguish between a friend snd a foe, be fit
to rule? You infidels think that because you have
rifles, guns •••and money, you can depend on them; but
we depend upon God in whose hands are our lives. You
infidels think that you will take our lives. If you
do not send a reply to this notice we are ready. If
we die wa ara martyrs. If we surviva we sra conquerors.
We are living but long for death.67
Ma Shao-wu, the Kashgar teo-yin, decided to move firat against the
Muslim insurgents threatening Aksu - no doubt reasoning that, should Ma
than-ts'ang and Timur be defeated, the much weaker rebel forces at Karakesh
and Surghak would offer little resistance. Another resson for relieving Aksu
65. !!?!!!•
66. This is in marked contrast to the proclamations of the IIi rebels in
1945 (see belolal~pp. 404-5), end even to the letter sant by the Kirghiz
leader CUthman Ali to the British Consul-Generel Ksshgsr in May 1933
(see balow, p. 198).
67. Anonymous noUea iasuedat KaraBhahr, 28 Sh81a1111al1351 (26 february 1933),
translated in IOlR, l/P1S/12/2331, PZ.1794.1933. HMCGK commente that
similar notices-were reportedly Bent to Meralbashi by the Muslim rebels
et Aksu.
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lay in the fact that Ma Shih-ming's forces at Turfan had severed the
telegraph line between Urumchi and KashgarJ the line had been re-routed
via Aksu, but if Aksu were to fall to rebel forces, communication with
the provincial capital would only be possible via the USSR, thus permitting
Soviet interception 68of top secret cables. Accordingly brigadier Yang,
at the head of a mixed force of 280 cavelry and 150 cavalry, set out for
Aksu on february 6th, 1933.69
Ma Shao-wu's position was not strong. On february 9th Chin Shu-chih,
the younger brother of Chin Shu-Jen and commander-in-chief at Kashgar New
70City, died after a sudden illness. . His place was taken by a Chinese
officer called Liu, who took command of three detachments of cavalry
(estimated.strength 480 men) and one detachment of artillery (estimated
strength 160 men) formerly under the command of· Chin shu-chfh, Ma Shao-wu
retained direct command over two regiments of cavalry (estimated strength
700 men) and three detachments of infantry (estimated strength 300 men),
all stationed at Kashgar Old City.71 In the middle of february reports
reached Kashgar that Brigadier Yang, heavily outnumbered by the rebele
under Ma Chan-ts'ang and Timur, had fallen back from Aksu end was occupying
Maralbashi. On february 23rd celebrations were held at Ksahgar to mark
Chin Shu-jen's conferral of the title "Special Commi8sioner for the
Suppression of Bandits" on Ma Shao-wu - sslutes were fired at the yam en and
68. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 241; l!Ud!, L/P&S/12/2356, PZ.8042.1933 (~-
randum Respecting Sinkieng Rebellion, 1933).
69. llllJ!, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.1979.1933 (HMCGK-GOI, 9/2/1933).
70. ~., according to Wu, Ai-chen (Turkistan Tumult, p. 241) Chin Shu-
chih committed suicide.
71. figures given by fitzmaurice, HMCGK, in~, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.1979.
1933.
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72Kuomintang flags were flown on buildings throughout the city; shortly
afterwards 'practically all' the New City forces under the command of liu
were despatched to ~aralbashi to bolster the position of General Yang.73
In a bid to suppress the risings at Surghak and Karakash before a full-
scale rising could develop on the south road, 200 men under the command
of a Colonel Li were despatched to Khotan; similarly a force of unrecorded
size under Colonel Chin, the former emban of Maralbashi, was despatched
74to Yarkand. Since the movement of troops to both the Khotan and'
Maralbashl fronts resulted in the serious depletion of the forces defending
Kashgar, Ma Shao-wu ordering the raising of a force of Kirghiz levies and
recalled Chinese troops from the frontier districts to the west of Kashgar.
As a ~esult of these policies, theChines8 garrison at Sarikol withdrew to
Kashgar on rebruary 12th, ieaving the region's TaJik inhabitants to their
own devices pending the resboration of Chinese authority elsewhere in
75southern Sinkiang. At Kashgar itself soldiers were posted on the walls
of both cities, orders were given for the closure of all city gates et
7 o'clock in the evening, and restrictions ware placed on the movement of
the local inhabitants.76
Oespite these moves, the provincial forces proved quite incapable of
stemming the rebel advance along both the north end south road. to Ksshger.
On rebruary 25th rebel forces entered Aksu Old City, shot all the Chinese
residenta, and seized their property; it 8eems probable that this was the
72. lQ!J!. l/P&'S/12/2331, Pl.2336.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 23/2/1933).-
73. 1.O.LB., L/P&'S/12/2331, PZ.2653.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 2/3/1933).
74. .!.QbB., L/P&'S/12/2331, PZ.2336.1933.
75. llli·
76. lQ!:l!" L/P&'S/12/2331, PZ.1647.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 2/2/1933).
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work of Timur's men, as the Tungan forces of Ma Chan-ts'sng ere reported
to have,peaoefullyoccupied Aksu New City, where they took possession
of both the araenaland treasury. British consular sources reporting the
fall of Aksu indicate clearly for the first time that Ma Chan-ta'ang,
at the head of approximately 300 well-armed Tungan troops, was allied to
Ma Shih-ming at Karashahr, and therefore to Ma Chung-ying, still recuperating
in north-western Kansu. The contents of the Aksu New City treasury and
arsenal were reportedly sent to the Tungan Headquarters et Karashahr.77
Later Ma Chan-ta'ang, accompanied by Timur at the head of an estimated
784,700 ill-armed Uighur irregulars, resumed his advance on Maralbashi
and Kashgar.
Meanwhile, on the southern road, both Keriya and Khotan passed into
the hands of Uighur insurgents. In the Keriya oa8is the Chinese officials
agreed to accept Islam and to hand over their goods, but on March 3rd a
group of 3S Chinese, including the leading officials, were executed and
their heads hung up in the bazaar. Khotan Old City seems to have declared
for the rebels almost immediately, whilst the New City surrendered on
March 16th and a reported 266 Chinese, including the Khotan tao-yin,
accepted Islam. The Khotan treasury and arsenal both passed into rebel
handa. Successful risings also occurred at Chira and at Shamba Bazaar,
where two 5hik~rpuri Hindu money-lenders were murdered.79 Beyond Ksriya,
at tha ramota oasas of Chorch~ and Charlik, bloodIes. risings ara raported
77. ~,L/P&S/12/2331, PI.3108.1933 (latter, HMCGK-GOI, 6/4/1933). cf.
~, L/P&S/12/2332, PI.3109.1933 (Kashgar Diaries, March 1933), para.
33.
78. Figure given by Fitzmaurice in IOlR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3108.1933.
. -
79. IOlR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.4045.1933 (lattar, HMCGK-GOI, 25/5/1933). Nearly
all the Hindu money-lenders in Sinkiang during the early Republican
period came from Shikarpur in Sind. See also Ambolt, Nils, Karavan, Travels
in Eastern Turkestan (London & Glasgow, 1939), p. 169.
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to have taken place after a small Tungan force o~ing allegiance to Ma
Shih-ming advanced into the region by ~eans of the little-used desert
eotrack between Karashahr and lop. Meanwhile, Uighur forcas under the
-c- -Karakash rebel leader Isma 11 Khan KhoJa blocked the main Yarkand-Khotan
road at Tokhta langar end turned back all but two of a group of Uighur
notables sent from Kashgar by Ma Shao-wu in an attempt to negotiate
with the rebel leadership at Khotan. Nothing further was heard from the
two begs permitted to proceed to Khotan, and with the failure of their
mission the whole south road from the eestern fringes of the Guma Oasis
to distant lop Nor passed out of Chinese control. The rebel leadership
at Khotan secured their position against possible counter-attack from
Kashgar by destroying the roadside wells in the desert to the east of
Guma, and proceeded to set up an overtly Islamic administration in the
"liberated araas".81
By mid-March, 1933, Ma Shao-wu's political control was effectively
limited to a triangular-shaped territory roughly defined by the garrisons
at Kashgar, Marelbashi and Yarkand. ,Morale, already low, was not improved
by the refusal of the British Indian government to send troops to the
assistance of the Chinese administration at Kashgar despite an official
82request made to the British Consul-General by Me Shao-wu on rebruary 25th.
It was all too apparent that no help would be forthcoming from Urumchi;
BO. ibid., cf • .!.Qb!!, L/P!SI12/2331,.,PZ.5370.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI,
13/1/1933); for ~developments under the Ulghurs at Chin (where the
insurgent leader was called "AmTr" cAbd al-Kadir), see Ambolt, pp. 170-2.
81. lQbft, L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.2652.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 9/3/1933),
PZ.2336.1933; PZ.2794.1933.
82. IOLR~ L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.1322.1933 (Telegram, HMCGK-GOI, 25/2/1933).
~British Indian Government declined to send troops to put down 'an
internal revolutionary movement' (PZ.1395.1933, Note by Political
Department on Situation in Chinese Turkestan), but offered to consider
requests for munitions on receipt of payment (PZ.1398.1933, telegram,
GOI-HMCGK, 10/3/1933).
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after the cutting of telegraph links between Kashgar end Urumchi at Aksu,
Ma Shao-wu received three telegrams from Chin Shu-Jen via the Soviet Union.
The first confirmed Ma in his position es commander-in-chief of the pro-
vincial forces in the south; the second related to the winding up of the
estate of Chin's late brother, Chin Shu-chihi and the third directed Chin'.
Kashgar representative to remit a large sum of money to Tientsin where the
provincial chairman maintained a personal bank account.83
Despite the reinforcement of Yarkand by troops under the commend of
Col. Chin (subsequently sent to the front at Guma), rampant inflation
continued unchecked and a sense of panic developed amongst the Chinese
84officials stationed in the region. In response the Chinese ~mban at
Yerkand New City, described by Fitzmaurice as a classical scholar, ordered
the ambanand all Chinese residents of Yarkand Old City to withdraw to
the fortified Ne!~ity, the walls of which were hurriedly repaired and
stocked with heavy stones to throw on the heads of besieging rebel
forces;BS 500 dummy figures were subsequently added to these defences '1n
B6order to give the impression of a well-manned rampart'. Meanwhile,
on about March 21st, the insurgent forces at Tokhta Langar resumed their
advance on Yarkand. Colonel Chin'. forces 8eem to have made no attempt to
resist the rebel attack, but instead looted Guma, and fall beck on Khotan
via a hill-track by-passing Karghalik and Po.gam. En routa thay are
reported to have killed a large number of Uighurs end one Hindu.87 The
83. ~, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.2794.1933. le fevra, r., An [astern Odyssey,
p. 263.
84. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PX.2336.1933.
85. ~, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ'.26S3.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 2/3/1933).
86. ~, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.2794.1933.
87. According to fitzmaurice, the Chinese troops killed 'between 150 end
410, including ona British Hindu', IOlR, L/P&S/12/2331, Pl'.3398.1933
(letter, HMCGK-GOI, 20/4/1933). ror-rhB route of Chin'. retreat ••e:
~, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3245.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 13/4/1933).
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rebel forces, ~ho were probably still under the command of IemaCII Khan
Khoja, seized Karghalik on March 24th and proceeded to kill nine further
B8Hindus, all British citizens, including the British Akaaka!. The
property of the dead Hindus was looted, their houses burned, and their
bodies thro~n into a wall. On March 25th the rebels reached Posgam, where
three more Hindus suffered a similar fate. Towards the end of March e
group of 150 Chinese troops IIIhohad succeeded in fleeing t.~erebels at
Khotan arrived in Yarkand; a further 300 Chinese troops were reported to
89have arrived in the oasis on April 2nd. No doubt these troops were
employed to strengthen the garrison at yarkand New City, sadly depleted
90by fighting on the Maralbashi front. Meanwhile large numbers of
insurgents had massed on tha east bank of the Yarkand River, although
reportedly ill-armed and untrained, the rebels crossed the river in early
April and advanced against Yarkand itself. On April 11th Yarkand Old
City fell to a force of insurgents from Khotan, Kerghalik and Po.gem; an
estimated 100 Han Chinese who were still outside the fortified New City
were caught and massacred. Accordjng to British sources Afghan citizens
from 8adakshan present in Yarkand took part in the attack on thaOldCity
yamen.g1 During the afternoon of April 11th the bazaar between Yarkand
88. Ak-sakal (Tk. "white beard") - term used for locally-based representa-
tives of foreign governments (British, Afghan, formerly Khokandi, ate.)
in Sinkiang. for details of the "Karghalik outrage"aeB l.Q!!!, L/P&S/
12/2331, PZ.3108.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 6/4/1933), cf. 'Rising in
Chinese Turkestan', The Times, April 20th,1933; for Indian attitudes
to killing of Hindus eee: 'Reign of Terror and Destruction in Chinese
Turkestan', The Daily Herald (Lahore), 26th July, 1933.
89 • .!.Q.bB., L/Pc1S/12/1331, PZ.3108.1933.
90. lQhfi, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.2794.1933.
91. lQhfi, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3398.1933; cf. 'A Turkestan Massacre', The Times,
May 3rd, 1933.
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Old and New Cities was set on fire and destroyed) the shops of Chinese
money-lenders were destroyed and their property looted, snd Yarkand New
City came under siege. On April 12th rebel forces advanced beyond Yarkand
to Kokrobat, one stage on the road to KashgarJ meanwhile reinforcements
from Khotan began to stream into the Yarkand oas18.92
By early April Ma Shao-wu's position was almost untenable. Hi. only
hope lay in reaching an agreement with the attacking forces of hi. fellow
Hui, Ma Chan-ts'ang or failing that in the militarily competent but
politically unreliable Kirghiz levies raised in March after the withdrawal
of Chinese units from the western frontier at Sarikol and elsewhere.
Negotiations with Ma Chan-ts'ang were duly opened through the medium of
93fitzmaurice, the British Consul-General et KashgarJ these appeared
92. ~, L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.3398.1933.
93. Fitzmaurice sent the following letter to Ma Chan-ts'ang after consultations
with Ma Shao-wu:
The Commander of the New Troops, Aksu Kashgar 21st March
Sir, I am informed that your troops have approached near to
Maralbashi, and that there has been severe fighting with the
Chinese forces, in the course of which many men have been killed.
If this fighting continues,not only will many more men be killed,
but the farmers will be unable to cultivate theIr fields end there
will be shortage of food. Many of the sufferers, either in fighting
or from famine, will be Moslems. Brother will be injuring brother.
In the hope of avoiding unnecessary loss of life, and of preserving
peace at Kashgar, I am writing to you to enquire whether it would be
agreeable to you that your troops should remain temporarily in their
present positions on the condition that the Chinese forces likewise
do not advance from their present positions, 80 that negotiations
may be held with a view to a friendly settlement of the peoples'
grievances. Since your followers ere Muslims, and the Hsing Cheng
Chang of Kaehgar (Ma Shao-wu) is also a Muslim, I think it should not
be difficult for you to arrive at an understanding with him. If
representatives of both sides meet at Chiutai, or at some convenient
spot, much trouble and suffering might be evoided. If I can be of
assistance in preventing further hostilities, I shell be glad to do
what I can with this object in view.
Complimenta, etc.,
N. Fitzmaurice, Consul-General.
(!Qhfi, L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.2794.1933). This letter undoubtedly paved the
way to a future alliance between Ma Chan-ts'ang and Ma Shao-wu - aee
below, p.200.
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promising, but Ma Chan-ts'ang could not speak for his ally Timur,
relations with whom may have been becoming strained. Unfortunately for
c- -Ma Shao-wu, his harsh action against the Kirghiz rebels under Id Mirab
in the previous summer had made Kirghiz cooperation in the maintenance
94of Chinese power a vain hope. On April 5th a large force of Kirghiz
levies mutinied at Sugun Karaul, some 65 miles north-west of Keshgar.
Almost simultaneously peasant risings broke out amongst the Uighur. at
Artush, some 15 miles north-west of Kashgar, and at raizabad, approximately
9540 miles due east of Kashgar. Correctly calculating that the mounted end
well-armed Kirghiz posed a mora immediate threat to Keshgar than either
the Khotan troops, still largely occupied 1n tha siege of Yarkand New
City, or the forces of Me Chan-ts'ang, with whom ha was atill discreetly
conducting negotiations, on April 13th Ma Shao-wu ordered Brigadier Yang
96and the troops on the Maralbashi front to fall back on Kashgar. Before
withdrawing from Maralbashi Yang's troops looted and burned tha town, .ftar
which'
They set out on their way to Ksshgar with e large
number of carts laden with refugees or loot or both;
but this proved to be the last straw. The troops mada
alow progress, and in the meantime tha whole country-
side, incensed beyond endurance, rosa against tha
Chinesa. A bridga was broken at Kera Yulgun and, whila
the column was halted, the column was set upon by a
vast horda of rebels.97
As a result of this attack Brigadier yang was wounded end taken prisoner;
of his original forca, astimated by fitzmaurice at well over 1000 man, a
94. lQb..!!t l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3245.1933. Sea above, p. 180.
95. IOLR, l/P&S/12/2332, PZ.3834.1933 (Kashgsr Diaries, April 1933),
para 54; lQba, l/P!S/12/2356, PZ.8042,1932 (Memorandum Respecting
Sinkieng Rebellion, 1933), p. 2.
96. ~, l/P!S/12/2331, PZ.3398.1933.
97. .!E.!.2.
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98mere 65 had straggled back to Kashgar by April 27th. Meanwhile the
main force of the Kirghiz mutineers had advanced to Artush by April
15th; from here they menaced Kashgar whilst other Kirghiz bands attacked
Kizil Ui and Ulugchat on the road to Irkeshtam and demolished the Chinese
post at Bulunkul in Sarikol.99 With the disintegration of Yang's Maral-
bashi force Kashgar was completely isolated.
Ma Shao-wu, no doubt still hoping to reach an agreement with Ma
Chan-ts'ang, remained in residence at the Old City yamen, but took ths
precaution of putting Kashgar New City, with its comparatively small
Uighur population, into a state of defence. Guns were accordingly set
up on the New City walls, the city gates wers kept almost permanently closed,
and freedom to enter or leave was restricted to residents carrying
100official passes.
At this stage, with the Chinese administration supine and apparently
awaiting the coup de grace, trouble began to develop between the invading
Tungan forces and the various Turkic Muslim factions. It appears that Ma
Chan-ts1ang,apparently worried by reports of Uighur insurgency at Khotan
98. Brigadier Yang was subsequently converted to Islam,end his daughter
married Ma Chan-ts'ang. Numbers of his officers from the Maralbashi front
were later seen in the green uniforms of the Tungen forces serving
under Ma Chan-ts'ang during hie occupation of Kaehga~ lQhE, L/P&S/
12/2332, PZ.3834.1933. Yang'e daughter was later killed by Ma Chan-
ts'ang, who reportedly shot her "with hie own hand", ~, l/P&S/
12/2332, PZ.6273.1933 (Kashgar Diaries, July 1933).
99. !Qbfi, LIP&S/12/2331, PZ.3245.1933. According to the British political
agent stationed at Gilgit, insurgents (presumably Kirghiz and not
Tajiks) captured Tashkurgan, the capital of Sarikol, on 19th May,
killing all the Chinese in the town. ~, LIP&S/12/2~31, PZ.3054.
1933 (British Political Agent Gilgit - Gal, 22/5/1933). See also:
'Moslem Revolt in Turkestan', The Times, 27th April, 1933.-
100. ~, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3559.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 27/4/1933).
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101and beyond which clearly owed no loyalty to his own Tungan forces,
determined to reach an agreement with Ma Shao-wu (who had already indicated
a willingness to compromise) by which Tungan power might be established
at Kashgar, the military and economic key to all southern Slnkiang. He
accordingly sent a message to the besieged tao-yin via the British Consul-
General at Kashgar in which he offered assurances that the sole objective
of the Tungan forces in Sinkiang was the overthrow of the tyrannical
Chin Shu-Jen and the reform of the provincial administration.102 Having
thus distanced himself from the Turkic Muslims, whose apparent aim was
complete secession from the Chinese Republic, Ma Chan-ts'ang advanced on
Kashgar in the company of Timur end his Uighur forces.103
Meanwhile, in Kashgar Old City, pan-Turanian elements most prominently
represented by a group referred to in British diplomatic sources as the
Young Kashgar Party (YKP) had become suspicious of Ma Chan-ts'ang's
motives, and were anxious to prevent collusion between the Kansu Tungans
and Ma Shao-wu - a development which the Uighur nationalists feared would
lead to Tungan domination of Kashgar and the replacement of a Han Chinese
101. It must be remembered that, in contrast to the situation at Kumul,
Tungan forces in southern Sinkieng were associated with the Han
Chinese administration. Ma Chan-ts'ang must have become increasingly
aware of Turkic Muslim hostility to hi. forces a8 he advanced ever
deeper into the Tarim Basin. There is every reason to believe that
the Uighur rebels on the Khotan front were in fact attempting to
pre-empt a Tungan advance into their region; Kazak Fuad, op.cit., p. 19.
102. IOlR. L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3398.1933 (includes text of latter from Ma
Chan-ts'ang to Fitzmaurice, dated Aksu, 10/4/1933).
103. At this stage of the rebellion Timur, a man described by Fitzmaurice
as 'easily swayed'(!Qhft,-L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3715.1933; letter, HMCGK-
GOI, 11/5/33), seems to have had no clear political purpose, and .
probably accompanied Ma Chan-ts'ang's forces without realising that
In so doing he was aiding the Tungan. against his own Uighur people.
At Kashgar he came under the influence of the pan-Turanian Young
Kashgar Party, and rapidly dissociated himself from Ma Chan-ts'ang
with disastrous consequences for his own future. See below, p.,219.
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colonial regime by a Tungan Chinese colonial regime. Accordingly seven
leading members of the YKP set out from Kashgar to persuade ~e Chan-ts'ang
that Ma Shao-wu was determined to offer resistance. The YKP representatives
met the Aksu leaders at faizabad, where consultations were apparently
i c - cbe ng held with Uthman Ali, the leader of the Kirghiz mutineers. On
hearing that Ma Shao-wu was not prepared to surrender but had armed all
c - cthe Chinese in the oasis, the rebel leaders agreed that Uthman Ali should
attack and attempt to capture Kashgar Old City. Ma Chan-ta'ang doubtless
agreed to this move in the hope that the elimination of Ma Shao-wu - who
had remained at his yamen in the Old City - would open the way to a deal
with some more compliant Tungan leader in the better fortified New City.104
following the rebel conference at faizabad the attack on Kashgar Old
City went ahead as planned. Early in the morning on May 2nd a considerable
c - cforce of Kirghiz under the command of Uthman Ali approached Kashgarofrom
the direction of Artush. After crossing the Tumen River the mounted Kirghiz
opened a swift attack on the Old City. According to eye-witness reports
reaching the British Consul-General:
They took up positions opposite each of the four gates
of the city and at the same time sent parties to'call
up the country people (Uighur.). These appeared from
all sides in thousands, armed with clubs and sticks,
and there was a great display of enthusiasm •••firing
continued until about two in the afternoon, when the
Kirghiz either forced en entry or were admitted by the
Tushik Gate.10S
Most of the non~Chinese garrison reportedly went over to the side of the
rebels, into whose hands the whole city, with the exception of the yemen,
rapidly fell. At the yamen Ma Shao-wu and his bodyguard continued to hold
out, end many Han Chinese caught in the old city by the speed of tha Kirghiz
104. lJllJ!, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3715.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 11/5/1933).
105. ]]hE, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.355B.1933 (latter, HMCGK-GOI, 4/5/1933).
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attack were able to take refuge in this stronghold. Meanwhile a letter from
CUthman cAli had been delivered to the British Consulate-General (which
was situated at Chini Bagh between the Old and New Cities); the tone of this
letter indicates that the Kirghiz leader had come under the influence of
the YKP, and is worth quoting in full as an apparently unique example of
c - c .Uthman Ali's (stated) political aims:
letter from the Commander of the Kirghiz forces
To: The exalted and honourable Consul-General
(Received May 2nd 1933)
Sir, We, the citizens under the teo-yin's Jurisdiction
beg to remind you that you, who ere highly civilised and
progressive, are eware how much tyranny has been practised
by the dishonest Chinese government towards the ignorant
people under them. Now the Muslims of Kumul, being jealous
of their honour and unable to endure eny longer the atrocities
of the tyrannical and dishonest Chinese, have risen to effect
a revolution against Chinese tyranny, to punish the Chinese
and to be free. The eyes of the misled people of this country
are now opened. We ere the only people. in the world who had
no civilisation. We want to see the progress made by Europeans,
to bring here expert. from other countries, to become 8S
civilised as other people of the world ere, to make machinery
and factories, and thus by thie revolution to make ourselves
their equals and to become independent.
At present we have Chinese education. You are eware that
for the last 15 years Ma tao-yin.ha. battened on the possessione
of us helpless people. He claims to be a Muslim. He did not
open schools or build hospitale for the benefit of the people,
but exported all the gold and silver from our country. Can
such a dishonest government be permitted in the world? We
demand our rights before exalted consuls like yourself. In
the name of politics our blood was shed for no reason. We
Muslims of Kashgar show our resentment of the tyrannical wronga
done to us by the tao-yin's orders, and in proof of his dis-
honesty we have prepared (this) note stating our proof. and .
reasons.
We hope that you, our honourable guest, will pay attention
to our note and help us, who had lost the way, to obtain our
independence.
CUthman CAli.
(undated) 106
106. !2!2.
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The Kirghiz, having secured the Old City, prevented the Uighur
peasantry from looting and ordered them to return to their villages. The
reason for this unexpected display of restraint became clear o~ the
morning of May 3rd when the Kirghiz, left in sole possession of the Old
City, proceeded to sack and loot it themselves. According to the British
Consul-General, about 100 Chinese were killed, as well as the Turkic wives
end mistresses of any Chinese on whom the Kirghiz could lay their hands.
The looted property of the unfortunate Chinese was either carried off or
auctioned on the streets.107
During the afternoon of May 3rd about 300 Uighurs under the command of
Timur arrived et Kashgar and were admitted to the Old City 'without question'
by the Kirghiz;on the same afternoon the advance guard of Ma Chan-ts'ang's
Tungan forces also arrived, but instead of Joining the victorious Kirghiz
and Uighurs in Kashgar Old City, they marched to the walls of Kashgar New
City, some two-end-a-half miles distant, and after brief negotiationa were
admitted by the Chinese defenders. No doubt, as fitzmaurice speculated, the
latter thoug~t it 'bE!_tterto surrender to'the T~ngans than ~I:)_!:l~._~,laughtared
by the Kirghiz,.108 With the fall of Kashgar New City, on May 3rd, 1933,
Han Chinese pOwer in southern Sinkiang - except at the besieged garrison of
Yarkand New City, which continued briefly to hold out - was effectively
brought to an end.109 .
107. lJllJ!, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.4602.1933 (Kashgar Diaries, May 1933); lQ1a,
L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.35S8.1933.
10B. lJllJ!, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.4602.1933. for a mora accessible account of tha
arrival at Kashgar by Ma Chan-ts'ang'a forces see: 'The Ri.ing in
Chinesa Turkestan', The Times, May 25th 1933.
109. The status of Yangi-hissar i8 not clear at this time, but it may have
been occupied by Khotan forces ~, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.4045.1933).
Certainly its Chinese inhabitants had been forced to adopt Islam, for
on May_6th a group of 180 soldiers under A~mad, a Uighur owing allegiance
to Timur, are reported by the British akaakal to have looted the town
and left the Chinese "converts" with nothing but 'their turbans and
their lives'. ~ L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3715.1933.
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5.3 The Turkic-Tungan Struggle at Kashgar and Yarkand
rour days after the fall of Kashgar New City, on May 7th, Ma Chan-
ts'ang and the main body of Tungan troops from Aksu arrived at Kashgar.
The Tungan commander soon learned that he had been misled by the Young
Kashgar Party at Artush, and that Tim~r, who had come under the influence
110of this pan-Turanian organisation, was no longer a reliable ally.
During the period between the initial capture of Kashgar Old City and the
arrival of Ma Chan-ts'ang at Kashgar tha Kirghiz, no doubt involved in
negotiations with Timur over the distribution of the spoils of their
victory, had made no serious attempt to .torm the Old City yamen where Ma
Shao-wu was still holding out. Ma Chan-ts'ang, whose troops retained un-
disputed control of Kashgar New City, realised that the influential (end
still legitimate) tao-yin would make an invaluable ally against the Turkic
nationalists who controlled Kashgar Old City and much of the rest of
southern Sinkiang. He accordingly entered the Old City yamen shortly
after his arrival and began negotiations with Ma Shao-wu. The latter, who
through Fitzmaurice had already indicated a willingness to compromise,
readily entered into an agreement with the Tungan commander. As a result
of this, on May 8th, Ma Chan-ts'ang had notices poatedannouncing that the
tao-vin and all other ambans of the formar regime should retain their
official posts. This move 'caused a sensation' amongst the Turkic Muslims,
who did not share Ma Chan-ts'ang's professions of loyalty to Nanking. The
Kirghiz accordingly closed tha Old City gates and manned the walls in pre-
paration for a trial of strength with the Tungan forces.At this point the
diplomatically far-sighted Ma Shao-wu temporarily defused the situation by
110. IOlR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3715.1933.
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resigning as tao-yin and handing over his seals of office to Ma Chan-
ts'ang.111 The latter did not assume the office of tao-yin, but retained
control of the Old City yamen as well a8 the New City, and kept Ma Shao-
wu under his protection as a possible ally in his unfinished struggle with
the Turkic nationalists.
Ma Chan-ts'ang's strategy seems to have been to drive a wedge between
c - c -Uthman Ali's Kirghiz and Timur's Uighurs before a unified Turkic alliance,
possibly including the Khotan faces, might be formed. He was also concerned
to limit the influence of the pan-Turanian Young Kashgar Party, which
seems to have been as anti-Tunga".' as it was anti_Chinese.112 On May 10th
he ordered the arrest of the most prominent YKP activist, cAbd al-RahIm•
Bai 8atche, who was only released after agreeing to supply the Tungan
113forces with 1,000 uniforms at his own expense. rollowing this ettack
on the YKP, Ma Chan-ts'ang attempted to neutralise the Uighur forces by
seizing Timur, who had been proclaimed commander-in-chief of the combined
Muslim armies at Kashgar on May 7th.114 Timur was accordingly invited to
a meeting at the Old City yemen on the evening of May 17th and placed
under arrest shortly after his arrival. Had Ma Chan-ts'ang been able to
transfer the captive Uighur commander to the Tungan stronghold of Kashgar
New City, his plan might have worked. As it was, he had insufficient troops
to defend both New and Old Cities, and when he attempted to seize control
- c -of the latter by locking out T~murl8 leaderless Uighur forces end Uthman
cAli's Kirghiz,the Turkic Muslims (led by the Kirghiz, who made excellent
111. ~.
112. IOLR, L/P&'S/12/2331, PZ.3883.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 18/5/1933);
1.Q11h L/P&'S/12/2332, PZ.4602.1933.
113. IOLR, L/P&'S/12/2331, PZ.371S.1933.
114. lE.!!!.
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- 115irregular fighters), scaled the city walls and forced Timur's release.
-With the failure of his attempt to hold Timur, Ma Chan-ts'ang had
revealed his purpose to the Turkic Muslims and had largely confirmed the
YKP in their claims that he intended to set up a Tungan administration
at Kashgar. On May 18th the incensed Kirghiz (who, as a result of Tungan
c- -participation in the suppression of the Id Mirab rebellion of 1932 had
always been more anti-Tungan than Timur's Uighur forces from Aksu),
launched a surprise attack on the Old City. They avoided tha Old City
yamen where Ma Chan-ts'ang and Ma Shao-wu remained under the protection
116of a powerful Tungan forca armed with artillery and machine-guns,
but during the course of the day sought out and murdered any Tungan
(or surviving Chinese) residents of tha Old City on whom they could lay
their hands. Heavy firing continued until tha evening, and FitzmauricB
recorded that casualties were probably heavier than they had been on
May 2nd, when the Kirghiz had originally seized the Old City fro~ Ma
117Shao-wu.
As a result of the Kirghiz attack, Ma Chan-ts'ang agreed to hand
- c - cover control of Kashgar affairs to Timur and Uthman IIi. On May 19th
a very inconclusive truce was agreed by which Timur was confirmed 8S
c -commander-in-chief'with his headquarters at Kashgar Old City and Uthman
cAli was given the rank of general in command of the Kirghiz forces.
Ma Chan-ta'ang was given no official position, but retained control of
the Tungan forces and on May 22nd, accompanied by his fully-armed troops
from the Cld City yamen, withdrew to the Tungan stronghold at Kashgar
115. IOlR, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3883.1933. See also 'Turkestan Muslims capture
Strategic Cities', Star of India (Calcutta), 3rd June 1933.
116. ~.
117. tOLR, l/P&S/12/2332, PZ.4602.1933.
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New City. Ma Chan-ts'ang's chief-of-staff, Su Chin-shou, and Yunus 8eg
of Kumul were appointed joint teo-yin of Kashgar, whilst Ma Shao-wu
was permitted to leave the Old City yamen and to take up residence et
a nearby country house under the formal protection of Timur and Ma
118Chan-ts'ang.
rollowing the truce of May 19th, Kashgar subsided into an uneasy
peace, with the Tungans in firm control of the New City (including its
treasury and important arsenal) and the Turkic Muslims controlling the
Old City and tao-yin's yamen. Fitzmaurice records that 'Ma Chan-ts'ang,
Timur and CUthman cAli all settled down to the congenial business of
119accumulating wealth and wives', whilst the Young Kashgar Party continued
its intrigues against the Tungans, organised a "parliament" of 40 members
(subsequently greatly expanded), and sent two delegates to Khoja Niyas
~ajjI, the Uighur leader at Kumul.120 Timur seems to have passed completely
under YKP influence,asa result of which he began to issue passports styling
himself "Timur Shah"; these documents employed only the Islamic ti!.l!:!
date, the Chinese Republican date having been dropped in 8 clear re-
121pUdiation of Nanking's authority.
Meanwhile on the southern rim of the Tarim 8asin, in an area un-
troubled by the invading Tungans and free from the complicatioh of Kirghiz
involvement, Khotan had emerged as a centre of exclusively Uighur influence.
IsmacIl Khan Khoja, the leader of the rebellious gold-miners at Karakash,
was soon eclipsed by the pan-Turanian Committee for National Revolution (CNR)
118. lQ!J!, L/Plr.S/12/2331, PZ.4045.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 25/5/1933);
.!QbB., L/Plr.S/12/2332, PZ.4602.1933 •
119. .!.2.!!!.
120. 1.Q.b.!!, L/Plr.S/12/2331, PZ.3715.1933; PZ.3883.1933.
121. llli·
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which had been founded in Khotan at the beginning of 1932 by Muhammad AmIn•
. 1228ugra (plate 13), • Muslim scholar in hi, mid-thirties, together with his
~., ~ _ . eI{Io ,'. ---~ c - -two younger brothers, Abdullah and Nur Ahmad, and a number of like-•
123minded friends. At the beginning of 1933 this group was joined by
cAbd al-BaqI ~abit Damullah, a school teacher and former S!~!(judge)
from Kulja who had travelled extensively in the Soviet Union, Turkey,
124Egypt and India. The political philosophy of the CNR was, like that
of the YKP, uncompromisingly pan-Turanian; however it stood further to
the right, being pronouncedly anti-communist and anti-Christian as well
as anti-Chinese and anti-Tungan. The CNR leadership apparently favoured
the establishment of an Islamic theocracy in Sinkiang, probably with
Mu~ammad AmIn Bugra as head of state. Links had been established between
the Khotan Muslim revolutionaries and Khoja Niyas HaJJI of Kumul after the•
latter had visited eouthern Sinkiang in 1927, and it is possible that the
subsequent Kumul and Khotan rebellions were co-ordinated to some alight
extent.125
122. fltznl8urice describes 6ugra ,;'88':'8 talib aI-Islam (Ar. "Student of Islam")
of about 35 years of age. IOLR. L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3398.1933.
123. Hayit, B., Turkestan zwischen Russland und China (Amsterdam, 1971), p. 301,
citing :Bugra'ssen's book, published in Turkish:, Bugra-Khan, Emin Muhammed
(Mu~ammad AmIn Bugra), Oogu Turkistan (Eastern Turkistan. Istanbul, 1952),
p. 29. Nyman,{op.cit., p. 105), appears to be mistaken in asserting
that there were only two Bugra brothers; cf. 10LR, L/P&S/12/2332,
PZ.6273.1933.
124. Hayit, op.cit., p. 301; cf. )OLR. L/P&S/12/2392, Ext. 4910.1941. (Who's
Who in Sinkiang, April 1940 •
125. KhoJa Niyas is reported by the Swedish missionary Arell to have stopped
Khotan on his way back to Kumul after completing the ~aJJ in 1927. Here
he held discussions with the local Muslim leadership amongst whom the
Bugra brothers 'played a key role'. The basic planning and co-ordination
for the coming rebellion was allegedly planned at this meeting. Arell,
G.A., et al., Din broders blod ropar (stockholm, 1935), pp. 16-17;
cited in Nyman, op.cit., p. 105.
Plotes 13 and 14:
THE KHOTAN AMIRS
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10k c 1 -,A group of Khotan 1 u ama ,
1933. The Amlr Muhammad Amln
is in foreground in black chapan.
The Khotanlik Armed Forces in
1933. Muhammad Amln Bugra, the
Khotanli~ Commander-In-Chief,
is again in the foreground.
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According to Hayit, Muhammad AmIn Bugra was working in Khotan as a•
mudarris, or teacher at a Qur'anic College, at the time of the Karakash
and Surghak risings in february, 1933. On february 20th, the CNR leadership
met at Khotan, probably in the Old City, and formed a provisional government
- c - - -ment with Mu~ammad Niyas A lam, the B!~!of Karakash, as president, ~abit
Oamullah as prime minister, and Muhammad AmIn Bugra as commander of the•
armed forces.126 The elder 8ugra, who appears to have been the most
powerful member of the new administration, took the title "AmIr al-Islam",
whilst his younger brothers styled themselves "AmIr cAbdullah Khan" end
"AmIr Nur A~mad Jan" respectively.127 As a result of these somewhat grandiose
titles, the Khotan Islamic Government (as the CNR provisional government
128was subsequently renamed) is more generally referred to in contempora-
neous sources ss the "Government of the Khotan Amlrs".
The religious intolerance of the Khotan AmIrs was revealed 1n their
capture of Khotan New City on March 16th as e result of which an estimated
129266 Chinese were forced to accept Islam. following this event numerous
Hindu money-lenders were murdered, and the Swedish missionaries resident
st Khotan were ordered to leave southern 51nklang - 72 orphans living at
the Swedish missions were later taken away and entrusted to the cara of
the local culama!130 At some time in March or April the conservative
nature of the AmIrs' regime was reinforced by the arrival in Khotan of
JanIb Beg, well-known Basmachi leader who, after fleeing from the Soviet
126. Hayit, op.cit., p. 301.
127. !Qhli, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3398.1933; PZ.3SS8.1933; PZ.5573.1933 (let!er,
HMCGK-GOI, 27/7/1933). British diplomatic sources sometimes call Nur
Ahmad "Nur Muhammad", perhaps confusing him with the eldest Bugra
• •brother.
128. ~,l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.4125.1933 (Chinese Turkestan: Internsl
Situation) •
129. for reports on the fighting at Khotsn and:the religious intolerance
of the "Amirs"_see Ambolt, op.cit., pp.169-73j 181~~.
130. J]1B, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3558.1933.
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Union to Kashgar, had been banished to the Keriye Oasis by Ma Shao-wu
in 1931.131 JanIb Beg made common cause with the Khotan AmIrs and,
probably in recognition of his military experience during the Basmachi
struggle, was placed in charge of a large body of Khotanlik rebel forces.
rollowing the consolidation of their hold on the Khotan Oasis, the
AmIrs began to extend their influence both eastwards, towards Lop Nor,
and westwards, towards Kashgar. In response to en appeal from the Uighurs
132of Chllorchc.nwho had risen against their Tungan "liberators", a force
of 100 Khotanliks was despatched to that oasis to guard against the
Karashahr Tungans (who appear to have remained in control of the Charklik
Oasis throughout the period from 1933 to 1937).133 Meanwhile, on the
western front, Khotanlik forces had seized Guma, Karghalik, Posgam and
Yarkand Old City by April 11th,134 and an estimated 2,000 Han Chinese
and Tungans were besieged in Yarkand New City.135
On April 24th the AmIr cAbdullah Khan, styling himself walI al-hakuma
of the Khotan'Islamic Government (a post approximating to vice-regent),
arrived in Yarkand to prosecute the siege of the New City. According to
ritzmaurice the Khotan forces, who had already organised a band, were
attired in red uniforms (the officers sporting red velvet tunics) in
contrast to the less flamboyant, but more practical,green favoured by the
T 136' I c -ungan troops of Ma Chan-ts'ang. Am r Abdullah was reportedly greeted
131. IOLR, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.4418.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 1/6/1933).
~rt of JanIb Beg's execution in the Kashgar Diary of November
is incorrect; see: IOLR, L/P!S/12/2332, PZ.3384.1933.-
The
1931
132. See above~p •.190
133. ~,L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.5408.1933.
134. Sea above, pp. 191-2.
135. ~,L/P!S/12/2332, PZ.3834.1933 (Kashqar Diaries, April 1933).
136. ~,L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.3558.1933.ror Khotanlik forces see plate 14.
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with great ceremony, with some of the Yarkand begs and other Turkic
officials who had served under the Chinese being dragged through the
137streets in chains as a public spectacle. . On April 27th he gave orders
for the arrest of the Swedish missionaries stationed at Yarkand. After
c -they had been bound and brought before him, Abdullah kicked and beat
them himself, announcing that by their teaching the missionaries had
'destroyed' the religion of Islam, and that it was therefore his duty to
kill them. The missionaries were only saved from the firing squad by
the intervention of the former British akeakal of Khotan and hi. colleague
from Yarkand; following this reprieve they were imprisoned and subsequently
138expelled from the country.
c -Abdullah next turned his attention to the 8iege of Yarkand New City
where the attacking Khotanlik forces had cut the water supply and were
139attempting to pierce the walla by tunnelling. On April 27th three
delegates from Ma Shao-wu arrived at Yarkand and attempted to negotiate
with the AmIr. c -Abdullah had a prisoner shot in their presence 'to bring
them to a proper atate of mind' end then .ent them into the besieged New
City to inform the defenders that their lives and personal property would
be spared if they agreed to accept Islam and to surrender their arms.140
The besieged Chinese, under the command of Colonel Chin (who hed retreated
from Guma in March) agreed to accept these terms, and Mey 12th wes set for
the final surrender. Shortly before this dete the first Tungan and Turkic
137. 1E!2.
138. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.4964.1933 (Information on Yarkand Situation
from the Swedish Mission, Yerkand, June 6th 1933); cf. Arell et el.,
op.cit., pp. 34-5, 78-81 (cited in Nyman, op.cit., p. 111)} also
Ambolt, Travels in Eestern Turkestan pp. 117-20. The British
akeakals, Khan Sahib and Rahim Bakshi Khan, although Indian, were
Muslims and hence escaped the rete of many or their Hindu compatriot ••
139. ~,L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.355B.1933.
140. ibid •..........
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troops, fresh from their victory at Kashgar, began to arrive in the
'141 - c -Yarkand Oasis. . The Amir Abdullah, who recognised that ~ictory lay
within his grasp and was, moreover, openly hostile to the Tungans, made
it clear to the newcomers that their assistance was neither needed nor
appreciated.142 Faced with Khotanlik hostility, the small but well-
armed Tungan force - which owed allegiance to ~a Chan-ts'ang, and through
him to ~a Chung-ying - followed tbe example of their fellow-Tungans at
Kashgar and entered the besieged New City, thus strengthening the Tungan
element amongst the defending garrison and causing renewed resistance to
- 143 c -the Amirs' forces. The Tungan action obviously caught Abdullah un-
prepared, and his hostility towards these hardened Chinese ~uslim troops
can hardly have been diminished by their action on ~ay 18th, when they led
a Bortie from the New City, briefly capturing the Altin and Khankah Gates of
Khotan Old City and subsequently setting fire to the surrounding areas
before retreating, apparently in good order, to their original base.144
The Uighur troops from Aksu and Kashgar, under Timur's commander,
~afi~, together with a number of Kirghiz irregulers, seem to have remained
neutral until ~ay 22nd, when news of the Tungan-Turkic split at Kashgar
first reached Yarkand. Following this development, the two Turkic armies
&.
co-operated in the siege of the New City, but did not merge into~.inglB
_ c - 145unit - indeed Hafiz and Abdullah remained bitter rivals. Faced with
• •
a united Turkic attack and realising that there was no possibility of
141. .!.Q!J!., L/P&'S/12/2332, PZ.4602.1933 •
142. IOLR, L/P&'S/12/2331, PZ.3883.1933.
143. .!E.!:!!, L/P&'S/12/2332, PZ.4602.1933.
144. IOLR, L/P&'S/12/2331, PZ.4418.1933.
145. .!.Q1B., L/P&'S/12/2331, PZ.4602.1933 •
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relief from Kashgar, the Chinese in Yarkand New City surrendered on
c -May 26th under the terms originally offered by Abdullah for the 12th.
The surrender was incomplete, however, as the beseiged Tungans insisted
on retaining their arms and on being allowed to proceed to Kashgar to
146join Ma Chan-ts'ang. The victorious Turkic forces are reported to have
relieved the Chinese garrison of 540 rifles. These were later divided
c - -between the forces of Abdullah and ~afi~, with the latter apparently
obtaining the majority of the serviceable modern weapons, a development
which caused increased friction between the two rival commanders.147
The defeated Chinase and the still defiant Tungans were divided into
two parties, each about 1.000 strong, and given permission to proceed to
Kashgar. Neither party was ever to reach its destination, however. The
first column, which was predominantly Tungan and consisted of 400 cavalry
(300 of whom were Tungan), together with 600 non-combatants (including 200
women and children) and numerous cart-loads of money, property and
munitions, was attacked in the desert near Kizil. The attacking force,
which consisted of Kirghiz irregulars apparently owing allegiance to
c - cUthman Ali supported by a large body of Khotanliks under the command of
Amlr Nur A~mad Jan,148 cut the column of refugees to pieces in what
149subsequently became known as the "Kizil Massacre". About 190 horsemen,
146 • .!E.!.£ •
147. lQkft, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.4602.1933.
148. IOLR, L/P&S/12t2331, PZ.4418.1933. It is difficult to establish with
any certainty Uthman cAli'e part in this attack, but there can be no
doubt that the Kirghiz bore the brunt 8f ~hecfight~ng a2aigst the
Tungans, and ritzmaurice records that Umar Ali, Uthman Ali's
brother, 'a bloodthirsty young walking arsenal', scarcely ettempted to
conceal his satisfaction over the massacre. !2!2.
149. ror a contemporary account of the "Kizil Massacre" see: 'War In Chinese
Turkestan: Refugees Killed in Desert', The Times, June 22nd, 1933. Also
lQhfi, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.4418.1933; L/P&S/12/2332, PI.5508.1933 (Kashgar
Diaries, June 1933); L/P&S/12/2356, PZ.8042.1933, p. 3. Particularly
unsavoury details of the massacre are given in Ambolt, Karavan, p. 182.
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almost certainly mainly Tungan cavalry, succeeded in reaching the fringes
of the Yangi-hissar oasis where they were put to death either by the
Kirghiz or by the Uighur troops of Ahmad, Timur's commanding officer at•
Yangi_hissar.150 The victorious Klrghiz also killed all the Chinese and
Tungan residents of Yangi-hissar at this time.151 The second column of
Chinese refugees from Yarkand New City was attacked and looted by a mixed
fprce of Uighurs under Hafiz and Kirghlz irregulars before it could leave• •
the Yarkand Oasis; on this occasion no general massacre occurred,
possibly because the attack took place near s major urban centre rather
than in the desert, as at Kizil.152
Whan news of the events at Yarkand New City and Kizil reached Kashgar,
\ Su Chin-shou, the Tungan Joint tao-yin, left the Old City yamen in protest
at the treatment of his fellow-Tungans and joined Ma Chan-ts'sng in Kashgar
New City.153 The fall of Yarkand New City this signalled not only the final
collapse of Chinese authority in southern Sinkiang, but also the complete
154alienation of Tungan Muslims from their Turkic co-religionists. following
the Kizl1 Massacre Ma Chan-ts'ang's Tungan troops - still the best armed
150.lQ!J!, l/P!S/12/2331, PZ.4418.1933. 32 officers and men, accompanied
by 12 women and children, reportedly escaped the original massacre st
the hands of the Klrghiz and Uighurs and were taken back to captivity
in Yarkand. ~, l/P&S/12/2332, PZ.5508.1933.
151. 46 Chinese and Tungans were reportedly killed. lQhfi, L/P!S/12/2331,
PZ.4418.1933.
152 • .!lili!•
153. IOlR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.4604.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 15/6/1933).
154. On May 31st the Ulghurs of Aksu, led by one Ism;cIl 8eg, attacked Ma
Chan-ts'ang's remaining Tungan forces in that town and drove out the
tao-yin. JsmalIl 8eg, who is believed to have been under the influence
of the Khotan Amirs, became the new tao-yin. lQhli, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.
5156.1933(letter, HMCGK-GOI, 6/1/1933).
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and most disciplined force in the south of the province - remained securely
within their fortress at Kashgar New City, making occasional sorties
against the various Turkic factions holding the Old City and surrounding
countryside, whilst awaiting the arrival of Tungan reinforcements from
Turfan or Kansu.155
5.4 Turkic factionalism at Kashgar and Varkand
With the temporary withdrawal of Ma Chan-ts'ang and his Tungan troops
from the struggle for control of southern Sinkiang, tension between the
rival Turkic regimes at Khotan and Kashgar increased substantially.
following the fall of Varkand New City on May 26th, Timur's representative
~afi~'. attempted to conciliate the Khotan Amrrs, who were still smarting
from his inequitable distribution of the captured weapons, by handing over
the New City granary and B quantity of old srms and ammunition found in
r c - 156the New City yamen to the Am r Abdullah. Relations between the rival
commanders remained strained, however, so Hafiz expanded his original• •
forcea, estimated at 400, by conscripting 200 Dulania from Merket.157
The Khotan AmIrs responded by transferring command of their Varkand forces
to the AmIr Nur Ahmad Jan, newly returned from the "Kizil Massacre" in
. .
c -which he is reported to have played B leading role. Abdullah took charge
of a force of 2,000 Khotanliks and set out for Ksshgar, presumably with
the intention of coming to terms with Timur rather than with his representa-
tive, Hafiz, who had proved unwilling to compromise. Meanwhil. s separate• •
155. Kazakh, op.cit., p. 20.
156. IOLR, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.4604~1933.
157 • .!!!.!!t •
column of approximately 1,000 Khotanliks, under the command of the ex-
1588asmachi leader Janib 8eg, arrived in Kashgar on June 11th.
Janib 8eg's sudden arrival at Kashgar, albeit with very poorly-
armed troops, caused consternation both amongst the local Turkic leader-
ship and at the Soviet Consulate-General, where it was feared that the
influence of the strongly anti-Soviet eX-8asmachi leader would swing the
revolution sharply to the right. Soviet concern must have redoubled when
it became known that Janib 8eg had made his headquarters in the garden of
the pan-Turanian activist cAbd al-RahIm Bai 8atcha, thus raising .•
.the spectre of an alliance developing between the Khotan AmIrs and the
Young Kashgar Party, elements of which had come to favour cooperation
with the USSR.159 Kashgarlik feeling at this time was strongly pro-AmIr,
and ritzmaurice doubted whether Timur's troops would have obeyed an order
to fire on the Khotanlik forces. c - cUthman .Ali was also disturbed by the
arrival of Janib 8eg; his Kirghiz followers were reportedly angered by the
increasing amount of time he was devoting to his opium pipe and newly-
acquired harem,160 and saw in the former 8asmachi guerilla a possible new
leader.161 On July 4th the Khotanlik presence at Kashgar was considerably
- c -strengthened by the arrival of the Amir Abdullah, accompanied by the 600
troops under his own command, 300 troops under his subordinate officer,
158. 'Chinese Turkestan Revolts New Rebel Leeder's Intervention', rh!
Times, July 8th, 1933. See also: ~, L/P!S/12/2332, PZ.5508.1933
(Kashgar Diaries, June 1933).
159. ~,L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.5370.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 13/7/1933);
PZ.4418.1933.
160. According to ritz maurice, writing at the beginning of the 1933
rebellion, CUthman cAli was 'about thirty years of age and a heavy
opium smoker'. IOLR, l/P!S/12/2331, Pl.4045.1933.
161. ~,L/P!S/12/2332, PZ.550B.1933.
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Qadir 8eg, and ~abit Damullah, prime minister and Shaykh aI-Islam of the
h t 162 c -K 0 an Islamic Government. Abdullah's forces were very poorly equipped.
British diplomatic sources indicate that about 300 of his rollowers were
armed with Russian rifles, whilst another 300 had antiquated muzzle-
163loaders and the remainder bore cudgels. Nevertheless, their presence
- c - cposed a serious threat to both Timur end Uthman Ali, neither of whom
wished to share the large stocks of food, money and arms held in Kashgar
New City with the AmIre - always assuming that they could be captured from
164 -besieged Ma Chan-ts'ang. Timur therefore made a show of welcoming
c -Abdullah, and installed him in a garden between the Old and New Cities
pending a suitable opportunity to move against this troublesome new rival.165
Meanwhile, at Yarkand, negotiations continued between Hafiz and the• •
AmIr Nur Ahmad Jan. Hafiz advanced Timur'a claim to all the territory
• ••
west of the Yarkand River, an area which included both Yarkand Old and
New Cities; Nur Ahmad Jan, on behalf of the Khotan Islamic Government,•
166countered with a claim to both Maralbashi end Kashgar. After several
minor incidents between the two rival Turkic armies, Nur Ahmad Jan took•
action against a number of Yarkandlik 8egs who had petitioned Hafiz to• •
intervene on their behalf against the Amlrs' forces. The offending
notables were executed, and their heads exhibited in the streets in en open
162. 'Another Rebel Leader in Turkestan: Glut of Ar~iee at Keshgar', The
Times, July 24th, 1933; cf. 10~~, L/P&~/12/2332, PZ.6273.1933 ---
(Kashgar Diaries, July 1933). cAbdullah left about 1300 of the troops
he hac set out with from Yarkand at Yangi-hisssr.
163. IOLR. l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.51b6.1933.
164. fitzmaurice noted on 6th July that both the Khoten AmIrs end Timur
were 'desperately anxious' to ley their hands on the New City treasury
and arsenal. lQhE, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.5156.1933.
165. ~.
166. IOLR, l/P&S/12/2332, PZ.5508.1933.
215
- 167challenge to Hafiz. When news of this incident reached Kashgar,
• •
Timur, who was 'irritated beyond endurance by the AmIre' attitude end
claims', decided to move against the Khotanlik forces at Kashgar. According
to Fitzmaurice, Tim~r 'played his cards well'. He won the support of
Cuthman CAli by stressing Janib Beg's threat to the Kirghiz leader's
command, and reportedly bought off most of the lesser Kirghiz leaders.
c - cIn mid-July Uthman Ali and his Kirghiz made ostentatious preparations
to leave for the hills, thereby lulling the Khotan leaders into 8 false
sense of security. It was therefore with the element of complete surprise
that Tim~r, on the morning of July 13th sent a force of 700 or 800 troops
to arrest Janib 8eg at his headquarters in cAbd al-Ra~Im Bai Batcha's
garden. After a small fight the former Basmachi leader was taken into
custody. The AmIr cAbdullah, on hearing this news, sent 100 of his men
to asaist Janib 8eg, but they arrived too late and were in turn arrested
end disarmed.16B
- - c-Following their successful move against Janib Beg, Timur and Uthman
cAli moved in unison against cAbdullah, arresting the AmIr and disarming
many of his troops. Realising that he too was in danger of imminent
errest, the Khotanlik Shaykh aI-Islam ~abit Oamullah fled towards Artush,
, - c - cbut was apprehended by troops loyal to Timur and Uthman Ali and brought
- c -back to the Old City yamen where the Amir Abdullah was also being held
captive. Casualties during Timur's action against the Khotanlik forces
were low on both sides,169 and on the evening of the 13th, with the
- c - C i b tsupremacy of Timur and Uthman Ali at Kashgar clearly establ shed, 0 h
167. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.5408.1933.
168. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ. 5370.1933.
169. ibid. British diplomatic sources indicate that during Tim~r's
~on against the AmIr and Janib Beg only four of his own men
and six Khotanlika were killed.
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the AmIr cAbdull;h and Sabit O;mull;h were permitted to return to their•
170 -garden. In marked contrast, Janib Beg was kept in custody, lending
weight to fitzmaurice's theory that the Soviet Consulate-General had
planned and financed Timur's coup in a bid to remove the strongly anti-
Soviet ex-Basmachi from the political stage of southern Sinkiang.171
The new balance of power in southern Sinkiang was confirmed at a
conference held in Kashgar on July 4th and attended by all the Muslim
leaders except Janib Beg and, of course, Ma Chan-ts'ang. As a result of
this conference it was agreed that both Yarkand Old and New Cities should
be included within Timur's area of administration, whilst the jurisdiction
of the Khotan Islamic Government (still controlled by the Amrr Muhammad•
Amrn Bugra, who remained in Khotan) should extend eastwards from the
Yarkand River.172 When news of this agreement reached Yarkand, Hafiz,• •
emboldened by the success of Timur and CUthman cAli in disarming the
Khotanliks et Kashgar, ordered the AmIr Nur A~mad Jan to withdrew from
Yarkend New City on July 17th. The Amrr, who felt constrained to comply,
left immediately for Yarkand Old City; however in so doing he caused
panic to break out amongst his untrained troops, many of whom, fearing an
attack b1 the victorious ~efi!, "stampeded, either riding ponies or
donkeys or on foot,.173 Hefiz immediately sent 200 men to hold the ferries• •
170~ fitzmaurice notes that Timur 'seems notto.have wished to humiliate
them too greatly'. ~,LLP!~/12/23~1, PZ.5370.1933. Timur may
have hoped to retain. the Amir Abdullah and his forces as subordinate
allies in the struggle against Ma Chan-ts'ang, still besieged in
Kashgar New City.
171. ~, L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.4472.1933; PZ.5370.1933.
172. ~,L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.5408.1933.
173. ~,L/P&'S/12/2331, PZ.S573.1933 (lette~L HMC£K-GOI, 27/7/193~).
Hafiz had received reinforcements under Isa HaJJI sent by Timur from
Kashgar on July 7th (~, L/P!S/12/2331; PZ.S370.193~). The!r number
is not known, but combined with the news of the Amir Abdullah's defeat
at Kashgar, they doubtless contributed to the panic felt by the
Khotanlik troops at Yarkand.
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across the Yarkand River to cut off their retreat. The fleeing
Khotanliks were subsequently relieved of their arms before being permitted
to cross the river into the territory alotted to the Khotan AmIrs by the
Kashgar conference of July 14th.174 Th A I N- Ah d J- t de m r ur ma an was cap ure•
c -in Yarkand Old City, and,like his brother Abdullah at Kashgar, was placed
under house arrest.175
With the retreat of the Khotan AmIrs following 80 closely upon the
withdrawal of Ma Chan-ts'ang to Kashgar New City, the victorious Turkic
c - -leaders Uthman and Timur seemed well-placed to extend their influence over
the whole of the western Tarim Basin. Such a development might indeed
have been possible had the two leaders proved capable of sustained co-
operation against the besieged Tungans. c - cAs it was, Uthman Ali, who
by now styled himself "AmIr al-MuslimIn, Conqueror of Kashgar, al-Ghazi
c - c 176Uthman Ali lu-chang", was keen to press the attack against Ma Chan-
ts'ang with whom he had particularly bad relations.177 Timur, on the O~~r
.hand, had never been overly anxious ,to attack his former ally, and when
news reached Kashgar in mid-July of Khoja Niyes HaJjI's realignment with. .
the provincial authorities against Ma Chung-ying, Timur is reported to have
objected strongly both to the truce and to cooperation with the Chinese
178against the Tungans. -Probably because of Timur's vacillation and
174. This is not to suggest that Hefiz respected the Yarkand River frontier;. . - .shortly after his rout o~ the Amir Nur A~mad Jan's forces, his own
troops marched on Karghalik, which they captured on July 20th. ~,
l/P!S/12/2331, PZ.5573.1933.
175. !2!E..
176. As reported in !QhR, l/P!S/12/2331, PZ.5370.1933. The title is 8
strange amalgam of Arabic, English, Turkish and Chinese - though
Fitzmaurice very probably translated the section "Conqueror of Ksshgar"
into English. Translated in full, the title means "Commander of the
c - c Ii"Muslims, Conqueror of Kashgar, the Holy Warrior General Uthman A •
177. IOLR, L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.4045.1933.
178. lQkft, L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.4689.1933.
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possibly because he also wished to re-assert his authority in the Kirghiz
highlands, CUthman cAli withdrew to the hills with most of his forces on
~uly 18th.179 Shortly after CUthman's departure, on ~uly 26th, a party
of Khoja Niyas ~ajjr's officers, accompanied by an escort of 30 men,
arrived in Kashgar from the north-east and presented Timur with an official
1 d 180sea an letter recognising his position as commander-in-chief at Kashgar.
Accordin9 to fitzmaurice, Khoja Niyas ~ajjI'8 delegates also put strong
pressure on Timur to attack Ma Chan-ts'ang's Tungan forces in Kashgar New
City. Timur still had 'no wish to participate in operations against the
c - cTungans', but he agreed nevertheless to invite Uthman Ali to return to
Kashgar with a view to possibly opening joint operations against the
181besieged Tungans.
c - cAccordingly, at the beginning of August, Uthman Ali returned
182from the hills with a large force of Kirghiz. However, it soon became
clear that Timur still had no intention of participating in an attack
against his former Tungan allies, and on August 8th the Kirghiz leader
once again withdrew from Kashgar 'in protest' at Timur's attitude.183
179.!2!2. Seemingly, by August, 1933, Kirghiz forces were in full cont!gl
of the Tien Shan and Pamir regions to the west of Kaahgar. The lame-
III Tajiks of Sarikol suffered badly at the hands of the sunnI Kirghiz
(by whom they were regarded as refizI, or "heretics"), moreover they
feared possible reprisals at the hands of the Chinese should they return.
The Tajiks accordingly sent a telegram to their spiritual leader, the
Aga Khan Muhammed Shah, stressing that they had 'taken no active part'
with one side or the other and simply wanted to live peacefully. The
Aga Khan subsequently appealed to the British Government to safeguard
IsmacIII interests in Sarikol. ~, L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.5281.1933.
(letter of Aga sultan Sir Mu~emmad Shah (Aga Khan) to India Office,
17/8/1933).
180. ~,L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.4851.1933; PZ.5573.1933.
181. IOLR~ L/P!S/12/2332, PZ.7339.1939 (Kashgar Diaries, ~ugust, 1933).
(Timur had always professed loyalty to Khoja NiYBS HajJI, as had the
Khotan AmIrs; see lQhfi, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.4851.1933).
182. lQhfi, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.5041.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 3/8/1933).
183. lQhR, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.7339.1933.
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Timur presumably saw this as an ideal time to eliminate his erstwhile
c -ally Uthman, thereby emerging as the sole Turkic commander of consequence
at Kashgar - a development which would probably have led to his attempting
to reach an accommodation with Ma Chan-ts'ang's Tungans. He therefore
collected together most of his troops and ordered them to pursue and disarm
CUthman cAli and his Kirghiz.184 That Timur's untrained Uighur troops
c -should overtake and disarm Uthman's mounted Kirghiz, all of whom were
experienced fighters, was clearly a vain hope. Nevertheless, on August
9th, Timur left Kashgar Old City by car to see how his troops were faring.
Shortly after his departure, a force of some 500 Tungans debouched from
Kashgar New City and rapidly overran the ill-defended Old City. Timur,
who had made the mistake of alienating one Turkic leader after another
without openly aligning himself with the Tungans, was intercepted by Ma
Chan-ts'ang's troops on his way back to the Old City. He was shot without
ceremony, following which his head was cut off and exhibited on a spike
c 185outside the Id-ga Mosque in Kashgar Old City.
As a result of Timur's execution the Uighur forces at Kashgar were
left leaderless. 80th Janib 8eg and the AmIr cAbdullah took advantage of
the confusion to escape from imprisonment, but neither was anxious to fall
into Ma Chan-ts'ang's hands, and both fled towards Yarkand.186 Ma Shao-
wu also took advantage of Turkic confusion to leave his country house
184. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.S258.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 10/8/1933); PZ.
6106.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 10/8/1933).
185. 1£!2. for a contemporary account of Timur's death see: 'Turki Chief be-
headed', ~he Times, 25th August, 1933.
186. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.6106.1933. Nothing more is heard of Janib
Beg, who, having decided that the situation in 80uthern Sinkiang
had become most unsafe (he was still actively Bought by the Soviets,
as well as by the Tungans), reportedly fled across the frontier
into neighbouring Afghanistan. ~, L/P&S/12/2392, EXT.4910.1941
(Who's Who in Sinkiang), p. 6.
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and to join Ma Chan-ts'ang in Kashgar New City.187 The Tungan forces
made no serious attempt to fortify the Old City, but removed all captured
arms and ammunition to the New City arsenal, leaving a small garrison to
guard the Old City against possible attack. On August 11th, 12th and
13th, c - cUthman Ali and his Kirghiz gradually returned to Kashgar. c -uthman
approached Ma Chan-ts'ang with a request for some of the weapons captured
from Timur, as well as with a demand for the return of arms taken by the
c -Tungans from Abdullah Beg, a Kirghiz commander, during the fighting on
August 9th. When Ma Chan-ts'ang refused to comply, the Kirghiz attacked
the Old City, capturing it from the Tungans on August 16th. During the
fighting CUthman cAli's younger brother cUmar was killed, whilst about
150 more Kirghiz lost their lives during an abortive attack on Kashgar
New City.188 following his recapture of Kashgar Old City, CUthman cAli
assumed Timur's titles and position as commander-in-chief of the Turkic
189forces at Kashgar, but the Kirghiz forces, 'who did not see why they
should bear the brunt of every attack' are reported to have become
'somewhat half-hearted' in their continuing operations against the
190Tungans.
Meanwhile, on being informed of Timur's death, Hafiz halted his.• •
advance against the Khotanliks (which had reached Guma), and returned
to his headquarters at Yarkand New City.191 following ~afi~'s with-
187. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.6106.1933. It is noted in this despatch that
Ma Shao-wu sent a letter to fitzmaurice informing him that he had
kept Ma Chan-ts'ang informed as to Timur's movements and was a party
to this Tungan coup against the Turkic forces.
188. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.5431.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 17/8/1933).
189. ~,l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.6634.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 31/8/1933).
190. ~, l/P&S/12/2332, PZ.7339.1933.
191• .!!?!2•
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drawal, the dispirited and leaderless Khotan forces began a very
tentative advance on Yarkand, reaching Karghalik on or about August
29th.192 During the latter half of August the situation at Kashgar
remained unchanged, with c - c controllingUthman Ali's Kirghiz Kashgar Old
City and the surrounding countryside, whilst Ma Chan-ts'ang and Ma Shao-
wu remained securely within the fortified New City and awaited the
arrival of Tungan reinforcements from the north-east. Turkic morale,
which had fallen badly following the execution of Timur end the heavy
losses sustained by the Kirghiz during the fighting with Ma Chan-ts'ang
on August 16th, received a much needed boost on August 28th when two
'influential representatives' of Khoja Niyas Hajjr arrived in Kashgar•
from Kuchar.193 The two newcomers, identified by fitzmaurice as cAli
- - - c_Akhund and Hajji Muhammad Niyas A lam Akhund, were 'bitterly anti-Tungan
. ...
but conciliatory towards the Chinese', and stressed Khoja Niyas Hajji's• •
desire that Kashgar New City, with its important treasury and arsenal
194 c -should be taken as swiftly as possible. At their prompting Uthman
cAli's Kirghiz renewed the attack on Ma Chan-ts'ang besieged forces,
• moreover they were once again assisted by Timur's Uighur troops who,
dispirited after the execution of their leader on August 9th, were re-
organised under the command of Tawfiq Bey, an Arab adventurer who had
c c r c- 195served for a time as an official of King Abd al- Az z ibn-Sa ud,
192. !Qhfi, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.65B2.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 14/9/1933).
193. lQLa, l/P&S/12/2332, PZ.7339.1933.
194. ibid., cf. ~, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.5907.1Y33 lletter. HMCGK-GOI,3Te71933)." .~... . .
- ," ,,~ ......, ,.~~v .:-.-,,,._ ,~. ,
195. Tawfiq Bey, who styled himself "Sayyid A~mad Tawfiq Bey SharIf
Effendi", first arrived in Kashgar from India in 1932. He was sub-
sequently deported by Ma Shao-wu, but returned to Sinkieng during
the 1933 rebellion in the south, possibly by way of Afghanistan. See
Appendix I, 'Who Was Who in Republican Sinkieng'.
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and who arrived unexpectedly at Kashgar on August 26th.196
Khoja Niyas H;jjf who clearly aspired to the unification of all.
the Turkic factions in southern Sinkiang under his own command, also
sent delegates from Kuchar to Yarkand in a Ibid to arrange a truce
between ~afi~ and the Khotan Amfrs. The Khoja's representatives arrived
at Yarkand on August 29th, apparently with the intention of securing the
release of the AmIr Nur Ahmad Jan, who was still held captive by Hafiz• • •
and then proceeding to Khotan for talks with the senior, AmIr, Muhammad•
- 197Amin Bugra. Before this plan could be put into effect, however, the
Amir c -Abdullah, who had escaped from Kashgar on August 9th, arrived at
Yarkand with a number of followers and captured the Old City, which was
apparently undefended. c -following the re-appearance of Abdullah, the
,d1sorgan1~ed Khotanlik forces at Karghalik rallied to his command and
began a siege of Yarkand New City, still held by Hafiz and a mixed force• •
198of about 600 Uighurs and Dulanis. In a move which may have been in-
tended to reassure the besieged forces with a view to bringing them to
the conference table,199 the amban appointed by ~afi~ to administer
196. lQkE, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.7739.1933.
197. lQhE, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.6582.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 14/9/1933).
198. ibid.-199. With the death of Timur on August 9th, ~afi~ had lost his commanding
officer and had no further reason (beyond self-preservation) for
continuing his struggle with the Khotan AmIrs; moreover, on September
10th, Tawfiq Bey, who had replaced Timur at KaShgar, informed fitz-
maurice that he had written to the Khotan AmIrs attributing previous
misunderstandings to the 'folly of Timur', stressing that there would
be no further trouble from Hafiz, and inviting the Khotanliks to• •participate in the attack on Ma Chan-ts'ang at Kashgar New City
£IOLR, s/P&S/12/2331, PZ.6582.1933). It is also possible that
Abdullah was prevented from launching an all-out attack on Yarkand
New City by anxiety for the safety of_his brother Nur A~mad Jan, who
may still have 2een held =aptlve by ~afi!~ Unfo~tunately it is not
clear whether Nur Ahmad Jan was freed by Abdullah during the latter's
capture of Yarkand Old City on September 3rd, or on the surrender_of
Yarkand New City on September 26th. It is clear, however, that Nur
Ahmad Jan did survive his period of imprisonment, and went on to
r~sume command of a section of the Khotan forces.
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c -Yarkand Old City was permitted to retain his post, although Abdullah
underlined his committment to the separatist programme of the Khotan
Islamic Government (and thereby his political differences with the now
dead Timur) by changing this official's title from the Chinese "hsien-
- I 200 c -~" to the Turkic "wal ". Abdullah's conciliatory tactics seem to
have worked, for on September 26th Varkand New City surrendered to the
Khotanlik forces and Hafiz,together with about 500 Uighurs, was permitted• •
201to leave the oasis unharmed.
Meanwhile, at Kashgar New City, the Tungan forces of l"IaChan-ts'ang
continued to beat off the combined Turkic forces of Tawfiq 8ey and
c - cUthman Ali with comparative ease. Ma Chan-ts'ang was also capable of
offensive action - on the evening of September 7th a strong force of
Tungans made a sortie from the New City and inflicted a severe defeat
on their Turkic enemies at the village of Sekes Tash; during the engage-
ment an estimated 200 Uighurs and Kirghiz were killed, with the Tungans
202withdrawing to their stronghold in good order. A similar surprise
attack was launched against the Turkic forces in Kashgar Old City on
September 21st, the result being, in fitzmaurice's judgement, 'a moral
if not a material success in Ma Chan-ts'ang's favour,.203 During the
course of September the besieging forces received substantial reinforce-
menta in the form of 300 Uighura from Aksu under a commanding officer called
IdrIs and, at the end of the month, the 500 Uighurs commanded by Hafiz• •
who had been expelled from Yarkand New City by the AmIr cAbdulleh on
201. IOlR. L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.6711.1933 (telegram, HMCGK-GOI, 5/10/1933).
According to this telegram, Hafiz and his troops were 'disarmed and
maltreated' by the Khotanliks before being allowed to leave for
Kahsgar.
202. ~, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.6583.1933.
203. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.7224.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI
28/9/1933).
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September 26th. 204A rather mysterious force of some 300 "Andijani" Uzbeks,
reported by fitzmaurice to have come from the Yarkand area, also arrived in
Kashgar at this time. Their commander, SatibaldI Jan, was a 25 year old
Uzbek from Margelan in Western Turkestan who was widely suspected of being
pro-Soviet, and who was mistrusted by the other Turkic leaders as a con-
205sequence.
c - cWith this heterogenous and ill-armed Turkic force Uthman Ali and
Tawfiq Bey attempted to maintain pressure on Ma Chan-ts'ang's Tungans, but
to little or no avail. Attempts to mine the New City walls ended in failure,
as did attempts to reduce the besieged garrison through starvation.206 Cuthman
cAli, who was clearly felt that his Kirghiz forces were doing more than their
fair share of the fighting, had three Uighurs executed at the Kashgar
207ammunition workshop for filling cartridges with sand instead of powder,
and instituted a drive against suspected "communist sympathisers" in the
208Kashgar area. Despite such measures,local enthusiasm for the struggle
against Ma Chan-ts'ang continued to decline, and the Turkic commanders felt
obliged to hang publicly three Uighurs outside the c -Id-ga Mosque for having
sold supplies to the besieged Tungans. By the end of September the morale
of the Kashgarliks had fallen to such an extent that the Turkic authorities
refused to issue passports to prospective hajjIs, a restriction believed by•
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
British consular sources from Kashgar habitually refer to members of
Sinkiang's tiny Uzbek community as "Andijanis" (see, for example, lQhE,
0.226, 'Who's Who in Sinkiang corrected up to 26th July 1938'), p. 3.
('Usbegs or Andijanis').
Hayit, op~cit., p. 313; IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.6634.1933; L/P&S/12/
2364 (Sinkiang, Internal Situation: Mail Reports, 15th Nov. 1933 - 12th
Nov. 1936), PZ.7903.1033 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 26/10/1933). See also
Appendix I, 'Who Was Who in Republican Sinkiang'.
lQhli, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.6634.1933; PZ.7031.1933.
l£!2. Burge comments that 'many Turki and Kirghiz bullets have been mis-
firing; one wounded Turki (Uighur) being treated at the mission hospital
said that 18 of his 20 bullets had misfired'.
c - cIOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.7224.1933; according to Burge, Uthman Ali was
'"i"i;Iiablyreported' to have executed four Russians in secret .at night
during this period.
225
the British Consulate-General 'to have been imposed owing to a wholesale
departure of all and sundry in an endeavour to give Kashgar a miss until
209the return of more peaceful conditions'. To add to the difficulties
of the Turkic Muslim forces, on September 26th Tawfiq Bey was seriously
wounded in the stomach during an abortive attack on the New City and took
210 c - cno further part in the fighting. Uthman Ali had clearly become dis-
illusioned with the siege, and on October 2nd he resigned his post as
commander-in-chief of the Turkic forces at Kashgar and 'departed hurriedly
to the hills, being followed by satibaldI and other local leaders,.211
c -With the resignation of Uthman, the last member of the triumvirate
that had originally cooperated in the overthrow of Ma Shao-wu in May and had
subsequently halted the advance of the Khotan AmIrs at Yarkand, disappeared
- 212from the political stage. The resulting power vacuum was filled by
~abit Oamull~h who, as prime minister of the Khotan Islamic Government, had
come to Kashgar at the invitation of Tawfiq Bey following the death of Timur.213
In this way the whole of southern Sinkiang, with the important exception of
Kashgar New City, passed under the control of the Khotan AmIre almost by
default.
209. lQbE, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.7031.1933.
210. lQbE, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.6711.1933 (Minute Paper. Secret. Political Dept:
Sinkiang Rebellion, Latest Reports).
211. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.6711.1933 (Telegram, HMCGK-GOI, 5/10/1933).
212. The other members of the triumvirate being, of course, Timur and Ma Chan-
ts'ang. CUthman :cAli was to re-appear at Kashgar as an independent Kirghiz
leader, but never again participated in the administration of the lowland
oases.
213. lQhfi, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.6582.1933. ~abit Damullah is not mentioned by
name in this consular despatch, but since the AmIrs Muhammad AmIn,
cAbdullah and Nur Ahmad Jan remained in (respective) c~ntrol of Khotan,
Yarkand and Yangi-hlssar, whilst Sabit arrived in Kashgar, it must be
assumed that he was sent by the Khotan administration in response to
Tawfiq Bey's request.
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CHAPTER 6
SINKIANG, 1933-34: TUNGAN INVASION. TURKIC SECESSION AND SOVIET INTERVENTION
Ma Chung-ying.was ons of thoss types of Inner Asian
ruler who are wont to appear every hundred years or
so and of whom Chinggis Khan and Timur are the most
famous. He was one of those types - half field-
marshal end half gangster - who, when successful,
are historic heroes, and when unsuccessful end their
lives in some dungeon.,
6.1 Ma Shih-ming's attack on Urumchi and the overthrow of Chin Shu-Jen
As has been shown, following his wounding at Liao-tun during the
autumn of '932, Ma Chung-ying withdrew with the bulk of his forces to his
2old fief in north-western Kansu. Here he set up headquarters at An-hs!
and, through his subordinates, began greatly to expand his forces through
extensive conscription. The British missionaries Cable and french were
resident in the neighbouring oasis of Tun-huang at this time, and have
left a graphic account of Ma Chung-ying's recruiting methods. Shortly
after the arrival of Tungan forces at Tun-huang:
The town was robbed of everything in the nature of
food, goods and money •••next to food the most
coveted possessions of the oases were the young,
vigorous, hardy men •••These were the men whom Ma
Chung-ying wanted for gun-fodder, and orders were
issued to the press-gang to fetch them in from
every farm of the neighbourhood, end collect them
in Tunhwang City. Every day wa saw them being
1. 'Durchdringungspolitik in Zentralasien', Beriehte des Asien Arbeitkreises,
1 (1939), P. 6. An anonymous article undoubtedly written by Georg Vasel,
a German national who knew Ma Chung-ying personally and witnessed his
invasion of Sinkieng during 1933.
2. Sea above, pp.162-4.
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rounded up. The ropes which they themselves
had twisted from desert grass were used to
tie their hands behind their backs, and to noose
their necks in a running-knot. Roped together in
droves of twenty to thirty, according to the
success of the raid, they were brought to town by
captors who rode the horses levied from these boys'
own stables. Thrust behind the high palings of
temple courtyards, the imprisoned youths lined the
barriers, looking out for some passers-by who
might belong to their own group of farmsteads and
would take a report home that son or husband had
been captured.3
After initial training at Tun-huang these raw recruits were taken to An-hai
where further intensive discipline awaited them. No doubt similar methods
of forced recruitment were applied at An-hsi itself and elsewhere in north-
4western Kansu, with the result that Ma's army grew et a prodigious rete.
Cable and french were also ordered to An-hsi, where they were instructed to
treat Ma Chung-ying's wounds and to care for those Tungans who had been
injured by the antiquated "fire arrows" used by the defenders during the
siege of Kumul Old City. Every day the missionaries were taken to Chung-
ying's private rooms, and as a result of their treatment 'within a short
5time he was able to ride again'.
Meanwhile, in Sinkiang, following his failure to crush the Uighur
rebellion at Kumul and faced with continued Tungan intervention in the
Turfan area, Chin Shu-jen turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for
6assistance. In September, 1931, he bought two biplanes from the Soviet Union
3. Cable and french, The Gobi Desert, pp. 238-9.
4. ~., p. 239.
5. ~., p. 241.
6. As Dallin points out in his Soviet Russia and the far East (New Haven, 1948,
pp. 94-5), Chin, isolated from China by the Tungan warlords of Kansu and from
British India by geographical factors, could only turn to the Soviet Union for
assistance. Moscow agreed to back Chin for a number of reasons including
financial advantage; fear of the possible impact of Muslim insurgency in Sin-
kiang on Soviet Central Asia; opposition to Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomin-
tang government after the CCP/KMT split in 1927; and opposition to Ma Chung-
ying, characterised by several sources as being virulently anti-Soviet, and
frequently denounced in Soviet propaganda as a puppet of the Japanese and
the British.
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at a price of 40,000 Mexican silver dollars each. These planes, which were
equipped with machine-gun mountings and bomb-dropping apparatus, were flown
by two Russian pilots'who were lent to the Sinkiang government as part of
the deal.7 A few days later, on October 1st, 1931, Chin signed a secret
trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. as a result of which eight Soviet trading
agencies were established throughout Sinkiang, at Urumchi, Chuguchak, KulJa,
8Kashgar, Aksu, Kuchar, Yarkand and Khotan. Customs duties on Soviet goods -
which already dominated the Sinkiang market - were reduced, end new
9Sinkiang-Soviet telegraph and radio communications were opened. Chin
signed this agreement illegally, without authorisation from the national
government at Nanking and without reporting it to the Chinese Ministry of
foreign Affairs.10 As a result of this treaty, Chin received substantial
economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union, including, .1n July
1932, a further eight aircraft which were flown from Chuguchak to Urumchi
11by Chinese pilots from Peking.
Oespite this Soviet military assistance, Chinls provincial forces -
with the exception of Pappanegutls White Russian detechment - remained ill-
trained .~nd poorly-officered~'following the relief of Kumul Old City and Ma
Chung-ying's withdrawal to Kansu, Chang plei-yuan, the provincial commander-
in-chief and military governor of III was ordered to proceed to Urumchi.
7. The biplanes were of Soviet manufacture, but were powered by American-
made "liberty" radial engines. ]JllJl, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.181.1933 (HMVCGK
Watts - GOI, 21/10/32), p. 9.
B. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 67; Cheng Tlen-fong, A History of Sino-
Russian Relations, p. 170.
9. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 67; Nyman, op.cit., pp. 81-2.
10. Cheng Tien-fong, op.cit., p. 170; Wu Ai-chen, China and the Soviet Union,
pp. 254-6. The text of the treaty together with four annexes is given
in Wu's Appendix 8.
11. ~, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.5443.32 (Information supplied by H. French Ridley
of the China Inland Mission, Urumchi).
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Apparently Chin did not altogether trust Chang P'ei-yuan, perhaps reasoning
that the victory at Kumul might have awakened dangerous ambitions in the
mind of the latter. This lack of trust seems to have been mutual, for
on receiving notice of his ,transfer to the provincial capital, Chang chose
to disobey the order and to return to Ili in a move approaching open
rebellion. -Chin responded by appointing Sheng Shih-tslai, Chang P'ei-
yuan's chief-of-staff during the Kumul campaign, to the position of provin-
12cial commander-in-chief. This action was to prove of major importance
both in Chin Shu-jenls own future, and for the future of Sinkiang.
Sheng Shih-tslai,who as Chin Shu-jenls successor was to rule
Sinkiang from 1933 to 1944, was born in 1895 at Liaoning in southern
Manchuria, the son of a small landowner and member of the local gentry (eee
plate 18). In 1917 he travelled to Japan to study political economy at
Waseda University in Tokyo, returning to China in 1919 in time to participate
in the May fourth Movement as a representative of the Liaoning students.
During this period Sheng began to develop radical and anti-Japanese political
sentiments13 as a result of which, according to his biographer Chan fook-lam,
he became convinced of the Ifutility of book-learning' and determined to
14take up a military career. He accordingly attended military training
12. Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 236.
13. Sheng was to claim in an interview with Allen S.Whiting during 1954 that
he had become a Marxist in 1919. This claim must be treated with reserv-
ation, as he failed to join the Chinese Communist Party which was founded
in the same year. He later declined to join the Kuomintang, although a
serving member of Chiang Kai-shek's staff, a decision he explained to
Whiting in terms of his 'Marxist beliefs'. Whiting and Sheng, Sinkiangl
Pawn or Pivot? (Michigan, 1958), part I, p. 15. A study of Sheng's B!2
failure in Sinkiang (op.cit., part 2), suggests that Sheng was, in fact,
a shrewd political opportunist much influenced by progressive concepts
emanating from the Soviet Union after 1917, but who was too cautious
(and probably too cynical) to commit himself absolutely to anyone party.
14. Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 227.
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school in Kwantung Province and later enrolled in the Northeastern
Military Academy. Sheng entered active military service under Kuo Sung-
ling, deputy of the powerful Northeastern warlord Chang Tao-lin, and rapidly
rose to become a staff officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel. In 1924
Kuo sponsored Sheng's admission to the Shikan Gakko (Military Academy) in
Japan for advanced military atudies. Sheng returned briefly to the North-
east during Kuo's abortive attempt to overthrow Chang Tso-lin, but although
implicated in the anti-Chang coup he was ~eter able to return to ~apan with the
support of fang Y~-hsiang and Chiang Kai-shek. Sheng left Japan for China in
1927 and participated in the Northern expedition 85 a staff officer attached
to Chiang Kai-shek's field headquarters. following the completion of the
Northern Expedition he was made chief of the war operations section of the
.
general staff at Nanking; however, in 1929 he resigned after a disagreement
15with his superiors. Afte~ this apparent setback to his career Sheng
is reported to have remained at Nanking end to have interested himself in
16the question of strengthening China's border defences.
/
Shortly after Sheng's resignation a delegation from the Sinkiang
provincial government visited Nanking in search of financial aid. Chin
Shu-Jen had instructed one of the delegates, the deputy general secretary
of the Sinkiang administration, Kuang Lu, to find an able young officer who
could assist in the reorganisation of the provincial military forces. Kuang
Lu made discreet enquiries and was duly introduced to Sheng Shih-ts'ai. As
15. Boorman and Howard, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, Vol. III,
pp. 120-121. Lattimore's explanation of Sheng's resignation - that
following Chang Hs~eh-liang's adherence to the Nationalist cause Chiang
Kai-shek had no further need of a young Northeastern warlord - is very
plausible. (Pivot of Asia, p. 70).
16. See, however, Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 229. esp. fn. 19 and 20.
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a result of this meeting Sheng, ~hose experience and qualifications were
clearly far greater than Kuang Lu could have hoped for, was appointed to
Chin Shu-jen's staff and travelled to Sinkiang via the Soviet Union,
arriving in Urumchi during the winter of 1929_30.17 By all accounts his
initial welcome in Sinkiang was somewhat cool. Chin Shu-jen was suspicious
of the well-qualified overseas graduate, and doubtless regarded him BS a
potential threat. Moreover, the provincial commissioner for military
affairs, Chin's brother Chin Shu-hsin, was less than pleased at the appoint-
ment of a young officer whose military knowledge and experience were clearly
far greater than his own. Despite these doubts Chin Shu-jen, whose military
position in the province was far from secure, appointed Sheng Chief of Staff
of the Sinkiang frontier Army and subsequently made him chief instructor
at the provincial military college. Chan fook-lam argues that in accepting
Sheng's services Chin Shu-jen 'buried a time bomb under his bed and brought
about his own doom,.18 In fact, through his venality and incompetence Chin
had already ensured his own downfall. Sheng Shih-ts'ai had simply to ~ait
for the explosion and then to pick up the pieces.
In spite of both British and Soviet military assistance, Chin Shu-jen's
grip on the province continued to slip. During his convalescence at An-hsi,
probably in or about May, 1932, Ma Chung-ying sent his adjutant, Ma Shih-ming,
19to take charge of the continuing Tungan military operations at Turfan. As
has already been shown, Ma fu-ming, the provincial commander at Turfan and
himself a Tungan, ~ent over to the side of the rebels during the autumn. At
the time of Chang ptei-yuan's insubordination and his own subsequent
promotion to commander-in-chief, Sheng Shih-ts'ai was based at Kumul directing
an unsuccessful campaign against the Uighur insurgents of the Karlik Tagh.
17. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 121.
18. Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 233.
19. See above,pp. 111-8.
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rollowing Ma ru-ming's defection and the Tungan capture of Turfan, Sheng
marched westward from Kumul in a bid to prevent the combined Muslim forces
from marching on Urumchi. After a bloody two-day battle he succeeded in
recapturing the city of Turfan, but not the whole oasis.20 In any case,
Sheng's victory seems to have had little effect on the Tungan forces of
Ma Shih-ming, who had already transferred his headquarters to Karashahr.
During the bitterly cold Central Asian mid-winter Ma Shih-ming end
his Tungan cavalry, aided by the forces of the "renegade general" Ma
ru-ming and large numbers of Turkic insurgents, began their advance on
Urumchi. According to Hedin a force of provincial troops sent from Urumchi
. by Chin to guard the Dawan Ch'eng Pass was surprised by the Tungans and
decisively defeated. Meanwhile full-scale rebellions had broken out at
Kuchar (under Timur) and at Khotan (und~r the "AmIrs") in the south of the
province. Chin responded by expanding Pappengut'e White Russian contingent
from its original strength of 250 to an estimated strength of 1,500.21
Once again the White Russians, most of whom came from the IIi Valley, had
no alternative but to enlist. According to Nicholas Vakar, who described
Chin's conscription of Russian exiles in the Slavonic Review of 1935,
besides threatening the White Russians with 'deportation to the Soviet Union,
Chin ordered the arrest of many Russian women to compel their husbands to
22enlist in Pappengut's forces. These White Russian "volunteers" were to
20. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol III, p. 121.
21. Cheng Tien-fong, A History of Sino-Russian Relations, p. 170; cf.
8eloff, M., The roreign Policy of soviet Russia, Vol I, p. 232.
According to Beloff, the White Russian troops were sent from KulJa
to Urumchi under the command of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, but this i8 at a
variance with Howard and Boorman's Biographical Dictionary of
Republican China, which sta~es that Sheng remained at Turfan after
his capture of that city in ,the winter of 1932 (op.cit., Vol III,
p. 121). The dictates of geography make Howard and Boorman's version
of events the more credible of the two alternatives.
22. Vakar, N., 'The Annexation of Chinese Turkestan', The Slavonic and
East European Review, XIV, 40 (1935), p. 121.
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playa vital role in the defence of Urumchi, as well as in the overthrow
of their persecutor, Chin Shu-jen.
By early January, 1933, Ma Shih-ming's Tungan forces had crossed
the Dawan Ch'eng and were operating almost at will in the Chai-wu-pao
corridor to the immediate south of the capital.23 Wu Ai-chen, 8 political
envoy of the Nanking government who travelled to Sinkiang via the Soviet
Union and arrived at Urumchi on December 25th, 1932, reports that on
January 29th, 1933, the city gates were suddenly closed. There followed
a month of growing food shortages and racial tension between Chinese and
Muslim, but it was not until february 21st that Ma Shih-ming's Tungan
troops reached the capital. According to Wu Ai-chen, who survived the
attack and has left a graphic account of the fighting, the Tungans advanced
towards the city under the cover of darkness and seized the Great West
Bridge after heavy fighting (see Map no. 9). The provincial commander
defending the city had only 700 troops at his disposal, and things would
have gone ill with the provincial forces had not a detachment of 300
White Russian soldiers suddenly arrived on the scene. The White Russians
(whom Wu describes as 'splendid fighters •••who suffered from moods of
..
savage melancholy in which they drank heavily') succeeded in driving back
the attacking Tungan and Uighur forces after two days of hand-to-hand
fighting.24 Meanwhile other Tungan forces had seized the radio station
and a local height called Oevil's Hill which commanded the Urumchi
suburbs. Chin Shu-jen turned to a local Buddhist-Taoist temple for advice,
23. ror a detailed map of the Chai-wu-pao corridor and the area around
urumchi see: Wiens, H.J., 'The Historical and Geographical Role of
Urumchi,.Capital of Chinese Central Asia', Annals of the Association
of American Geographers, LIII, 4 (Dec. 1963), p. 444-5. Maps 8 and 9
of the present study are adapted from this article.
24. Wu Ai-chen, Turkistan Tumult, p. 80; Hedin, BIg Horse's rlight,
pp. 6-7.
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and according to Wu was informed that for those ordained to die. flight
offered no escape. whilst for those fated to survive all places were
of equal safety:
"Safe is the home and safe is the country." said
the oracle; "but how shall one born. for disaster
seek to escape?"25
The Chinese authorities. fearing to admit further Muslim civiliens
to the fortified Old City. kept the city gates firmly closed egainst
the large numbers of refugees from the suburbs who gathered outside the
walls. particularly at the West Gate (see Map. no. 9). Outside the West
Gate ran the "Street of the Lesser Teaching" (Ch. Hsiao-chiao chieh, a
condescending euphemism for Islam).26 During the Tungan attack in lat.
rebruary, 1933, the West Gate became the focus of the most severe fighting.
Wu Ai-chen who witnessed this struggle. records that:
In times of peace this atreet was one of the most
prosperous in the city. but now it was crowded
with innocent fugitives, whose plight wes terrible
indeed. There was worse to come, however, for now
the advancing rebels came to this quarter and
seizing the houses made loop-holes in the walla.
On the flat roofs they set up machine-gun posts
which could enfilade Government positions on
either side of them. I could see for myself
that the situation was desperate and that our
troops would be penned against the walls. General
Pai, who was in command. did not hesitate. He
gave the order that the street of the small religion
should be set on fire.
Then followed a scene so frightful that the
reader's imagination must suffice. As the flames
swept down the long lane of wooden structures they
became an inferno of horror, for the roar of the
conflagration was edded to the rattle of gun-fire,
and the hideous shrieks of those who were trapped.
The rebels sought safety in flight, and as they
25. !£!£., p. 81. In fact, despite the enigmatic words of the oracle,
Chin was born both for disaster and escape, as will be shown.
26. Wu, Turklstan Tumult, p. 82. cf. the application of the term
'Hinay~na' ("Lesser Vehicle") to Therav~da Buddhism by followers of
the 'Mahay~na'("Greater Vehicle").
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crossed the open were machine-gunned from the
Red Mountain; but the fugitives had nowhere to
fly to and perished to the last man, woman and
child. Nevertheless the city was saved, and
when at last the flames died down the approach
to the West Bridge was strewn with the bodias
of our assailants.
On the evening of the second day I had
completed ten thousand words of copying. I
asked how many were dead. I was told 'at least
two thousand'. Once again I returned to my
task, reflecting that a human life had been
taken at every fifth word.27
following this defeat, the Muslim forces were forced to fall back
from the immediate vicinity of the West Gate; however they retained their
hold on the Great West Bridge, a mere half-mile to the north-west, and
'after dark were capable of amazing boldness. Several were killed while
28attempting to scale the walls under the very mouths of the guns'. The
White Russian troops who provided the backbone of the defence succeeded
in holding the city walls and in making occasional sorties against the
attackers,29 but Urumchi would certainly have fallen had not Sheng
Shih-ta'ai, at the head of a strong force of provincial troops from Turfan,
marched to the relief of the city. With the approach of Sheng's com-
paratively disciplined and well-equipped forces, the Muslim insurgents
broke off their attack and withdrew to the surrounding countryside, most
of which had fallen under their control. fearing that the melting of the
snows would lead to an outbreak of cholera, the Chinese authorities took
advantage of the respite gained by Sheng's arrival to bury the dead. Wu
Ai-chen, who participated in the burials has left a harrowing description
27. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 82; cf. ~, l/P&S/12/2331, PZ.4641.1933
(Report of R.H. Joyce, China Inland Mission, Urumchi, dated April 18th,
1933).
28. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 83.
29. Wu notes that the White Russians ambushed end killed nearly 600 "Turben-
heads" (the Chinese colonial idiom for Uighurs) in a defile outside the
city during one such sortie; Turkistan Tumult, p. 83.
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of conditions in the city at this time. More than 1,000 bodies were
30buried in a single mass grave in the suburbs, and the final death toll
31was probably in excess of 6,000 Chinese and Muslims.
following Sheng Shih-ta'ai's relief of Urumchi the insurgent forces
consolidated their hold on much of the surrounding countryside. The
strategic Dawan Ch'eng was taken, the district of fu-k'ang, some 25 miles
north-east of the capital, fell into rebel hands, and in the neighbouring
district of San-to-pao an estimated 900 Han Chinese were killed, whilst
large stocks of rice which would normally have provisioned Urumchi were
captured and burned.32 The rebels were able to operate with impunity
within a few miles of the capital, and on March 1st a detachment of about
100 provincial troops was decimated at Ch'i-tao-wan, a mere three miles to
the north of the capital, by a column of Muslim insurgents reported by Wu
33to have been more than 1,000 strong. Meanwhile the situation elsewhere
in the province continued to deteriorate; to the south Ma Shao-wu was
isolated at Kashgar, whilst to the north a Kazakh rebellion had broken
out in the Shara Sume region under the leadership of one SharIf Khan.34
The Dzungarian Tungans were also restive, and a rising at Manass under the
leadership of a mutinous lieutenant in the provincial forces ~as only put
down with difficulty.35
30. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. B8. See also Wu's Chapter VII, 'We Gather Our
Dead', and his plate facing p. 82.
31. Hedin, Big Horse's flight, p. 7.
32. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 83-4, 89.
33. !E!£., p. B4.
34. Hayit, Turkest~n Zwischen Russland und China, p. 301. According to
Hayit, who draws heavily on 8ugra's Do~u Turkistan, trouble between the
Tungans and Kazakhs of Shara Sume led to the outbreak of a struggle
between Chinese Muslims and Turkic Muslims in northern Dzungaria which
paralleled that developing in southern Sinkiang. In fact, tensions
between Tungan and Turkio Muslim in Dzungariawere primarily of economio
origin, as Tungans·tended to act.as landlords and "flock-lords" over
Uighur and Kazakh tenants in.that region. See :Barnett, A., China on the ,
,Eve of the Communist Takeover (London, 1963), p;"273.
35. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 92;
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The Kazakh rising at Shara Sume seems to have finally convinced the
Soviet leadership that the administration of Chin Shu-Jen, whose in-
eptitudes they had watched with increasing misgiving, could not survive
the Muslim insurgency which had spread across the whole of Sinkiang. A
decision was accordingly taken, apparently with the knowledge and support
of Nanking, to send reinforcements to the provincial government at
Urumchi.36 By fortuitous chance - from Stalin's point of view - a
force of approximately 2,000 battle-experienced Chinese troops had been
forced across the Heilungkiang-Siberia border by the Japanese during the
latter's attack on Manchuria in 1931. These troops, who had been interned
by the Russians, were now transported by the Trans-Siberian and Turk-Sib
37Railways to the Sinkiang frontier at Chuguchak. Chen notes that this
force, known as the Northeast National Salvation Army, was composed of
'regular soldiers, well-disciplined, well-trained, and full of fighting
spirit,.38 The arrival of these Northeastern troops in Urumchi on March
27th, 1933, substantially strengthened the position of the provincial
administration, and more particularly the position of the provincial
commander-in-chief, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who was a fellow Northeasterner.39
Under the command of Sheng, the reinforced provincial army succeeded
in pushing back the invading Tungan forces of Ma Shih-ming, who appears to
(,
36. ~., p. B9-90.
37. 8eloff, The roreign Policy of Soviet Russia, Vol I, pp. 232-33; cf.
Chen, 'The Road to Power', p. 238. (Beloff is certainly mistaken in
putting the size of the forces transferred from Heilungkiang to
Sinkiang at 7,000; cf. Chen, op.cit., p. 238, fn. 42. lattimore,
Pivot of Asia, p. 69, puts the total number of Northeastern troops
at 'over 1,000').
38. Chen, 'The Road to Power', p. 238; cf. Teichmann, Sir Eric, Journey
to Turkistan (London, 1937), p. 20 ('a strong body of Chinese troops
expelled by the Japanese from Manchuria'), and p. 187 ('the timely
arrival of •••relatively efficient Chinese troops from Manchuria').
39. Chen, 'The Road to Power', p. 238.
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have retreated over the Dawan Ch'eng to his headquarters at Karashahr.
The Uighur insurgents were undoubtedly dismayed by these new developments,
end Khoja Niyas ~ajjI, who controlled a wide belt of territory extending
from the vicinity of the Sinkiang-Kansu frontier to Turfan, is reported
to have sent an urgent appeal for assistance to Ma Chung-ying, still con-
40valescing at An-hsi in north-western Kansu. Meanwhile Chin Shu-jen, who
had played no part in these successes and whose .authority was seriously
undermined (whilst Sheng's was strengthened) by the arrival of the troops
of the Northeast National Salvation Army,41 was faced by increasing un-
rest in the capital. During the defence of Urumchi in rebruary and March
the White Russian forces, although bearing the brunt of the fighting, had
been irregularly paid and provided with the worst of the horses and ammuni-
tion.42 Moreover Chin's unpopularity'amongst all nationalities including the
Han Chinese was not improved by the actions of his ,brother, Chin Shu-hsin,
and his former batman, Ts'ui Chao-chi, who had succeeded in cornering
grain supplies whilst the city was under siege and were reportedly
43manipulating the market for personal gain.
rollowing the withdrawal of the insurgent forces pappengut and the
other White Russian officers approached the leaders of the Northeast
National Salvation Army with an account of their grievances against Chin
Shu-jen, and having been assured of the Northeasterners' support, mounted
40. ~.
41. As Lattimore pointed out in his Pivot of Asia (p. 70)s 'Ever since the
regime of China's first modern warlord, YUan Shih-k'ai, a provincial
governor who does not control his own troops has usually been over-
shadowed by the commander of the militery forces'. This was increasingly
the case in Sinkiang in 1932, even before the arrival of Bome 2,000
of Sheng's fellow-provincials in March, 1933.
42. Hedin, Big Horse's rlight, pp. 8-9.
43. ~., p. 8. Howard and Boorman, op.cit., Vol I, p. 382.
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a coup against Chin on the night of April 12th. About 400 Russians were
involved in the fighting, 200 of whom s~ized the city gates and chair-
man's yamen, whilst the remainder mustered outside the city walls in
44a show of strength. Chin who must have been prepared for this eventu-
ality, succeeded in escaping over the city walls and in fleeing to the
Soviet Union via Chuguchak. From here he returned to China by way of
45the Turk-Sib and Trans-Siberian railways. His younger brother,
46Chin Shu-hsin, was captured and later executed.
Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who was encamped at Uruba (Urupa on map 8) at
the time of the coup, insists in his memoirs that the Chin's overthrow
was engineered by the Soviet Union and that he had no foreknowledge of
the event.47 In fact Sheng's wife, Ch'iu Vu-fang, the ambitious and
intelligent daughter of a trusted subordinate of the Northeastern war-
. . 48lord' Kuo Sung-ling, is reported to have entered into negotiations
44. For a detailed first-hand description of the coup see Wu, Turkistan
Tumult, pp. 100-118.
45. Following his arrival in China Chin Shu-Jen was arrested by the
Nationalist government and charged with illegally signing the 1931
treaty with Soviet Russia. In April 1935 he was sentenced to three-
and-a-half years imprisonment, but was subsequently pardoned on
10th October of the same year. He was later visited by George Hogg
living in retirement near Lanchow in his native Kansu, 'a scholarly
old gentleman named Chin Shu-jen, who began and is ending his life as
a gardener'. (Hogg, G., I See a New China, pp. 118-9). Chin may well
have bought his pardon with the large sums of money transferred il-
legally from Sinkieng to his personal bank account in Tientsin.
Certainly he paid a light penalty for his years of misrule in Sinkiang.
See Appendix I, 'Who Was Who in Republican Sinkiang'.
46. Wu, Turkis'tan Tumult, p. 117; Hedin, Big Horse's Flight, p. 9.
47. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Red Failure in Sinkiang (part 11 of Whiting and Sheng,
Sinkiang, Pawn or Pivot?), p. 159. cf. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, 'Hsin-chiang
shih-nien hui-i-lu', Tzu-Ii wan-pao, 6th October, 1952 (cited in Chen,
'The Road to Power', p. 240).
48. Ch'iu VU-fang's father was Ch'iu Tsung-chun. His connections with the
Northeastern militarist leadership must have strengthened Sheng's hand
during negotiations with the Northeast National Salvation Army during
1933. See Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 242.
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with the leadership of the Northeast National Salvation Army several
days before the coup, and to have obtained their backing for her
49husband in his move by proxy against Chin Shu-jen. Following the
coup d'etat a message was sent to Sheng at Uruba requesting him to return
to the capital.50 In the negotiations which followed Liu Wen-lung,
formerly Minister of Education under Chin Shu-jen, was appointed Provincial
51Chairman, whilst Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who protested that he was 'only a
common soldier,52 (but who enjoyed the full backing of both the White
Russians and the Northeast National Salvation Army),53 was confirmed
in the all-powerful position of tupan, or Border Defence Commissioner,
54as de facto ruler of the province.
6.2 The Second Invasion of Ma Chung-ying
Following Ma Shih-ming's failure to capture Urumchi and KhoJa Niyas
~ajjr's renewed plea for assistance, Ma Chung-ying determined to re-enter
49. l2!£. Chen implies that Ch'iu Tsung-chun was also in Sinkiang at this
time, end negotiated with the Northeast National Salvation Army on
behalf of his son-in-law.
50. In his memoirs Sheng states that the message was brought from Urumchi
to Uruba by Li-Hsiao-t'ien aboard a plane. Although possible, it
should be noted that Uruba is no more than 7 miles from Urumchi, and
in Wu's account of the coup mention is made of sending a junior Kuo-
mintang commissioner, Pei, on horseback to Sheng at Uruba. (cf. Sheng
Shih-ts'ai, Red Failure in Sinkian , pp. 159-60, and Wu, Turkistan
Tumult, pp. 107-8 • This discrepancy casts further doubt on Sheng's
version of events and reinforces the theory that he was a party to
the coup.
51. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 109; Chen, 'The Road to Power', p. 241.
52. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 118.
53. Wu, Hsin-chiang chi-yu fu Su-lien Vu-chi, p. 78.
54. According to Chang Ta-chUn Sheng 'surrounded 'the assembly hall where
negotiations were being held with soldiers brought back with him from
Uruba, and thus engineered the result he desired., Chan, 'The Road. to
Power', p. 242.
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Plates 15 and 16:
THE TUNGAN INVADERS OF SINKIANG
Turkic conscripts near Kumul
1933.
Tungan troops in winter clothing
c. 1933.
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the fray in person. There can be little doubt that, far from being down-
cast at Ma Shih-ming'e reverses, Ma Chung-ying was delighted at the ease
~ith which his adjutant had crossed the Dawan Ch'eng and almost seized
Urumchi - a factor which, combined with Ma Chan-ts'ang'e seizure of
Kashgar New City in southern Sinkiang, convinced the young Tungan warlord
that Sinkiang was his for the taking. Moreover, whilst Chin Shu-Jen's
55position appeared to be hopeless, Ma Chung-ying's position had been
considerably strengthened by 18 months' recuperation in north-western Kansu
during which time his army had been restructured and greatly expanded
through widespread conscription. Ma's personal prestige had also been
much enhanced, for early in 1932 the Nanking government, probably motivated
by news of Chin Shu-Jen's illegal treaty with the Soviet Union, recognised
his Tungan forces as the 36th Division of the National Army of China, with
56Chung-ying as commanding officer.
following Ma Chung-ying's treatment at An-hsi by the British mission-
aries Cable and french, he transferred his headquarters to Sooohow, probably
in April or May, 1932. Here he continued to train and expand his army,
witnessed by the German engineer Vasel, whose descriptions of the young
Tungan warlord indicate very clearly the latter's unstable character. In
conversation with Vasel,Ma professed his admiration for Napoleon, Bismarck
and Hindenburg. He was frequently to be seen running at the head of his
troops during training, even in sub-zero temperatures. Military training
was pursued with a 'spartan rigour •••pushed to the verge of utter ruthless-
ness'. Desertion was punishable by death, and on one occasion Vasel saw
55. According to Wu (Turkistan Tumult, p. 136) Ma Chung-ying did not
learn of the,successful coup against Chin Shu-Jen until after he had
launched his new invasion.
56. Cable and french, The Gobi Desert, p. 227; Hedin, Big Horse's flight,
p. 6; Kazak, )poCit., p. 18, fn. 47; As WU points out in his Turkistan
Tumult (p. 70 , following this appointment Ma Chung-ying would have
been able to draw on central government funds to pay for his army.
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Ma personally behead five such offenders. On another Vasel recalls
seeing Ma:
In one of those sudden fits of exuberance that W~
typical of him, snatching up casually some hand
grenades, which he had made himself, and hurling
them, one by one, against the lofty clay-coloured
walls of the city. And then he laughed heartily
when he saw his men fling themselves flat on the
ground as splinters of steel hurtled in all
directions. He scorned to seek safety by throwing
himself on the ground, and was quite delighted when
he saw that I too did not seek cover. 57
During the spring of 1933 Ma Chung-ying continued his preparations
for the forthcoming invasion of Sinkiang. The Swede Sexell, who was
working in the Kansu-Tsinghai frontier region at this time, records that
in preparation for the invasion Ma pushed taxation of his own fief in
north-western Kansu to the limits of the peasants' endurance; moreover he
sent detachments of soldiers into Tsinghai illegally to tax an area which
owed allegiance to the Tsinghai authorities at Hsi-ning.58 During May,
1933, Ma Chung-ying's army withdrew from Soochow and advanced on VO-men.
w;.r _ ...
Vasel, has left a description of the 36th Division's departure:
A dark mass of human beings, camels and oxen,
was pouring out of the city gate towards the
west amid clouds of dust. There were hundreds
of heavily-laden camels, the bells on their
necks clanging monotonously,their drivers
easily discernible by their gaudy headgear.
In the rear followed high-wheeled ox-carts,
flanked on either side by infantry. Behind
them again came a company of cavalry, which
presently galloped past the lumbering camals
and oxen along the track through the desert •••
and now I had an opportunity of seeing at
cloSQ range General Ma's famous cavalry riding
past me and keeping its post at the head of the
marching columns. This was the famous white
57. Vasel, G., My Russian Jailers In China, pp. 52-5.
58. 8exell, G., 'Geological and Palaeontological Investigations in
Mongolia and Kansu, 1929-34', Tha Sino-Swedish Expedition, Vol IV,
pp. 239, 244.
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cavalry regiment of which General Ma was
especially proud. The broad iron swords of
the dragoons clanked as they rode along on
their magnificent white horses, while on their
shoulders they carried carbines of the most
varied and antiquated patterns. Next came the
brown regiment, while in the rear followed the
black regiment, comprising some two thousand
horsemen.
A short distance behind the cavalry came
the infantry - regiment after regiment, headed
by the Chinese (Kuomintang) standard. On they
swept, platoon after platoon, followed by their
officers, with their mausers at the ready. The
columns strode along, keeping perfect time with
their shrill, high-pitched, mournful, Asiatic
marching songs.
Sandwiched between some of these trained and
trustworthy soldiers I saw large drafts of recruits
who had been compelled to join General Ma's forces.
These raw levies were constantly kept under very
close observation. 59
Although accurate statistics giving the full size of Ma Chung-ying's
reorganized army during his second invasion of Sinkiang do not, apparently,
exist, there can be no doubt that it was substantially stronger then
during his first invasion in 1931 (perhaps by as much as ten times).50 It
was also better trained, better armed, and better paid. 51 Moreover,
following Ma Chung-ying's arrival in north-eastern Sinkiang, large numbers
of you~g Uighur men were conscripted into his ranks (see plate 15). The
threat posed to the provincial authorities at Urumchi was, therefore,
substantial.
59. Vasel, op.cit., pp. 101-2. for details of troop movements in north-
western Kansu following Ma's renewed invasion of Sinkiang, eee Bexell,
op.cit., pp. 245-6.
According to Hedin, who was briefly held captive by the 36th Division,
Ma's troops were 'several thousand strong' (Big Horse's flight, p. 12);
According to Cable and french (The Gobi Desert, p. 228) Ma's forces
totalled 3,000 men, a figure also given in Boorman and Howard's
Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, Vol II, p. 464. The anony-
mous article 'Recent Events in Sinkiang', JRCAS, XXI, 1 (1934), p. 85,
states that Ma had 4,000 men at his command, all of whom were poorly-
armed, and only 1,000 of whom were Tungans. In fact it seems probable
that Ma had at least 2,000 Tungan cavalry at his disposal, in addition
to the cavalry already in Sinkiang under Ma Shib-ming's command.
Together with infantry his initial invasion force can hardly have numbered
less than 4,000. According to ruad Kazak, op.cit., p. 19, by the summer of
1933 the strength of Ma's army had reached 10,000.
See, for example, Wu's Turkistan Tumult, pp. 136; 152-6.
60.
61.
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In May, 1933, Ma Chung-ying despatched a force of about 2,500
Tungans, under the command of his younger brother, Ma Chung-chieh, to
take the ruined town of Kumul. This was achieved with little fighting,
most of the area being firmly in the hands of Ma Chung-ying's ally,
Khoja Niyas Hajji. Whilst Ma Chung-chieh issued bilingual proclamations•
to the effect that the people of Kumul had been freed for ever from
the tyranny of Chin Shu-jen (who, by this time, was safely in the Soviet
Union), Ma Chung-ying travelled from An-hsi to Kumul by lorry, remote,
62for once, from the front line fighting. Meanwhile Sheng Shih-tslai,
who had hardly been able to secure his own position before facing the
renewed Tungan challenge, hurriedly prepared a force of about 5,000
Sinkiang, White Russian and Northeastern troops to the north of the
63Dawan Chi eng at Urumchi. Having rejoined the main force of his troops
at Kumul, Ma Chung-ying advanced, unopposed, on Chli-chIao-ching, the
furthest point west reached during his invasion of 1931. Instead of
advancing along the main road to Turfan, the Tungan forces next crossed
the narrow defile between the Kuruk Tagh and the 80gdo Ula ranges, and
advanced on the provincial garrison town of Kitai. The first clashes
took place at Mulei, a few miles to the east of Kitei, on about May 15th.
On May 17th Kitai was attacked by a mixed force of Tungans and Turklc
Muslims estimated by the local provincial commander, Li Hai-ju, to be
4,000 strong. Once again, the commanding Tungan officer was Ma Chung-
chieh, Ma Chung-ying apparently choosing to stay in the background. On
May 26th Sheng Shih-tslai set out from Urumchi at the head of soma 5,000
troops, more than 1,000 of whom wera White Russian conscripts. He had
informed Wu Ai-chen that his intention was to hold San-tai, half-way
62. ~., p. 137; Hedin, Big Horse's rl1ght, p. 11.
63. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 138.
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between Kitai and Urumchi, but following bitter fighting during which
64Ma Chung-chieh was killed, Kitai fell to the invading forces. Sheng
Shih-ts'ai retreated to Urumchi, arriving in the capital on the night
of June 1st. At this time his fortunes were at their lowest ebb. Still
, 65unsure of Nanking's reaction to the coup d'etat against Chin Shu-Jen,
his position was threatened to the east by Ma Chung-ying, who had set
up his headquarters at Kitai, and to the west by Chang P'ei-yUan,
the military governor of Ili, whose loyalty remained questionable and
66who was secretly negotiating with the Tungan invaders.
Meanwhile Ma Chung-ying, whose forces were within striking distance
of the capital, unexpectedly halted his attack and sent a telegram to the
67provincial authorities offering to come to terms. Ma's unexplained
failure to advance, which may have been due to his realisation that Chin
Shu-jen had been overthrown and had fled the province, enabled Sheng to
reorganise his defences. A peace mission, under the leadership of the
Nanking representative Wu Ai-chen, was despatched to Kitai, whilst Pappengut's
68White Russians were sent to hold a new front line at ru-k'ang. Despite
64. According to Wu, Tungan losses during the capture of Kitai were 1,000
killed or wounded. Ma Chung-chieh was reportedly killed in a moment
of 'inspired but utterly reckless bravery' when attempting to scale
the walls in the face of machine gun fire. (Turkisten Tumult, pp. 138-9;
152). There would appear to be no SUbstance in the claims made by the
JRCAS that Ma's troops were largely unarmed before their attack on Kitai,
or that they were subsequently defeated by provincial forces to the west
of Kitai on May 29th. ('Recent Events in Sinkiang, JRCAS, XXI, 1, 1934,
p. 85).
65. Sheng can have been in little doubt that Nanking welcomed the overthrow
of Chin Shu-jen, but must have feared that Chiang Kai-shek had chosen
Ma Chung-ying, recently promoted to the command of the KMT 36th Division
and (unlike Sheng) said to have been a KMT member, as Nanking's
protege in Sinkiang. This uncertainty doubtless played at least some
part in Sheng's decision to turn to the Soviet Union, rather than to
Nanking for assistance.
66. Hedin, Big Horse's rlight, p. 12; Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 246.
67. lE!2., p. 244.
68. ror details of Wu's mission, in which he encouraged Ma Chung-ying to
seize control of southern Sinkiang, whilst leaving Dzungaria to Sheng
Shih-ts'ai see.Turkiatan Tumult, pp. 148-60.(Chapter XI, 'I See 8igHorse' ). ..~-ry" ....
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initial promise of success, Wu's peace mission failed to achieve its
purpose. Ma Chung-ying assured the provincial delegates that he would
observe a cease-fire, and that there would be no further fighting
between his forces and those of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. However, according to
Wu, shortly after his return from Kitai to Urumchi aerial reconnaisance
reports indicated that Tungan troops were once again on the move,
advancing westward towards San-tai. Sheng immediately left Urumchi for
fu-k'ang, where he took personal command of the provincial forces and
"advanced to meet Ma Chung-ying at the hamlat of Tzu-ni-ch'uan. During
the subsequent battle, which took place during mid-June, the provincial
foroes gained the upper hand following the onset of severe weather
conditions for which the lightly-clothed Tungans were ill-prepared.69
The Uighur forces of Khoja Niyas Hajjr, who were present in the region•
at the time of the battle, took no part in the fighting.70 The defeat
of the Tungans at Tzu-ni-ch'~an, although a serious setback for Ma
Chung-ying, was not, however, a complete rout. The defeated troops
succeeded in withdrawing in good order and in retreating, via Kitai,
to Ch'i-chiao-ching. from this point they advanced westward to Turfan,
where they joined up with the remnants of the'Tungan forces under Ma
Shih-ming, and proceeded to extend their authority towards the southern
end of the Dawan Chi eng.
It was also during mid-June that Huang Mu-sung, a "pacification
commissioner" sent by the national government in Nanking, arrived by air
in Urumchi. Huang's mission was ostensibly to establish a lasting peace
between the provincial authorities and Ma Chung~ying, both of whom
69. ~., pp. 174-6. According to Wu, the provincial forces seized
1,000 rifles and four machine guns from the retreating Tungans; cf.
Cable and french, The Gobi Desert, p. 280.
70. Kuang Lu, 'Hain-chiang li-shih', in Ling Shun-sheng, Pien-chiang
wen-hua lun-chi (Cultural Essays on the frontier Region, Taipei,
1954), III, pp. 330-33.
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professed at least nominal allegiance to the Nanking government. Sheng
remained suspicious of Huang's motives, however, clearly feeling that
Nanking might lend its backing to the Tungan forces whom, especially after
his victory at Tzu-ni-ch'uan, he still hoped to defeat.71 His reaction
was accordingly swift and harsh. Abandoning all pursuit of Ma's forces,
Sheng returned to Urumchi and placed Huang Mu-sung under house arrest.
Shortly thereafter three leading officials of the Sinkiang government
whom Sheng accused of plotting with Huang Mu-sung, Chang peel-yuan and
Ma Chung-ying to effect his overthrow were arrested and executed by firing
sQUad.72 Having thus distanced himself from Nanking, Sheng followed the
example of his predecessor, Chin Shu-jen, by turning increasingly to the
Soviet Union for aid in his continuing struggle with the various Muslim
rebel forces.73
During the summer and early autumn of 1933, Ma Chung-ying remained in
the Turfan region reorganising his forces, whilst Sheng devoted his energies
to securing his position at Urumchi and elsewhere north of the Tien Shan.
During July and August provincial authority was restored at Shara Sume, .
which had been looted and burned by Kazakh rebels during April,74 and also,
71. Doubtless Sheng still retained feelIngs of bitterness towards Nanking
dating from the time of his resignation from Chiang Kei-shek's stafr
in 1928.
72. Details in Wu, Turkistan Tumult, pp. 181-3. According to Japanese
diplomatic sources, Huang Mu-sung was in fact en egent of Chiang
Ka1-shek's political rival, Wang Ching-wei, who was anxious to brIng
about the downfall of Chiang's old protege, Sheng, end thus to strengthen
his own position within the KMT. Miscellaneous Documents Relatin to the
Political and General Situation in Sinkiang in Japanese), Japanese
foreign Office Archives, cited in Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang
(Part 1 of Whiting & Sheng, Sinkian9. Pawn or Pivot?, p. 24). The three
leading officials of the Sinkiang government executed by Sheng Shih-ts'ai
were T'eo Ming-yueh, Ch'en Chung and Li Hsiao-t'len.
73. See below, pp. 265-74.
74. According to Wu Ai-chen, Shara Sume fell to the rebel Kazakhs on April
18th, when the local tao-yin, having received news of Chin Shu-jen's
overthrow, erroneously assumed that Urumchi had fell en to the rebels.
He accordingly destroyed his records, set fire to the administrative
buildings, and fled to Soviet territory with the other Chinese residents
of Share Sume, leaving the town undefended.(Wu, Turkistan Tumult,
p p.132-3).
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75according to Hayit, in the border region of Chuguchak. Meanwhile
KhoJa Niy~s ~~JJr, the most influential of the Kumullik rebel leaders,
had grown increasingly uneasy in his alliance with the Tungan forces of
Ma Chung_ying.76 At some stage during late June or early July, probably
following the battle of Tzu-ni-ch,nan, he opened secret negotiations
with Sheng Shih-tslai which resulted in his recognition of the new
provincial authorities and appointment to the position of "Chief Defence
77Commissioner for Southern Sinkiang". following this volte-face he
marched his Uighur troops across the Dawan Chleng and occupied Toksun
only to be attacked and badly defeated by the Tungan forces of Ma
Shih-ming.78 As a result of these developments, by late July KhoJa Niyas
~ajj! and his ramshackle army had completely disappeared from the
political stage in north-eastern Sinkiang, having been forced to retreat via
via Karashahr to Kuchar, into a region owing at least nominal allegiance
75. Hayit, Turkestan Zwischen Russland und China, p. 302.
76. In fact a sense of war-weariness was spreading throughout the Turkic
population of north-eastern Sinkiang. During Wu Ai-chenls peace
mission to Ma Chung-ying in May, 1933, Khoja Niyas ~aJjr, his
military commander Mahmud, and a group of Muslim akhunds met with
him at San-tai. They expressed their desire to avoid a wide-scale
conflict in Sinkiang and, in marked contrast to the Uighur
secessionists of south-western Sinkiang, stated that they would
be prepared to support the new administration at Urumchi now that
Chin Shu-jen, the oppressor of Kumul, had been overthrown. (Turkistan
Tumult, p. 146).
77. Wie~s, op.cit., p. 242. According to Hayit, op.eit.,.p. 303. Khoja
Niyas Hajji reached an agreement with Sheng on 9th June, 1933 (i.a.. " )before tha battle of Tzu-ni-ch'uan ; howev~r;this is at a variance
with the primary account of Wu Ai-chen (Turkistan Tumult, pp. 146;
234), which suggests that KhoJa Niyas may have changed aides in late
June or early July, 1933.
78. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 234.
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79to the rebel forces at Kashgar and Khotan.
Meanwhile Nanking's peace commissioner Huang Ma-sung had secured
his release from house arrest in Urumchi by wiring Nanking with the
recommendation that Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Liu Wen-lung be crinfirmed in
80their posts as chief military and civil authorities in Sinkiang.
Nanking, presented with a fait accompli and fearing the further growth of
Soviet influence in Sinkiang, had no alternative but to comply with Huang's
recommendation. On September 2nd La Wen-kan, Nanking's foreign minister,
arrived in Urumchi by air. His brief was formally to confirm Sheng in
office (which he did at an official ceremony on September 7th), and then
to mediate between Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Ma Chung-ying on the clear
understanding that Nanking recognised the former as the legitimate tupan
of Sinkiang. As a result of La's mission, Ma Chung-ying was offered
the post of Garrison Commander of Eastern Sinkiang - an appointment which
he agreed to accept, duly assuming legitimate authority over B region which
81included Kumul, Barkol, and part of the Turfan Depression. Shortly
after La Wen-kan's departure from 5inkiang in early October, however,
Sheng announced the discovery of a new "plot" against him. The figure-
head Provincial Chairman, Liu Wen-lung, was accused of conspiring with
Ma Chung-ying, Chang P'ei-yuan, and, through Lo Wen-kan, with Nanking,
79. It was as a result of his defeat and withdrawal to Kuchar that Khoja
Niyas HaJJI sent representatives to Kashgar and Yarkand advocating
a poli~y which was 'bitterly anti-Tungan but conciliatory towards the
Chinese' (see above, p•. 221 ). According to HMCGK these represent-
atives left Kuchar for Kashgar on July 29th. 1!llJl, L/P&S/12/2331, PZ.
6634.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 31/8/1933). Yulbars Khan, the other
prominent Kumullik leader, who was probably at Kumul or Bardash during
this period, chose to remain aligned with Ma Chung-ying. Howard and
Boorman, op.cit., Vol IV, p. 59.
80. Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 245; cf. rleming, P., News rrom Tartary
(London, 1942), p. 250.
81. Howard and Boorman, op.cit., Vol III, p. 122; ~, L/P&S/12/2356,
PZ.4894.1934 (Notes Respecting the Sinkiang Rebellion), p. 1.
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to overthrow Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Liu was accordingly forced to resign,
and was replaced as provinci~l chairman by Chu Jui-hsi, a still more
pliable cipher.82
Whilst Sheng was thus occupied in strengthening his grip on the
provincial government at Urumchi, his enemies in the rest of the province
were preparing for a final, all-out attempt to unseat him. Ma Chung-ying.
apparently encouraged by Ma Shih-ming's successes againet Khoja Niyas
~ajjr,decided on a 'lightning stroke' against the capital, and in
December, 1933,cswiftly moved his forces across the strategic Dawan Ch'eng
to attack Urumchi.83 In response to this move Chang P'ei-yuan, the
military governor of IIi, finally determined to throw his support behind
the invading Tungans He accordingly led his troops across the Talki Pass
into Dzungaria, and attacked the provincial forces stationed at Wusu.B4
Meanwhile, encouraged by the advance of the Kansu Tungan forces, the
indigenous Tungans of Dzungaria rose en masse and flocked to Ma Chung-
ying's banner.8S In late December a detachment of the 36th Division, led
by the indefatigable Ma Shih-ming, bypassed the capital and attacked the
82. Howard and 800rman, op.cit., Vol III, p.122; when Chu died early in
1934, he was replaced by another figurehead provincial chairman,
Li Yung.
83. According to Wu Ai-chen (Turkistan Tumult, p. 234), Ma 'advanced egain
to the pass' .Dawan Ch'eng •••working his way through the hills he
evaded the forces sent to check him'. In fect, Ma already held
Dawan Ch'eng, and had repelled a provincial attack on his positions
in September, 1933. Kuang Lu, 'Hsin-chiang Li-shih' in LinQ Shun-sheng,
Pien-chiang wen-hua lun-chi (Cultural Essays on the. Frontler Region),
Taipei, 1954), III, p. 333. In October, 1933, Wu Ai-chen left
Sinkiang via the Soviet Union. rrom this time his account ce~ses to
be an invaluable primary source, and although still useful becomes less
reliable. Kuang Lu, however, remained in Sinkiang on Sheng's staff at
this time, and is therefore a more reliable primary source (eee
Appendix I, 'Who Was Who in Republican Sinkiang').
84. Kuang Lu, op.cit., pp. 333-4.
85. Hedin, Big Horse's flight, p. 196; Vasel, My Russian Jailers in China,
pp. 164-5; Nyman, op.cit., p. 108; Wu, Turkistan Tumult, p. 233.
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border town of Chuguchak. By coincidence Georg Vasel, who had witnessed
the departure of the KMT 36th Division from Soo,ho~ in May, was
sheltering in the local Soviet consulate during its attack on Chuguchak.
His description of the Muslim army's appearance and composition after an
advance of more than 1,500 miles once again merits quotation in full:
The sun's rays, by this time, were shining
obliquely across the street and showed us the
Tungan army entering the town. They looked
more like a horde of Asiatic mercenaries
whom the political upheaval had swept along
from their mountain fastnesses and arid deserts
than like conquerors. Stirrup to stirrup, the
young regular soldiers in their smart uniforms
looked a well-disciplined, trim and efficient
force. I recognised one of their officers -
Ma Schiming (sic), the commander-in-chief's
adjutant, who had frequently been my guest in
Suchow. These regular soldiers rode past on
beautiful horses, while huge red flags floated
in the breeze above their heads, bearing the
word "Ma" in black letters on a white ground.
At a short distance followed a horde that
was tolerably well equipped according to Asiatic
standards - that is to say, many of the fire-
arms which they bore along with pride would have
been welcome trophies for many a museum. I saw
needle-guns, blunderbusses and MUZzle-loaders
galore. On these crude warriors c~me, mounted
on their little, unkempt, big-headed Mongolian
horses. In their rear dense clouds of dust,
which shut out the light, billowed onward, and
then came the infantry, a motley mob ~ho looked
like a mixum-gatherum (sic) of all the brigand
armies of China - men with wild eyes and matted
hair, brutalised and bestial-looking wretches,
with lust for blood and booty written in their
repulsive faces - nomads, outlaws ~ho had nothing
to lose end everything to gain from the upheaval
that was going on.
After the infantry followed a huge horde of
camels, with their rythmical swaying gait, laden
with produce and goods of every conceivable
type •••the wooden peg which was driven through
the nose of each camel wes made fast to the saddle
of the beast just ahead of it. The breath came
from their mouths like smoke - their necks were
craned forward, and their heads kept bobbing
up end down.S6
86. Vasel, My Russian Jailers In China, pp. 172-3. Vasel was a National-
Socialist and a convinced member of the Herrenvolk, and these attitudes
are apparent in his writing. Hls descriptioni of Ma Chung-ying'sforces are nonetheless very evocative as well as uniquely detailed.
258
As a result of the Tungan advance into Dzungaria and Chang P'ei-yOan's
defection to the side of the rebels, by the mid-winter of 1933 Sheng
Shih-ts'ai's position at Urumchi appeared all but untenable. Meanwhile,
in the south of the province, the secessionist movement of the "Khotan
AmIrs" had entered a new and potentially decisive phase.
6.3 The "Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan"
During September and October 1933, whilst the armies of the rival
warlords Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Ma Chung-ying continued their struggle for
power in northern and eastern Sinkian9, the rebel forces in southern
Sinkiang maintained their siege of Ma Chan-ts'ang's Tungan forces in
Kashgar New City whilst gradually consolidating their control over a wide
swathe of territory which stretched from Charchon in the east to Aksu in
the north. Following the execution of Timur and the withdrawal from
c - cKashgar of the Kirghiz leader, Uthman Ali, by the beginning of October
the Khotan Amlrs had emerged as the leaders of the south Sinkiang Muslim
. 87rebellion 'almost by default'. In marked contrast to the Kumullik
leaders Khoja Niyas Hajjr and Yulbars Khan, neither of whom had (as yet)•
88announced their intention to secede from the Chinese Republic,
the Khotan Amrrs were committed to just such a secessionist policy, and to
the establishment of a conservative, theocratic Muslim state in southern
Sinkiang.89
rollowing his defeat by the forces of Ma Shih-ming and subsequent
87. See above, pp. 212-25.
88. Khoja Niyas ~ajjI was later to commit himself, albeit briefly, to the
separatist c~use. Yulbars Khan appears to have remained loyal to the
nationalist authorities at Nanking (and later on Taiwan) until his
death. See Appendix I, 'Who Was Who in Republican Sinkiang'.
89. i.e. in "(astern Turkestan".
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retreat from Toksun to Kuchar in late July, 1933, Khoja Niyas HajjI, the•
spiritual leader of the Uighur forces in both north-eastern and southern
Sinkiang, found himself on the periphery of the secessionist region ruled
by the government of the Khotan ~mirs. Since the Khoja had but recently
agreed to recognise the administration of Sheng Shih-ts'ai and had
accepted the title of "Chief Defence Commissioner for Southern Sinkiang",
his position was, to say the least, somewhat anomalous. According to
Muhammad Amin Bugra, the eldest Khotan Amrr, a decision was taken to woo
the Khoja (and his sizeable army)90 away from the provincial authorities
in Urumchi by offering him the presidency of their secessionist Islamic
state.91 Khoja Niyas HajjI, a pragmatist of little political vision who•
was, no doubt, mindful of the Turkic secessionist armies to his west as
well as of the Tungan armies to his east, promptly accepted this offer,
proclaiming a "Republic of (astern Turkestan" with himself as President,
either at Kuchar or Aksu, on September 10th, 1932.92 Although by this
action the Khotan ~mIrs succeeded in driving a wedge between Khoja Niyas
~ajjI and his erstwhile Chinese allies, nothing came of the resultant
"Republic of Eastern Turkestan", which remained purely notional until
November 12th, 1933, when. perhaps in desperation at the behaviour of
Khoja Niyas Hajj! (who, from his new headquarters at Aksu, was reportedly•
negotiating for aid from the Soviet Union) ~abit Damullah, the shaykh
aI-Islam of the Khotan government, proclaimed a "Turkish-Islamic Republic
90. The Khoja's army, although no match for the regular troops of
Sheng Shih-ts'ai or Ma Chung-ying, was nevertheless large.
According to Hedin (Big Horse's flight, p. 152), the Khoje'a
army consisted of 15,000 men, 60,000 sheep and 40,000 cows.
91. Bugra, Do~u Turkistan, p. 43, cited in Hayit, op.cit., pp. 303-4.
92. ~.
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fE t ( "" )o as ern Turkestan" Tk. Sarki Turkistan Turk-Islam Cumhuriyeti or,
TIRET.93
The policies of the TIRET were closely aligned with the original
principles of the Khotanlik Committee for National Revolution, being
94staunChly anti-Chinese, anti-Tungan, and anti-Soviet. Moreover the
leadership of the new republic, with the exception of Khoja Niyas Hajji•
who was permitted to retain his honorary position as President, was clearly
based on the Islamic fundamentalist leadership of the CNR in alliance with
a number of anti-Soviet Muslim refugees from Soviet Central Asia (see
Table 4, p. 333). Thus, according to Hayit, Sabit Damullah became Prime•
Minister of the TIRET capital at Kashgar Old City, whilst Nur Ahmad Jan. .
Bugra was confirmed as a "Khotan AmIr" with ministerial rights at Kashgar.
Mu~ammad AmIn Bugra remained in control of both Old and New Cities at
Khotan, and cAbd~llah Bugraratained control of both cities at Yarkand.95
The nascent republic rapidly took on the unwieldy trappings of full
93. ~. See also Hai, Badruddin Wee-liang, Muslim Minority in China,
pp. 105-6. According to HMCGK the TIRET was 'probably founded without
Khoja Niyas ~ajjI's knowledge', lQhfi, l/P!S/12/2331, PZ.98.1934
(separate paper submitted with PZ.98.1934, entitled 'Comments on the
local Situation at Kashgar').
94. According to Chang Ta-chun part of ~abit Damullah's declaration of in-
dependence. stahd quite explicitly that:
The Tungans are no less our enemy than the Han
Chinese. Our people are now still under the
oppression of the Tungans although the Chinese
yoke has already been thrown off •••Neither the
Han Chinese nor the Tungans have any legitimate
claim to Eastern Turkestan. We, the people of
Eastern Turkestan, no longer need foreigners to
be our masters.
(Ssu-shih-nien-tung-Iuan Hsin-ch'iang, Hong Kong, 1956, pp. 52-3~
_ " .. e- _- _- ',- .•. ~,.,- ••.. ,.
95. Hayit, op.cit., p. 302, fn. 6; cf. Hayit's 'Qst Turkistan:Machtkampf
zwischen China und Russland', Das Parlament, XXVIII (1963), p. 341.
~, l/P!S/12/2364, PZ.8033.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, nd).
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statehood, with a cabinet of 13 ministers (including two deputy prime
ministers) and a national assembly. The Chinese Republican legal system
was replaced by Islamic sharI'a law, and a constitution of some complexity
was promulgated.96 In a reaffirmation of the Islamic identity of the new
state, a "national flag" consisting of a white star and crescent on a
97blue ground was widely displayed at Kashgar. Sinkiang provincial
currency (at this time being issued by both Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Ma
Chung-ying - see plates 19 and 20) ceased to be "legal tender", and TIRET
98bank notes were issued at both Kashgar and Khotan. TIRET policies,
which were supposedly based on the Cur'an and ~adIth, were described by
the British Consul-General at Kashgar as being essentially five in number,
viz:
1) To form an independent Muslim state.
2) To seek freedom from the 'Soviet stranglehold'.
3) To restore peace and put down lawles~ness.
4) To encourage and restore trade.
5) To seek friendly relations with the British government
and to obtain its aid as far as was possible.99
In many ways the TIRET was the direct spiritual successor of the
.,. c -Am~rate founded by Va qub Beg in the mid-nineteenth century, which was also
96. ror details of the administration and constitution of the TIRET -
such as it was - see Appendix IV, 'The Constitution and Composition
of the "Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan" ~
97. ~, L/P!S/12/2364, PZ.8339.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 16/11/1933).
According to Wu (Turkistan Tumult, p. 247); the flag of the TIRET
'showed a crescent moon and a star on a white ground, on which there
were also written certain texts from the Koran'. According to the rlag
Institute at Chester, England, the flag of the TIRET was triangular, of
sky blue, with a border of red tongues (cf. the flag of the Khotan AmIrs,
,.plate 14); in the upper hoist wae a crescent and star. '!heFlag Institute,
Qheste~t 'Notes on the Vex1l10~08Y of Chinese Turkestan' (Ms., 1980).
9B •._!QbE, L/P&S/12/2364, PZ.98.1934 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 23/11/1933).
99. ~, L/P!S/12/2331, PZ.98.1934.
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c -centred on Kashgar. Like Va qub Beg, the TIRET leadership looked to
British India and to Turkey for aid and recognition in its struggle
against the Chinese, the Russians and the Tungans; however unlike VaCqub
Beg, who was to succeed in winning recognition and some degree of aid
from both London and Constantinople, the TIRET leadership was to fail
completely in this aim. Approaches were made to the British through the
medium of Thomson-Glover, the new British Consul-General at Kashgar, who
arrived November 1933, in the same month as the independence of the TIRET
was announced by Sabit Damullah. Thomson-Glover, who was ardently anti-•
Soviet and possibly somewhat inexperienced, reported to the Government
of India that:
The Moslem spirit from Khotan (amounting to
fanaticism) •••has alone made any attempt to
stem the overwhelming tide of Soviet domin-
ation •••The threat to India of complete Soviet
control right up to the passes leading to
India via Gilgit and Chitral is not imaginary,
and unless the opportunity arises and is at
once seized upon of supporting a friendly
Moslem state it will only be a short time
before the threat is translated into an
accomplished fact.100
Thomson-Glover felt that, were any lasting unity between Khotan, Kashgar,
and Khoja Niyas HajjI to emerge, then:•
With nominal allegiance to Nanking it might
be possible for a friendly power to extend
practical symoathy and help to the new and
struggling Republic.101
The Government of India lost no time in reminding Thomson-Glover that the
British recognised Nanking as the sole authority in Sinkiang, and that all
moves to counter Soviet penetration of the area should be based, as usual, on
a policy~ or support for the Chinese authorities in the province. A
100. !2!2.
101. !2!2.
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telegram was duly sent to Kashgar on 11th December, 1933, which stated
flatly:
You should give no encouragment or assistance
to the new administration if they attempt to
send representatives to India to seek help.
It would be impossible for the Government of
India to give any help whatsoever, as being
inconsistent with the attitude of strict
neutrality which is being observed by His
Majesty's Government and Government of India
in present disturbances in Sinkiang.102
The TIRET leadership also attempted to win recognition and aid from
Turkey and Afghanistan, again with li_ttle success. In November, 1933, two
cTurkish citizens, Or Mustafa Ali Bey of Izmir and a military officer called••
Ma~mud Nedim Bey, appeared in Kashgar as "advisers" to the new republic.103
Reports of the developments in Sinkiang were initially greeted by the Turkish
press with some exuberance. The Turkic rebels were represented as 'true
Turks', and tha TIRET as 'a modern state which will advance along the road
to perfection,.104 A New Year's telegram which was sent by Mustafa cAli••
Bey to the Turkish government at Ankara conveying greetings from the 'blue
flag of newly-liberated (astern Turkestan to the red flag of beloved
Turkey' was widely circulated by the Anatolian News Agency,105 but no
102. lQhR, L/P!S/12/2356, PZ.8340.1933 (telegram, GOI-HMCGK, 11/12/1933).
At tha beginning of february, 1934, two representatives of the
TIRET did, in fact, arrive at New Delhi seeking British recognition.
They were immediately rebuffed, and The Times commented: 'So far as
Delhi is concerned, the Republicans hava gone to the wrong address.
Sinkiang is the province of a State with which the British
Government are on good terms and the delegates will get no more
than the advice to settle their differences .with Sinkiang before
worse befalls them'. 'Chinese Turkestan and Autonomy', The Times (London),
7th February, 1934; 'Chinese Turkestan', The Times (London), 22nd
February, 1934. .
103. According to Belofr, these TUrks were 'anti-Kemalist exiles'. ~
Foreign Policy or Soviet Russia, Vol 1, p. 234.
104. Nyman, op.cit., p. 114; IOLR, L/P!S/12/2364, PZ.1390.1933 (British
Ambassador at Angora/Ankara to fa, 12th february, 1934).
105. .!.2.!.£•
material support for the TIRET was forthcoming from Ankara, end the
Turkish foreign Minister, Tawfiq H~st~ Bey, warned that nations ~hich,
were neighbours of Soviet Russia, must, above all, be on good terms
with the Soviets 'who alone can be of use to her neighbours in the way
of development,.106
In Afghanistan the government of Mu~ammad Zahir Shah regarded the
Islamic rebels in southern Sinkiang with some sympathy, and sent its
congratulations to Sabit Damullah and Khoja Niyas HajjI on the foundation• •
107of the TIRET in November, 1933. As a result of this apparent
recognition the TIRET leadership sent a "permanent mission" to Kabul
and attempted to purchase munitions, thus putting the Afghans in a
difficult position vis-~-vis their Soviet neighbours, who viewed the
emergent anti-communist regime in Kashgar with considerable distaste
and were determined that it should be overthrown as swiftly as possible.
In the event the rebel leadership ~as unable to acquire a significant
amount of munitions through Kabul, and it seems probable that, faced with
Soviet diplomatic pressure, the ~fghan government felt unable to provide
108the TIRET with anything more than discreet moral support.
It can thus be seen that all attempts made by the rebel leadership
in southern Sinkiang to win diplomatic or material support in their
attempt to set up a secessionist Islamic state ended in failure. In
effect the TIRET was doomed from the moment of its inception, for having
adopted an uncompromisingly conservative pan-Turanian line, it had
deprived itself of allies whilst, ensuring itself of the enmity of the
three most powerful forces in Sinkiang - the Tungans, the provincial
authorities, and the Soviet Union.
106. .!2!.&.
108. .!E.!£.
107. Nyman, op.cit., p. 115.
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6.4 Soviet Intervention in Support of Sheng Shih-tstei-
As has already been shown, by the beginning of January, 1934, Sheng
Shih-ts'ai was beleaguered in the provincial capital at Urumchi whilst the
Tungan forces of Ma Chung-ying ranged almost at will across Dzungaria.
Sheng could expect no assistance from Nanking, whose envoys he had accused
of plotting his downfall, and from whose forces Sinkiang was, in any casa,
isolated by a wide swathe of territory under the control of Ma Chung-ying's
fellow Tungans belonging to the "five Ma" warlord clique. To compound
Sheng's isolation, tha strategic Ili Valley was under the control of
forces owing allegiance to the renegade general Chang P'ei-yuan, who was
himself threatening Urumchi from Wusu, whilst the greater part of southern
Sinkiang was under the control of the avowedly secessionist "Turkish-
Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan". It was at this eleventh hour that
the Soviet Union, which had become increasingly disturbed by the continuing
turmoil in Sinkiang, finally determined, in response to an urgent appeal
from Sheng Shih-tstai, to intervene directly in support of the provincial
authorities at Urumchi.
It is not known when Sheng Shih-ts'ai first approached the Soviets
with a request for aid. Certainly, in October, 1933, Sheng despatched Ch'en
Te-li and Yao Hsiung as his personal representatives to the Soviet
authotities in Moscow. In his memoirs Sheng claims that the purpose of
their mission was to urge the Soviets to supply the provincial authorities
with weapons which they had promised to Chin Shu-Jen in 1931, but which had
not been delivered.109 It is interesting to note, however, that shortly
after the April 12th coup d'etat, the provincial council which replaced
Chin Shu-Jen determined to send a messenger to Nanking to inform the
109. Sheng, Red Failure, in Whiting and Shang, op.cit., pt. 2, p. 163.
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national government of developments in Sinkiang. According to Wu Ai-chen,
who held an influential position on this provisional council, Sheng
Shih-ts'ai's chief-of-staff, Chien Chung, was chosen to be the council's
representative and was duly despatched to Nanking by way of Chuguchak and
Moscow. Before his departure Chien Chung waa 'royally feasted' by Sheng
110and a wealthy White Russian called Gmerkyn. Nothing was heard from
ChIen throughout the months of April and May, though on June 3rd a message
was received in Urumchi which announced that the special envoy to Nanking
would shortly be returning to Sinklang. Wu Ai-chen w~s greatly puzzled by
the speed with which Chien Chung had completed his mission, and went to
meet him at Urumchi airport on his return. Here he learned that ChIen
had only travelled as far as Moscow before returning to Sinkiang having
forwarded his report to Nanking by mail - a task which could easily have
been performed, by air, from Urumchi itself. Wu's account of his
conversation with Chen concludes thus:
I was too well trained in tact to ask him
by whose order he had altered hia movements
it was certainly not on our council's in-
structions that he had done so. Something, it
was clear, was going on behind the scenes.111
In retrospect it seems probable that Chien Chung travelled to Moscow
on the orders of his commanding officer, Sheng Shih-ts'al, and that whilst
in Moscow he bgan negotiations with the Soviet authorities on Sheng's
behalf. When news of Chin Shu-jen's arrest and imprisonment by the Nanking
authorities reached Sheng, he must have become doubly cautious in his
dealings with the Soviet Union, none of which were sanctioned by the
national government of China. Sheng's hostility towards the Nanking
110. Wu, Turkistan Tumult, pp. 119-20.
111. ~., p. 141.
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emissaries Huang Mu-sung and La Wen-kan might well have been based on
his fear that Nanking had learned of these secret negotiations with
Moscow, and had determined to install the anti-Soviet Ma Chung-ying in
his place as de facto governor of Sinkiang.112 By October, 1933, however,
Sheng had effectively burned his bridges with Nanking,113 and was 1n
serious military difficulties at Urumchi, with the greater part of
Sinkiang in rebel hands. He therefore had no alternative but to follow
the path taken by his predecessor, Chin Shu-jen, in turning to the Soviet
Union for military and financial aid. Accordingly, with Ma Chung-ying's
troops in command of the strategic Dawan Ch'eng and threatening the
capital, Sheng sent Ch'en Te-li and Yao-hsiung to Moscow in a last,
desperata plea for assistance.
Sheng's emissaries to the Soviet Union were received with sympathy
in Moscow. The Soviet leadership was disturbed by two aspects of the
developments in Sinkiang. In the south, they viewed the emergence of an
anti-Soviet, pan-Turanian republic (the TIRET) with deep concern.
Although the TIRET itself posed no military threat to the Soviet Union,
there was always the possibility that, with British or Japanese support,
the TIRET might manage to survive as an autonomous unit, providing a haven
112. This theory is strengthened by the subsequent fate of Ch'en Chung,
who, within a few days of his return from Moscow and the almost
simultaneous arrival of Huang Mu-sung in Urumchi, was arrested by
Sheng and executed, together with two other prominent officials,
by firing squad (see above, p. 250 ). At the time Ch'en was accused
by Sheng of plotting, together with Nanking, Ma Chung-ying and Chang
P'ei-yuan, to effect his overthrow (Wu, Turkistan Tumult, pp. 181-3).
In his reminiscences Sheng neatly reverses the charge to one of
conspiring with Moscow to effect his overthrow (Sheng, Red Failure
in Sinkiang, pp. 160-61.
113. Although Nanking's foreign Minister, Lo Wen-kan, officially installed
Sheng as tupan of Sinkiang on September 7th, 1933, this action
represented Nanking's reluctant acceptance of the status quo rather
than overt approval of Sheng's position. In a word, Sheng forced
Nanking's hand by detaining Huang Mu-sung in Urumchi. Besides, as
has already been indicated, Nanking was in no position to offer
,Sheng assistance even if it had wished to do so.
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for discontented Muslim elements from Western Turkestan and a general
focus for anti-Soviet activities in Central Asia. More seriously, the
Soviet Union appears to have feared that Ma Chung-ying, who was on the
verge of capturing Urumchi, was under Japanese influence. In March, 1932,
only 18 months before Ma Chung-ying's forces reached the Sino-Soviet
frontier at Chuguchak, the Japanese Kwantung Army had invaded Northeast
China and had set up the puppet state of "Manchukuo"; moreover in february,
1933, Japanese forces had pushed westward into the Chinese province of Jehol.
It is in this wider international context that Soviet policy towards
5inkiang in the mid-1930s must be considered.
As has already been shown, by 1931 the Soviet Union had effectively
attained "most favoured nation" status in Sinkiang. The external trade
of the province was almost wholly with the Soviet Union, and the provincial
chairman Chin Shu-jen had gone so far as to sign a secret agreement
permitting the Soviets to establish eight trading agencies at various
114locations throughout the province. In return the Soviet Union had
provided Chin with limited logistical and financial backing, though not
with direct military support. following Chin's overthrow and the continued
Japanese aggression in Northeast China, however, the Soviet Union became
increasingly anxious about the situation in Sinkiang - especially after
a Japanese national attached to Ma Chung-ying's staff, by name Tadashi
Onishi, was captured by Sheng Shih-ts'ai's forces after their victory et
" 115Tzu-ni-ch'uan in June, 1933. Tadashi appears to have been no more than
an 'adventurous forerunner' of Japanese imperialism in Sinkiang, and to have,
had no official backing from the Japanese foreign Office which, when
114. See above, p. 228.
115. Tadashi Onishi was apparently using a Chinese name, Yu Hua-heng, as a
pseudonym, Cbaft, 'The Road to Power', p. 239J An Ning, Hsin-chieng
nel-mu (Behind "the Scenes in Slnklang)," (Singapore, 1952), p. 48.
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approached by Nanking, denied all knowledge of his eXistence.116 Despite
this Japanese disavowal, however, the Soviet Union was seriously disturbed
by the capture of a Japanese "agent" attached to Ma Chung-ying's staff
and, through Pravda, denounced the incident as a further manifestation
of Japanese imperialism in Central Asia.117
Seemingly the Soviet Union was less concerned with British economic
competition in the Kashgar region, and although publicly chastising the
British for attempting to create "a Greater Tibetan Empire" which was
supposedly to include southern Sinkiang,118 the Politburo must have drawn
comfort from Britain's refusal to have dealings with the pan-Turanian
119"Turkish Islamic Republic of (astern Turkestan~. Of more concern to
the Soviets were reports of tentative Japanese contacts with the TIRET,120
116. Miscellaneous Documents Relatin to the Political end General Situation
In Sinkiang in Japanese, A.6.1.3:4, Vol II, June, 1930 - December,
1933, Japanese foreign Office Archives. Ariyoshi to Hirota, November
20th, 1933. (Cited in Whiting and Sheng, op.cit., part I, p. 40).
According to Lattimore (Pivot of Asia, p. 72): 'There is •••no doubt that
Ma Chung-ying had Japanese agents at his headquarters - agents who Can
be described as adventurous forerunners rather than acknowledged re-
presentatives of Japanese policy'.
117. Pravda, Decembar 8th, 1933. Cited in Whiting and Sheng, op.cIt.,part I,
p. 40.
118. Nyman, op.cit., p. 116; Beloff, ~T~h~e~r~o~r~e~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Vol I, p. 234; cf. Izvesti a, March 17th,
L/P&S/12/2364, PZ.2076.1934 •
119. It must have been clear to Moscow that Britain, already deeply concerned
by Islamic unrest in many parts of her extensive empire, could never
lend support to an overtly pan-Turanian movement in southern Slnkiang.
Because both Britain and Russia controlled extensive ~11m territories
in south and central As1a,support !or pan-Turanian and pan-Ialamio move-
ments in-the area remained the exclusive preserve of Germany and Japan.
120. Anon., 'Durchdrirgungspolitik in Zentralasien~, pp. 5-6;_The Soviets were
disturbed by the presence in Tokyo of Prince Abd al-Karim, the grand-
e -son of the late Sultan Abd aI-Hamid of Turkey, whom they feared as a
possible future Japanese puppet ruler of Sinkiang (much as the ex-
Emperor Pu-yi served Japanese interests in Manchukuo). According to
British diplomatic sources the prince was a rrench passport holder,
born in Constantinople but domiciled in Beirut. Between 1930 and 1933
he travelled through India, ceylon and Malaya attempting to raise
money from local Muslim rulers (he~was reported by the Colombo'CID to
be 'slightly insane'). His arrival at Tokyo in 1933 provoked strong
Soviet protests. 1!UJi, L/P&S/12/2364, PZ.1681.1934 (passport Dept.
Warning Control Circular 524424) •.ln fact Japanese activities in
Sinkiang remained minimal throughout the Repllblican pe,:iod.,
_. -. ~-. - - ~ ... '. '-- .._.
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and of visits by TIRET representatives to the embassy of Nazi Germany in
Kabul.121 Already wary of German and Japanese intentions on her 'western
and far eastern frontiers, the Soviet leadership had no intention of
permitting either Berlin or Tokyo to extend their influence to the
remote Central Asian frontiers of the USSR, be it either through the
medium of the pan-Turanian TIRET, or through the medium of the ambitious
and politically unpredictable Ma Chung_ying.122 The official Soviet
attitude towards developments in Sinkiang during 1933 may best be summed
up by the contemporary warning of a Soviet diplomatic mission to Nanking
which was reportedl7 as follows:
We do not mind if you Chinese develop
Turkestan (sic). But if you permit
Turkestan (sic) to become a second
Manchuria, we must act to protect
ourselves·123
Thus it was that in late 1933, following Sheng Shih-ts'ai's urgent
appeal for assistance, the Soviet Union determined to intervene directly
in Sinkiang - for Sheng, although manifestly unreliable, was at least
124known to be convincedly~anti-Japanese.
121.
122.
123.
124.
The German Minister in Kabul Is known to have received visits from
TIRET envoys (Nyman, op.cit., p.115)J moreover the Soviet Union
accused a German national resident in Kabul of planning to send
munitions to the TIRET at Kashgar. The Germ~n roreign Office denied
this accusation. AA IV Chi 270/10.2.1934; Deutsche Botschaft, Moskau,
8.2.34. Cited in Nyman, op.cit., p. 155, fn. 27.
According to Oallin (Soviet Russia and the rar East, p. 95), Moscow
'backed Ma's opponents from the very beginning'. Note, however, Ella
Maillart's contemporary report that whilst Izvestiya was inveighing
against Ma Chung-ying as a puppet of the Japanese, Pravda Vostoka, the
Tashkent organ of the CPSU, represented him in 1932 as a peasant leader
in revolt against the militarist feudal system of Sinkiang.(M~\~,
Fo~I"'pa.) 30iAAl'EY.~. t.l7) •
White"T., 'Report from Turkestan', ~, 25th October, 1943, p. 27
According to Wu (Turkistan Tumult, p. 236), the Soviet press at Tashkent
stated that were the Japanese in control of Sinkiang, the oil-fields of
Baku would be within reach of their bombers.
'There can be no doubt that Sheng Shih-ts'ai •••was genuinely opposed to
Japanese imperialism - which, like many Chinese who had studied in Japan,
he thoroughly understood'. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 72. Sheng was,
of course, a Northeasterner, and his home province of Liaoning had been
incorporated in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo.
Accordingly, when Ch'en Te-l! and Yao-hsiung returned to Sinkiang
from Moscow in December, 1933, they were accompanied by G. Apresoff, an
experienced Soviet diplomat, who was to be the new Soviet Consul-General
at Urumchi.125 Shortly after Apresoff's arrival, Sheng conducted a purge
of his armed forces - about 20 officers of the Northeast National
Salvation Army were arrested and shot,126 as were 8 number of senior
officers from the White Russian "volunteer" force, including its commanding
officer, Pappengut, The White Russian unit was subsequently reorganised
under the command of Soviet officers.127 At the same time between 40
and 50 senior Chinese officials suspected of holding anti-Soviet
128sentiments were removed from office and a secret police force,
reportedly under the supervision of a senior Soviet official called
Pogodin, was established.129 There are also a number of unconfirmed
reports that Sheng signed a secret agreement with the Soviet Union by which
they were granted further economic concessions in Sinkiang, as well as the
right to build a railway from Ayaguz (Sergiopol), through Chuguchak, to
urumchi.130 To complete his alignment with the Soviets, Sheng announced
his "Six Basic Policies" of: (a) anti-imperialism, (2) kinship to
125. Whiting, A.S., Soviet strategy in Sinkiang, 1933-49 (Part 1 of Whiting& Sheng, op.cit., p. 25). G.A. Apresoff was a Soviet specialist in"Central
Asian affairs who had formerly served as Soviet consul in Mashhad,and
who had worked with the Tudeh (Iranian Communist Party).
126. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol III, p. 122; cf. 8eloff, The foreign
Policy of Soviet Russia, Vall, pp. 234-5.
127. Serebrennikov, J., Veliki Otkhod (The Great Exodus, Harbin, 1930),
p. 262; Cheng Tien-fong, op.cit., pp. 171-2; 8eloff, op.cit., pp. 234-5.
128. Dallin, op.cit., pp. 97-8.
129. Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 247. Shen9's secret police was the
Pao-an Ch~ (Bureau of Public Security). It worked closely with the GPU,
which was also active in Sinkiang at this time. Nyman, op.cit., p. 124.
130. Cheng Tien-fong, op.cit., p. 171; fleming, P., News from Tartary
(London, 1936; 13th impression, 1942), p. 251; Dallin, op.cit., pp. 97-8.
272
Sovietism, (3) racial or national equality, (4) "clean" government,
(5) peace)and (6) reconstruction.131
The Kremlin was clearly satisfied with these moves, for early in
January, 1934, without the approval of the Chinese national authorities
at Nanking, two brigades of GPU troops, numbering an estimated 7,000 men
and supported by tanks, planes and artillery, moved across the Sino-
Soviet frontier and attacked rebel positions at Kulja end Chuguchak.132
The Soviet forces, who had been ordered to 'clear the roads and liquidate
the rebellion',133 rapidly overcame the provincial forces of Chang
" . 134P'ei-yuan, who is reported to have committed suicide. The Tungan forces
of Ma Shih-ming put up much fiercer resistance and, although forced to
retreat from the Chuguchak region, succeeded in blocking the Soviet advance
on Urumchi. According to Alexander Barmine, the Soviet official who was
in charge of the supply of Soviet arms to Sinkiang at this time, continuing
Tungan resistance prevented for some time the despatch of planes and
munitions from the Soviet frontier to Urumchi:
rinally the command of the Red Army rorce
operating there took charge of this ship-
ment. They "delivered" our cargoes, con-
131. This was ~n addition to Sheng's "Eight Points" (promulgated shortly
after Chin Shu-jen's overthrow in the summer of 1933), viz. (1)
racial equality, (2) religious freedom, (3) immediate rural relief,
(4) financial reforms, (5) administrative reforms, (6) extension of
education, (7) realisation of self-government, and (8) judicial reform
(Sheng,. Red Failure, .p. 165). As can be seen, the "Eight Points"
and the "Six Basic policies" are essentially similar, and indeed
overlap at some points.
132. 8eloff, op.cit., p. 235.
133. 8armine, A., One Who Survived, (NY, 1945), p. 231.
134. According to Wu (Turkistan Tumult, p. 235), Chang committed suicide in
Ozungaria after sustaining a crushing defeat near Wusu. Hedin's account
of Chang's defeat,which is both more detailed and more plausible,
indicates that the defeated commander returned to Ill, and was
attempting to flee across the Muzart Pass to Aksu when caught by a
violent snowstorm. When he realised that there was no escape, he
committed suicide (8ig Horse's rlight, p. 14). Certainly a number of
Tungans in the IIi area managed to flee across the Tien Shan to Nan-lu.
Nyman, op.cit., p. 108.
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signed to the governor, by dropping the
bombs on the rebel forces gathered around
the capital, and by landing the planes
right on the airfield of the besieged
fortress. I was instructed to send the
bill for the bombs, as well as the other
goods, to the governor'135
According to Vase1, the Tungan forces managed to beat back repeated
attacks by the numerically and technically superior Soviet units for a
period of some 30 days, on one occasion foiling a Soviet pincer attack by
'crawling through the snow, camouflaged by reversed sheepskins, and
storming, from a very short distance, Soviet machine gun posts whilst
136wielding the characteristic curved sword o~ Islam'. The main battle
between the Tungans and the GPU troops reportedly took place on the
frost-bound banks of the Tutun River, .some 30 miles north-west of Urumchi.
raged for several days; but the Tungans'
unskilled ferocity was no match for B
mechanised foe, and the troops - who were
all peasants from parts of China as yet
but little inured to the blessings of
modern civilisation - were badly de-
moralised by gas bombs dropped by the
Soviet airmen.137
135. Barmine, op.cit., p. 231.
136. 'Durchdringungspolitik in Zentralasien' (an anonymous report of
the German foreign Office Work/study Group on Asia, clearly penned
by Georg Vasel), p. 10.
137. fleming, P., op.cit., p. 252. Beloff, (op.cit., p. 235) is mistaken
in claiming that: 'fleming's assertion that the Soviet troops used
gas is unconfirmed by any other source'. Possible primary sources
for the Soviet employment of gas ere to be found in Kuang Lu, op.cit.,
pp. 333-4; IOlR, l/P&S/12/2332, PZ.4216.1934 (Kashgar Diary, April
1934); IOlR, l/P&S/12/2364, PZ.3418.1934 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 12/4/1934).
Use of gas is also mentioned in 'Durchdringungspolitik in Zentra1-
asien', p. 10 and, relying on secondary sources, in Wiens, op.cit.,
p. 453, and Nyman, op.cit., p. 108.
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13880th Soviet and Tungan forces suffered serious losses, but
ultimately the GPU units prevailed, and Ma Chung-ying withdrew from
Urumchi to the Dawan Ch'eng,'closely pursued by a mixed force of
provincial 139Chinese, White Russian and Soviet troops. At the Dawan
Ch'eng the Tungans attempted to make another stand when, according to
Vasel, a detachment of Soviet troops supported by an unspecified number of
armoured cars was attacked by a force of some 500 Tungans. After savage
hand-to-hand fighting the Soviet forces were driven back, and their
armoured cars were rolled off the mountainside by the victorious Tungans.
At this juncture, by a strange twist of fate, the surviving Soviet
troops were relieved by a force of White Russian "volunteers", and Ma
Chung-ying was forced to continue his retreat through Toksun to Korla.140
138. Tungan losses were estimated by Wu at 2,000 (Turkistan Tumult, p. 237).
Soviet losses were naturally unpublicised, but Bosworth Goldman, a
reporter on the staff of the Evening Standard, happened to chance on a
'hospital for the injured from the Manchurian war' when in Novosibirsk
shortly after the Soviet intervention. His curiosity naturally
aroused, he entered the building: '
Men were sitting about in a gloomy hall, many of
them with some part of their body hidden in bandages;
they ranged in nationality from Laplanders to pure
Mongols ••• l asked some of them where they had been,
and they replied that they had been fighting in the
southern Altai, in co-operation with some Chinese,
against 'anti-social elements' disturbing the
advance of the class warfare banner into Sinkiang •••
Later, other men with whom I spoke about this
struggle often told me that they had never hear'Cl
of a hospital at Novosibirsk. On the other hand,
an occupant of the one I visited told me it was
'the best of the three'.
(Goldman, B., Red Road Through Asia, london, 1934, pp. 132-3).
139. The Soviet GPU troops did not wear Red Army uniform, but 'discreetly
garbed in uniforms without insignia or identifying markings, the Red
forces mixed with White Russian units already in Sinkiang as "the
Altai Volunteers" , (Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang, in Whiting
& Sheng, op.cit., part I, p. 26.)The GPU alias ties in well with
Goldman's account of the Novosibirsk hospital noted in fn. 138
immediately above.
140. 'Durchdringungspolitik in Zentralasien', p. 10; Hedin, Big Horse's
flight, p. 15.
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Meanwhile in southern Sinkiang, the Soviet Union was actively
attempting to destabllise the already distinctly shaky "Turkish-Islamic
Republic of Eastern Turkestan"~ On the one hand, in a move apparently
designed to protect the Soviet frontier and to insulate Soviet Central
Asia from pan-Islamic influences emanating from Kashgar, a Soviet-backed
force of irregulars known as the "Tortunlis" was set up at Ulugchat under
the command 'ofone Yusuf Jan.141 On the other hand, in a move clearly
designed to isolate the ultra-conservative "Khotan AmIrs" who effectively
controlled the TIRET, the Soviets entered into negotiations with KhoJa
Niyas ~ajjr who, although titular president of the TIRET, had remained
142at Aksu with the bulk of his army. As a result of these negotiations
the KhoJa acquired a limited_supply of Soviet armaments - though scarcely
enough to make him a threat to any faction other than his supposed TIRET
143colleagues at Kashgar - whilst a wedge was successfully driven by
the Soviet Politburo between the "president" of the TIRET at Aksu and his
144virulently anti-Soviet "cabinet" at Kashgar.
141. ~ 0.226 (Confidential), Who's Who in Sinkiang (corrected up to 26th
July, 1938), p. 15, no. 1~6; cf. Roberntz, G., En ekumenlsk nattvard-
sh8gtid i Centralasien (Stockholm, 1944), p. 251 (cited in Nyman,
op.cit., p. 155).
142. According to YulbarS_Kha~ (op.cit., pp. 115-21), the Soviets first
approached Khoja Niyas ~ajji at Kumul in 1931, as a result of which the
Kumullik rebels received 500 rifles, 100,000 rounds of ammunition, and
40,000 silver taels. It is difficult to understand why the Soviets should
have offered backing to the Khoja at this early stage, and Yulbars'
account must be treated with due caution. cf. Lee ru-hsiang, The Turkic-
Moslem Problem in Sinkiang, pp. 60-61; Hayit, Turkestan Zwischen Russland
und China, p. 310.
143. According to Thomson-Glover, the Khoja received 'nearly 2,000 rifles with
ammunition, a few hundred bombs and three machine guns'. IOlR, L/P&S/12/
2364, PZ.1627.1933 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 18/1/1934). .
144. When ~abit Oamullah heard of the Kho~a's_de~l with the Soviets, he in-
formed Thomson Glover that Khoja Niyas Hajji was 'no longer a champion
of Islam, but a tool 1n the hands of the Russians and over-friendly
to the Chinese'. IOlR, L/P&S/12/2364, PZ.1772,1934 (letter, HMCGK-GOI,
21/12/1933). -----
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6.S The Collapse of the TIRET and the flight of Ma Chung-ying
Just how weak Khoja Niyas HajjI's predominantly Uighur forces really•
were became clear in mid-December when, despite recent Soviet arms supplies,
his headquarters at Aksu fell to an eOO-strong advance guard of Ma Chung-
ying's Tungans almost without offering resistance. following this defeat
Khoja Niyas withdrew westward, arriving at Kashgar with about 1,SOO men
on the evening of January 13th, 1934.145 Despite the opposition of the
NKhotan AmIrs" group to his policy of rapprochement with the Soviets,
Khoja Niyas HajjI was given an 'outwardly cordial welcome' by Sabit• •
- - 146Damullah, who went so far as to vacate the Old City yamen in his favour.
For a brief period of about two weeks ~abit and the Khoja cooperated in
a series of increasingly desperate attacks against the Tungan forces of
Ma Chan-ts'ang, still besieged in Kashgar New City, but on January 28th
the last of these Joint attacks was beaten back with heavy losses and the
short period of cooperation between the Kumullik and Khotanlik factions
within the TIRET came to an end. On february 5th, faced with the imminent
arrival at Kashgar of Ma Chung-ying's Tungan forces, both Sabit Damullah•
and Khoja Niyas HajjI withdrew separately towards Yangi-Hissar, et•
this stage held by Nur Ahmad Jan, youngest of the Khotan Amlrs.147 Within•
24 hours the Tungan advance guard, still clad in the uniform of the KMT
36th Division and under the command of Ma fu-~an, entered the Kashgar
oasis. They were met with little resistance, and according to Thomson
Glover 'some eoo Tungans and 1,200 conscripts caused nearly 10,000 (Turkic)
148rebel troops to flee from Kashgar'. Ma tu-yuan was at pains to stress
14S. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.28S0.1934 (Kashgar Diary, January 1934).
146. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2364, PZ.1627.1833 (letter HMCGK-GOI, 18/1/1934).
147. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.304S.1934 (Kashgar Diary. february 1934).
148. Thomson Glover, J., 'Present-Day Kashgaria', JRCAS, XXIV, 3 (1937),
p. 44S.
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Tungan loyalty to Nanking, and on february 13th, one week after the
relief of the besieged garrison of Kashgar New City, it was announced
that Ma Shao-wu, the former tao-yin of Kashgar, had 'assumed senior
military and civil control on behalf of the Chinese Republic at the
request of Ma Chan-ts'ang and Ma ru_yuan,.149 Thus, in a development
which emphasised the deeply conflicting interests of Turkic and
Tungani Muslims in southern Sinkiang, the capital of the secessionist,
pan-Turanian TIRET was recaptured for Nanking not by the provincial
forces of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, but by the Muslim forces of Ma Chung-ying.
following the Tungan capture of Kashgar, the administration of
the TIRET - or what was left of it - was re-established under Sabit
•
Damullah and Nur Ahmad ~an at Vangi-Hissar. In marked contrast Khoja•
Niyas HajjI, who still held the titular presidency of the stillborn•
republic, fled to Irkeshtam on the Soviet frontier. Here, according to
Hayit, he signed a treaty with the Soviets by which he agreed to dissolve
the TIRET and to place his (predominantly Kumullik and Turfanlik) forces
at the disposal of the provincial authorities in their struggle against
the Tungans and the Khotan AmIrs. In exchange, Khoja Niyas Hajjr was to•
become "Civil Governor for Life" of Sinkiang, under the military govern-
ship of Sheng Shih_ts'ai.150
Meanwhile on february 14th, following an abortive Turkic attempt to
151 ••recapture Kashgar, the Tungan forces of Ma Chan-ts'ang and Ma fu-yuan
149. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2364, PZ.2136.1934 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 15/2/1934).
150. Jarcek (pseud. for Hayit Baymirza), '~argI-T~rkistan ve Rusya',
Milli Turkistan, LXVIII (1950), p. 25, cited in Hayit, Turkestan
Zwischen Russland und China, p. 310. for details of Khoja Niy~s
HajjI's treaty with the Soviets see Appendix V, 'Selected Documents
Relating to the Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan'.
151. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.3045.1934 (Kashqar Diary, february 1934).
During the Tungan counter attack on the morning of february 14th,
the British Consulate General at Chini Bagh came under attack,
resulting in several casualties, including the wife of Col. Thomson
Glover who was shot through the lung but subsequently recovered.
Thomson Glover, 'Present-Day Kashgaria', p. 444.
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took their revenge on their Turkic co-religionists for the "Kizil
Massacre" of June, 1933. for two days the Tungans systematically looted
. 152Kashgar Old City, whilst between 1,700 and 2,000 citizens were massacred.
Subsequently both Ma Chan-ts'ang and Ma fu-yUan advanced on Yangi Hissar,
where on March 28th they looted the Old City and bazaar whilst 'killing
every living thing,.153 In the face of this new Tungan advance, the AmIr
Nur A~mad Jan took refuge in the fortified citadel of Yangi Hissar New
City, where he was soon closely invested by Tungan troops, whilst Sabit•
Damullah fled towards Yarkand. Once within the fortified New City, the
AmIr Nur Ahmad Jan put up unexpectedly fierce resistance, and it was not•
- c -until April 2nd, when the Amir Abdullah arrived from Yarkand with several
thousand troops, that the Tungans were able to achieve any military
c -success. Caught in the open, Abdullah's Khotanlik troops were no match
c -for the Tungans, and many were killed. finally Abdullah himself was
killed - it is interesting to note that he was defended to the last by
'a few faithful'Afghans' - and his head was sent to Kashgar to be
c- 154exhibited outside the Id-ga Mosque. The Khotanlik forces withih the
-Yangi Hiasarcitedalcontlnued to resist the attacking Tungans (who were
armed only with rifles), 'conserving their scanty ammunition and rolling
back the attackers scaling the walls by means of large stones and tree
155trunks'. During the siege the Tungans are reported to have suffered
_)
152. ~, l/P&S/12/2332, PZ.3045.1934. According to 8ugra (Do~u TUrkietan,
p. 43), the Tungans killed more than 7,000 people during this massacre
(Hayit, Turkstan Zwischen Russland und China, p. 304).
153. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.4216.1934 (Kashgar Diary, April 1934).
154. ibid.; cf. Thomson-Glover, op.cit., p. 446; also IO~~, L/P&~12/2364,
PZ.3589.1934. 'Those who remained longest with him Abdullah) and
who were the laat to be killed with him were Afghans'.
155. IOlR, L/P&S/12/2364, PZ.341S.1934 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 12/4/1934).
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156several hundred casualties, but on April 12th, following the success-
ful mining of the citadel walls, the New City fell to the attacking Tungan
forces and about 500 defenders, including the AmIr Nur Ahmad Jan, were put•
to the sword.157
Approximately four weeks before the Tungan attack on Vangi Hissar,
probably on or about March 1st, Sabit Oamullah and the TIRET cabinet•
received notice from Khoja Niyas HaJJI that he had reached an agreement with•
with the Soviets at Irkeshtam, and that the secessionist TIRET should be
dissolved •.At a special meeting of theTIRETcabinet on March 2nd, ~abit and
his colleagues rejected the Khoja's instructions and declared their erstwhile
president a traiior.158 When news of this decision reached Khoja Niyas,
he marched from Irkeshtam to Varkand, where Sabit Oamullah and certain•
prominent officials of the TIRETwere conferring with Mu~ammad AmIn Bugra,
the eldest and only surviving Khotan Amir. Khoja Niyas arrived at Varkand in
mid-April, several days before the Tungan forces of Ma fu-yUan and
Ma Chan-ts'ang, and arrested ~abit Oamullah. The sole surviving Amrr
159managed to evade the Khoja's forces, and fled back towards Khotan. Khoja
Niyas proceeded to collect all the gold he could find - a good deal of
which was reportedly in the house of the deceased AmIr c -Abdullah - and then
withdrew, taking S;bit as his prisoner, through Merket and Maralbashi•
towards Aksu. -The Tungans arrived atVarkand on April 20th, and immediately
set off in pursuit of the Kh~ja, whilst other Tungan forces left Kashgar for
faizabad in a~ apparent attempt to prevent the Khoja from reaching Aksu,
156. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.4216.1934.
157. ~; cf. Thomson-Glover, op.cit., p. 446.
158. Hayit, Turkestan Zwischen Russland und China, pp. 310-12. See also
.Appendix V, 'Selected Documents Relating to the Turkish Islamic
Republic of (astern Turkestan'.
159~ Hayit, Turkestan Zwischen Russland ~nd Chine, p. 313; lQhfi, l/P&S/
12/2332, PZ.4216.1934.
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160which had fallen to provincial forces on or about 12th. Despite
these last minute attempts to capture Khoja Niyas, he managed to
evade the Tungan pursuit and to arrive safely at Aksu, where he handed
over Sabit DamuliBh to the provincial authorities. Both Sabit DamullBh• •
and the TIRET Justice Minister, SharIf QarI, were subsequently hanged
at Aksu in July.161 It should be noted that, in their "struggle"
against the secessionist TIRET, the provincial authorities had to do
little more than tie the rope around Sabit Damullahts neck. The TIRET. "
capital at Kashgar fell to the Tungani Muslim armies of Ma Chung-ying,
and the TIRET" leadership was finally dispersed or arrested by the pre-
dominantly Uighur Muslim- army of the Kumullik leader Khoja Nlyas HajjI.162•
Meanwhile, on April 6th, 193~, the Tungan comma~der-in-chief Ma
.- 163Chung-ying had arrived at Kashgar. His forces, totalling an estimated
10,000 men (some 60% of whom were Turkic conscripts), were reportedly
more than a match for the provincial forces in hand-to-hand fighting, but
had been badly demoralised by Soviet bombing. The Tungan army had been
closely pursued as far as Aksu by the provincial forces (now composed
primarily of Chinese, White Russians and Mongols, few GPU troops having
advanced beyond Turfan), but after the fall of Aksu the pressure of the
164pursuit had slackened. Ma Chung-ying had accompanied the rear-guard
160.· ~; lQhE, l/P&S/12/2332, PZ.4791.1934 (Kashgar Diary, May1934).
161. Hayit, Turkestan Zwischen Russland und China, p. 313; Vakar, 'The
Annexation of Chinese Turkestan', p. 122 (according to Vakar the
two TIRET leaders were shot).
162. According to Hayit (Turkestan Zwischen Russland und ChinA, p. 313, fn.
19), amongst those TIRET leaders who mana2ed to escape were: the
Foreign Minister, Muhammad Qasim Jan Hajji (fled to Karachi) and
the Defence Minister; sul~an Beg 8akhtiar 8~g (liv!d un~il 1960 in
Tatif, Saudi Arabia). The Health Minister, Abdullah Khan, died in
his flight across the Himalayas. See also Appendix I, 'Who Was Who
in Republican Sinkiang'.
163. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.4216.1934.
164. ibid; Thomson Glover, op.cit., p. 445; Hedin, 8ig Horse's Flight,
p. 228; Whiting & Sheng, op.cit., part I, p. 26.
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of his army, and arrived at Kashgar in a lorry which he had requisitioned
165from Sven Hedin's Sino-Swedish Expedition et Karle.
following his arrivel at Kashgar, Ma denounced Sheng Shih-ts'ai as
a puppet of the Soviet Union and stressed his loyalty to the Chinese
national government at Nanking - indeed he went so far es to lecture his
. c·Turkic fellaw-Muslims efter friday prayer at the central Id-ga Mosque on
166the importance of loyalty to Nanking. Meanwhile Tungan troops occupied
. 167Sarikol and, having rejected peace overtures from the AmIr Mu~ammad
- 16BAmin, continued their advance in Khotan which was occupied, without
fighting, on June 12th. In marked contrast to their behaviour at Kashgar
and Yangi-Hissar, the Tungans refrained from looting Khotan, but sent
a detachment of troops in pursuit of Mu~ammad AmIn, who had escaped,
together with about 3,000 followers, towards Keriya.169 The AmIr
succeeded'in evading his pursuers and, having doubled back towards
Khotan, 'fled with several pony loads of gold towards Shahidullah'~ 170
Although with the flight of the last of the "Khotan AmIrs" the secessionist
"Turkish-Islamic Republic of (astern Turkestan" came finally to an end,
the conservative pan-Turanian ideals which the TIRET had embodied continued
to live on in southern Sinkiang, nurtured, to some considerable degree, by
an aura of martyrdom and myth of near success which came increasingly to
surround the "Khotan AmIrs" after their defeat.
165. Hedin, Big Horse's flight, pp. 145-53 (chapter 9, 'Ma Chung-ying takes
our lorries').
166• .!Q!J1, L/P&S/12/2364, PZ.4B15.1934 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 7/6/1934).
167. Sarikol was occupied by the Tungans on May 7th, 1934. IOLR, l/P!S/12/
2364, PZ.4253.1934 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 17/5/1934).
168. ~,l/P&S/12/2332, PZ.4791.1934.
169. IOLR, L/P!S/12/2364, PZ.5269.1934 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 5/7/1934).
170. IOkR, l/P!S/12/2364, PZ.5557.1934 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 19/7/1934). MUQsmmad
Am~n Bugra arrived safely at leh in Kashmir (~, L/P!S/12/2332, PZ.7370.
1934, Kashgar Diary, August 1934).He subsequently entered Afghanistan
where he made contact with the Japanese Ambassador Kitada (see below.
p. 308.
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Following the overthrow of the secessionist TIRET and the (largely
symbolic) restoration of Nanking's authority in southern Sinkiang, ~a
Chung-ying was able to turn his attention more fully to the continuing
struggle with his arch-rival Sheng Shih-ts'ai. At the time of his arrival
at Kash9ar ~a .hadclearly hoped to obtain munitions and possibly diplomatic
support from the Government of India. Accordingly, on April 6th, he visited
I
the British Consulate-General where he explained to Thomson Glover that
he had come to Kashgar 'to try and save south Sinkiang from RUBsian
171influence' and continued to stress his loyalty to Nanking. Thomson
Glover was clearly impressed with Ma Chung-ying, for he informed New
Delhi at some length of his discussion with the Tungan commander-in-chief
adding: 'his version of current affairs.~~from all other evidencE
available ••• appears to more or less represent the course events are
taking,.172 Meanwhile, on the military front, Ma Chung-ying established
defensive lines at Maralbashi and faizabad and placed his half-brother
(or brother-in-law) Ma Hu-shan in command of the main Tungan force
173opposing the provincial advance.
During May and June, 1934, it gradually became clear to Ma Chung-
174ying that, despite some manifestation of British sympathy for his position,
171. 1QhE, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.4216.1934.
172. ibid •..........
173. 1]1E, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.4791.1934. L/P&S/12/2364, PZ.5269.1934. For
Ma Hu-shan's relationship with Ma Chung-ying Bee Appendix III, 'The
"Five Ma" Warlord Clique'.
174. The GOI went so far as to suggest to the fO that 'we should explain
the circumstances at Kashgar to the Nanking Government end suggest
that they should (1) accord recognition and support to Ma Shao-wu,
particularly as he is their old tao-yin, and (2) restrain the Urumchi
forces from further attacking Ma Chung-ying. An "oral communication~
was subsequently made to Nanking, IOLR, L/P&S/12/2356 (Chinese
Turkestan: Internal Situation and Affairs. December 1933 to 1936),
unnumbered minute paper, dated 14/6/1934.
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'both on account of neutrality and the physical difficulties of the
routes to India and Afghanistan' he could expect no direct intervention
175on his behalf by the Government of India. rollowing this realisation,
Ma Chung-ying's visits to the Soviet Consulate at Kashgar became
increa~ingly frequent, and he reported to Thomson Glover, perhaps in a
last bid to win British support, that the Soviets had approached him
176'to find out how much he would require to be bought off'. Certainly
Ma seems to have reached some accommodation with the Soviets, for
following heavy provincial bombing attacks against his forces at
Maralbashi towards the end of June, Ma Chung-ying ordered the Tungan
armies to evacuate Kashgar and to proceed to Khotan, announcing that
177he would be accompanying them in person.
What happened next remains something of a mystery. On the 4th,
5th and 6th of July the Tungan armies streamed out of Kashgar towards
Khotan, apparently expecting Ma Chung-ying to follow with the rear
guard, as he had during the retreat from Korla to Kashgar. What ac~ually
happened, in the words of the British Consul-General Thomson Glover, was
that: "
Ma Chung-ying left Kashgar for Irkeshtam early
on 7th July with three or four of his officers •••
and an escort of some 50 Tungans and one or more
members of the USSR Consulate or Trade Agency.
Arrived near the border to Russia the escort
were met by Russian or Russian-employed troops.
The Tungan escort dispersed or handed over their
their arms to some of KhoJa Niyasl levies, and
Ma Chung-ying disappeared into Russia.178
175. IOLR,L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.5997.1934.
176. ibid; also PZ.4216.1934 •..........
177. 11llJ[, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.5997.1934."
178. ~. Ma Chung-ying was accompanied by M. Konstantinov, the secretary
of the Soviet Consulate at Kashgar, as far as Ming Yol, the first
stage on the road to Irkeshtam (IOLR, L/P&S/12/2364, PZ.5557.1934) •..........
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Why the young Tungan warlord should have chosen voluntarily
to put himself in the hands of the foreign power which was providing
support for his rival Sheng Shih-ts'ai remains a mystery. Ma's position
at Kashgar was not under serious military pressure from the provincial
< ,forces, as can be seen from the fact that the city was not occupied
by Sheng's troops until almost two weeks after Ma's journey to the
Soviet Union. Moreover Ma could have accompanied his forces to Khotan,
which his half-brother Ma Hu-shan was to hold successfully for a further
, , 179three years before returning safely to his native Kansu. Soviet
motives in offering Ma sanctuary are easier to understand, however.
, .
With Ma Chung-ying dead, a fugitive in India, or safely back in his
fief in north western Kansu, Moscow's protege Sheng Shih-ts'ai would
assume full power over Sinkiang and, although no doubt duly grateful
to the Soviet Union for their assistance, might well feel able to re-
" -, 180
assert his independence. On the other hand, with Ma Chung-ying safely
removed from the political stage in Sinkiang and living in the Soviet
Union'as "honoured guest", the Kremlin would retain a card which might
be played to great effect against a possibly recalcitrant Sheng
,
119. Nonetheless, M.C. Gillett, H~VCGK who travelled extensively in
nTunganistan" in 1937 and who interviewed Ma Hu-shan, reported
that Ma Chung-ying went to the Soviet Union 'as a hostage to
prevent the further punishment of his troops'. IOLR, L/P&S/12/
2336; Pl.4094.37 (Re art b Vice-Consul M.C. Gillett Kash ar,
on his Tour to Keria , p. 6. It is, perhaps, just possible that
the USSR agreed to restrain Sheng from attacking the remnants
of Ma Chung-ying's forces on the understanding that Ma should
travel to the Soviet Union. It may be that the Soviet Politburo
saw the Tungans as'a useful counterbalance to Sheng in southern
Sinkiang - pr possibly that Stalin wished to avoid offending the
Government of India at a time of rising tension in (urope.
, ..
180 •. Moscow'sdoubts concerning Sheng's reliability were shown to be
well-founded in 1942 when, following Hitler's attack on the
Soviet Union in 1941, Sheng seized the opportunity to break
with his former ally. (see below, pp-.349-56).
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181Shih-ts'ai, or indeed, should the necessity arise, against a hostile
Nanking or an expansionist Japan.
Almost nothing is known of Ma Chung-ying's movements after his
crossing of the Soviet frontier at Irkeshtam. G. Apresoff, the Soviet
Consul-General at Urumchi, told Sven Hedin that Ma had been arrested
182and disarmed on entering Soviet territory. later Grosskopf, the
German Consul at Novosibirsk,'reported that Ma had been taken from
Irkeshtam to Alma Ata, where it was presumed that he was being held in
captivity.183 In January, 1935, it was reported in the Journal of the
Royal Central Asian Society that Ma had travelled to Moscow, but had
184died on arrival. In the summer of 1935, however, The Times, corres-
pondent Peter fleming was shown a picture of Ma Chung-ying:
posed in an arresting attitude. His hair
was long, like a foreigner's (all the
Tungans crop their heads); and he wore
the uniform of a cavalry officer in the
Soviet Red Army. It appeared that
internment on Soviet soil was not without
its compensations.185
Ma was again reported to have been seen in Moscow at the beginning of
1936,186 and a British diplomatic source dating from April, 1940, still
181. In this context it is pertinent to note that following Ma's flight
to Soviet territory, Sheng pressed for his extradition through
Apresoff, but 'the Soviet Government, acting in the spirit of the
Soviet constitution, did not find it possible to accede to the
request of the Sinkiang Provincial Government'. Izvestiya, July
14th, 1934 (cited in Degras, J., Soviet Documents on foreign Policy,
1917-1941, london, 1953, III, p. 85.
182. Hedin, BIg Horse's flight, pp. 240-41.
183. ibid.
184. Anon, 'The Rebellion in Chinese Turkestan', JRCAS, XXII, 1 (1935),
p. 102.
18S. fleming, News from Tartary, p. 301;cf. Maillart, (., rorbidden Journey
(london, 1937), p. 232: 'The photograph of Ma Chung-ying in Soviet
cavalry uniform was under our eyes. He was a tall, well-built man,
and contrary to Tungan custom, wore his hair long'.
186. Hedin, Big Horse's rlight, p. 247.
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placed him In that city before advancing the (unlikely) theory that
he had been sent by the Soviets on several occasions to Kansu.187
Ma Chung-ying's ultimate fate remains unknown, though according to one
report he was executed on Stalin's orders following Sheng Shih-t.'ai's
visit to Moscow in 1938.188 Certainly the young Tungan warlord was
never seen again, and in retrospect it seems likely that, as predicted
189by Vasel, Ma ended his life 'in some dungeon'.
Almost two weeks after Ma Chung-ying's precipitate departure for'
the Soviet Union a unit of 400 Chinese troops under the command of
General Kung Cheng-han, Urumchi's Pacification Commissioner for Southern
Sinkiang, arrived at Kashgar. He was accompanied by a force of some
2,000 Uighurs under the command of Khoja Niyss ~ajjI's former chief-of-
- 190staff, a Turfanlik Uighur known simply as Ma~mud shih-Chang. Kashgar
thus passed peacefully under the control of the provincial authorities
at Urumchi for the first time in almost a year. Meanwhile Ma Chung-ying's
command passed to his half-brother, Ma Hu-shan, who set up Tungan head-
quarters at Khotan whilst his troops fanned out through the oases to the
south of the Taklamakan, eventually establishing their control over a
region which extended from Karghalik In the west to Charklik and the
191frontiers of Kansu in the east. The provincial forces, probably for
187. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2392, EXT.4910.1941 (Who's Who in Sinkiang) corrected
up to 15th April, 1940), p. 7, no. 41.
188. Boorman and Howard, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China,II,
p. 464; see also the present author's 'Ma Chuni-ying' in the new
edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol V, io~,
189. See Vasel's quotation at the beginning of this chapter.
190. IOLR, l/P&S/12/2332, PZ.5997.1934 (Ch. shih-chang • divisional
commander).
191. IOLR, l/P&S/12/2332, PZ.6835.1934 (Kashgar Diary, August 1934).
267
want of Soviet backing, made no attempt to advance against Ma Hu-shan
and his sizeable Tungan army, and in September 1934, following the
visit of Tungan delegates to Kashgar, an armistice was, signed which
brought hostilities between the Tungans and the provincial authorities
temporarily to an end.192
"
, ,
192. lQkli, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.7370.1934 (Kashgar Diary, September'1934).
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CHAPTER 7
SINKIANG, 1934-44: THE ~USlI~S UNDER SHENG SHIH-TS'AI
Sheng Shih-te'ei to Stalin:
(In a rush ofaxcitement): Once a new Sinkiang
Comes into being with all nationalities enjoying
a happy and prosperous life, it will prove that
communism is the saviour of mankind. All religious
groups, including Moslems and 8uddhists, might
then see that by developing our economy in this
fashion their fanciful paradise in heaven can
come into reality on earth.
Stalin to Sheng Shih-te'ai:
(Smiling sympathetically): You are quite right.
(Molotov and Voroshilov nod agreement).1
7·1 The Hut Satrapy of "Tunganistan"
following the armistice of September, 1934, the strife-torn province
of Sinkiang entered a brief period of peace, with the secessionist TIRET
overthrown and its leaders dead or in exile, but with power still divided
between the provincial authorities under Sheng Shih-te'ai at Urumchi, and
the Tungan KMT 36th Division under Ma Hu-shan at Khotan.
following his withdrawal to Khotan in July, 1934, Ma Hu-shan (see
Plate 21) gradually consolidated his hold over the remote oases of the
southern Tarim 8asin, effectively establishing a Tungan 8atrapy where Hui
Muslims ruled as colonial masters over their Turkic Muslim subjects - a
system which well serves to illustrate the traditional relationship between
Tungan and Turkic Muslim in southern Sinkiang.2 The territory thus
1. Sheng Shih-tatai, Red failure in Sinkiang. pp. 200-201.
2. With the exception that, before thia time, Tungan power in southern
Sinkiang had always served Han Chinese power in Urumchi.
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administered from 1934 to 1937 was given the entirely appropriate name
3of "Tunganistan" by Walther Heissig.
Little is known of "Tunganistan", which was surrounded on two -
eventually three - sides by the provincial forces of Sheng Shih-ts'ai end,
4on the fourth, by the high Tibetan plateau. The only presses in this
isolated region were used for.the printing of money. Thus no internal
literature or news sheets were produced - or, at least, are known to have
been produced - and our knowledge of the period is based almost exclusively
5on the accounts of two or three travellers, as well as on the diplomatic
report made by HMVCGK Gillett following his official visit to Khotan and
Keriya during the spring of 1937.6 from these sources it is clear, however,
that Ma Hu-shan - who ruled "Tunganistan" as a complete autocrat, known
to his Turkic subjects as padishah (Ir. "king") - consistently stressed his
ultimate loyalty to the Nationalist authorities at Nanking, and indeed
regarded himself as the standard-bearer of Chinese nationalism in Sinkiang,
3. Heissig, W., Das Gelbe Vorfeld (Serlin, 1941), p. 130 (map); both
filchner (A Scientist in Tartary, London, 1939) and Maillart
(forbidden Journey, London, 1937) style the region under Ma Hu-shan's
control "Tungania".
4. The remote south-eastern oasis of Charklik was originally in Tungan
hands, permitting access to Tsinghai and Kansu (lOLR. L/P&S/12/2332,
PZ.6835.1934; fleming, News from Tartary, p. 263 • By mid-1936,
however, Charklik had passed into provincial hands (f1Ichner, A
Scientist in Tartary, p. 222). A sketch map drawn by HMCGK Packman
'to illustrate political in Sinkiang up to 1st September, 1937'
lQhfi, L/P&S/12/2357, Chinese Turkestan: Internal Situation, 1937-1938),
marks the allegiance of Charklik with a question mark, but the oasis
was almost certainly in provincial hands at this time.
5. i.e. fleming, News From Tartary; Maillart, forbidden Journey; end
filchner, A Scientist in Tartary.
6. lJllJl, L/P&S/12/2336, PZ.4094.1937 (Report by Vice-Consul M·.C. Gillett,
Kashgar, on his Visit to Keria).
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7Sheng Shih-ts'ai having become, in Tungan eyes, a Soviet puppet. At
no time did Ma Hu-shan consider seceding from the Chinese Republic and
setting up "Tunganistan" as an independent state. Nor did Islam ever
play an important role in the politics of "Tunganistan" beyond
providing a vague spiritual focus for shared Tungan and Turkic opposition
to the "Sovietization" of Dzungaria and the northern Tarim 8asin.8 In
effect, "Tunganistan" represented a Tungan warlord enclave transplanted
from Kansu to the remote far west - a bastion of Chinese colonialism,
and not of Muslim separatism, in Sinkiang. Thus, when Gillett first
visited Ma Hu-shan's Tungan fief in January, 1937, he wrote:
My first impression of the Tungans was that
their mode of government was almost rascist,
being a young men's government (there is no
one holding an important post under the
36th Division who is over 45), an authorit-
ative government and a militaristic
government. My next impression was that
they were, in some measure, colonists. They
all endeavour to live as Chinese a life as
possible, have brought with them Chinese
cooks and have established, in the larger
places, Chinese baths. In all the district
towns street names were put up in Chinese as
well as in Turki, and the police had set up
crude lamps th~t were lit at night, refuse
bins and entirely inadequate water butts for
7. According to rleming, in the absence of postal and telegraphic facilities
Ma Hu-shan sent an emissary to Nanking in 1935 proclaiming his allegiance
to the Chinese Republic and asking for assistance in his struggle against
Soviet influence in Sinkiang (News from Tartary, p. 263). It is also
interesting to note that the Tungans were 'very anti-Japanese' and that
'most of the stock anti-Japanese slogans from China proper (were) to be
found written up in the streets of Khotan (whilst) "Resistance to
Japanese Imperialism" formed one of the six simple principles of govern-
ment'(of "Tunganistan")." (lOLR. L/P&S/12/2336, PZ.4094.1937, p, 6).
8. Nyman's statement that 'the isolated Tunganistan preserved a spirit of
jihid through an unparallelled reign of terror' (op.cit., p. 109) cannot
be permitted to pass unchallenged. The Tungan 'reign of terror' was
directed exclusively at their Turkic fellow-Muslims, whilst non-Muslim
Han Chinese and White Russians are known to have served in KMT ~5th
Division ranks in southern Sinkiang at this time; moreover Ma Hu-shan's
civil administration favoured Han Chinese appointees over Turkic Muslims
(1]1ft, L/P&S/12/2335,PZ.4094.1937, pp. 4-5). In fact the 'reign of terror'
in Tunganistan was of typical warlord type, and was quite unrelated to
Islam and the concept of Jihad.
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use in case of fire, all of which things were duly
labelled in Chinese. These first impressions
suggested that the Tungans might have developed
some administrative abilitY'g
After a stay in "Tunganistan" of .about two months duration Gillett was
to alter his initial evaluation somewhat:
Subsequent experience and investigations •••showed
that the Tungans were still ful filling their
historic role of a fine fighting forca, but even
so a purely destructive force and one completely
unable adequately to administer the territory
it controls by force of arms. What I had first
taken for fascism turned out to be en attempt
to modify martial law into something that
would work in times of peace •••The whole aim of
the government is to provide the military with
the necessary money and supplies, while the needs
of the people are entirely disregarded. Education
is utterly neglected; and taxation is cruelly
heavy. Taxation falls hardest on tha cultivators,
and then only on the poorer among them, the taxes
being collected through the Begs and other rich
men, who are largely exempt. Of these taxes the
hardest are the levies in kind - grain, fodder
and fuel - for military purposes: these are
collected by tha military, not through the civil
. authority, and, in the Karghalik district, are
so heavy that many people have to go to Posgam
(i.e, to the zone under provincial control) to
buy stuff in the market there with which to pay
these levies'10
Certainly Tungan rule was a heavy burden.for the people of.the
southern oases (known to the <Turkic peoples of Sinkiang as t~t1n Vol,
or "the Lower Road"). filchner reports that the administration of
Ma Hu-shan assessed the oasis of Charchen 'at the immense sum of 1,000
l£i of gold, the equivalent of 180,000 silver dollars'. Every inhabitant
of the easis was expected to make ~ contribution of 90 dollars (180 in
the case of prope;ty-a'wners), all payable exclusively in gold. Those who
could not pay were initially baaten, and then imprisoned until relatives
9, IOlR, L/P&S/12/2336, PZ.4094.1937, p. 4.
10. llli.
294
or friends agreed to buy them out. faced with these conditions, one
third of the population of Charch4n had fled towards Charklik or into
11the mountains. rleming, who visited Keriya Oasis in the heart of
Astin Vol, recorded similar impressions:-,
There was no doubt that Tungan rule lay heavily
on the oases; the Turkis were groaning under
the weight of other people's military ambitions.
Almost all the activity that was going on was
for the benefit of the garrison; the donkeys
trotting in from the outskirts of the oasis
with loads of fodder or fuel, the men who
were levelling the new parade ground - these
and other signs of forced labour abounded.
Both farmers and merchants were victimi~ed by
exactions. On the day we were in Keriya the
Tungans commandeered, without paying for them,
no less than 6000 eggs, 300 measures of
vegetable oil, and 140 bricks of tea; these
they beat up and fed to their horses. We
heard that they used to do this once or twice
a month to make a change in their animals'
diet of maize •••12
Ma Hu-shan's rule represented a vicious circle for the Uighurs under
his control. With an estimated minimum strength of 10,000 soldiers and
a similar number of horses, the KMT 36th Division was the single most
powerful armed force in Sinkiang during the mid-1930s.13 To maintain
11. fi1chner. op.cit.,pp. 254-5; filchner puts the sums involved into
perspective by indiceting that, at the time of his visit to Charchen,
1 l2l of gold (or 180 silver dollars) was adequate to buy 'a fine
fermstead, with cattle, gardens end vineyards'.
12. fleming, op.cit., p. 288.
13. 10lR, l/P&S/12/2336, PZ.4094.1937, p. 5J cf. fleming's estimation of
troop etrength in "Tunganistan" in 1935:A'their effective strength
i8 probably in the neighbourhood of 15,000 rifle., but they could
put into the field a very much larger force of auxiliaries armed
with swords. About 80~ of the troop. are cavalry, extremely well
mountedJ there are .everal machine gun. and a few light cannon. The
unit. ara officared by Tungan., but in .oma the majority of the rank
and fila are Turki.. The Tungana, who are born fighter., keep their
troopa intenaively trained and undoubtedly constitute the most
formidable fighting force in the province'. (News from Tartery. p.
263).
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this sizeable force (which was entirely unproductive, being occupied
solely in military training), Ma Hu-ahan bled white tha .tring of
oases under his control., The'reaulting Turkic discontent could only be
suppressed by the widespread maintenance of larga military garrisons,
which in turn necessitated further exactions in tax. Moreover, Ma
Hu-shan nurtured ambitions to extend his control ,over the whole of
Sinkiang, and accordingly con8cription by press-gang was a common
phenomenon. Thi. eerved further to alienate the Uighur aubJects of
"Tung.nistan", and adveraely affected agricultural production in the
region. ',Thoseminor industrie. which "Tunganistan" poaeeased ware aleo
badly hit. The production of raw ailk dropped, the ~anufacture of
finiahad ailk stopped, and work in the Jade mines ce••ed altogethar.
EVen the internationally-renowned Khatan carpet industry wa. affect.d
in 1937 Gillett noted thata 'the government carpet factory hae abandoned
the traditional designs and makas mostly carpet. of blatantly Chine.e
14deeignj characterised by shoddy workmanship end unatabl. dy•• ••
The resources of the amall area under Tungan control were .trictly
limited, and it was clear that it could only be a ~atter or,time bafore
Ma Hu-shan, having exhausted the oales or a,tln Yol, wa. forced to move
, 15onwards. , In 1935, following his retreat to Khotan, Ma would have been
able to return to hi. native Kansu by way or,Charkllk end Tun-huang,'
together with mo.t of his forces - indeed communications are known to
have been established with Ma pu-fang, the warlord of Tsinghai and
14. ~,l/PlS/12/2336, PZ.4094.1937, p. 4J cf. Maillart, op.cit.,
p. 226. The carpet industry had not fully recovered by the time
or Krishna Menon'a visit to Khotan in 1944 (Delhi-Chungking,
Bombay,,1947), p. 105.
15. cf. Ma Chung-ying's occupation or north-we.tarn Kaneu, aptly
described by Cable and french a. 'the way of the locust'. See
above, p. 150.
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16~estern Kansu, shortly atter the Tungan takeover at Khotan. Ma
Hu-shan showed no inclination to return to Kansu, ho~ever, and clearly
intended resuming his struggle with Sheng Shih-ts'ai et the earliest
opportunity. To this end the whole ot "Tunganistan" was maintained es
en armed cemp, with military training ground5att8ched to each oasis,
however small,17 whilst at Khotan itselt:
bugles were alw8Ys blowing somewhere, and all
day the tierce Moslem 80ngs rolled about the
city like the sound at an angry see. I have
never eeen troops in China trein so herd.18
It seems certein that Ma,Hu-shan intended to strike westward,
19towards Kashgar, . but deleyed doing so in the hope that his charismatic
helt-brother would reach some agreement with the Soviet leedership
before returning to Khoten to lead the ettack on Sheng's forces. The
Soviets, ~ho were anxious to maintain a Tungan presence in southern
Sinkieng as e counterbalance to Sheng Shih-te'ei, but ~ho had no desire
16. In 1935 en embassy tram Ma pu-tang visited Khotan carrying a message
'under sealed orders' (fleming, op.cit., p. 264). According to
Maillart (op.cit., p. 232), the delegation csrrying this .ess8ge
arrived at Khotan from Hsi-ning in circa June, 1935. Th. contenta
at Ma Pu-fang's message remains a mystery, but its delivery contirms
that, at least in mid-1935, the road tram Khotan to Ksnsu remained
open.
17. At the small oasis of Chira, to take one example, there was a parade-
ground just outside tha bazaar 'equipped, e8 ~ere all Tungan parada
grounds, ~ith a hundred-foot-high wooden tower on ~hich ecaling
parties might precti•• essaults (though heaven knows there ar. faw
enough walls of that height in the Province). from the summit of
this tower an officer with a megaphone was drilling t~o or three
hundred cavalry. The tina 8adakshani horlas were divid.d, in the
Coasack fashion, according to their coloura - on. troop at graye,
one troop of blacks, and ao on. The drill consi,ted of making your
hor•• Ii. down and taking cover b.hind hi.'. (flaming, op.cit., p. 291.
18. !2!&., p. 302. Se. also plate 22.
~
19. Ma Hu-shan informed P.ter fleming that he intended to eand his main
force. towarde Yarkand and Kashgar, ~hilst a smaller d.techment would
advance on Aksu acro•• the Taklamakan by following tha banks of the
Khotan Oarya. (News trom Tartary, p. 300).
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to saa a renewed outbreak of hostilities before they could consolidate
their position at Urumchi and in the rest of the province, ware careful
to encourage ~a Hu-shan's beliaf that ~a Chung-ying would .hortly return.
To this end regular letters ware despatched "from ~. Chung-ying" in
Soviet tarritory to ~a Hu-shan at Kashgar. Each of these latters bar.
the personal 'sBal of thB exilad leader, end wes r.ed out to the troops
, 20of the K~T 36th Division to boost morale.
It seems that for the best part of two years ~8 Hu-shan chose to
believe tha contents of thase letter8 though ha must suraly have had
80me doubts as to their authenticity. What Hu-shan may not have perc.ived,
however - at least until it was too lata - was that beneath this con-
tinuing Soviet deception lay a deeper strata of diplomatic purpose,
for by 1937, when ~a Hu-shan s.ems finally to have despaired of ~a
21Chung-ying's raturn to Sinkiang, Soviet control had bean firmly
established over Sheng Shih-ts'ai, whilst the military inactivity of
the Tungan armies had undermined tha vary fabric of "Tungani8tan" from
within.
The first indications of stress within "Tunganistan" developed .s
Barly as mid-1935, when the oasis'of Charklik was racked by a Uighur
rising which wa. put down by tha Tungan. with great sevlrity.22 Later
in the same year, and more seriously for ~a Hu-ahan, the Tungan garrison
at Charklik mutinied, ~ossibly because of their proximity to Kansu.23
20. ~., p. 264.
21. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2336, PZ.4094.1937, p. 6.
22. When rle~ing visited Charc~ in June, 1935, 'a kind of independence
movement had Just been suppressed at Charklik and more than a
hundred people executed;tth. family of the Turki leader had been
sent to Khotan as hostages'. (News from Tartary, p. 267; cf. ~aillart,
op.cit., p. 194).
23. rleming, op.cit., pp. 284-5; cf. ~alllart, 0e.cit., plate facing p.194.
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Relations between the Tungans and the Turkic Muslims grew steadily
worse as Ma Hu-shan's occupation of the oases of Astin yol continued.-,
24Prices rose steadily, and the Tungans flooded the region with un-
backed and almost worthless currency~ When Maillart visited Khotan
in mid-1935 the mint was the only industry in "Tunganistan" running
at full capacity:
It was a Chinese houae, like any other in the
main street, except that there was an orderly
on guard. On the flags of the courtyard thousands
of coloured squares were drying in the sun. They
were the bank notes of the Tungan Republic.
Squatting youths were arranging them in bundles
of a hundred. Inside, behind the paper windows,
in rooms where the atmosphere was alcoholic
with the exhalations from the colours, men went
on indefatigably printing notes on mulberry-
bark paper with blue, black, red and green
stamps. The director told us that they had been
turning out some thirty thousand a day for a
year past, but he added that it was not enoughJ
they needed as many more again.25
To meet this additional need, Ma Hu-shan re-issued the notes of
the defunct TIRET, on each of which was superimposed the seal or
"Tunganistan".26 These worthless notes were used to pay the Tungan
rank-and-file, who in turn forced them into circulation at the point
of a bayonet. faced with these conditions relations batween the Turkic
27Muslims and their Tungan mesters continued to deteriorate, whilst
unrest within the ranks of the KMT 36th Division increased proportionately.
,
Aa early as mid-1935 fleming hed noticed Tungan discontent and a desire
24. filchner, op.cit., p. 300.
25. Maillart, op.cit., pp. 227-8J cf. fleming, op.cit., p. 302.
26. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.6B35.1934.
27. According to Gillett the Tungans referred disparagingly to their
Turkic fellow Mualims as ch'an-t'ou ("turban heads") and nao-tzu
chien-tan ("Iimple-minded"). By this time Sheng Shih-ta'a! had
'forbidden the use of the insulting epithet ch'en-t'ou in the remainder
of Sinkiang, where th- Turkic Muslims wers known by their national
groupings (Uighur, Kazakh, etc.). See also rleming's description or
Tungen insensitivity towards leading Uighur citizens (op.cit., p. 30B).
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to return to Kansu. In a "poor inn" at Lop he had. shared his quarters
with an itinerant Tungan patrol:
There was something medieval about the spectacle of
its commander - the overweening sullenness of his
face enhanced in sleep - being fanned by a pretty
Turki girl lest the flies should disturb his rest.
Ons of his msn (the noun is a courtesy title, for
he was very young) poured out his woes to us in a
low voice. He had been pressed into the service of
of Ma Chung-ying three years before, hated a soldier!a
life and ths company of soldiers, end yearned to see
again his family in Tunghwang. There must be many in
the Tungan armies like him.28
8y 1937, when it finally became clear to the Tungan leadership that
Ma Chung-ying would not be returning to Sinkiang from the Soviet Union,
and that immediate military action was imperative, "Tunganistan" was
already on the verge of collapse. Turkic opposition to consistent Tungan
29requisitioning had led to fighting in the streets, and desertion from
Tungan ranks had reached major proportions, with Ma Hu-shan, like his
30half-brother before him, personally executing miscreants in public.
7.2 The 1937 Muslim Rebellion in Southern Sinkiang
following the collapse of the secessionist TIRET and Sheng Shih-
ts'ai's Soviet-assisted victory over the Tungan forces of Ma Chung-ying,
an uneasy peace descended over those areas of Sinkiang which had pessed
under provincial control. Sheng's victory had not been complete, however,
and he still required substantial Soviet assistance and the good will
of his Turkic Muslim subjects to counter the ever-present threat of Ma
Hu-shan's powerful armed forces billeted in "Tunganistan".
Accordingly, in late 1934, shortly after Ma Chung-yingts flight
to Soviet territory, Sheng declared that the provincial government of
28. fleming, oe.cit., p. 294.
29. filchner, op.cit., p. 315.
30. !E!£., pp. 292, 310.
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5inkiang had nine chiefs duties to perform. These were:
1. To eradicate corruption.
2. To develop economy and culture.
3. To maintain peace by avoiding war.
4. To mobilise all manpower for the cultivation of land.
5. To facilitate communications.
6. To keep Sinkiang a Chinese province forever.
7. To start the work of anti-imperialism and anti-
rascism, and to maintain a close relationship
with the Soviet Union.
8. To construct a "New Sinkiang" (Ch. Hein Hsin-chieng).
9. To protect the position and privileges of religious
leaders·3l
In Sheng's eyes, the most important of these "duties" was clearly
the maintenance of a close relationship with the Soviet Union.32 The
Soviet government responded by extending substantial financial and material
aid to Urumchi, including a five-year loan of five million "gold roubles"
(in fact, Sheng received silver bullion), agreed without Nanking's
consent on May 16th, 1935.33 At about this time Soviet geologists began
a survey of Sinkiang's mineral resources (again, without the permission of
the Chinese government), as a result of which, later in 1935, Soviet oil
rigs began drilling at Tu-shan-tze, near Wusu, to the north of the Tien Shan.34
31. Chan, 'The Road to Power', p. 255.
32. cf. clause 2 ("kinship to Sovietism") of Sheng's "Six Basic Policies"
(PP. 211-2 above).
33. Unlike his predecessor Chin Shu-Jen, Sheng did inform Nanking of his
negotiations with the Soviets. However, despite repeated requests from
the Chinese authorities, Sheng failed to submit a draft of the contract
for their inspection. In fact the loan was at 4% p.a. interest, repayable
in local Sinkiang produce. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkieng. pp. 28-9;
Cheng Tien-fong, op.cit., pp. 173-4; Chan, 'The Road to Power', p.25l.
According to Og~chi Goro there were no other conditions attached to this
loan ('Seihoku ni okeru Kan-Kai no tairitsu 'i'o',.~oko, IX, 9 (1942), pp.
17-18; similarly Tu Chung-yuan, Sheng Shih-tatsi yu hein Hein-chiang,
(Hankow, 1938), pp. 93-4.
34. Whiting, Soviet strategy in Sinkiang. pp. 55-6.
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Writing of these events after his flight from the Soviet Union
to the United States, Alexander 8armine, the Soviet official in charge
of supplying arms to Sheng Shih-ts'ai, recorded that:
According to Stalin's plan, Sinkiang was to become
a sphere of exclusive Russian influence and to serve
as a bulwark of our power in the east. We had to
equip 10,000 Sinkiang troops completely, from boots
to Kuomintang insign1a. soviet advisers, who actually
exercised the authority of ministers, were placed at
the governor's elbow. A commission headed by Stalin's
brother-in-law, Svanidze, was sent to Sinkiang to draw
up a plan of reconatruction for the province. My trust
(the Auto_"oto-Export Trust, a Soviet automobile export
trust which acted as a front organisation for arms
exports) was instructed to send engineers to build
roads, airdromes and hangars allover Sinkiang.
Sinkiang was soon a Soviet colony in all but name.35
Ties between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union may have been further
strengthened through a secret agreement said to have been aigned on
January 1st, 1936, and which reportedly included a Soviet guarantee to
come to the aid of Sinkiang 'politically, economically and by armed force •••
i 36n case of some external attack upon the province'. Whatever the truth
of this claim, by early 1936 considerable numbers of Soviet specialists
were active in Sinkiang, working in such fields as construction, education
health and military training. Russian replaced English as the foreign
language taught in Sinkiangls schools, whilst hundreds of Muslim youths -
end a number of Muslim girls - were sent to study in Soviet Centrel Asia.
Within Sinkiang itself, Muslim women were encouraged to appear in public
unveiled, and a vigorous atheistic propaganda campaign was instituted.37
35. 8armine, oe.cit., pp. 231-2. Svanidze makes no reference to his supposed
role in Sinkiang in his memoirs, ex Uncle, Joseph Stalin (N.Y., 1953)
Anon., 'Russian Penetration tnto Sinkiang', !!'!~--IXVI, 4' (1936), pp. 414-5.
37. Oallin, op.cit., p.100: Cheng Tien-fong, oP.c)t.,PP. 174-5; Cable, M.,
'The New "New Dominion"', JRCAS, XXXV, 1 (1938 , p.16
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In Urumchi and those regions of the province most securely under
Sheng's control, social clubs known as uyushma were opened. According
to one source:
These clubs became the centres of Soviet propaganda
and proved a great help in increasing Soviet influence.
The smoking of hashish and opium was forbiddan but
drinking arag and vodka was encouraged, probably in
order to undermine Moslem traditions ••• At the same time
the Soviets tried to liquidate the remnants of the
"reactionary" Moslem and nationalist leaders in Sinkiang,
some of whom were refugees from Soviet Asia. They also
tried to destroy the power of Islam. The mosques were
closed or converted into clubs and theatres. The mullahs
were publicly ridiculed and persecuted.38
These radical policies seem to have been accepted with equanimity,
though certainly not with enthusiasm, in both IIi (where Soviet influence
had been consistently predominant from the early 1920s) and in Urumchi,
where, according to Sven Hedin, the Soviet Consul-General Apresoff was
39'more powerful than Sheng tupen' himself. Sheng's pro-Soviet policies
seem to have been less acceptable to the feudally-organised and fiercely
independent Kazakhs of northern Dzungaria, however, end by eerly 1937
Sinkieng's Altai region was once again in a state of open rebellion against
the provincial authorities.40
Still more serious for Sheng, however, was the situation in south-
western Sinkiang where pan-Islamic and pan-Turanian sentiment remained
41strong, and where GPU troops remained few in number. f~llowing the
38. Mclean, N.l.D., 'Sinkiang Today', International Affairs, XXIV, 3 (July,
1948), pp. 380-81.
39. Hedin, S., The Silk Road (london, 1938), p. 166.
40. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Red failure In Slnkieng. p. 178.
41. See above, p. 280.
collapse of the TIRET and the retreat or Ma Hu-shan to "Tunganistan"
in the autumn of 1934, Sheng attempted to conciliate the Turkic Muslim
population of Sinkiang by appointing various Kumullik and Turfanlik Uighurs
to positions of considerable authority in the new administration. Thesa
Uighurs belonged to the non-secessionist group of rebels which had followed
KhoJa Niyas HaJJI - thus Yulbars Khan, despite his long association with•
Ma Chung-ying, was named district magistrate and garrison commander at the
north-eastern oasis or Kumul. Similarly Khoja Niyas ~8JJI'. military
commander, Mahmud shih-chang. waa appointed divisional commander at Kashgar•
Old City, with a force or about 2,000 Turkic troops under his command,
whilst KhoJa Niyas himselr was given the rank of vice-chairman of the
provincial government, and remained at Urumchi with Sheng Shih-ts'ai.42
80th Yu1bars and Khoja Niyas belonged to the conservative Kumullik
aristocracy, and can have had little enthusiasm for Sheng's anti-Islamic
and pro-Soviet policies. However from their posts at Urumchi and Kumu1,
both of which were strongly garrisoned with Soviet-supplied (and in some cases,
Soviet-officered) troops, neither was in a position to offer serious opposition
to the reforms of the new provincial administration. In Kashgar, however,
isolated rrom the main Soviet power base in Sinkiang by the Tien Shan, and
doubtless reassured by the proximity of both Ma Hu-ahan'. anti-Soviet rier
and the British Indian frontier, Mahmud shih-chang was better placed to offer•
resistance to the more radical innovations instituted by the provincial
adminiatration at Urumchi.
42. Anon., 'Ourchdringungspolitik in Zentralasien', p.l3; Boorman and Howard,
op.cit., Vol IV, p. 59; IOLR, 0.226 (Who's Who in Sinkieng. Corrected up
to 26th July, 1938).
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little is known of Mahmud shih-chang. According to HMCGK Packman,•
he was 'a wealthy but intriguing and unreliable ex-merchant from Turtan',43
whilst Packman's predecessor, Thomson Glover, records that Mahmud 'was a•
simple and kindly man, and a zealous Mohammedan •••• (who) might have walked
44on stage without any make up and taken the part of Henry VIII'. Certainly
Mahmud seems to have been something of a patriarch, and following the arrest•
or flight of the local TIRET leadership, many sections of the Kashgarlik
Muslim population looked to him for leadership.
As has already been shown, following the flight of Ma Chung-ying
to Soviet territory in early July, 1934, Kashgar was occupied by provincial
troops under the command of Mahmud shih-chang and Kung Cheng-han on 20th
•
July. Partly to reassure the local populace, end partly to ellow himself
further time to consolidate his hold on the north end the east of the province,
Sheng appointed Mahmud overall military commander of the Keshgar region
•
(Ch. ssu-ling), and reappointed the Yunnanese Hui Muslim, Ma Shao-wu, to the
position of tao-yin at Kashgar New City. Sheng was clearly uneasy with
45Muslim officials in charge et Kashgar, however, end within e month had
despatched a fellow north-easterner, liu Pin, to assume the position of
46GOC Kashgar. Following Liu Pin's errivel at Kashgar on August 7th, 1934,
43. tOLR, L/P&S/12/2357 (Chinese Turkestan: Annual Confidential Report,
June 1937-38), p.g.
44. Thomson Glover, 'Present-Day Kashgaria', p.442.
45. tOLRl L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.6835.1934. It is, perhaps, misleading to brackatMahmCd and Ma Shao-wu together. Sheng may heve suspected the former of
S.cessionist tendencies, but in marked contrast he certainly feared the
latter for his loyalty to Nanking and his well-known antipathy towards
the Soviet Union.
46. tOlR, L/P&S/12/2369 (General liu Pin, Defence Commissioner, Kashgar),
passim.
M~hmUd lost his elevated position as ssu-ling. but was permitted to
retain his former rank as divisional commander, together with authority
over the 2,000 Turkic Muslim troops garrisoning Kashgar Old City,
Yangi Hissar and Yarkand. In contrast Ma Shao-wu was reportedly ordered
to travel to Urumchi - instructions which, if complied with, would almost
certainly have resulted in his imprisonment or execution. Mahmud seems
•
to have accepted this blow without open complaint, though his support for
Sheng's edministration can hardly have been strengthened by hi. demotion.
Ma Shao-wu, however, was less cooperative. He had been ordered to Urumchi
on several occasions in the past, but had always contrived to avoid
47answering the summons. Seemingly the shrewd old Yunnanese tao-yin
demurred once again. On this occasion, however, he was no longer dealing
with the incompetent Chin Shu-Jen and, probably as a direct result of his
procrastinations, he was seriously wounded in an assassination attempt and
forced to travel to the Soviet Union for treatment.4B With Ma Shao-wu'e
fall from power the last of the old-style feudal mandarins beet represented
by Yang Tseng-nsin left the political stage of Sinkiang.
EVen before Mahmud's demotion and the attempted assassination of
•
Ma Shao-wu, power at Kashgar had effectively passed to Han Chinese appointees
of Sheng Shih-ts'a1, foremost amongst whom was Liu Pin, a .taunch Chinese
nationalist and a Christian. Liu, although apparently en upright o'ficial,
seems to have understood little of local Muslim sensibilities, for almost
his first act was to order that a picture of Sun Yat-aan, the father of modarn
c-Chinese nationalism, should be hung in the Id-ga Mosque in Keshgar Old City.
47. IOLR. L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.6835.l934.
48. 10LR. L/P&S/l2/23S7 (Annual Confidential Report. 1937-38), p.S; Maillart
op.cit., pp. 254-5; fleming, 0ptcit., pp.J26-7J aee alao Appendix 1,
"Who Was Who in Republican Sinkianglt•
306
A Uighur notable who objected to this (clearly sacriligious) act was
arrested and put on trial for 'disrespect to the founder of the Chinese
Republic'. The Kashgarliks greeted this development with dismay, and
according to the British consul-general: 'many murmurs were heard that the
49Bolsheviks had taken over the country and were bent on destroying religion'.
Kashgarlik disaffection with the new administration at Urumchi was
further increased as a result of a series of ill-considered and over-hasty
educational reforms - thus many teachers, including women, were brought in
from Soviet Central Asia, and it was made compulsory for the Turkic Muslims
to send their daughters, as well as their sons, to school. In itself this
might have proved acceptable, but simultaneously Qur'anic studies were cut
back, military drill was introduced, and an attempt was made to replace
. 50Turkic numerals with those employed in Russia and the West. To complete
the alienation of the pan-Islamic and traditionalist south-west, Urumchi
forced new currency notes into circulation whilst refusing to honour those
which had been issued by Ma Shao-wu following the relief of Kashgar New City
and the collapse of the TIRET.. A police force composed largely of
pro-Soviet Kirghiz was sat up under the command of a Uighur communist
called Cadir Beg, 51 and Kashgarliks who refused to accept the newly-issued
Urumchi currency notes were beaten up and, in some cases, nailed by their
c- 52ears to the walls of the Id-ga Mosque.
49. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.6833.1934.
50. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2367 (Chinese Turkestan: Retuer's Speciel News Correspondent
in Kashgar), PZ.5875.1935, part 2. Confusingly, the numbers presently used
in the West and throughout the greater part of the world are, of course,
known as Arabic numerals, whilst those employed in the Arab World (and,
until recently, amongst the Muslims of Sinkiang) are quite different.
51. HMCGK Peckman noted that 'Cadir HaJi (Q;dir Beg), the ruthless chief of police'
was a 'Russian-trained enthusiast ••• who is bitterly hated by most Turkis'.
IOLR. L/P&S/12/2357, PZ.4740.l937 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 3/6/1937)
52. IOlR, L/P&S/12/2332, PZ.7370.1934 (Keshgar Diary. September 1934), cf.
IOLR, l/P&S/12/2367, PZ.5875.l935, part 1.
Opposition to the new regime crystallised, once again, around the
pan-Islamic and pan-Turanian elements who had traditionally dominated
Turkic Muslim politics in the Kashgar region. Outside the province, in
Afghanistan, a few survivors of the TIRET began to assemble in Kabul,
where they lObbied the Afghan government and certain foreign embassies
most notably the Japanese - for aupport. The Japanese ambassador to Kabul,
Kitada Masamoto, who had previously served in Cairo and was 'deeply interested
in all aspects of Islamic culture as ~ell as of Central Asian politics',53
provided a willing audience for these pan-Turanian exiles, especially after
being informed by the Afghan foreign minister that - in the opinion of the
Afghan government - Soviet moves in Sinkiang stemmed from continuing
widespread Muslim unrest in the Soviet Union, and that some 600,000 Turkic
and Iranian Muslim refugees had fled to Afghanistan from the Soviet-controlled
54north during tha first half of the 1930s.
Amongst Kitada's pan-Turanian visitors was Tawfiq Bay, in whosa nama an
appeal was forwarded to tha Japanese roreign Office in May, 1935, claiming that:
Moslems in the vast area east of Kashgar to Ha-mi
(Kumul) have anti-Soviet, pro-Japanesa sentiment
which may enable Japan to make en ideological drive
into Sinkiang. ror this armed invasion is unnecessary.
Such en ideological drive might disturb the situation
in Soviet Turkistan, the weak point of Soviet Russia.SS
53. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang. p.35
54. ibid •........
55. Miscellaneous Documents Relatin to the Political and General Situation
in Sinkiang in Japanese, Vol IV, 'Interview with Tewfik Sherif Pasha
reported by Kitada to Hirota, May 7th, 1935'. Cited in Whiting, op.cit.,
pp. 35-6.
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Also in mid-1935, Kitada was visited by Muhammad AmIn Bugra, the•
last of the "Khotan AmIrs", who had travelled to Afghanistan in disguise
and under an assumed name, via Leh and Chitral. Once in Kabul, he was
awarded a monthly allowance of 500 Afghanis (c. 125 Indian rupees) by the
Afghan government, an action which would seem to confirm the existence of
earlier links between the administration of the "Khotan AmIrs" and Kabul.56
Paralleling Tawfiq Bey's proposals, Muhammad AmIn Bugra submitted a detailed•
plan proposing the establishment of an "Eastern Turkestan Republic" under
Japanese sponsorship, with munitions and finance to be supplied by Tokyo.
following Japanese penetration of 5inkiang, an armed revolt by the local
Muslim population would, the AmIr assured Kitada, 'disturb the rear,
assisting the advance of Japanese troops'. The AmIr's final goal was,
purportedly, the establishment of an "independent" Sinkiang, which would
offer special economic and political privileges to Japan. Perhaps most
revealing of all the Amir's proposals, however, was the identity of the
Turkic ~uslim he suggested as the future leader of this proposed Central
Asian n~anchukuo" - none other than ~ahmud shih-chang, the divisional
•57commander of the Kashgar region.
56. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2386 Chinese Turkestan: Activities of the eX-Amirs of
Khotan and the Tungans. 1935-43), PZ.523.l937; also IOLR, EXT.495 1942).
57. Miscellaneous Documents, etc., (in Japanese), Vol IV, 'Kitada to Hirota,
undated', cited in Whiting, op.cit., p. 36, In his tn. ~2 Whiting
speculates that Kitada's visitor, who styled himself "Amir ofKhotan",
was Sabit Damullah. In fact, Sabit was probably dead by this time -
according to Hayit (Turkestan Zwischen Russland und China, p. 313) he
was hanged in Aksu in July 1934; British diplomatic sources simply note
that he was 'removed to Urumchi in 1934, subsequent fate not known' (IOLR,
L/P&S/12/2392, EXY.49l0.l942). It_ia clear, therefore, that Kitada'a
visitor must have been ~uhammad Amin Bugra••
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Meanwhile, within Sinkiang, following the extension of Sheng Shih-tsai's
atheistic propaganda campaign to the south of the province during the latter
half of 1936,58 opposition to the pro-Soviet government in Urumchi had indeed
crystallised around the ample figure of Mahmud shih-chang who, besides being•
a 'zealous Mohammedan', was also 'a man of property (who) resented and was
keenly apprehensive of the increase in Russian influence in South Sinkiang,.59
Mahm~d made use of his position as the leading Uighur official in the south•
to form a semi-secret group around himself, 'ostensibly for the protection of
Islam, but actually in the hope of checking the increase of Russian influence
i 60n the Kashgar area'. Sheng Shih-ts'ai moved against Mahmud with caution,
•
no doubt fearing that any hasty action on his part might cause the Turkic leader
to make common cause with Ma Hu-shan in the neighbouring oases of
"Tunganistan". In fact Sheng need not have worried, for Kashgarlik affection
for the Tungans, never strong even at the best of times, had not been
strengthened by hostile reports brought to Kashgar from Khotan by Uighur
refugees fleeing the continuing depradations of Ma Hu-shan. Neverthless,
Sheng made no move to arrest Mahmud, but took steps to undermine the latter's
•
position through the appointment of a significant number of Soviet-trained
officers to subordinate but influential positions within the Kashgar garrison.
58. Hedin, The Silk Road, p. 300
59. !QbB, L/P&S/12/2357 (Annual Confidential Report, 1937-38), p.lO
60. ibid •..........
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As a result of this process, by the beginning of 1937 Sheng felt
strong enough to order Mahmud to Urumchi "to attend the April 12th
•
celebrations" which marked the anniversary of Chin Shu-Jen's overthrow.
Mahmud had no intention of travelling to Urumchi, however, and at his•
instigation the Turkic Muslims of Kashgar Old City staged large-scale
street demonstrations which caused Sheng to rescind his orders. Despite
this temporary success, however, Mahmud remained understandably ill at
•
ease, and his fears are reported to have reached a peak when it was
rumoured in Kashgar thatShengShih-ts'ai had despatched a high-ranking
military official from Urumchi to effect his arrest. Mahmud's nerve seems
•
finally to have broken in late March, ~931, and;on April, 2nd ot that year
61he fled to India via Yangi Hissar and Yarkand.
Unfortunately for Sheng, Mahmud's precipitate departure for India -
•
though in itself, no doubt, eminently desirable - was to prove the spark
which touched off yet another large-scale Turkic Muslim rebellion in
southern Sinkiang. Shortly after Mahmud left Kashgar for India his. .'
exasperated troops, fearing that Soviet influence would now become
predominant in Sinkiang's Muslim traditionalist south-west, rose against
the provincial authorities at Yarkand and Yangi'Missar and proceeded to
execute all Officials who were either Soviet-trained or suspected ot
harbouring pro-Soviet sentiments. Subsequently an "independent" Turkic
administration was set up in the rebel area under the command of two of
c - 62Ma~mud shih-cheng's officers, Kichik Akhund and Abd al-Niyas.
61. ibid., pp.10-ll; Anon., !Islam in Kashgar', JRCA5. XXIV, 4 (1937), p.
729. for details of Mahmud's later activities see Appendix I, "Who Was
Who in Republican Sinklang".
62. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2357 (Annual Confidential Report, 1937-38), p.11; Isma'i1
M.S., and Isma'il, M.A., Moslems in the Soviet Union end Chine, pp. 12-13;
Hayit, Turkestan Zwischen Russland und China, p. 314
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raced with these unwelcome developments Liu Pin, who had only 700
reliable north-eastern troops at his command but who remained in control
of the whole Kashgar Oasis, sent an urgent appeal for assistance to Sheng
at Urumchi. At the same time he used a squadron of nine Soviet planes to
bomb both Yangi Hissar and Yarkand, though apparently to little effect.63
Meanwhile Ma Hu-shan and his Tungan forces, who had completely exhausted
the oases under their control and were anxious to expend the frontiers of
"Tunganistan", watched the developing situation with interest.
Possibly emboldened by Liu Pin's failure to move against them, the
Turkic Muslim rebels attacked the Kashgar airfield on May 20th, only to
ba repulsed with slight 10sses.64 Ten days later a much lerger force of
approximately 1,500 Uighurs and Tungan irregulars under the leadership of
Kichik Akhund attacked and seized Kashgar Old City, where they were welcomed
. . .. 65by the local-populace as;l1berators. This new rebellion seems once again
to have been pan-Islamic and anti-Soviet in nature, for Kichik Akhundlet
it be known that he was fighting "in the defence of Islam" - and in case
any local Turkic Muslim missed this point, each of his troops sported an arm
band bearing the legend fi sabI1-il1ah (Ar. "in the way of GOdtl).66
63. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2357 (Annual Confidential Report, 1937-38), p.l3
64. IOLR, L/P&S/l2/2357 (Confidential Memorandum of [vents Connected with
the 1937 Rebellion in Sinkiang. nd.), p.2
65. 1E!&; IOLR, L/P&S/12/2357, PZ.4740.l937, p.2
66. ~,L/P&S/l2/2357, PZ.4740.l937 (letter, HMCGK-GOI, 3/6/1937), p.l
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Sheng Shih-tslai responded to this new rebellion by recalling Liu
Pin to Urumchi end appointing Chiang Vu-fen, Liu's former Chief-of-Staff,
67to the position of GOC Kashgar. Sheng was clearly unwilling to commit
fresh troops to the Kashgar front whilst Ma Hu-shan's Tungans remained
uncommitted, and moreover were capable of striking not only at Kashgar, but
more directly towards Urumchi via the Taklamakan and Aksu, or even by way
of ChQrch~n in the east.68 To make his position still less enviable, the
rebellion in-south-western Sinkiang was shortly followed by a Kirghiz
69rising 1n the mountains above Kuchar, and more seriously, by renewed
Muslim unrest in the strategic oasis of Kumul.70
for almost two months following Mahmud shih-chang's flight to India
•
Ma Hu-shan remained at Khotan watching the situation. Eventually, however,
the counsels of his Chief-of-Staff, Pai Tzu-Ii, and of Ma Ju-lung, the
commander of the Tungan 1st brigade stationed at Karghalik, persuaded Ma
71Hu-shan to strike northwards against Kashgar. Accordingly on June 2nd, only
three days after Kichik Akhund's capture of Kashgar Old City, the Tungan
67. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2392, EXT.4910.1941, p 5.
68. IOLR. L/P&S/12/2357, PZ.4740.l937, p. 1
69. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2357 (Annual Confidential Report. 1937-38), pp.lS, 19.
70. ~.; cf. 'Durchdringungspolitik in Zentralasien', pp. 14-15
71. IOlR. L/P&S/l2/2357 (Annual Confidential Report, 1937-38), p.13. It is
interesting to note that in his report on "Tunganistan" HMVCGK Gillett
recorded that Ma Hu-shan 'relies much upon the opinions of his Chief-of-
Staff Pai Tzu-li, an intelligent, rus' man of about 40 who was formerly
secretary to Ma Chung-ying'. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2336, PZ.4094.37, p. 5
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1st brigade under Ma Ju-lung arrived at Kashgar "to put down the rebels".72
In tact there seems to have been some understanding - though not a full
alliance - between the Tungans and the Turkic rebels, thus on June Jrd, when
Ma HU-shan arrived to take possession of Kashgar Old City, Kichik Akhund and
his forces moved off towards Aksu without fighting. At about the same time the
Tungan 2nd brigade under Ma Sheng-Kuei occupied the raizabad-Maralbashi area.73
Ma Hu-shan clearly intended to let the Turkic Muslim rebels bear the brunt of the
fighting with Sheng Shih-ts'ai's provincial forces whilst consolidating his
own hold on southern Sinkiang. Accordingly, his troops surrounded Kashgar
New City (which was still in the hands of north-eastern troops under
Chiang Vu-fen), and messages were sent to the British Consulate-general
explaining that the Tungan forces - still officially the KMT 36th Division -
were 'acting in covenant with the Turkis with a view to overthrowing
the Provincial Government and replacing it by an Islamic Government
74offering strict allegiance to Nanking'.
Ma Hu-shan's caution was well-founded. ror one thing, his troops
had done no serious figh~ing for almost three years, and although well-
trained, were badly in need of more arms and ammunition.7S Another
important factor was Soviet backing for Sheng Shih-tstai. The Red Army
had intervened against Ma Chung-ying in 1934, and was almost certain to
renew this intervention if its zone of traditional influence in IIi or
72. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2357 (Annual Confidential Report, 1937-38), p. 14
73. ibid•..........
74. ~., p.1S.
75. Ibld~..........
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its new economic investments in Ozungaria were once again threatened by
Tungan armies. Besides, control of the Kashgar-Khotan area offered Ma Hu-
shan and his advisers a safe escape route to British India if things
went ~rong for them. Sinkiang was not their homa province, and a steamer
from Calcutta would return them safely to the China coast and, ultimately,
to their native provinces of Kansu and Tsinghai, where the "rive Ma"
warlord clique still reigned supreme.
In fact, unkown to Ma Hu-shan, the decision to intervene had been taken
by the Kremlin even before Tungan forces moved northwards against Kashgar.
In late May, 1937, some 5,000 Red Army troops backed by an air unit and an
armoured regiment moved across the Soviet-Sinkiang frontier at Sheng Shih-ta'ei's
request.76 With the intervention of this powerful forca the fate of the Turkic
Muslim rebels in southern Sinkiang was sealed. Towards the end of August
provincial forces backed by regular units of the Red Army fell on Kichik Akhund's
troops before Aksu. The rebels suffered a severe defeat, although both
Kichik Akhund and cAbd al-Niyas evaded capture and fled towards Kashgar with
about 200 men.77 rollowing this d~bacle the Tungan administration in southern
Sinkiang collapsed like a house of cards.
76. Statement of Sheng Shih-tstai in interview with Allen S. Whiting, May,
1954. Cited in Whiting, op.(it., p. 51. For a Turkish aooount ot the
renewed Soviet intervention giving grossly exagserated tigures both tor Soviet
troops and for TUrkio oasualties) see: Karahooa, !may, Do~ TUrkietan -
yin "mustem1ikesi" (East Turkestan, a "oolony" ot China), Istanbul, 1960,
p. 16.
77~.~, L/P&S/12/2357 (Annual Confidential Report, 1937-38), p. 16.
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Shortly after the rout of Kichik Akhund, Ma Sheng-kuei, the commander
of the Tungan 2nd brigade stationed at raizabad about 60 miles east of Kashgar,
turned against Ma Hu-shan and declared his support for the provincial forces
of Sheng Shih-ts'ai.78 His reasons for taking this action are not clear, but
would seem to have been founded on a mixture of political dissatisfaction with
the Tungan administration at Keshgar, and military realism in tha faca of
79advancing provincial and Red Army units. Heving ennounced this change of
allegiance - and apparently with the full support of the Tungan 2nd brigade -
Ma Sheng-kuei marched on Kashgar, arriving in the oasis on September 1st, 1937,
only to find that Ma Hu-shan, Ma Ju-lung and Pai Tzu-Ii had withdrawn to
Karghalik at the head of the Tungan 1st brigade. The mutiny of the Tungan
2nd brigade signalled the final downfall of Tungan power in Sinkiang. On
September 7th Ma Hu-shan,accompanied by Ma Ju-lung, Pai Tzu-Ii, and various
other high-ranking officers of the Tungan 1st brigade, deserted their men
at Karghalik and fled across the mountains to India.eO
78. !2!2., p. 16; 'Rebellion in Sinkiang: The Tungans lose Kashgar', lh!
Times (London), 5th January, 1938.
79. British diplomatic sources also suggest that Ma Sheng-kuei may have been
bribed by Sheng Shih-ta'ai. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2357 (Annual Confidential
Report, 1937-38), p. 16
eo. ibid.; IOLR, L/P&S/12/2357, (Confidential Memorandum of Events Connected
with the 1937 Rebellion in Sinkian nd.), p. 3. According to 10LR,
L/P&S 12 2392, EXT.4910.1941 Who's Who in Sinkiang to 15th April, 1940),
Pai Tzu-Ii was 'said to have been shot on the road by Ma Hu-shan', and
did not reach India. May Hu-shan and Ma Ju-lung arrived at Leh on 26th
September, 1937. Ma Hu-shan left India for China in rebruary, 1938, and
subsequently resumed his career as a petty militarist in the Kensu-
Tsinghai area. After the communist victory in 1949 Ma Hu-shan led an
anti-communist 9uerilla group in the hills around T'ao-chou in southern
Kansu. In 1954 he was captured - according to anti-communist sources,
by treacherous means - and executed in the city of Lanchow. Kao Han-Jen,
The Imam's story (Hong Kong, 1960), PP. 93-8, 'fate of a Hero'. See also
Appendix I, 'Who Was Who in Republican Sinkiang'.
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With the arrival of the Tungan 2nd brigade at Kashgar, the siege of
the New City, which had lasted since the end of May, was lifted. Genersl
Chiang Yu-fen, who remained GOe Kashgar, immediately launched his forces
in pursuit of the retreating Tungan 1st brigade, whilst provincial forces
advancing in a second column from Maralbashi drove the retreating forces
~ 81of cAbd al-Niyas and Kichik Akhund towards Yarkand. According to K.C.
Packman, the British Consul-General in Kashgar at this time, the provincial
forces were assisted in these actions by planes of the Red airforce operating
82directly from bases in Soviet Central Asia. 8y September 9th Yarkand had
c -fallen to Shang's forces, and on September 15th Abd al-Niyas was captured
and killed in the same area.83 Subsequently provincial forces moved to
occupy Khotan and the hinterland of "Tunganistan" whilst the remnants of
the KMT 36th Division melted away into the wastes of Tsinghai and southern
84Tibet. The fate of Kichik Akhund is not known, but with the disbandment
of the mutinous Tungan 2nd brigade at Kashgar on October 12th and the
85transfer of Ma Sheng-kuei to a subordinate post at Khotan, both the
Turkic Muslim rebellion of 1937 and the Hui satrapy of "Tunganistan"
were effectively brought to an end.
81. IOLR, L/P&S/12/23S7 (Annual Confidential Report, 1937-38), p. 17.
82. ibid., pp. 16-17.
83. ~., p. 17; Hayit, Turkestan Zwischen Ruseland und China, p. 314
84. 'Rebellion in Sinkiang: The Tungans lose Kashgar', The Times (London), 5th
January, 1938.
85. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2392, EXT.49l0.l94l (Who's Who in Sinkiang to 15th April.
1940). The same source records that 'an unconfirmed report states that ha
~Sheng-kuei) has found his way to Kansu'.
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7.3 1937-42: Sinkiang as a Soviet Satellite
rollowing the collapse of the Turkic Muslim rebellion in southern
Sinkiang and the flight of Ma Hu-shan to India, Sheng moved quickly to
restore his authority elsewhere in the province. By the beginning of
October, 1937, the disturbances at Kumul had been brought to an end by
the arrival of Red Army troops in that oasis and the flight of Yulbars
- B6Khan to Kansu. Shortly thereafter provincial troops were also sent to
the mountains above Kuchar to deal with the recalcitrant Kirghiz of that
87area. As a result of these operations, by the end of October the Muslim
opposition in Sinkiang was bereft of leadership and in complete disarray,88
whilst Sheng's writ, for the first time, ren throughout the length end
breadth of the province.
86. IOLR, l/P!S/12/2357 (Annual Confidential Report, 1937-38), p. 17;
Boorman and ti0ward, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, IV,
p. 59. Yulbars succeeded in evading his pursuers, and shortly afterwards
was seen by Georg Vasel 'sitting on a straw mat on the bug-ridden kang
of a caravanserai in Suchow - instead of on the valuable Khotan carpet of
his seraglio in Hami' ('Ourchdringungspolitik', p.23). Yulbars
subsequently made his way to Nanking, where he was given the rank of
lieutenant general in the national forces and appointed to a sinecure
by Chiang Kai-shek pending the reassertion of KMT authority in Sinkiang.
87. IOLR, l/P!S/12/2357 (Annual Confidential Report. 1937-38), p. 19
88. Khoja Niyas ~ajjr, who had been reduced to a powerless figurehead in
Urumchi and took no part in the 1937 rebellion, was nevertheless
arrested and executed by Sheng in the winter of 1937-38. IOLR, L/P!S/12/
2392, EXT.4910.1941.
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It soon became apparent, however, that the price of Sheng's supremacy
was to be the almost complete domination, both politically and economically,
of Sinkiang by the Soviet Union. The most striking indication of this
increased Soviet influence came shortly after the renewed military
intervention of the Red Army in May, 1937, when Garegin Apresoff, the
Soviet Consul-General in Urumchi, "informed" Sheng Shih-ts'ai that a
self-contained task force was to be stationed at the strategic oasis of
Kumul, on the main trunk road between Sinkiang and China proper. This
unit, to be known as the Red Army Eighth Regiment, was to remain in Sinkiang
"indefinitely".B9 It has been argued with some Justification that the
Soviet Union took this action 'to guard the eastern approaches to Sinkiang
90against the possibilities of a motorized Japanese raid through Inner Mongolia'.
Certainly the Soviet military command was wary of Japanese intentions towards
Central Asia, particularly since the Japanese Army had demonstrated its
ability to mount a fast-moving, motorised advance by its ten-day conquest
91of the Chinese province of Jehol in rebruary, 1933.
89. Whiting, Soviet strategy in Sinkieng, 1933-49, p. 51; cf. Cheng Tien-fong,
A History of Sino-Russien Relations, p. 176; Lattimore, Pivot of Asia,
p. BO.
90. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 80; cf. Lattimore, 0., 'The Kimono and the
Turban', ~, XXXVIII (May, 1938), pp. 274-5; also 'Sinkiang's Place in
the ruture of China' (introduction to Norins, M., Gateway to Asia, N.Y.,
1944), pp. 16-17. A similar argument is advanced in Eleanor Lattimore,
'Behind the Sinkiang Incident', rer Eastern Survey. May 3rd, 1944, pp.
80-81.
91. Clubb, O.E., Twentieth Century China (N.Y., 1963), pp. 172-3
319
It is important to note, however, that the stationing of a Soviet
regiment at Kumul in 1937 was undertaken without the permission of the
92Nationalist government at Nanking, as well as (if Sheng Shih-ts'ai is
to be believed) without the permission of tha provincial authorities
at Urumchi.93
In fact, Soviet motives for garrisoning Kumul were probably at least
four in number. Besides wishing to pre-empt a possible (though hardly
likely) Japanese thrust into Sinkiang, Moscow undoubtedly sought to limit and
even totally to ~xclude Nanking's influence from China's westernmost province,94
to prevent further incursions by the Tungan soldiery of the "rive Ma" warlord
group who still controlled neighbouring Kansu, Tsinghai and Ningsia,95 and
finally, to inhibit further rebellion by the indigenous Muslim peoples of
Sinkiang against the rule of Stalin's protege, ShengShih-ta'ai.96
92. The Nationalist government eventually lodged a protest (from Chungking, in
1940), against the continued presence of "uninvited" Soviet troops
in Sinkiang. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang, p. 51, cf. Chiang Kai-
shek Soviet Russia in China: A Summing-up et Seventy (N.Y., 1957)
pp. 99-103.
93. Whiting. Soviet Strategy in Sinkieno. p. 51
94. According to Sheng Shih-ts'ei: 'Soviet advisers in my province repeatedly
declared that "The peoples along the Sino-5oviat frontier are all
bretheren. The racially related populations will one day be united as
citizens of the same nation. This cl,avaga at present is like a water-
melon cut into two halves which sooner or later will again combine as
a single entity" '(Red railure in Sinkleno, p. 168). Whilst there are
no indications that Stalin sought actively to detach Sinkiang from China,
there can be no doubt that, should China have fragmented completely, he
intended Slnkiang to become either a fully-integrated part of the Soviet
Union, or alternatively a Soviet satellite state. (Precedent for the former
may ba found in Tannu Tuva, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, finnish Karelia,
and eastern Poland) for the latter in the Mongolian People's Republic).
95•. See Appendix III, 'The Wu Ma ("rive Ma") Warlord Clique'.
96. This point was stated clearly by the Soviet Consul-General Pushkin
during an altercation ~ith Sheng Shih-tela! in 1942. According to Sheng,
Pushkin stormed into his offIce, protesting in an angry voice; 'Why do
you demand the withdrawal of the Russians? •• The Red Army is here to
help you quell rebellion' (Red Failure in Sinkiang, p. 256).
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Moreover, the stationing of a Red Army regiment at Kumul in the first
half of 1937 proved to be merely the first, albeit probably the most
significant, manifestation of a permanent Soviet military presence in
Sinkiang. Shortly after the establishment of the Red Army advanced base at
Kumul, following the "Marco Polo Bridge incident" of July 7th, 1937, open
hostilities broke out between Nanking and Tokyo. During the summer of 1937,
although war had not been officially daclared by either side, Japanese forces
rapidly overran most of north China. The Soviet leadership, deeply alarmed
by the speed of the Japanese advance, determined to come to China'. aid -
no doubt with the intention of halting the Japanese war machine before it
could advance to threaten the inner Asian frontiers of the Soviet Union.97
As a result of this decision, a Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed
on August 21st, 1937, and the Soviet Union advanced substantial credits to
, 98the Nanking authorities to finance the purchase of war materiel. Moscow
also sent five air wings of Soviet planes and pilots to assist the Chinese, and
a sizeable military mission which at its peak numbered soma 500 men, including
such formidable military figures as Generals Grigori K. Zhukov and
Vasili I. Chuikov.99
97. Moscow's hostility towards Japanese expansionism in eastern Asia must
have been redoubled by the signing of the 1936 German-Japanese Anti-
Comintern Pact, an agreement which pointed ultimately to a two-pronged
attack on the Soviet Union from rurope and the Japanese-controlled puppet
"state" of Manchukuo.
98. The Soviet Union provided credits worth C100 million in 1938, followed
by a further t150 million in 1939. These credits were to be paid for by
exports of Chinese tungsten, wool and tea, to be transported to the
Soviet Union overland, via Sink lang. Clubb, Twentieth Century China, pp.
219-20.
99. Clubb, op.clt., p. 220. Zhukov was later to be the Soviet Marshal who
captured Berlin, whilst Chuikov defeated the Garmans at Stalingrad.
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Stalin's chosen route for the supply of war matSriel to Nanking ley
through Sinkiang and Kansu, via Chuguchak, Urumchi, Kumul and lenchow. fuel
and other heavy supplies crossed Sinkiang and Kansu by road, carried either
100by Soviet lorries, or by huge camel caravans. Still more significantly,
of the ass aircraft supplied to the Chinese authorities by the Soviet Union,
nearly all flew via Sinkiang.10l To maintain these aircraft, Moscow agreed
to provide a complete aeroplane assembly plant on Chinese soil. The
Nationalist authorities at Chungking (Nanking having fallen to the advancing
Japanese in December, 1937) requested that this plant should be established
in Kansu, but the Kremlin was adamant that it ehould be eet up in Sinkiang.102
Under immediate threat from the Japanese, the Chinese government was in no
position to quarrel with Moscow over the presenceot Soviet troops in
Sinkiang, and accordingly the aeroplane assembly plant was constructed at
T'ou-t'ung-ho near Urumchi.103 Under the guise of the Sinkiang "Agricultural
Implements factory", this assembly plant ~as surrounded by heavy fortifications
100. Wu, China and the Soviet Union, pp. 257-8, 269; lattimore, 0., 'China's
Turkestan-Siberia Supply Road', Pacific Affairs, XIII (Dec. 1940), 393-412
passim; Strong, A.L., 'Airplane from the USSR', ~, Jan. 1942,rr. ~.·Z'.
101. Llu, F.,A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949 (Princeton, 1956),
p. 168.
102. Whiting, Soviet strategy in Sinkiang, p. 62
103. Sheng, Red failure in Sinkiang, p. 258
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and manned by more than 1,500 Soviet troops equipped with a force of about
twenty tanks.104 At about this time, the Soviet Union also established a
flying school for Chinese pilots at an airfield near KulJa.105
As a corollary to this increased Soviet military presence in
Sinkiang, the Soviet economic hold on the provinc. - already clearly
predominant over both Chinese and British commercial interests - was
expanded to become a virtual monopoly. With the defeat of Ma Chung-ying
following the Red Army intervention of 1934, the Soviet Union had achieved
almost total domination over the foreign trade of both northern and
eastern Sinkiang; following the intervention of 1937 and the collapse
of "Tunganistan", decisive steps were taken to extend this dominance
over the southern part of the province as well.
Shortly after the extension of provincial control to the oases of
southern Sinkiang in September, 1937, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, doubtless acting
at the behest of his Soviet patrons, took steps to diminish British
influence and prestige in this traditionally Anglophile reglon.106
104. Whiting, op.cit., p. 62; in his Red failure in 5inkieng. p. 258, Sheng
states that in the autumn of 1942 there were 'eight tanks and dozens of
airplanes stationed within the compound of tha so-called Agricultural
Implements Manufacturing factory at T'out'ungho'.
105. Whiting, op.cit., p. 62. Very few westerners were permitted to visit
Sinkiang during this period, and Ili remained particularly cut off from
(.non-Soviet) outsiders. One exception, however, was the Norwegian refugee
Wilfred Skrede, and it seems very likely that the 'frisky, strapping'
Russian girls whom he saw playing basket-ball at an aerodrome near KulJa
were attached to this establishment. Skrede, W., Across the Roof of the
World (Trans. from the Norwegian ~ver Verdens Tak), London, 1954, pp.48-9.
106. Contemporaneous warmth towards Great Britain was probably derived from
c -British recognition of the Amirate of Ksshgar proclaimed by Va qub 8eg
in the mid-nineteenth century (see above, pp. 68-9). Against this must
be set the considerable hostility felt by the Turkic Muslim population
of southern Sinkiang towards the British Indian money-lenders resident
throughout their region.
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Although Britain had never ~avered in her support for Chinese control
over Sinkiang, and had remained consistently aloof from the various Muslim
rebel groups who had seized control of Kashgar and the surrounding oases
107since the death of Yang Tseng-hsin, the British euthorities were accused
of complicity in the rebellion of 1937 and the British Consul-General at
108Kashgar was effectively boycotted. At the same time, an anti-British
109trade embargo was introduced, the consular mails between India and Kashgar
were interfered With,110 and British Indian nationals long resident in Khotan
and Yarkand were expelled from the province and forced to attempt a crossing
111of the Himalayas in the depth of winter. In a related move, steps wers
also taken to force the closure of the Swedish missions at Yarkand and
Kashgar Old City. An anti-Swedish boycott ~as instituted during the winter
of 1937-38 on the orders of the provincial government, with the result that by
February, 1938, all Swedish missionary ~ork in Sinkiang had been effectively
brought to a halt.112 Meanwhile, Soviet goods in plentiful supply and at
107. British diplomatic sources held in the ~ uniformly indicate that this
basic policy never varied (in this context, see ths official response to
HMCGK Thomson Glover when he 8uggested that some form of aid or recog-
nition might be extended to the "Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern
Turkestan", above, p. 263 J also Teichman, Sir E., Journey to Turkistan,
pp. 191-2). Unfortunately Britain has been accused, without adequate
substantiation, of aiding and abetting the "TIRET" by numerous observers
of the Sinkiang scene including Basil Davidson (Turkestan Alive, pp.llO-
111) and Jack Chen (The Sinkiang Story, p. IB4). These serious charges
would appear to be entirely without foundation.
108. Wu Ai-chen, China and the Soviet Union, p. 258.
109. IOlR, l/P&S/12/23S7 (Annual Confidential Report, June 1937-38) p. 5.
110. The Times (london), March 25, 1939.
111. The Times (london), June 1, 1939.
112. IOlR, l/P&S/12/23S7, Section 8 ('Relations with Sweden').
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cheap prices flooded the markets of southern Sinkiang, although across the
border in Soviet Central Asia the great cities of Samarkand and Tashkent
were experiencing" acute shortages of consumer supplies.113 These Soviet
moves to drive out British competition in Sinkiang, both by decree and by
special pricing, were so successful that by June, 1938, K.C. Packman, the
British Consul-General at Kashgar, was constrained to report to Delhi that
Soviet Russia has at last regained in full the
influence Russia used to exercise in Imperial
days, and which was temporarily lost, as a result·
of the Russian revolution, during the period 1917-
1931. Russian methods, Russian ideas and Russien
trade predominate throughout the province; most of
the important posts in the province are filled by
Russophile officials (often Russian-trained and
speaking Russian); and both provincial and local
authorities frequently seek the edvice and assistance
of the Russian Consular establishments in the
province, to which advice and assistance they attach
great weight.114
Despite these commercial successes, it is evident, however, that the
Soviet Union's major economic goal in Sinkiang was not control of the
province's trade, but exploitation of its mineral resources. As has
already been indicated, following the Red Army intervention of 1934, Soviet
geological specialists began extensive surveys of Sinkiang without obtaining
. 115the permission of the Chinese authorities at Nanking. Because of the veil
of secrecy surrounding these surveys, little information is available as to
their nature and extent. According to Allen S.Whiting, however, a large
Russian map, drawn in 1935 and held in the personal archives of Sheng Shih-ta'ai
on Taiwan, identifies numerous deposits of manganese, copper, lead, tin, wolfram
and oil. in Sinkiang. According to the map, few of these resources were then
116in production, although many are identified 'on the basis of survey'.
113. Whiting, Soviet Strateg~ in Sinkiang, p. 65
114. IOLR, L/P&'S/12/2357, pp. 4-5
115. See above,p. 300.
116. Whiting, Soviet Strategy 1n Sinkian5l~ p. 65
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117It is pertinent to nota that 'a particularly rich cluster of minerals'
is identified by this map as lying in the northwestern part of Sinkiang,
near the Soviet frontier. It was in this region, near the town of Wusu,
118that Soviet technicians began drilling for oil in mid-1935. According
to later Chinese Nationalist sources, actual production from these oil
fields began in 1939;19 Although initial production was low, a refinery
~ith an estimated capacity of 50,000 tons of crude oil per annum was
120subsequently established by the Soviets at Tu-shan-tzu. Moreover,
according to observers in Sinkiang et the time of Hitler's attack on the
Soviet Union in April, 1941, following the initial Soviet d~bacle in turope,
production at Tu-shan-tzu 'increased markedly ••• with constant truck convoys
121travelling between the fields and the Soviet frontier'. According to Whiting,
in addition to Soviet exploitation of Sinkiangf-scoil reserves, large amounts of
tungsten were extracted from '~all-engineered' mines located along Sinkiang's
north-western frontier in an operation ~hich enabled the USSR to cut back
122in tungsten imports from other parts of China. Similarly, according to
117. ibid~-
118. Sea above, p.300.
119. Su-lien tu! Hsin-ch!eng t! ching-chi ch'in-lueh ('Soviet tconomic
Aggression Against Sinkiang', Taipei, 1950), pp. 78 ff. (cited in
Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang, p. 66).
120. Huang, T.K., et al.,Report on Geological Investigation of Some Oil
fields in Sinkieng (Nanking, 1947); cf. Soviet Economic Aggression,
p. 82 (both cited in Whiting, op.cit., p. 66).
121. Whiting, op.cit., p. 66.
122. ibid.-
O.E. Clubb, a 'Joint mining enterprise' was established near the Borotala
River in western Dzungaria 'engaged, it was widely believed, in the
123exploitation of a deposit of uranium ore'.
Although specific details of contemporaneous Soviet mineral
exploitation in Sinkiang are generally unavailable, there is one major
exception to this rule - namely, the 1940 Tin Mines Agreement - which
clearly indicates that Moscow's commercial relationship with Sinkieng
during this period, far from being basad on "fraternal solidarity", was
based on nakedly exploitative criteria which effectively reduced 5inkiang
to little more than an economic colony of the Soviet Union. Valid for 50
yeArs, the "Sin-tin" agreement granted the Soviet Union 'exclusive rights
for the prospection, investigation and exploitation of tin end its ancillary
minerals' within Sinkieng.124 With this monopoly, the Soviet Union gained
exclusive control over power supply, road transport, and telegraph end redia
,
communications in all zones (end areas leading to such zones) under "Sin-tin"
management. Similarly, Soviet personnel received unlimited entry privileges
end unrestricted right 'of movement anywhere within Sinkiang. The agreement
fUrther stipulated that "Sin-tin" should. have the right to establish
'without hindrance', 'branch offices, sub-brench offices,. end agencies
within the whole territory of Sinkiang'; that the corporation was to be
123. Clubb, O.E., China and Russia: The Great Game (N.Y. and London, 1971),
p. 320. O. Edmund Clubb became the first American Consul to Urumchi in
1943. He also held diplomatic posts at Vladivostok, Mukden, Changchun,
Chungking, and subsequently became Director of the Office of Chinese
Affairs in the U.S. Oepartment of State from 1950 to 1952.
124. Whiting and Sheng, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? Appendix 8 ('Agreement of
Concessions Signed by the Representatives of the Government of USSR and
Governor of Slnklang') p. 280.
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provided with land 'on application' and 'without delay'} and that the
Sinkiang government should 'remove all the population residing in such·
125areas' as had been allotted to "Sin-tin". In effect, these clauses
enabled the Kremlin to establish control over large areas of a neighbouring
sovereign state, and to do so without recourse to the Chinese Nationalist
authorities at Chungking. As if to emphasise the existence of this state
within a state, armed guards controlled by the corporation excluded all
outsiders from "Sin-tin" premises, including the 5inkiang provincial police.126
In exchange for this remarkable series of concessions, the economic
benefits accruing to Sinkiang were minimsl, whilst the Soviet Union profited
greatly. All exports at "Sin-tin" produce were to be duty-free, compensated
for only by a 2% ad valor8m charge. Rent for land was to be paid in kind at
the rata of 5% of production} this was then to ba sold to the Soviet Union
127st prevailing world prices. No share in nat profits and no participation
in management was given to either the Sinkiang or tha Chinese Nationalist
authorities. On the contrary, the Sinkiang government was expressly
forbidden to 'inspect, supervisa, investigate, Or audit the various operations
l2Bof production, finance, and commerce' of "Sin-tin". In return, Sinkiang
(not "China"), was to receive all tha corporation's facilities, 'without
129compensation', after 8 period of fifty years.
125. 1£!£., pp. 282-3.
126. Whiting, Soviet strategy in Sinkiang, p. 67.
127. After five years payment for land was to rise to 6%, still in kind, and
still to be sold to the Soviet Union at prevailing world prices. Slnklang:
Pawn or Pivot? Appendix S, p. 283
128. ibid., p. 284.
129. ibid., p. 285.
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If Sheng's own account of his discussions with the group of officials
sent from Moscow to "negotiate" the Tin Mines Agreement is accurate, then
it is clear that in seeking to establish an effective Soviet monopoly over
the mineral resources of Sinkiang, Stalin was finally demanding repayment
(with interest) for his interventions on Sheng's behalf in both 1934 end 1937.
Not unnaturally, Sheng was dissatisfied with the original text of the
Tin Mines Agreement. Accordingly, he pointed out to the principal Soviet
negotiator, Bakul!n, that the text had been drawn up without prior
consultation with the Sinkiang authorities; that certain clauses were
totally unacceptable; and that important revisions would have to be made
before the agreement could be signed. Bakulin informed Sheng 'in curt,
clipped tones' that:
When we were preparing to leave Moscow for Sinkiang,
Comrade Stalin told us that the contents of this
secret agreement on the Soviet leasa of. tin mines
must not be revealed to anyone except Commissioner
Sheng, who is to put his signature on it ••• Both
contracting parties must sign the agreement tomorrow,
or the day after tomorrow at the latest.
Sheng continued to object, but was 'rudely interrupted' by Bakulin:
Although it is our wish to hear your opinions on the
agreement we must call your attention to the fact that
when we were given our mission Comrade Stalin said
that Commissioner Sheng must sign the agreement as it
is and not a single word of it is alterable.130
Sheng records that he could no longer restrain his temper, and spoke
from his heart, likening the Tin Mines Agreement (with considerable
Justification) to Japan's infamous Twenty-one Demands. Nevertheless,
130. Sheng, Red railure in Sinkiang, pp. 219-21.
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Sheng realised that he was in no position to oppose the will of his
Soviet backers, and accordingly signed the agreement on 26th November, 1940.131
Although the "Sin-tin" agreement represents a considerable landmark
in Moscow's establishment of de jure economic control over Sinkiang, it is
important to note that, long before the signing of that agreement, the province
had already become a de facto political appendage of the Soviet Union. It
must have been clear to Sheng that the price of the Soviet intervention of
1934 would be the establishment of a pro-Soviet, anti-Japanese government
in Sinkiang, and indeed it seems likely that Sheng, driven from his north-
eastern homeland by the invading Kwantung Army, was only too pleased to
commit Sinkiang wholeheartedly to the anti-Japanese cause. It is difficult
to understand, however, just why Sheng threw himself so enthusiastically
into the arms of the Soviet Union - even Stalin must have been (pleassntly)
surprised.132
131. According to Sheng, Bakulin implicitly stated that not only the future
of Sinkiang, but also Sheng's personal future, would be at risk if the
Tin Mines Agreement were not signed (Red failure in Sinkieng, p. 224).
Sheng argues unconvincingly that by signing the agreement, but by failing
to affix the seals of the Sinkiang Provincial Government and of the
Border Defence Commissioner's Office, he succeeded in tricking the Soviet
Government and in invalidating all its clauses. Sensu strictu this may b.
correct, but pettifoggery of this kind did not prevent the exploitation of
Sinkiang's mineral wealth by the Soviet Union, and does not excuse Sheng's
actions.
132. Neither Sheng's subsequent claim to have become a Marxist in 1919
(Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang, p. 15), nor the presence of
his arch-rival Ma Chung-ying in Moscow (Sheng, Red failure in Slnkieng,
p. 193) can fully explain Sheng's unrestrained support for contemporaneous
Soviet policies. It may be that both these factors, taken together with
Sheng's 'Chameleon' political nature (lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 69-81)
combined to bring about, at least 'for a few years, a sycophancy towards
the Kremlin unmatched almost anywhere outsids the frontiers of ths Soviet
Union.
As has already been shown, following the Soviet intervention of 1934
and the subsequent flight of Ma Chung-ying, Sheng Shih-ts'ai implemented
a series of policies ostensibly designed to create a "New Sinkiang" (Ch.
Hsin Hsin-chiang) which was to be closely allied to the Soviet Union.133
In line with this declared objective, Sinkiang's armed forces were re-
designated the "Anti-Imperialist Army" (with Japan and Britain as tha
perceived imperialists), whilst an "Anti-Imperialist Society" was established
as a supposed alternativa to political parties.134 Indications of the
closeness of the "New Sinkiang's" ties with the Soviet Union may ba found
in Sheng's adoption of a six-pointed red star as the emblem of the
province,l35 and less symbolically but more practically, in the transfer
of provincial traffic from left-hand drive (as in the rest of China) to
136right-hand drive (as in the USSR). Of more serious consequence. for the
various peoples of Sinkiang, however, was the establishment in July, 1934, of
the Peo-en-chU, or Secruity Preservation Bureau, and of its sinister offshoot
the Pao-an-tu!, or Security Preservation Corps, a Soviet-style secret police
force modelled on the NKVD and controlled by an NKVD Brigadier-General called
Pogodin.l37
133. Sae above, pp. 271-2. 299-302.
134. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., III, p. 122.
135. Clubb, China and Russia: The Great Game, p. 286.
136. Callin, Soviet Russia and the rar East, p. 102
137. According to Clubb, Pogodin was assisted by ana Tseng Hsiu-fu, 'the alias
of the communist Wang Li-hsiang, who had long served in outer Mongolia'.
Similarly, the Pao-an-chu was placed under the control of ana Chang I-wu
'with an able deputy in the person of Chang Hsien-ch'eng, who had been
Borodin's interpreter at the time of the Northern Expedition'. Clubb, O.E.,
China end Russia: The Great Game, pp. 289-90.
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In 1936 this secret police network was expanded and strengthened by
the creation of an Office of Border Affairs, with Sheng Shih-tstai assuming
the position of its commander-in-chief. from thie time onward, both entry to
and exit from Sinkiang, es well as travel within the province, came under
138increasingly tight control. Sheng also made extensive use of censorship
139to maintain his monopoly of power.
Dramatic proof of ShengShih-ts'ai's involvement with the NKVD was
forthcoming in 1937, when, following the collapse of "Tunganistan", the Great
Purge which had been sweeping the Soviet Union since 1936 was extended to
Sinkiang at Stalin's behest.140 In his apologia Red failure in 5inkiang
Sheng Shih-ts'ai, writing in a style reminiscent of the Stalinist idiom
of the 1930s, describes his discovery of a 'far-reaching conspiracy
extending from Tokyo to Berlin, linked by the international Trotskyist
movement,.141 After the manner of Yezhov's NKVD purges, 'the mastermind
behind the Trotskyite plot was none other than the Soviet consul general
142in Tihua (Urumchi), Garegin Apresoff'. The goal of the "fascist-
Trotskyite plotters" was 'nothing less than the assassination of Sinkisngts
138. ibid., p. 290; cf. Teichman, Sir E., 'Chinese Turkistan', JRCA5, XXIII
~ct. 1936), p. 570.
139. Cable, M., 'The New "New Dominion",' ~RCAS. XXV, 1 (1938), 13; IOLR.
L/P&S/12/2357, section 4.
140. The Great Purge (known in Russia as the yezhovshchina after N.I. Yezhov,
the contemporary head of the NKVD), was extended to Soviet Central Asia
in 1937 following the "discovery" of a "nationalist plot" in Uzbekistan.
Wheeler, G., The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (london, 1964),
PP. 140-42.
141. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Red failure in Sinklang, p. 176.
142. ibid., p. 177. Apresoff was subsequently executed for "Trotskyite plotting".
Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? p. 277.
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political and military leaders, overthrow of the provincial government,
and armed uprising throughout the Soviet Union,.143
.
Sheng Shih-ts'ai and his Soviet backers used the twisted logic and
rhetoric of the Great Purge as a vehicle for the indictment of a "Trotskyist
network" of no less than 435 persons, including such unlikely bedfellows as
the Tungan Ma Hu-shan, the Uighurs Khoja Niyas HaJJI and Mahmud shih-chang,• •
the loyal nationalist official Ma Shao-wu, various prominent Kazakhs, Mongols
and Tatars, and the Han Chinese Huang Han-chang, Secretary-General of the
Sinkiang Provincial Government.144 Sheng called in NKVD officials to 'take
145part in the investigation', following which the alleged conspirators were
either executed or imprisoned within Sinkiang, or sent across the frontier
146to the Soviet Union for further interrogation by the NKVD. In retrospect,
it is clear that the only factor linking the ethnically and politically
diverse "Fasoist-Trotskyite Plottersn147 was their opposition - or perceived
potential opposition - to the Soviet-sponsored status quo in Sinkiang and,
143. Sheng, Red failure in Sinkiang, p. 178
144. ibid., pp. 179w80. One of the accused was the Tatar Burhan ShahIdi, a
great political "survivor" in Sinkiang politics, who was 8ubsequently
to become, in direct succession, both the last KMT and the first CCP
head of the Sinkiang Provincial Government. Sae Appendix I, 'Who Was Who
in Republican Sinkiang'.
145. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinklang, p. 52.
146. Sheng, Red failure in Sinkiang, pp. 179-80; Whiting, Soviet Strategy in
Sinkiang, p. 52.
147. cf. Stalin's trial and execution of "Rightists and Trotskyites" in
Uzbekistan during 1937 and 1938. Wheeler, "The Modern History of Soviet
Central Asia, p. 142; similarly, BennigsBn and Lemercier-Qualquejay,
Islam in the Soviet Union (London, 1967), p. 151.
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more particularly, to Sheng Shih-ts'ai himself. Thus, as Allen S. whiting has
indicated:
The purge may have served Sheng, as it did Stalin, to
destroy rival centers of potential power. In addition,
Sheng seems to have shared the Georgian dictator's
paranoid tendencies. Seen in this light, the purge of
1937 appears as en extension of Stalinism into Sinkiang,
with Sheng acting as the willing executioner of both
policy and people.148
following the Soviet intervention 0' 1937 end the subsequent NKVO-
style purges, Sheng Shih-ts'ei found himself isolated 'rom tha remainder
of China and almost completely dependent upon the Soviet Union. In e
possible attempt to offset this dangerous imbalance, Sheng approached
two high-ranking Chinese communists en route from Moscow to Yenan with
149a formal request that he should be permitted to Join the CCP. According
to Sheng, this request was conveyed to the CCP Politburo in Yenan, but
was subsequently referred to Moscow for approval -'an indication, i'
correct, of how closely Sinkiang~ although still theoretically an integral
part of the Chinese Republic, had becoma bound to the USSR.1SO
148. Whiting, Soviet strategy in Sinkieng, p. 53
149. According to Sheng Shih-ts'ai (Red failure in Sinkiang. p. 186), the
two sanior-ranking mambers of the CCP, by nama K'sng Sheng and Chen
Shao-yu (aliss Wang Ming), stopped over in Urumchi at an unspecified
time during 1937. According to Alan S. Whiting, this has been
corroborated by Chiang Kai-shek during an interview (Soviet Strategy
in Sinklang, p. 60, fn. 21). A letter sent by Sheng to Chieng in July,
1942, states that K'ang Sheng and Ch'en Shao-yu pasaed through Urumchi
'as early as the beginning of our war of resistance' i.e. in July,
1937); Su-lien tu! Hsin-chiang ti ching-chi ch'in-lUeh (Taipei, 1950),
Pp. 67-8.
150. Sheng, Red Failurein Sinkiang, pp. 186-8; Whiting, Soviet strategy
in Sinkiang, p. 68.
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stalin clearly had no desire to enhance CCP influence and prestige
in Sinkiang at the expense of the CPSU, and is accordingly reported to
have vetoed Sheng's application. lSI This development, possibly coupled
with the contemporaneous reinforcement of Soviet garrison troops in the
152neighbouring_Mongolian People's Republic, seems finally to have convinced
Sheng that the expanding tide of Soviet influence in Central Asia was
irreversible. Accordingly, the ruler of Sinkiang followed his natural
inclination to flow with the tide; thus the chameleon war-lord became
redder than red.
The period of Sheng's closest alignment with the Kremlin began in
October, 1938, when, together with his family, Sheng travelled to Mosco~
for consultations with the Soviet leadership. He arrived at Moscow
incognito,153but immediately began a round of intensive discussions at
the Kremlin, culminating ina drinking party at Molotov's dacha 'in the
154pleasant countryside far from the gray Moscow environs'. During his
151. ibid•..........
152. Clubb, O.E., ChIna and Rugsla: The Great Game, pp. 313-5.
153. Sheng notes in his memoirs that 'my visit escaped general notice,
and even the Chinese ambassador to Russia apparently did not learn
of my pilgrimage to the Kremlin' (Red failure in Sinkieng , p. 197).
154. Sheng notes discreetly that: 'although we Chinese are known for our
generous toasts and the floW of wine at maals, tha Russian capacity
for drinking put us to shame as the dinner progressed' (Red failure
in Sinklang, p. 205). Needless to say, this equivocation is really
intended to convey Sheng's distate for the inebriety of the Soviet
leadership. for further details in this context, aee Milovan DJilas,
Conversations With Stalin (Harmondsworth, 1962), pp. 63-4; 117-8. It
is interesting to note that after dinner at Molotov's dacha, Sheng
was shown a film entitled 'Esli zavtrs voins •••' ('If War Should Come
Tomorrow ••• '), which he found 'sober and moving' (Red failure, p. 205)
Seven years later, after a similarly over-indulgent dinner, OJi18s was
shown the same film. He writes:
The war in that film was waged with the help of poison ga8,
while at the rear of the invaders - the Germans - rebellious
elements of the proletariat were breaking out. At the end of
the film Stalin calmly remarked, "Not much different from what
actually happened, only there was no poison gas and the German
proletariat did not rebel".' (Conversations with Stalin, p. 82)
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stay in Moscow~ Sheng expressed his wish to strengthen the links between
Sinkiang and the Soviet Union and, having assured Stalin of his "devotion
to Marxism-Leninism", he further stated his desire 'to receivB party
155training end indoctrination immediately'. Stalin promptly agreed to
this request, and before leaving Moscow Sheng was .enrolled as a member
of the All-Union Communist party.156 In other words, Sheng Shih-ts'ai,
although a Chinese national and the military govarnor of Sinkieng
province, voluntarily became a member of tha CPSU, and not of tha CCP
157as he claims to have originally intended. Sheng fUrther records that
ha left Moscow 'in an aura of chear and optimism', noting with great
satisfaction that:
I had seen Stalin not once, but three times. I had
been dealt with by the most important men in the
Kremlin as though I were head of China, instead of
being marely governor of a province, and a rather
undeveloped province et that.158
following his visit to Moscow, Sheng's foreign policy became a virtual
carbon copy of the Kremlin's, whilst at home the survival of his regime
became still more dependent upon Soviet advisers and police controls.159
155. Sheng, Red failure in Sinkiang, p. 201.
156. Party membership card no. 1859118. Red failure in Sinkieng, p. 206.
157. In his apologia Red failure in Sinkieng (pp. 206-7), Sheng off.rs
various excuses end justifications in an attempt to explain 'mechanical
details' concerning his party membership, most notablyz 'By enrolling
••• in the Russian Communist Party, I could flatly and honestly deny
to questioners any connection with tha Chinesa Communist. in Yenan'(l).
IS8. Sheng, Red failure in Sinkiang, p. 206.
159. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang, p. 69.
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The power of his Soviet backers was seemingly amply confirmed by Ganeral
Zhukov's crushing defeat of a section of the Jspsnese Kwantung Army at .
160Nomonhan in May-August, 1939. Sheng subsequently endorsed the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939; applauded Stalin's absorption of the
Baltic States; supported the Soviet Union in its war with finland; and
hailed the Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland as the 'glorious mission of the
great and courageous Red Army ••• to help the Whit. Russian and Ukrainian
peoples inside the Polish border, saving them from falling under German
fascist oppression ••• (and) bringing them over from the dark camp of the old
161world to the bright new world'. By 1939 it may therefore fairly be said
that Sinkiang, though still nominally a part of China, had become a virtual
dependency of the Soviet Union, differing hardly at all from the neighbouring
Mongolian People's Republic.
160. At the battle of Nomonhan (Khalkhin Gal), situated on tha Mongolian
side of the MPR-"Manchukuo" frontier, General Zhukov's Soviet far
Eastern first Army Group (comprising 35 rifle battalions and 20 cavalry
squadrons, supported by an estimated 500 tanks, 500 armoured carl, and
500 planes) defeated the Japanese Special Sixth Army (comprising 2S
infantry battalions and 17 csvalry squadrons). The battle of Nomonhan,
which reached a climax in August, 1939, resulted in the destruction of
the Japanese forces and tha effactive elimination of the Japanese
threat to Outar Mongolia. Japanese 10S88S at Nomonhan are put at
55,000, compared with an estimated 10,000 for the combined Soviat-
Mongol forces. The significance of this Soviet victory an the political
situation in Sinkiang, and more particularly on tha psych. of Sheng
Shih-ts'ai, can hardly be over-estimated. Garthoff, R.L., SinO-Soviet
.Military Relations (NY, 1966), pp. 36-9; cf. Coax, A., 'High Command and
field Army: The Kwantung Army and the Nomonhan Incident, 1939',
nilitary Affairs, XXXIII, 2 (October, 1969), 302-111 Young, K.H.,
'The Nomonhan Incident: Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union',
Monumenta NipponicB. 22 (1967), pp. 82-101.
L61. Sheng Shih-ta'ai, liu ta-cheng ti chiao-ch'eng ('The Six Great Policies
Study Manual', Urumchi, 1942), I, p. 48 (cited in Whiting, Soviet
Strategy in Sinkiang, p. 72).
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7.4 The Muslims of Sinkiang During Sheng's "Progressive" Period
As a direct result of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's adoption of a stridently
pro-Soviet line during the years 1934-42, his policies became associated,
in the eyes of numerous contemporary writers, with the anti-fascist
"peace camp" dominated by Stalin and the Comintern from Moscow. vet
whilst the opportunistic foreign policy and domestic repression of the
Stalinist era in the Soviet Union have long since been recognised by
dispassionate scholarship as incontrovertible fect, the myth of Sheng
162Shih-ts'ai's "progressive" period has remained all but unchallenged.
Much of'Sheng's reputation as a progressive reformer during the first
eight years of his rule is derived from Tu Chung-ynan's panegyric, Sheng
Shih-ta'ai yu hain Hain-chiang (Sheng Shih-ts'ai and the New Sinkiang),
the only detailed firsthand study of Sheng's rule, based on the author's
163experiences in Sinkiang circa 1937. Although never translated into English,
162.
163. Tu was a childhood friend of Sheng Shih-ts'.i, who visited Sinkiang
during the early years of Sheng's rule before returning to Hankow to
publish his Shen Shih-ta'ai u hsin Hsin-chien (1938). He
subsequently returned to Sinkiang ? in 1938), when he was appointed
Chancellor of Sinkiang College. In 1943 hi waa accuaed by Sheng of
being an agent of the CCP. A wrItten "confession" was subsequently
extracted under torture (reproduced in Appendix E of Slnkiang: Pewn
or Pivot?), and Tu was executed. Writing of Tu's book in hia memoirs,
Sheng (no doubt hypocritically) comments: 'While the statistical data
and the facts (Tu) included were accurate, he carefully refrained from
a single word of criticism, although I would have been the first to
admit shortcomings in my own regime'. (Bed ral1ure in Sinkieng, pp.
210-11).
Tu's book provided the basis for Martin R. Norins' 1944 study af
§inkiang: Gateway to Asia, which concludes that:
••• far from being a Soviet Russian "puppet", Sheng
Shih-ts'ai has been one of tha most far-sighted,
enlightened, and ';"liQ.f<M!.tA," military leaders of
modern China. That he has ••• brought to Sinkiang •••
much of the best qualities of both China and of
neighbouring Soviet Russia is truly an amazing
achievement, too long unappreciated by the outside
",orld·l64
Similarly 0"'8n Lattimore, in his 1950 study, Sinkieng' Pivot of Asia,
draws heavily on the prima facie evidence of Tu Chung-yUan to prove that,
at least during the years 1934-42, Sheng had 'embarked on a period of real
reform' • Thus, where the Muslim and other non-Han peoples of tha province
were concerned:
Uighurs and Kazakhs were immediately appointed to high
posts in their o",n districts. All non-Chinese nationalities
were allowed to promote education in their own languages
and schools. The number of students increased from 3000
in 1933 to 150,000 in 1936, and in addition 329 non-Chinese
stUdents were sent to the Soviet Union to study medicina,
veterinary science, engineering and agriculture ••• The
provincial newspaper Hsin-chieng Jih Pec ••• (was) published
in seven languages. "cultural Associations" began to
function for Uighyrs, Kazakhs, Tungans, Tatars, Russians
and Chinese. Of these the most active was that of the
Uighurs, the majority people, ",ith e regional and 41
district branches, supporting 1736 primary schoole with
124,174 students, and also conducting teacher training
and adult education.16S
164. Norins, M.R., Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang (NY, 1944), p. 101. Norins
quotes very extensivelY from Tu Chung-yUan throughout this study;
moreover, a 'selection of paraphrases' from Tu'. Sheng Shih-ta'si yu
bain Hain-chiang is included es a separate appendix (op.cit., pp.
141-51). See also idem, 'The New Sinkiang: China'. Link with tha Middle
East', Pacific Affairs, XV, 4 (Cecember, 1942), pp. 457-70, passim.
165. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 72-3, citing Tu Chung-yuan, op.cit.,
pp. 80-84. It should be notad that Tu'. figures ara apparently
uncorroborated by any independent source.
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At a later point Lattimore comments that 'during the first period'
(i.e. from 1934 to 1942), 'Sheng Shih-ts'ai ran Sinkiang very smoothly
on the three wheels of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, democracy,
and interests of the "nationalities" or ethnic groups of the province,.166
These claims have been echoed in such later (and lesser) studies of
Sinkiang as Basil Davidson'sTurkestan Alive (1957),167and Jack Chen's
The Sinkiang Story (1977).168 Even Allen S. Whiting, whilst noting that
Sheng Shih-ts'ai employed 'a crude compound of anti-imperialism and anti-
capitalism, offered under the rubric of Marxism-leninism ••• to equip
him(self) with ideological pretensions fitting his visions of political
leadership',169 adds the caveat thet Sheng 'genuinely aspired to make
Sinkiang a model province', and that 'to deny this••• is to overlook a
major aspect of his policy,.170
To what extent, therefore, did the Muslim peoples of Sinkiang benefit
from Sheng's "progressive" policies between 1934 and 19421 As Allen S. Whiting
has indicated, 'most firsthand accounts, whether friendly or hostile, agree as
to the construction of schools, medical facilities, and roads, as well as to
171the improved fiscal and enlightened cultural policies of his rule'.
166. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 72-3
167. Davidson, B., Turkestan Alive, pp. 112-17.
168. Chen. J., The Sinkiang Story, pp. 1B6-92
169. Whiting, Soviet strategy in Sinkiang, p. 127.
170. ibid., p. 137.
171. ibid•..........
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Yet a careful examination of the available contemporaneous sources would
seem to indicate continuing Muslim, and especially Kazakh, hostility
towards Sheng throughout this period.
As has been shown, following the collapse of the 1937 Muslim rebellion
in southern Sinkiang and the suppres.ion of lesser disturbances in tha Tien
Shan and at Kumul (events which, in themselves, provide evidence of wide-
spread Muslim hostility to Sheng's regime), Sheng Shih-ts'ai instituted an
NKVD-backed police stata which clearly owed mora to the terror of the
·yezhovshchinaft than to any abstract ideals of democracy or national equality.
Much has been made of Sheng's appointment of Sinkiang Muslims to senior
positions within his administration following the collapse of the secessionist
TIRET in 1934,172 yet these officials - perhaps best exemplified by such
powerless figureheads as the hapless Khoja Niyas HaJJI - had not long to•
survive. During 1937 Stalin's Great Purge swept across Soviet Central Asia,
stunning the Muslim population and leaving scarcely a family untouched.l73
Anti-religious propaganda was stepped up, as was the hunt for "bourgeois
nationalists" and pan-Turanianiata of all description. EVen epparently
loyal communists in positions of great power and influence were not safa.
172. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 73; Chen, The Sinkieng story, p.lBs;
Norins, 'The New Sinkiang: China's Link With the Middle Esat', p. 463;
idem, Gateway to Asia, p. 93; Barber, A., snd N.D. Hanw8ll, 'The
Emergence of China's far West', far Eestern Survey, VIII, 9 (April
26th, 1939), p. 103; Lee fu-haiang, The Turkic-Moslem Problem in
SInk ian : A Casa Stud of the Chines. Communists' Nationalit Polie
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Rutgers University, 1973 , p. 65; Chan rook-
lam, G., Sinkieng Under Sheng Shih-ta'ei, 1933-44 (unpublished MA thesi.,
University of Hong Kong, 1965), p. 165, ~.
173. Hayit, B., Turkestan im XX Jahrhundert (Darmstadt, 1956), cited 1n
Wheeler, G., The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia. p. 143.
Thus faizulla Khodzhayev, the Prime Minister of Soviet Uzbekistan, was
accused of having buried his dead brother according to Islamic rites)
he was subsequently dismissed from office, orderad to report to Moscow,
and executed.174 Similarly Akmal Ikramov, first Secretary of the Uzbek
Communist Party, was accused in a newspaper article of being a Turkic
, nationalist, called to Moscow, and executed.175 Stalin was anxious to crush
all vestiges of Muslim independence in Central Asia - as indeed waa his
prot'g', Sheng Shih-ts'ai, within Sinkiang. It was therefore entirely
predictable that when the purges were extended from the Soviet Union to
Sinkiang, the great majority of those executed or imprisoned by Sheng end
his NKVD backers for allegedly plotting with Germany end Japan were Turkic
176Muslims. Moreover it is clear that, following the 1937 purges,
very few Turkic Muslims (and virtually no Tungans)l77 were permitted
174. ibid., pp. 142-3; Caroe, 0., Soviet Em ire: The Turks of Central Asia
and Stalinism, p. 160: Maillart, E., Turkestan Solo lLondon, 1938 , pp.
193-9.
175. Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Centrel Asie, p. 142. Bennigsen
and Lemercier-Quelquejay have described Khodzhayev and Ikramov as 'the
two most outstanding Muslim communists since Sultan Galiyev' (Islam
in the Soviet Union, pp. 160-61). According to Wheeler (op.cit., p.
143), Ikramov was rehabilItated in 1956. Xhodzhayev apparent17 remain •.
'an unperson'.
176. Whiting, Soviet Policy in Sinkiang, p. 53; cf. Sheng, Red failure in
Sinkiang. pp. 179-80. Se. also the list of Muslim "martyrs eXBcuted by
hanging" in the year 1938-39, given by Isma'il, M.S., and Isma'il, M.A.,
in Moslems in the Soviet Union and in China, p. 13.
177. Even M. Norins, probably the most enthusiastic Western partisan of Sheng'.
"New Sinkiang" felt constrained to comment that:
The unfortunate omission of detailed information relating
to the place or lack of place of the Tung-kans under
(Sheng's) policy, leads one to feel that the Tung-kan
question may not even yet have been solved in Sinkiang,
and that in this respect the policy of "Racial [quality"
as practised in the province may possibly b. vulnerable
to criticism. (Geteway to Asia), p. 93).
to hold high office in Sinkiang.17B It thus seems probable that Sheng's
continuing reputation for employing Muslim officials in senior positions
under his administration rests almost exclusively on a number of token
appointments made during the first three years of his rule, from 1934
to 1937. In this context it is instructive to note the comments of the
Norwegian, Wilfred Skrede, who spent some time in Kulja during 1941.
Skrede; who subsequently travelled to British India via Urumchi, Aksu and
Kashgar, records that:
The wearing of uniform was confined to persons of one
definite racial type out of all those in Sinkiang's
very mixed population. That was easy to see. The
members of the army and police all had the distinguishing
marks of the Chinese. Thus, for all his communism,
Comrade Shun (sic) was practising a sort of racial
policy. Moslems of all kinds were kept out of it.179
As a result of Sheng's Draconian policies, following the defeat
of the 1937 Muslim rebellion and the blood-letting of the subsequent purges,
Muslim resistance to Sheng's regime seems to have been temporarily brokan
throughout most of the province. Accordingly, specifically anti-religious
propaganda was slackened, whilst anti-British and anti-Japanese propaganda
180increased. According to British diplomatic sources, durin9 the years
178. Exceptions to this general rula were the Uighurs Abutu (Reconstruction
Affairs Commissioner) and "Kuerpan" (presumably Qurbsn) Niyas (Vica-
Oi!ector of the Police Department); the Kazakhs "Sarifuhan" (i.a. Sharif
Khan, Administrator of the Altai Region) and Buhart, a tribal prince)
and tha Tungan lan Yen-shou, a vica-commissioner of the provincial
government. All were accused of conspiracy in September, 1940, and
subsequently purged. (Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Red railure in Sinkiang, pp. 216-7).
Needless to say, people of all nationalities including Han Chinese and
Russians were swept up in,this purge, as in ell Sheng's purges.
179. Skrede, Across the Roof of the World, p. 57.
180. Mclean, N.l.D., 'Sinkiang Today', p. 382. In this context see also
IOLR, l/P&S/12/2358, PZ.1236.1940 (Report of HMCGK Johnson on'his visit
to Urumchi, July-September, 1939). Johnson records that:
Another si9n of the times in Urumchi was the deserted
mosques and Chinese temples. Many of these buildings are
falling into disrepair or havs been converted to other uses •••
It Is evident that religious observance of any kind is not
intended by the powers that be to have any part in the future
of Sinkiang (op.cit., p.4).
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1937-1941, the indigenous population of the traditionally secessionist
south of the province remained relatively quiescent, as, seemingly, did
the population of IIi. Meanwhile in Urumchi itself, 'any observant visitor'
could not fail to notice:
Tha larga proportion of men in military or police
uniform ••• tha large number of Russians in the
city••• the cowed look of the Chinese and Moslem
population, and the arrogant bearing of the
Russians·181
During these years large numbers of Muslim people - in particular
landowners, petty officials and mullahs, but also those caught reading
182religious books - ware arrested and thrown into prison. Those who escaped
a summary bullet in the back of the head were sent to work in the gold minas
of the Altai, or in some cases were forced to erect fortifications and dig
air raid shelters outside the capital. Croups of prisoners in the latter
category were transported through Urumchi each evening 'with their feces
covered', thus providing a salutory warning to the populace of the fete in
183store for all opponents of Sheng's regime. Police surveillance seems to
have been all-pervasive, as a result of which in Kumul 'conversation wes
184limited to the growing of melons, the weather and market prices',
whilst in Urumchi:
181. IOlR. l/P&S/12/2358, PZ.l236.l940, p. 3.
182. ibid.: cf. Mclean, op.cit., p. 381. for a description of Sinkiang
prison conditions in Sinkiang under Sheng's rule written from personal
experience, see Ahmad Kamal, land Without laughter (NY, 1940). A good
secondary source is Chen, The Sinkiang story, pp. 195-8.
183. IOlR. l/P&S/12/2358, PZ.1236.1940, p. 3.
184. Vasel, C., 'Ourchdringungspolitik in Zentralasien', p. 14. A vivid
account of the activities of Sheng's secret police in Kumul mey be
found in this work, pp. 14-15.
No person, whether official, military officer,
soldier, or ordinary civilian (could) be exempt
from the fear that he (might) suddenly be denounced
by some secret agent and suddenly disappear. I was
told that the friends of a person who had so
disappeared were afraid to say so openly, and that
the expression "gone to Chuguchek" was generally
used in such cases.lSS
It is clear that the widespread purges carried out by the Pao-en-chu
(under NKVD tutelage) between 1937 and 1942 inspired sufficient fear
effectively to crush opposition to Sheng's regime, at least amongst the
settled urban and rural population of Sinkiang.1S6 As in tha Soviet Union,
however, police terror was to prove less effective when directed ageinst
nomadic Muslim peoples such as the Kirghiz, and mora especially the Kazakhs.
Sheng's problems with the "religious tribesn187 of the Altai and the
Tien Shan date from the very beginning of his rule in Sinkiang,l8S and ara
closely linked with contemporaneous developments across the Soviet frontier
where, in the name of collectivisation, Stalin was pursuing a policy which
amounted to deliberate genocide. The Soviet government's collectivisation
of the Kazakh steppe and its concurrent attempts to suppress nomadism have
been catalogued elsewhere, as indeed has the fierce resistance of the Kazakh
, lS9people to those policies. Suffice it briefly to record that, according
18S. IOLR, L/P&S/12/235S, PZ.1236.1940, p. 3.
166. This is hardly surprising, considering the NKVD involvement. A. a
result of the contemporaneous NKVD purges in Soviet Central Asia
'there has never been any further suggestion of a nationalist plot
or movement' in that area, although many individuals have, of course,
been accused of harbouring nationalist sentiments. (Wheeler, The Modern
History of Soviet Central Asia, p. 143).
187. Sheng's own phrase. Red Failure 1n Sinkian9, p. 181.
18S. As indicated above (pp.237-8 ), a Kazekh rebellion under the
leadership of one Sharrf Khan broke out in the Shara Sume region in
early 1933. It is not clear whether the 1933 rebel leader is the 8am.
person as the SharIf Khan purged in 1940 (eee fn. 178 above).
189. See, for example, Caroe, op.cit., pp. 162-72 ('Russianizatlon') and pp.
173-88 ('CollectIvization and the Suppression of Nomadism'), Wheeler,
The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, pp. 130-36.
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to Soviet statistics, between 1926 and 1939 the Kazakh population of the
USSR declined by approximately one-third,190 ~hilst during the six years
between Yang Tseng-hsin's assassination in 1928 and Ma Chung-ying's dafeat
in 1934, livestock losses in Soviet Kazakhstan ran to an estimated 73% of
all cattle, 83% of all horses and 87% of all sheep.191
During the years of collectivisation (known to the Kazakhs as the
192Katl-i-aam, or "general massacre"), many thousands of Kazakhs fled across
193the SinO-Soviet frontier to Sinkiang. Here they eet up their yurts in
north-western Dzungaria and attempted to make good their losses in 8 zone
still outside Soviet control. rollowing the Red Army intervention of 1934,
however, and the subsequent gradual reduction of Sinkiang to Soviet satellite
status, the Kremlin adopted a more forward policy towards the recalcitrant
Kazakhs of Ozungaria, whom they attempted to bring under the direct control
of the Urumchi adminstration.194 To escape this interference a large group
of Kazakhs, variously estimated at between 15,000 and 18,000 atrong,
190. Caroe, op.cit., pp. 166-72, citing Soviet census statistics for 1926
and 1939, and lorimer, r., The Population of the Soviet Union (league
of Nations, 1946).
191. Holdswo~tht M., 'f,o"'E,.t° ee,J",.~ fh,,,- '"Iq11-1'140" $0",(.1" c;:.h~£e&) 1[[, ~
('SCV\.~, lQr;'l), f· ~,,&.
192. Caroe, op.cit., p. 172.
193. Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, p. 131; cf. lias, G.,
Kazak Exodus (London, 1956), pp. 61-2. Similarly, many Kirghiz fled from
Soviet Kirghizia to the Pamirs and the Tien Shan (saa above, pp. 17~-Itl) ..
Photographs of the fleeing Kirghiz and of the pursuing Red Army may be
found in the account of Gustav Krist, an Austrian who accompanied the
Kirghiz into the Pamirs during their flight. Krist, G., Alone Through
the forbidden land (london, 1939), pp. 139-63; plates 19, 21-22.
194. Mclean, 'Sinkiang Today', p. 381.
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moved out of Dzungaria and began a long trek to the Kansu-Tsingha1-Sinkiang
border area, where they settled in the region of Gez Kol (Tk. "Lake Gez"
see map No. 5).195
Information concerning subsequent Kazakh rebel activity is both
sparse and unreliable, but according to Kazakh refugee sources emanating
from Kashmir and Turkey, following the emigration to Gez K61, three separate
centres of Kazakh opposition to Sheng's regime were to emerge. These were
in the central Tien Shan, under the joint leadership of °Al! Beg ~
and Yunus Hajj!;196 at Gez Kol itself, under Husayn TajjI and Sultan sharIf;197• ••
c - - - 198and (most significantly) in the Altai, under Uthman Batur. Seemingly,
between 1936 and 1944 the Sinkiang Kazakhs fought a series of sustained but
199low-key guerilla actions against the Urumchi authorities. little is known
of developments at Gez Kol or in the Tien Shan during this pariod,200 but it is
195. Lias, op.cit., pp. 71-2; Isma'il, M.S., and Isma'il, M.A., ep.cit., p.
12 ('The Revolution of 1936').
196. Lias, op.cit., pp. 76-7, 92.
197. ibid., PP. 72-3.
198. ibid., p. 91; cf. Boorman and Howard, Biographical Dictionary of
Republican China, Vol III, pp. 46-7.
199. lias, op.cit., pp. 81-5 ('The Kazak Way of War').
200. Many Kazakhs (possibly between four and five thousand) eventually left
Gez Kol and continued their trek out of Sheng's sphere of influence. An
estimated three thousand of these refugees eventually managed to reach
Kashmir, apparently by way of western Tibet (lias, op.cit., p. 73; Isma'il,
M.S., and Isma'il, M.A., Ope cit., p. 12). According to Mclean (op.cit.,
p. 382) by 1948 the remnants of this Altai Kazakh band had scattered
throughout many of the towns of north India, where they made their living
by selling lambskin caps. ror a rather fanciful description of events in
the Tien Shan and Manass region, see lias, op.cit., pp. 76-8.
c - --at least clear that the Altai Kazakhs under Uthman 8atur proved to be a
constant thorn in the sids of the provincial administration. Thus Sheng, in
his Red failure in Sinkiang, accuses the Altai Kazakhs of complicity in the
"fascist-Trotskyite" conspiracy of 1937. following the 1937 purges, troops
201were sent to 'crush the rebels of the Altai by force of arms', yet despite
Soviet assistance, Sheng was only partly successful in this aim. c -Uthman
8atur withdrew to the high Altai beyond the reach of the provincial forces,
only to return in 1940 to lead a new Kazakh rising which broke out in
September of that year, particularly in the districts of Kokotohai and
202Tsingho. Once again Sheng sent troops to suppress this revolt, though
apparently with little success. 8y November, 1940, unrest is reported to
have spread throughout ths three north-western border districts of IIi,
Chuguchak and Shara Sums (Altai), as well as - for the first time since
2031937 - to the southern, Uighur-inhabited oasis of Aksu.
In sum, therefore, it seems that the benefits brought to the indigenous
Muslim peoples of Sinkiang during Sheng's "progressive"years have been greatly
exaggerated. On the credit side must be set Sheng's rapid extension of road
204and telephone communications within the province, the partial stabilisation
201. Sheng, Red failure in Sinkieng, pp. 178-9.
202. ~., pp. 215-6.
203. 1E!2., p. 218.
204. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 75, apparently quoting Tu Chung-yuan. It i.
clear, however, that the Sinkiang road-building project was not intended
specifically to benefit the population of Sinkiang. Rather it was undertaken,
employing Soviet funds and Turkic labour, with the intention of improving
links between the USSR and the Sino-uapanese war front. Thus to many Sinkiang
Muslims, Sheng's road-building projects can have seemed to be little more
than forced labour in a Soviet and Chinese causa. In this context, see Lies,
op.cit., p. 78.
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of provincial currency,205 and certain much-vaunted educational and
"cultural" reforms which should, however, only be examined in the context
of contemporaneous educational and "cultural" reforms within neighbouring
206Soviet Central Asia. Against this, following a painstaking examination
of the available sources (none of which are truly non-partisan), there
emerges a picture of police terror, military repression, and continuing
Muslim resistance to Sheng's rule.
205. Seemingly the Sinkiang currency reforms were undertaken, at Sheng's behest,
by Mao Tse-min, the younger brother of Mao Tse-tung, whom Sheng subsequently
executed. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 74-5, fn. 46.
206. Tu Chung-yuan's impressive but unsubstantiated claims of Sheng'a
educational achievements (cited above, p. 338 ) give the misleading
impression that, during these "progressive" year., many thousands of new
primary schools sprang into existence. In fact it i. clear that in most
cases Sheng merely altered tha curricula of existing aur'anic schools
(see Cable and french, 'The New "New Dominion"', pp. 13-14). Undoubtedly
Sheng and his Soviet backers did institute a sweeping literacy programme
between 1934 and 1942, though very much for their own purpose •• Thus in
the Soviet Union:
By 1930, all the languages of Central Aaia had been provided
with Latin alphabets, and these were used in the textbooks
for the new achools being ••t up, and in the newspapers,
Journals and books published by newly-established presses.
Many hundreds of thousands of adults and school children
learning to read for the first time knew only the Latin
alphabet. Unfamiliar with the Arabic script, they ware cut
off from the classic works that comprised the literary
tradition of Central Asia. The Koran and its commentaries
became closed books, as did the Psrsian pastry of Sa'di,
firdausi and Hafiz and the scholarly works produced during
the golden days of learning in Samarkand and Bukhara. for
the generations beginning their education in Soviet schools
and adult education classes, the literary blackboard was
wiped clean, ready for new writing. Bacon, E., Central Asians
Under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change, NV,1966)". Iq,.
By the mid-1930s these Stalinist educational reforms, which
were clearly something of a mixed blessing, had spread across
the Sino-Soviet frontier to affect both the sedentry and nomadic
populations of Sinkiang. {Emiloglu,A., 'Changes in the Uighur
Script during the Past 50 years', taJ.,XVII. 1.12B-9i Lias. gp,cIS.,
pp. 74-5; cf. Winner, T.G., The Oral Art and literature or the
Kazakhs of Central Asia (NY, 1958), pp. 14-42).
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7.5 1942-44: The fall of Sheng Shih-ts'ai and the [mergence
of Kuomintang Influence
As has been shown, by the time of the outbreak of the Second World
War in September, 1939, Sinkiang had become a virtual territorial extension
of the Soviet Union, whilst its ruler, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, although still a
Chinese national, had become a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and was amongst the most vociferous (and sycophantic) of Stalin's
foreign supporters. As a corollary to this development, a number of senior
CCP members under the leadership of Chen T'an-chiu and including Mao Tse-tung's
brother, Mao Tse-min, were despatched to Sinkiang early in 1938.207
Once in Urumchi, they took up various important posts in the provincial
administration, though it is clear that they remained suspicious of Sheng's
bona fides, and that their loyalty lay ultimately with Yenan.20e
Soviet influence in Sinkiang undoubtedly reached a peak in November,
1940, when Sheng Shih-ts'ai ratified the infamous "Tin Mines Agreement",
209apparently. at Stalin's demand. The year 1941, however, saw two striking
developments, both of which seriously affected the military and political
position of Sheng's Soviet ally. firstly, on April 13th, 1941, the Soviet
Union and Japan signed a mutual non-aggression pact which was o~viously
210detrimental to Chinese interests. This development cen hardly have
207. Clubb, China and Russia: The Great Game, p. 321.
208. ibid., p. 323; Sheng, Red failure in Sinkiang, pp. 232-3.
209. According to Sheng, during the negotiations over the "Sin Tin" agreement,
he was informed by the Soviet delegation that ha was a member of the All
Union Communist Party (CPSU), and that he should therefora obey the ordera
of the party (i.a. a1gn the agreement). Red failure in Sinkiang. p.222.
210. Stalin is reported to have embraced Matsuoka, the Japanese roreign
Minister, and to have said: '~e are Asiatics, too, and we've got to
stick together'. Werth, A., Russia At War, 1941-45 (London, 1964), p. 121.
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pleased Sheng, who, although otherwise politically amoral, seems to have
remained staunchly anti-Japanese throughout hie long political career.2ll
At the time of the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact,
however, Sheng was clearly in no position to express overt hostility towards
a policy of d6tente with Japan. Accordingly, he seems to have "hedged his
bets" by suggesting that the Soviet Union should institute a fully-fledged
Soviet regime in Sinkiang,2l2 whilst simultaneously opening secret
negotiations with the Kuomintang authorities in an apparent move to bring
Sinkiang back into the Nationalist Chinese fold.2l3
Sheng's political indecision was not to last long. Within two months
of Stalin's reaching agreement with Japan, the political balance in Central
Asia was once again radically changed by Hitler's June, 1941 blitkrieg
against the Soviet Union. Within days it became apparent that the supposedly
invincible Red Army had suffered a series of cataclysmic defeats at the hands
of the Germans, and was reeling back towards the Urals. In October, 1941,
the severely over-strained Soviet Government informed Chungking that all
214shipments of military aid to China would have to be suspended, whilst by
November of the same year German forces had brought Leningrad under siege,
were within some 30 miles of Moscow, and had thrust far into the Ukraine.
211. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 72. It should be remembered that Sheng's
native province of Liaoning had been occupied by the Japanese Kwantung
Army in September, 1931, and was subsequently incorporated in the
Japanese puppet state of "Manchukuo".
212. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang, p. eo.
213. ~, pp. 80-81. It is interesting to note that during April, 1941, Sheng
was officially appointed Governor of Sinkiang by the Nationalist authorities.
Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 123.
214. North, R.C., Moscow and Chinese Communists (Stanford, 1953), p. 18S.
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8y the end of the year these developments had served both to weaken
Soviet influence and prestige in Sinkiang, and severely to diminish
the attractions of the Soviet Union as an ally in the eyes of Sheng
Shih-tslai.
smoulder.21S
Meanwhile, the Kazakh revolt in the Altai continued to
On December 7th, 1941, a third factor entered the increasingly
complicated equation of Central Asian politics with the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbour. As a result of this development,"Chiang Kai-shek gained an
powerful and committed ally in the United States of America, as well as
a new source of military and financial aid to replace the hard-pressed
Soviet Union. Kuomintang morale received a considerable boost as a result
of this political windfall, and Chiang Kai-Shek - now fully confident that
216 .Japan would lose the war - took stepa to atrengthen hi. position within
China in preparation for the KMT-CCP conflict which would inevitably follow
Japan's defeat.2l7 Sinkiang obviously figured prominently in Chiang's
calculations. If the KMT wished to secure its rear and to isolate the main
CCP base at Yenan from the Soviet Union, it would clearly be necessary to
wean Sheng Shih-ts'ai away from his Soviet and CCP advisers and back into
the Nationalist camp. Meanwhile, 1,500 miles away in Urumchi, faced with
spreading Muslim unrest and rapidly diminishing Soviet assistance, Sheng had
reached a similar conclusion. It only remained for the negotiations to take
place.
215. Jackson, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands, p. 53; Ismalil, M.S., and Isma'il,
M.A., op.cit., p. 14; Lias, op.cit., pp. 102-3.
216. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, p. 103; Whiting, Soviet strategy
in Sinkiang, p. 82.
217. Whiting, Soviet strategy in Slnkiang, p. 82. Needless to say, a similar
course of action was taken by the CCP. North, R.C., Chinese Communism
(london, 1966), pp. 167-8.
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Accordingly, in March, 1942, General Chu Shao-liang, commander of
the Eighth War Area, with headquarters at Lanchow, flew to Urumchi to hold
218secret talks with Sheng Shih-ts'ai. It seems highly probable that Chu,
acting on Chiang Kai-shak's instructions, suggested to Sheng that ha should
break with Moscow and realign himself with Chungking. As Clubb has indicated,
the guid pro guo would presumably have been Chiang's agreement to Sheng's
continuation in power, together with the promise of a share in the financial
39aid already pledged to the KMT by the American Government. Sheng apparently
signalled his acceptance of Chiang's offer in April, 1942, when, in rapid
succession, he stopped publication of the pro-Soviet monthly organ
220fan-ti chan-hsien ("Anti-Imperialist War front"), and ordered the arrest
of numerous "progressives" and CCP members working in Sinkiang. Amongst those
arrested were Sheng's childhood friend, Tu Chung-yUan, and Mao Tse-min,
221brother of the CCP Chairman, Mao Tse-tung. At about this time Sheng Shih-ts'ai's
216. Wei, H., China and Soviet Russia (Princeton, 1956), citing a dispatch by
Theodora White in Time, october 25th, 1943. According to Allen S. Whiting
(Soviet strategy in Sinkiang. p. 94, fn. 10), White'. information has
been corroborated 'by en American, well informed on events of this period
through eyewitness contacts'. See also Clubb, China and Russia, p. 323
According to Lattimore (Pivot of Asie, p. 79), Sheng Shih-tala! had onca
been a subordinate of Chu Shao-liang.
219. Clubb, China and Russia, p. 323. See aleo: Esposito, B.J., 'China's West
in the 20th Century', Military Review, LIV, 1 (1974), p. 72.
220. Chan fook-lam, G., Sinkiang Under Sheng Shih-te'ai, p. 163; Whiting,
Soviet strategy in Sinkiang, p. 83.
221. According to CCP sources (Sinkiang Jlh-peo, June 3rd, 1953, cited in
Whiting, op.cit., p. 94, fn. 12), over 100 Chinase Communists were
arrested during Sheng's Spring 1942 purge. Mao Tse-tung'a biographer,
Stuart Schram, would appear to be mistaken in dating Mao Tse-min's
arrest to September, 1942. Schram, Meo Tee-Tung (Harmondsorth, 1966), p.
209.
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own brother, Sheng Shih-ch'i, who commanded the motorised brigade at
Urumchi, was shot and killed, apparently because of his pro-Soviet views.222
Negotiations between Sheng Shih-ts'ai and the Nationalist authorities
at Chungking continued throughout the summer of 1942, with Chu Shao-liang
acting as intermediary. Chu mada a second, unofficisl visit to Sinkiang
i 223n May, and a third, official visit in July. finally, accompanied by
Madame Chiang Kai-shek and by Chaucer H. Wu, the Nationalists' Spacial
Commissioner for foreign Affairs, Chu flew into Urumchi on August 29th to
finalise the agreement. According to Chinese Nationalist sources,
Madame Chiang carried with her a letter from her husband promising Sheng
4~'not only forgiveness for past deeds, but ~ . full responsibility for
their consequences,.224
222. Considerable mystery surrounds the death of Sheng Shih-ch'i. According
to Sheng Shih-tstai (Red failure in Sinkiang, p. 240), Shih-ch'i was
murdered by his wife, Chen Hsiu-ying, who was acting on Soviet and CCP
instructions. A "written confession" to this effect was extracted from
Chen Hsiu-ying, who was subsequently executed (Whiting and Shang,
Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?, pp. 293-301). According to Chang Ta-chun,
however, the unfortunate Chen Hsiu-ying was tried in camera and held
incommunicado until the time of her execution (Ssu-shih nien tung-luan
Hsin-chiang, pp. 118-21). Allen s. Whiting has reviewed the available
information surrounding the death of Sheng Shih-ch'i (Soviet strategy,
pp. 85-6), and concludes that, in all probability, Sheng Shih-tstai
.ordered his brothar's execution because of the latter's pro-Moscow
sympathies and hostility to the KMT. In this context, sea also the pro-
Soviet version recounted in: Anon., 'The Story of Sinkiang', Amerasia,
December 15th, 1944, pp. 357-60.
223. Whiting, Soviet strategy in Sinkiang, p. B4; Clubb, China and Russia,
pp. 324-5.
224. Whiting, Soviet strategy, p. BS; Clubb, China end Russia, p. 325; Chiang
Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, p. 101. Lattimore, however, states that
Mme Chiang and General Chu were accompanied by Wu Chung-hsin (See Appendix
I) and not by Chaucer H. Wu (Wu Tse-hsiang). Pivot of Asia, p. 79)
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rollo~ing tha succa••ful conclusion of Sheng'. negotiationa with
the KMT and Sinkiang'. official re-incorporation into the Chinese nationel
fo~d, on October 5th, 1942, Shang Shih-ts'a! .ent a memorandum to the Soviet
Consulate-General in Urumchi demanding the general withdrawal of ell Soviet
military and technical personnel within. period of three month ••225 Puehkin,
226the Soviet Consul-General, prevaricated. The war in Europa wa. not going
wall for the Russians. Amongst other rever.es, during the autumn of 1942
German armoured divisions rapidly overran the Kuban and struck deep into
the Caucasus, fei.ing the Swastika flag on Mount Elberus and threatening the
strategically vital oil-producing region of Baku. Under th••e circu~8tance8
Stalin understandably was not anxious to relinquish Soviet control over the
227Sinkiang oilfielda at Tu-shan-tzu. Ha accordingly ignored Shang's threa
month warning, and opened negotiations with tha Nationali.t authorities at
Chungking in a yein attempt to salvage the Soviet poaition.228 Meanwhile
Sheng, in a move epparently designed both to impre •• Chiang Kal-ehek and to
pre-empt the possibility of a Soviet-aponsored coup in Urumchi, began a new
225. Shang, Red F'ailure in Slnk1eng, pp. 2~5-6J Clubb, Chine end R,,~de, p.
326.
226. Sheng, Red F'ellure In 5ink1ang, pp. 255-8.
227. Werth, op.cit., p. 474; cf. Norine, Ceteway to AsiA, p. 113, where the
Tu-shsn-tzu oil is described es 'quality 011 comparable to tha Baku
product'.
228. Clubb, Russie end Chine, p. 327; Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkleng,
PP. 86-9.
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and vicious purge of all "progressive" elements in Sinkiang. Amongst
those tortured and executed at this time were both Mao Tse-min229and
Tu Chung_yuan.230
Within a few months of this dramatic volte-face, however, it became
apparent that Sheng had miscalculated badly. In early february, 1943,
shortly after the linking of Sinkiang's currency to that of the Nationalist
Government,231 and just as the first KMT-appointed officials were arriving
232to take up their posts in Urumchi, news reached Sinkiang of the crushing
German defeat at Sta1ingrad. Seemingly the premise upon which Sheng had
based his shift of allegiance in 1942 had been erroneous; the Soviet-Union
was not to be conquered by the Nazis after all.
During the spring of 1943 the Soviet armies began their reconquest of
the Ukraine. As the German panzer divisiona rolled back from the Caucasus,
,
so the immediate importance to Stalin of the Tu-shan-tzu oilfields in Sinkieng
diminished. Accordingly, on March 17th, the Soviet Union notified Chungking
229. According to G. Kessle, Sheng sent photographs of the dead bodies of Mao
Tse-min and other prominent CCP members to Chiang Kai-shek in order to
prove that the executions really had taken place. Myrdal, J., and G. Kessle,
The Silk Road (London, 1980), p. 212. for a transcript of Mao Tse-min's
"confession" see: Whiting and Sheng, op.cit., pp. 287-90.
230. Tu Chung-yuan does not appear to have been a member of either the CCP or
the CPSU. for details surrounding Tu's activities in Sinkiang and his death
at the hands of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, see two articles by Sa Kung-liao (an
associate of Tu who fled Sinkiang in 1940) in Kuo Hsin (Hong Kong), NS I,
3 (Nov. 11, 1947) and 4 (Nov. 25, 1947), cited in Lattimore, Pivot of Asie,
p. 78. for a transcript of Tu's "confession", see: Whiting snd Sheng,
op.cit., pp. 291-2. for Sheng's rather unconvincing denial of Tu's murder,
see: Whiting, Soviet Strategy, p. 94, fn. 13.
231. Clubb, China and Russia, p. 327.
232. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, p. 101.
that all Soviet Personnel and equipment attached to the Urumchi aircraft
factory and the Tu-shan-tzu oilfields and refinery would be withdrawn.
One month later, on April lOth, a similar notification was passed to Sheng
Shih-ts'ai which also promised the evacuation of Soviet geological teams
from Sinkiang and the withdrawal of the Red Army Eighth Regiment from Kumul.233
Stalin was clearly most unhappy at these developments, however. rinal Soviet
withdrawal from Sinkiang was not completed until October, 1943, almost one
year after Sheng had first issued his "three month" ultimatum. Moreover,
the period of withdrawal was a most unsettled one, with the Kremlin protesting
to Chungking over Sheng's "hostility" whilst at the ssme time - according
to Sheng - making threatening tank movements across the Ili frontier.234
As the Soviets withdrew, they capped the Tu-shan-tzu oil wells end carried
back across the frontier every bit of equipment which could be moved, from
235heavy plant to medical supplies. Yet it is clear that this withdrawal was
regarded as a purely temporary expedient, in indication of which Soviet
geologists and engineers are reported to have frankly informed Chinese
236observers: "We'll be back in two years".
233. Whiting, Soviet Strategy, p. 89; Clubb, China and Russia, pp. 327-8.
234. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, p. 102) Sheng, Red failure In
5inkianQ, pp. 264-6; Whiting, Soviet strategy, pp. 86-91.
235. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. BO) Clubb, China end Russia, p. 328.
236. Whiting, Soviet Strategy, p. 100.
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Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek had acted to strengthen Nationalist
links with the "five Ma" Tungan Warlord group in Northwest China by
appointing Ma Pu-ch'ing, an uncle of Ma Chung-ying and potential rival
of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, to the post of Pacification Commissioner for Western
Tsinghai.237 Sheng wae thus in a very weak position when, in June, 1943,
KMT troops under the command of General Chu Shao-liang began to enter
Sinkiang from Kansu. following the final withdrawal of the Soviets in
October of the same year, it became clear that Sinkiang was slipping from
Sheng's grasp, and that it could only be a matter of time before he was
removed from power and the provincial administration passed fully under
KMT control.
In fact, Sheng was to survive in power until the autumn of 1944.
Moreover, during the intervening period, he was to make a last, desperate
attempt to change sides once again. Sheng's last gamble began in the spring
of 1944, at a time of rising KMT-CCP tensions within China, and of rapidly
worsening Sino-Soviet relations in Central Asia.238 Accordingly, in february,
1943, the Sinkiang warlord declared himself ill and began to absent himself
from meetings with KMT functionaries in Urumchi.239 Then in April of the same
year, the Japanese suddenly launched their first large-scale anti-Chinese
offensive of six years, driving swiftly south from the lunhai railway line
237. Lattimore, Pivot of Asie, p. 79; Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol II,
p. 474. for a general study of Chieng's p.licia9 towards the "Wu Ma"
clique during this period, see Nohara Shiro, , hu oku ni okeru kaik 0
seisaku' ('China's Muslim Policy'), Kindei Chugoku Kenkyu Studies in
Modern China), May, 1948, pp. 299-323.
238. Within China, pitched battles ware being fought between the KMT and the
CCP as the latter rapidly extended the areas under their control.
Internationally, Soviet comment had become increasingly critical of
the KMT war effort, whilst on the Sinkiang-MPR frontier small-scala
fighting had developed between KMT and MPR forces. In April, 1944,
the Soviet Union declared its support for the MPR in this border
dispute. See Whiting, Soviet strategy in Sinkiang, p. 92.
239. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 80.
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in Honan to roll up Nationalist positions as far south as Hainan Island
and the frontiers of Indo-China. Sheng saw his opportunity, and in ~un8
began arresting 'numerous' students and teachers whom he suspected of
holding Nationalist sympathies. Then, on August 11th, shortly after
the fall of,the Nationalist strongpoint of Heng-yang to the advancing
~apanese, Sheng called an emergency meeting of provincial officials in
Urumchi and promptly arrested all those KMT functionaries who were unwise
enough to attend.240 This move signalled the beginning of Sheng'a fourth
major purge, during which martial law was declared and over 300 KMT officials
241had their property seized and were imprisoned without trial. Next, Sheng
acted to confuse the KMT garrison forces stationed near Urumchi by informing
the Nationalist commander that he had uncovered a "communist plot" to overthrow
the Sinkiang administration, whilst at the same time secretly alerting his
own military forces for action against the KMT garrison should this become
242 243nacessary. finally, according to at least two sources, Sheng sent a
message to Stalin via the Soviet Consulate-General requesting that the Red Army
240. ~,cf. Clubb, China and Russia, p. 329.
241. Clubb, China and Russia, p. 329; Lattimore, Pivot of Asis, pp. 80-81;
Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang, p. 91.
242. Clubb, China and Russia, p. 329.
243. According to Chang Ta-chun (Ssu-shi nien tung-lusn Hsin-chieng, pp. 138-9),
Sheng offered the Soviet Union concessionary rights in the Altai goldmines
and at the Tu-shan-tzu oilfields, together with 450,000 sheep, as an
inducement to intervene in Sinkiang. According to Christopher Rand, however,
Sheng went so far as to ask Stalin to incorporate Sinkiang into the Soviet
Union (New York Herald Tribun" September 23, 1947. Cited in lattimore,
Pivot of Asia, p. 81).
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should once again intervene on his behalf - only on this occasion
against the legally-constituted and internationally-recognised Government
of China, and not against Muslim rebel forces. It is hardly surprising
244that this appeal failed to draw a Soviet response.
As a result of Stalin's refusal to intervene, Sheng was left
politically isolated and militarily detenoeless before the suparior power
of the KMT. Accordingly, on August 29th, 1944, Sheng Shih-ta'ai was notified
by the Nationalist Government that he had been transferred to the post of
Minister of rorestry and Agriculture at Chungking. At the same time,
General Chu Shao-liang was appointed Acting Chairman of tha Sinkiang
Government, whilst command of all troops in the province was transferred to
the Nationalist Military Affairs Commission (headed by Chiang Kai_shek).245
Shortly thereafter, on September 11th, 1944, Sheng flew out of Sinkiang
for the last time to take up his sinecure in Chungking.246
244. Bearing in mind Stalin's dictum that: 'Military diplomacy should know
how to use for the war aims ••• even the devil and his grandmother'
(Werth, op.cit., p. 492), it seems unlikely that Stalin was chiefly
motivated by his distaste for Sheng (Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. ell
Clubb, China end Russia, p. 330), though this may well have proved a
secondary factor in the Kremlin's refusal to assist Sheng in 1944.
245. Clubb, China and Russia, p. 330; Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China,
p. 102.
246. According to Sa Kung-liao, 'Talks about Sinkiang', Wen Teie, XXII, March
21, 1946 (cited in Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 74), Sheng paid the KMT
a massive bribe of 500,000 Chinese ounces of gold to buy his sinecure
and subsequent immunity (See also Chen, The Sinkieng Story, p. 201;
Davidson, op.cit., p. 118). lattimore agrees that 'Like many another
official insuring himself against a fall from power, Sheng in his last
years in Sinkiang put by an immense fortune' (op.cit., p. 74). Unfortunately
Lattimore does not indicate his sources for supposing that Sheng only
embezzled funds 'during his last years'. Certainly Tu Chung-yUan makes
the claim in his 1938 panegyric that 'Sheng hes set a leading example
in governmental unselfishness by accepting a monthly salary of less than
$100 Chinese for his work (whilst) Mrs. Sheng, an administrator of a girl's
middle school, gets about·~lO Chinese' (Norine, Gateway to Asia, p. 98),
but in the light of our subsequent knowledge of Sheng's character, is
this claim really credible?
During his ten years of absolute power in Sinkiang, Sheng Shih-ts'ei
was responsible for the imprisonment of an estimated 100,000 people, many
thousands of whom were subsequently tortured, sent into internal exile, or
247simply executed. Inevitably, the great majority of these people were
Turkic Muslims, whether "reactionary" victims of Sheng's pro-Soviet pariod,
or "progressive" victims of his virulently anti-communist leter years.
As a result of this prolonged reign of terror (coupled with important
Soviet military and financial assistance during the period 1934-42)
Sheng was able permanently to break the power of tha Tungans in Sinkiang,
and temporarily to suppress Turklc Muslim separatism, particularly in the
troubled south of the province. Yet ~uslim opposition to Chinese rule in
Sinkiang did not diminish es a result of Sheng's repressive policies;
rather it went underground, where it developed in extent and maturity, only
to re-emerge following Sheng's break with the Soviet Union and subsequent
fall from power as the bitter legacy of Sinkiang's last warlord to his
Kuomintang successors.
247. According to Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 78, Sheng imprisoned 'about
80,000 people'; Clubb, China and Russia, p. 330, gives a figure of
100,000: Chen, The Sinkiang story, p. 199, claims 200,000. According
to Anna Louise strong, unpublished CCP sources put the number of
prisoners held by Sheng after his break with the USSR at 50,000 (cited
in Whiting, Soviet strategy, p. 94), whilst Kotov claims that during
Sheng's rule (which he mistakenly refars to as KMT rule) 'over 12,000
of the best fighters in the people's cause' were executed or died in
gaol (Kotov, p. 443). It is, of course, impossible to verify these
figures.
CHAPTER 8
SINKIANG, 1944-47: MUSLIM SEPARATISM UNDER THE KUOMINTANG
In the quick thunder of cavalry skirmish and
squalor of ambush without mercy and In partisen
wildness and in Kuomintang horror, in cruelty
and counter-cruelty, this revolt of the Three
Regions had the grandeur and misery of a trua
war of 1iberation.l
This "Revolution of tha Three Regions" was a
constructive part of the Chinese Revolution.2
8.1 KMT Policies in Sinkiang, 1942-45
With the transfer of Sheng Shih-ts'ai to Chungking in September,
1944. and with the concurrent appointment of General Chu Shao-liang to
the post of Acting Chairman of the Sinkiang Provincial Government, direct
central government control over China's far north-west was re-established
for the first time since 1911. Whereas Yang Tseng-hsin and his successors,
Chin Shu-jen and Sheng Shih-ta'ai, had established themselves in Sinkiang
by force before being recognised by the central authorities as the "de Jure"
1. Davidson, 8., Turkestan Alive, p. 120.
2. Mao Tse-tung, in conversation with Yamamoto Mitsuru. See_the latter's:
'Henkyo no Chugoku 0 yuku: Shlnzian Uiguru Tab! Nikki shg , ('A Visit to
the Chinese rrontier: Diary of Travels in the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous
Region'), Chuo-koron (Tokyo), November, 1977, p. 167.
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~AP 12: The III Rebellion and the "Pei-ta-ehen Incident"
rulers of the province, following Sheng's deposition, power of appcintment
passed directly to the Nationalist Government in Chungking. In practice
this was to mean that, from the autumn of 1944, affective control over the
Sinkiang administration passed to Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT Genera11asimo, and
to his principal supporters ,within the KMT"the·inf1uential and authoritarian
"C.C. C1iquelt•3 8etween 1944 and 1948 the KMT was to appoint four officials
in rapid succession to the post of Chairman of Sinkiang. These wera the
Han Chinese Wu Chung-hs!n (1944-46) and Chang Chih-chung (1946-47), the
~ - --Uighur Mas ud Sabri (1947-48), and finally the Tatar 8urhan Shahidi
(1948-49), who was subsequently to become the first Chairman of Sinkiang
under the CCP.4
Wu Chung-hsin, the first KMT appointee, flew into Urumchi on October 4th,
1944, after a brief interregnum during which Sinkiang was officially
5administered by the C.C. Clique-influenced General Chu Shao-liang.
3. According to Lattimore, the C.C. Clique'was 'the "Tamannyn of the KMT,
controlling more political machinery and mora kay appointments than any
other faction, (which) was known for its impatient policy of direct
repression, and its preference for the use of force in extirpating any
challenge to its supremacy. Its strength came from-the brothefs Ch'en
Kuo-fu and Ch'en Li-fu, nephews of an early political patron of Chiang
Kai-shek and confidential secretaries to the Generalissimo who helped to
engineer his original rise to power'. (pivot of Asia, pp. 81-2).
4. for further details regarding these four officials, see Appendix I,
'Who Was Who in Republican Sinkiang.'
5. kccording to Lattimore (Pivot of Asia. p. 86), General Chu Shao-liang was
working for the C.C. Clique at this time.
Wu was an experienced bureaucrat, formerly Governor of his native
Anhwei, who, according to Lattimore, was also 'long associated with the
C.C. Clique, long active in frontier affairs, and long distrusted by
6Mongols and Tibetans'. That Wu was distrusted by China's national
minorities was hardly surprising, for he was a follower of the "Great Han"
school of thought, much beloved of Chiang Kai-shek and certain powerful
factions of the KMT, which holds that all the inhabitants of China belong
to one (Chinese) family, and that incidental differences of culture,
religion and language are unfortunate aberrations. destined to be subsumed
7in a "Greater Han" Chinese whole. As an edJunct to this belief, Wu actively
supported the KMT policy of encouraging Han Chinese colonisation of national
minority regions, particularly along China's long end vulnerable Inner Asian
frontier.8
6. Lattimora, Pivot of Asia, p. 85.
7. According to Lattimore (Pivot of Asia, p. 83), amongst the most extreme
exponents of this "Great Han" theory was Li Tung-fang, e historian patronised
by the C.C. Clique, who taught that there was no difference of nationality
between Sinkiang Uighurs and Han Chinese (in this context, see Li's 'Are
the People of SinkiangTl1rki?'~ in Altai (Chungking), I, 2 (April 25, 1945).
for Chiang Kai-shek's "Great Han" views, see above, p•. 37 • for evidence
that Wu Chung-hsin shared these views, see: IOLR. L/P&S/12/2359, EXT.23l4.l945,
Turral, G., (HMCU). Sinkiang Situation: The first Months 0' the New Regime,
p. 3.
8. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. S6J see elsa Wu Ai-chen (Aitchen K. Wu),
'Will China Lose Its far West?' Asia, XXXIX (1939), p. 675:
One might say that China is like a bankrupt
family, which is so embarrassed financially that
it can hardly continue to exist, but whose
ancestors, fortunately, have left it an estate
in the west. If need be, there is still this
vast country to fall back on.
Wu's first months in Sinkiang were hardly auspicious, though the
new regime was distinguished more by administrative incompetence and
tactless paternalism then by the outright brutality of its predecessor.
Possibly the KMT's first mistake was its delay in appointing a new
governor, for during the brief 17-day interval between Sheng Shih-ta'ai'a
departure for Chungking and Wu Chung-hsin's arrival in Urumchi, Sheng's
trusted lieutenant and Chief of Police, Li Yi-ch'ing, was able to conduct
his own purge of Sinkiang's prisons, during which an estimated 400 to 500
political prisoners were 'liquidated' - an action which took place under
KMT auspices, if without official KMT sanction.9 Moreovar, thia mistake
was compounded - whilst KMT complicity in the killings was surely
confirmed in the eyes of most Sinkiang Muslims - by Wu'. subsequent
10failure to have Li Yi-ch'ing arrested for this crime. ro1lowing Wu's
assumption of office, a number of political prisoners were released,
with great fanfare, from the 14 or 15 major gaols which Sheng had...
11 .maintained in Urumchi. According to the new1y-estab1ished British
12Consula~e in Urumchi, however, between October, 1944, and rebruary,
1945, no more than 500 political prisoners were thus reieased, and most of
these were KMT adherents or officials who had been detained by Sheng during
13his final, abortive purge of the preceding summer. In marked contrast,
g. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2359, EXT.2314.1945, p. 2.
10. ~., Li was subsequently dismissed and permitted to leave Sinkiang.
11. lli.!!.
12. rollowing Sheng's realignment with the KMT, American and British
consulates were set up in Urumchi (in April and September, 1943,
respectively) at KMT request. Lattimore, E., 'Behind the Sinkiang
InCident', rES, Mey 3rd, 1944, p. 81.
13. lOLR, L/P!S/12/2359, EXT.2314.1945, p. 2J cf. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia,
p. 86.
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non-KMT political refugees who had fled Sinkiang to escape Sheng's
14dictatorial rule were forbidden to return by the new authorities;
similarly, none of Sheng's prisons were closed, and no attempt was made
to dismantle his much-feared secret police force, which continued its
15surveillance activities as before, but under Wu Chung-hsin's orders.
Meanwhile, inflation and corruption, both of which had been kept
within manageable limits during Sheng's "progressive" years, spiralled
upwards and out of control, so that the saying "One Sheng Shih-tstai went
out, but two cama in", became current throughout Sinkiang.16 In effect, the
economic collapse of the province began in 1942, following Sheng'a break
with the Soviet Union end the establishment of close fiscel end economic
links between Sinkiang and Nationalist China. As Lattimore hes shown, during
periods of close economic co-operation between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union
(as in 1934-42), the oases of southern Sinkiang, with their relatively large
population and demand for consumer goods, bought more from the Soviet Union
than they sold. Conversely, the predominantly nomadic region of Ozungaria,
with its small population and large herds of livestock, sold more to the
Soviet Union than it bought. The Dzungarian nomads were thus able to usa
some of the surplus cash derived from their profitable trade with the USSR
14. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. SS.
15. lOLR, L/P&S/12/2359, EXT.2314.194S, p. 7J aea, however, Whiting,
Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang. p. 104.
IS. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. SS.
to buy arable products and other goods from the southern oases (and
Ili). The pattern of Sinkiang-Soviet trade was therefore circular,
with the main currerit flowing from Dzungaria to the Soviet Union, then
from the Soviet Union to the southern oases surrounding the Tarim Basin,
and, finally, from the southern oases back to Dzungaria.17
rollowing Sheng's break with the USSR, however, this trade cycle
was ruptured, with disastrous consequences for Sinkiang in general, and
for tha southern oases in particular. 8y the end of 1942 trade with the
Soviet Union, which had completely dominated the provincial economy for
over a decade, had ground to a virtual standstill.1S The only manufactured
goods available in Sinkiang were cigarettes, imported from the Nationalist-
controlled areas of China proper. According to Chen, practically no
industrial goods could be bought in the shops or bazaars of tha major towns,
whilst in the southern oases iron had become a "precious metal", one pound
of which could purchase several tan-yard bolts of locally-woven cloth.19
To compound this economic disaster, in November, 1942, Sheng accepted a
KMT plan for the linking of Sinkiang's currency to that of the Nationalist
Government at an exchange rate which substantially overvalued the inflated
Nationalist currency. Immediately, near worthless Nationalist dollars began
17.· 1B!£., pp. 175-6.
18. According to Wong Wen-nao, the Nationalist Minister of Economics, during
mid-1942 some 90% of Sinkiangfs exports went to the USSR (cited in Whiting,
Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang, p. 99); in marked contrast, according to Chen
(The Sinkiang story. p. 204), by early 1943 trade with the USSR provided
no more than 3.5% of the provincial revenue.
19. Chen, The Sinkiang story, p. 203.
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to flood into Sinkiang, whilst valuable provincial produce was syphoned
20into China proper in exchange. Inevitably, this process addad to
existing provincial inflation, so that by 1943 the Provincial Commercial
Bank alone was receiving Nationalist currency notes at the rata of one
million dollars per day.21
Sheng's break with the Soviet Union was also to have an important
impact on his own, purely personal business activities, which both adversely
affected the provincial economy, and pointed the way for the rirst of many
KMT "carpet baggers" who began to arrive in Sinkiang from 1942 onwards.
Even before 1942, during his "progressive" years, Sheng had dominated a
large part of Sinkiang's trade through the misleadingly-named Provincial
Trading Corporation, in !act'a priT~tecompany with a working capital
of US$2.5 million, which was owned by Sheng and run by various agents on
his behalf.22 In 1942, no doubt motivated by an increasing awareness of the
insecurity of his own position, Sheng appsrent1y determined to increase his
share of the profits from the Sinkiang economy. Accordingly, a complete
trading monopoly was granted to the Provincial Trading Corporation, through which
Sheng purchased wool, livestock, cotton, furs and other local producta at
compulsory prices fixed well below the market price, transported them on
his own trucks, and sold them, primarily to the Soviet Union, in exchange
for Soviet manufactured goods. Moreover, in 1943, following the sharp
decline in Sinkiang-Soviet trade and the introduction of Nationalist currency,
20. Clubb, Russia and China, p. 327.
21. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 179.
22. ibid •..........
payment in manufactured goods was gradually phased out by the Provincial
Trading Corporation, to be replaoed by compulsory purohase, at fixed rates,
in the grossly devalued paper currency pouring out of Sheng's own
printing presses in urumchi.23
Sheng's monopoly of provincial trade was.to be short-lived, however,
for following the establishment of a KMT provincial headquarters at Urumchi
in January, 1943, the growth of Nationalist political influenca in Sinkiang
was closely paralleled by an expansion of KMT commercial interests throughout
the province. The artificial exchange rate prevailing from November, 1942,
strongly favoured merchants from China proper, who began to export local
produce from Sinkiang to Kansu and all points east at high rates of profit.
The chief beneficiaries of this transfer of trade from the USSR to China
were the "8ig four families" of the KMT, including the Chena of the C.C. Clique,
24the Soongs, the l<ungs, and Chiang Kai-shek himself. In a bid to regulate and
control the flow of goods between Sinkiang and China proper, a "Northwestern
Development Company" was established, under KMT auspices, at Lanchow in Kansu.25
At the same time, economic pressures were brought to bear againat indigenous
trading companies operating from within Sinkiang; thus the passport fie for
a merchant leaving the province was at first trebled, end then multiplied
by ten.26 faced with economic discrimination on this acale, even firma
24. Chen, The Sinkiang story, p. 204.
25. Barnett, A. Doak, China on the Eve of the Communist Takeover (london,
1963), p. 240.
26. Vu Han, 'Sinkieng Memoir', Tu-chih wen-chai (Shanghai), I, 6 (July 16th,
1946), cited in Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 86, fn. 65.
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like "Mussabayev's" (i.e."l"lusa8ai's"), the largest and best-known
Turkic Muslim trading company in Sinkiang, were hard pressed to survive.27
As a result of these policies, by the end of 1944, inflation in Sinkiang
28was running in excess of 1,200% per annum, whilst basic consumer goods
had become all but unavailable. According to Jack Chen:
Tea became a luxury beyond the reach of the common
people. Salt and sugar disappeared. Stocks of cheep
manufactured cotton were soon exhausted. Islamic
custom prescribes thet a corps. be wound in a shroud,
which requires up to twenty feet of cloth. Now there
was nothing in which to bury the dead. This was the
final affront, the final indignitY.29
staple foodstuffs were also seriously effected by inflation. According to
L~ttimore, the price index of wheat flour,. taking June, 1940, 8S 100, had
already increased to 865 by December, 1942. In 1945, during the administration
of Wu Chung-hsin, it reached 75,000, whilst in 1947, under WU'G successor,
Chang Chih-chung, it was to rise to an astonishing 517,500.30
Turkic Muslim discontent stemming from KMT economic mismanagement
in Sinkiang was further exacerbated by the mas.ive deployment of Hen Chinese
and Tungan troops throughout the province which accompanied the reassertion
of central government authority after 1942. It has been estimated that,
et the time of his break with the Soviet Union, Shang Shih-ts'ai had 20,000
troops at his command,31 of whom only the 2-3,000 troops formerly attached
27. Chen, The Sinkiang storl, p. 204.
28. IOlR, L/P&S/12/2359, £XT.2314.1945, p.4.
29. Chen, The Sinkiang story, p. 204.
30. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 179.
:31. Clubb, Russia and China, p. 328.
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to the Northeast National Salvation Army were politically reliable or
32militarily competent. During the period 1942-44, the number of troops
33 .at Sheng's command seems to have been expanded considerably, whilst four
divisions of the KMT's New Second Army were transferred to Sinkiang from
Kansu. rinally, one year after Sheng's departure for Chungking, two divisions
of Tungan cavalry from Tainghai{the rifth and rorty-Second Cavalry Armies,
whose loyalty to the Nationalist cause remained wholly dependent upon the
continuing marriage of convenience between the KMT and the "five Ma" warlord
clique) were transferred to strengthen the N~tionali8t garrison in Sinkiang.34
By 1944-4S, therefore, the KMT was maintaining an estimated 100,000 troops
in Sinkiang, almost all of whom were of Han Chinese or Tungan ethnic origin.3S
It is hardly surprising that the indigenous population of Sinkiang regarded
this huge force as an army of occupation - and, moreover, an army which they
were obliged to maintain through greatly increased taxation (generally payable
in kind, since the provincial government refused to accept its own, almost
37worthless currency) and through forced labour.
32. See above, .p. 238.
33. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 84.
34. ~.J Barnett, op.cit., p. 262.
35.._ Barnett, op.cit., p. 263.
36. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 178-9; Chen, The Sinkieng story, pp. 204-5
37. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. BS; Chen, The Sinkiang story, p. 206.
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Still more disastrous for the Nationalist administration in
Sinkiang, however, was the official encouragement of Han Chinese emigration
to the far north-west. In effect, this represented the reintroduction of a
policy which had been instrumental in bringing about Chin Shu-jen's downfall,
-and which had subsequently been banned by Sheng Shih-ts'ai in en attempt
38to pacify Sinkiang's Turkic Muslim majority. Renewed Han emigration to
Slnklang seems to have begun in late 1942, shortly after Chiang Kai-shek
announced a "Northwest Development Movement" which, besides pledging large
sums of money to finance the transfer of some 10,000 officials, together
39with their families, from China proper to Sinkiang, also aimed to encourage
the emigration of Han Chinese peasant farmers to the far north-west. Whilst
no doubt unpopular, the mass movement of Han Chinese officials to Sinkiang
(aptly characterised by Whiting as a 'subsidised migration'), was probably
acceptable to an indigenous Muslim population long accustomed to living under
an almost exclusively Han bureaucracy. Han Chinese land settlement, however,
particularly when introduced with the clear intention of permanently altering
the ethnic balance in Sinkiang, raised bitter memories of the annexation of
Kumul, and was clearly unacceptable to the Muslim population as a whole.
In feet, the number of Chinese migrants settled on the land in Sinkiang
during the KMT period was never large. Moreover, most of the "colonists"
thus settled were impoverished refugees fleeing famine and war in China proper,
38. Lattimore, Eleanor, 'Report on Sinkiang', rar Eastern Survey, XIV, 7
(April 11th, 1945), p. 79.
39. Whiting, Soviet strategy in Slnkiang, pp. 99-100; Cheng Tien-fong,
A History of Sino-Russian Relations, p. 176
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and may thus be legitimately described as victims of China's internecine
strife, in much the same ~ay as those Muslims whose land they usurped.
Neverthless, deserving of sympathy though these Han settlers may have
been, their plight in no ~ay diminished the very real hostility ~hich
their arrival (frequently accompanied by KMT brutalities towards the
indigenous population) engendered amongst the Muslim peoples of Sinkiang.
The first such Han eettlers were victims of a severe famine in
40Honan, over 4,000 of ~hom arrived in Sinkiang during 1943. In the early
1930s, Chin Shu-jen had attempted to settle Han immigrants on land which
was already cultivated, and ~hich belonged to sedentary Uighur agriculturalists,
with disastrous consequences. The KMT clearly had no desire to repeat this
experiment, besides ~hich, during the intervening ten years, pressure on
farming land had increased substantially due to population growth and
41resultant over-cultivation. Accordingly, a decision seems to have been
taken to settle the Honanese refugees on land occupied by Muslim nomads,
42initially near Kitai, and subsequently elsewhere in Ozungaria. The chi.f
victims of this new colonisation policy were the Sinkiang Kazakhs, numbers
of whom were forcibly transported from their ancestral hom. in tha Altai
region,43 ~hilst according to Lattimore, in soma instances KMT troops used
machine guns mounted on trucks to wipe out whole Kazekh encampments.44
40. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 79; Dallin, Soviet Russia end the fer (ast, p.362
41. ~., pp. 179-80
42. ~., p. 79.
43. Clubb, Russia and China, pp. 364-5.
44. Lattimore, pivot of Asia, p. 156.
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Needless to say, during the period 1942-45 rampant inflation, official
corruption, and renewed Han Chinese immi9ration combined to produce e deep-
seated animosity towards KMT rule amongst ell the Muslim peoples of Sinkiang.
c-EVen Mas ud Sabri, a Uighur Turk living in Chungking whose political loyalties
are reported to have lain with the C.C. Clique, and ~ho was subsequently to
become the third KMT governor of Sinkiang, felt constrained to write in 1945
that the main characteristics of Nationalist rule in 5inkiang were domination
by 8 large number of troops who were regarded as "human-faced locust.", and
promotion of the kind of Chinese colonisation that had contributed 80 much
45to the rising at Kumul in 1932.
B.2 The Kezekh Revolt in Ozungsria and the Birth of the "Eest
Turkestan Republic" in Ili.
As hes been shown, during his "progressive" years (1934-42), Sheng
Shih-tslai was engaged in an almost continuous, though low-key, .trugg1e
46with the Muslim Kezakhs of Ozungaria. By 1940 Kezakh unrest had spread
throughout IIi, Chuguchak and Shara Sume, the three northernmost administrative
districts of 5inkiang, often referred to collectively In contemporary sources
as "The Three Regions". Moreover, a clear leadar of this nomadic ravolt had
c - - - ( c - )emerged in the person of Uthman 8atur Tk." Uthman the Haro" , a powerful1y-
built and charismatic patriarch of the Kirei Kazakh tribe who Is reported to
have been born In an isolated Altai encampment in north-eestarn 5inkieng some
. Utime during 1899.
45. c-ibid., p. 84, citing an article by Mes ud Sabri entitled 'Regarding
POirtlcs in the Northwest', published in A1tei (Chungking), April 25th,
1945 (in Chinese).
46. See above, pp. 344-8.
Boorman end Howard, Biographical Oictionarx of Republican China, Vol III,
p. 46; cf. the rather fanciful account of Uthman'a birth in Lias, Kezekh
Exodus, pp. 23-4 ~8irth of a hero~.
47.
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c -Uthman, who is reported to have taken part in guerilla raids against
the Chinese even before his 13th birthday, was essentially a Kazakh freebooter
whose activities in the Sinkiang-Ru8sian-Mongolian border area might more
accurately be described es banditry than es a struggle for Turkic or Kazekh
national liberetion. Certainly he was a political opportunist who shared none
of the pan-Turenian ideels which motivated the "Khotan Amrrs" to set up the
secessionist "Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan" at Kashgar in
481933; nor, by all accounts, was he an over-zealous Muslim. Yet in msny ways
it was the very absence of these ideals - which, although vague and nebulous
in southern Sinklang, had caused the rebellious Uighur. to establish provisional
organs of government end a "capital" which presented an easy target for
Chinese counter-attack - that made CUthman Batur and his Kazekh followers
an elusive but persistent thorn in the aide of the Chinese administration at
Urumchi.
By the time of hie break with the Soviet Union in late 1942 Sheng
Shih-tstai had, with Soviet aid, succeeded in re-establishing hia authority
over the greater part of the "Three Regions". Even in the Kazakh stronghold
c -of Shara Sums, provincial forces were in control, whilst Uthman and his
followers hed been driven to taka refuge acrosa the Sinkiang-Mongolian
frontier in the remote fastness of the Mongolian Altai, where thay ara
reported to heve spent the winter of 1942-43 at Tayingkul, on the upper
49reaches of the Bulgan River (see Map No. 12) following Shang'. break
with tha Soviet Union, however, the alignment of forces in northern Sinkiang
48. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol III, p. 46; Lias, op.cit., passim.
49. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol III, p. 47.
changed dramatically as Stalin, 1n a bid to maintain Soviet influence over
the minaral-rich "Three Regions" of northern Sinklang, swung his support
behind Sheng's Muslim opponents. c -As a result of this development, uthman
8~tur and his followers suddenly ceased to be targets for Soviet air and
ground attack, and became instead political and military clients of the
Mongolian People's Republic - itself, of course, e Soviet client state.
c - --According to Kezakh refugee sources, talks between Uthman 8atur,
Mongol representatives of the MPR, and two Soviet-sponsored Kazakh delegates
50from the nearby Kazakh SSR, took place at Tayingkul in mid-1943. Little
substantive information i8 available concerning these talks, but it seems
c - .that Uthman was provided with a certain amount of arms and equipment via
the MPR, as well es with a safe base erea outside the frontiers of Sinkiang
51from which to haresa Chinese forces in Shara Sume. In exchange, the Kazakh
leader is reported to heve offered the MPR grazing rights within tha Altai
52region of Sinkiang, as well as an unspecified amount of livestock. Thus
c -strengthened, Uthman formulated a policy that called for Kazakh-Mongol
cooperation within an autonomous Altai region, and for the barring of all
53Han Chinese military end civilian officials from that region.
50. ~.; cf. Lias, op-cit., pp. 103-11. Lias' fanciful claim that Marshal
Choibalsang, the MPR dictator, attended theae talks, would appear to be
unfounded.
51. Boorman and Howard, Ope cit., Vol III, p. 47; cf. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet
Russia in China, p. 102.
52. Hayit, Turkestan Zwischen Russlend und Chine, p. 318.
53. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol III, p. 47.
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Sheng Shih-ts'a! and his KMT backers responded by mounting renewed
attacks against the Altai Kazakhs, their yurts, and their livestock, whilst
c -Sheng asserted publicly that Uthmen wes receiving Soviet aid and direction,
end that Sinkieng would know neither peace nor prosperity until the Kazakhs
54 c -had been suppressed. fighting between Uthmen's Kazakh horsemen and Sheng's
predominantly Han Chinese troops flered up in December, 1943, and again in
March, 1944, when the provincial forces Buffered a severe defeat which
c - SSleft Uthman in full control of the disputed area. Urumchi blamed this
defeat on the Soviet Union, and Chaucer H. Wu, the Nationalist's Special
Commissioner for foreign Affairs who was 1n Sinkiang at the time, cabled
Chungking to report that Soviet aircraft and MPR troops were acting in
56conjunction with the Kazakh rebels. Official protests by both Urumchi
end Chungking met with a flat Soviet denial of interference in SinkiangJ
however, on April 2nd, 1944, l!!! announced from Ulan Bator that Chinese
forces in pursuit of fleeing Kazakha had crossed the Mongolian frontier
57and had been duly repelled by MPR troops. In case the KMT should remain
in any doubt as to the official Soviet stance, this message was followed
up on April 3rd by a further ~ announcement, this time trom Moscow, to
54. ~.
ss. Clubb, Russia and China, p. 366; Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Slnkiang, p. 102.
56. ~.J According to Cheng Tien-fong (tormerly KMT Minister of Education):
'Under Soviet air cover and with tha help of.Outer Mongolian troops'
c -Uthman 'succeeded in wiping out the entire Chines. garrison st Huihoko
consisting of three regimenta' (op.cit., p. 281).
57. Clubb, Russia and Chine, p. 366.
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the effect that: 'China has moved troops along the Outer Mongolian border.
Soviet Russia, on the basis of its mutual assistance pact with Outer
58Mongolia, is obliged to render assistance'. Clearly Stalin intended that
c -Uthman should remain a thorn in the side of the Chinese authorities, end
thet his eanctuary in the MPR should remain inviolate.
59Meanwhile, prompted by KMT colonisation policies in the Kitei region,
and by an order that 10,000 horses should be requisitioned for Nationalist
60cavelry forces, the Ka~akh revolt continued to spread. 8y the time of
Sheng's departure from the provincial scene in September,,1944, the greater
part of Shara Sume and much of Chuguchak administrative districts had become
c - --disputed territory, and Uthman Batur effectively controlled the Sinkiang
sector of the Altai renge, in which region he is reported to have cerried out
61a mass slaughtar of Han Chinese 'regardless of aex or ege'. It is important
c -to note,'however, that no attempt was made by Uthman toaet up an alternative
administration in Shara Sume and that his revolt, which might perhaps best be
described as a nomadic reaction to egriculturel encroachment and centralised
authority, lacked a coherent political philosophy end remained essentially
anarchic in character.
58. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkieng, p. 102.
59. McLean, N., 'The Much-Courted Kazakhs', The Geographical Magazine, XXI
(1948), pp. 256-63.
60. Kotov, K.F., op.cit., p. 443J ct. Moseley, G., A Sino-Soviet Cultural
Frontier: The IIi Kazakh Autonomous Chou (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), p. 12
(also a reference to Kotov, but in the JPRS, rather than the CAR, version).
61. Lias, op.cit., p. 57, 116.
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All this was to change in the autumn of 1944, when, within a few
weeks of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's departure for Chungking, a major revolt broke
out in the IIi Valley which wes to involve not only the nomadic Kazakhs
(and Kirghiz), but also the settled Uighur ("Taranchi") population, which
62had long remained quiescent under Chinese rule. Moreover, although the
IIi Revolt was initially Turkic Muslim in character, it was later to
attract significant support amongst many non-Muslim peoples of the IIi
region, including numbers of White Russians, Mongols, Tungusic peoples
(Sibo, Solon and Manchu), and even some Han Chinese. In this the IIi
Revolt (or, as it subsequently became generally known, the "Revolt of
the Three Regions"),63 is unique in the annals of Sinkiang history.
Seemingly, trouble had been brewing in the IIi Valley ever since
Sheng's break with the Soviet Union in 1942. IIi, the richest and most
fertile district of Sinkiang, had long enjoyed a special relationship
with its Russian neighbour. The entire valley had been occupied by Tearist
62. The Uighur Muslims of IIi had last rebelled against Chinese authority in
1864-6; Chinese euthority was ultimately restored in 1882. At the time of
the IIi Revolt in 1944, therefore, IIi had remained untroubled by 8 major
Muslim rebellion for over 62 years - much longer than e~other part of
Sinkiang. See Hsu, The IIi Crisis, passim; also above, pp.
63. The often-app1ied term "Revolt of the Three Regions" (aee, for example,
the quotation from Mao Tse-tung at the beginning of thia chepter) i. in
fact misleading, as it tends to obscure the fect that two separate and
politically distinct revolts occurred in northern Sinkieng during this
period - one in IIi, the other in Shara Sume. Although nominal unity was
achieved for a short while, political differences inherent between the
two groups were to prevent their effective unification into a single
movement, as will be shown.
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forces between 1871 and 1882, and had only reluctantly been returned to
64China after prolonged negotiations. During this period of Tsarist
occupation, many Russian settlers moved into tha Iii region. Their numbers
were leter reinforced by "White" Russian refugees, both during and after
the Russian Civil War. Throughout the Republican period Iii had remained
unaffected by the Muslim revolts which swept through Dzungsria and the
Tarim 8asin, and because of its close economic links with the USSR (which
remained largely uninterrupted under both Yang Taeng-hsin and Chin Shu-jen,
as well as during Sheng's "progressive" years), the region had enjoyed a
prosperity far beyond any other in Sinkiang. rollowing Sheng's break with
the Kremlin, however, Ill's special economic relationship with the Soviet
Union was abruptly severed, causing the valley to lose its principal market
for the sale of cattle end raw materials, and its principal source of
manufactured goods. As a result, according to Soviet sources I 'imports
grew fewer and fewer, so that prices of manufactured goods soared, whilst
65those of cattle-breeding fell almost to nothing'.
64. Hsu, op.cit., passim.
65. Mingulov, N.N., 'The Uprising i~ North-West Sinkiang, 1944-49' (an
abridged version of Mingulov's 'The National Liberation Movement in.
Sinkiang as part of the Chinese Revolution, 1944-49', ori9inally
published in Va ros Ietori! Kazakhstana i Vostochno 0 Turkestan Alma
Ate, 1962), CAR, II, 2 1963, p. 183.
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This decline in trade with the Soviet Union, combined with the
greatly increased InflatIon, taxatIon, and requIsitIons in labour and
66kind which accompanied KMT rule, Boon caused widespread discontent in
IIi. The inhabitants of the region seem also to have suffered because of
67their long-standing cultural and educational links with the Soviet Union,
and many Soviet-educated Turkic Muslims were forced to flee across the
neighbouring Sino-Soviet frontier to escape the widespread anti-communist
purges which swept 5inkiang following Sheng's break with the USSR. As was
c - --the case with Uthman 8atur's Kazakhs at Tayingkul in the MPR, these Turkic
Muslim refugees met with a warm reception from the Soviets, and in1943 a
"Sinkiang Turkic People's National Liberation Committee" (STPNLC) was
reportedly set up at Alma Ata, tha capital of Soviet Kazakhstan, with a view
68.to organising "progressive" opposition to the Sheng-KMT regime in Urumchi.
Meanwhile, possibly as early as 1943, but certainly by mid-l944, Turkic Muslims
of the III Valley started to take to the Tien Shan in amall numbers, where
they began to organise resistance to Chinese rule.69
66. Mingulov, oe.cit., p. 183; Kotov, op.cit., p.443.
67. See above, pp. 85-7. 302.
68. Chang Ta-chUn, Ssu-shih nien tung-lusn Hsin-chiang, p. 175; lee fu-hsiang,
op.cit., p. 67.
69. Davidson, Turkestan Alive, p. 122.
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During September and October, 1944, Kazakh unrest in Shara Sume and
70Chuguchak districts spilled over into IIi. This spreading nomadic unrest
was accompanied by a small-scale rising at Nilka, a small village on the
right bank of the River Kash about 80 kilometres east of Kulja, where in mid-
September a mixed group of Kazakhs and Uighur. launched an attack on the
local KMT garrison. According to Chinese sources, the leaders of thia attack
were Ghani Batur, a local Uighur, and farhad, variously described as a Tatar
and an Uzbek, who is said to have 'entered China from Soviet Central Asia,
and to have brought with him arms, including trench mortars and machine guns,
. 71for the rebelling tribesmen'. This accusation was vigorously deniad by
the Kremlin,72 and Soviet sourcea maintain that, in protest against KMT
requisitions and taxes; 'an excited countryside rose with fowling pieces,
pitchforks, hatchets and sticks,.73 Be this as it may (and it must be
remembered that most Kazakh and Kirghiz fighting men would have been mounted
and armed with rifles, however antiquated), the KMT garrison at Nilks, together
with its amall araenal, fell to the Muslim rebel. on or about October 7th,
1944. Shortly thereafter a band of insurgents, variously estimated at
between 1,000 and 2,000 strong, set out over the mountains to attack Kulja,
74the administrative capital of IIi.
70. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2359, EXT.23l4.l945, p. 1.
71. Cheng Tien-fong, op.cit., p. 281; cf. lee fu hsiang, op,cit., p,66;
Chen, J., op.cit., PP. 208-10; Oal11n, op.cit., p. 364.
72. Moore, H.L., Soviet far Eastern Policy. 1931-45 (Princeton, 1945), p. 276,
Beloff, M., Soviet Policy in the far Eest, 1944-51 (London, 1953), p. 97.
73. Mingulov, op.eit., p. 183.
74. !2!2.J cf. Chen, The Sinkieng Story, p. 211.
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On balance, it seems probable that the Nilka rising was a
spontaneous and purely local affair, in which both the USSR and its
"progressive" front organisation, the STPNLC, played no direct part, but
which both were subsequently swift to exploit for their own ends. Possible
indications of this may be found in the raising of the green flag of Islam
at Nilka, and in the general massacre of Han Chinese which seems to have
75taken place. Similarly Jack Chen, whose writings on Sinkiang faithfully
echo the orthodox Maoiet line, notes that: 'it took time to channel into
constructive activities the revolutionary tlood loosed by the first victory
76of the people in Nilka'. Most telling of all, however, i. the (apparently)
casually-ex~ressed comment of the Soviet historian N.N. Mingulov that:
'what the insurgents now naeded was co-ordination, and this wes provided
by a Committee presided over by Ahmadjan Qasim with headquarters at Kulje,.77•
ror it was the Soviet Union, and not the CCP, which was to 'channel into
constructIve activities' the 'revolutionary flood' loosed at Nilka.
Oocumentary proof is, elas, lacking, but circumstantial evidence strongly
suggests that Ahmadjan Qasim was Stalin's man in Kulja, whilst the committee•
he chaired 1n that town was almost certainly the local (underground) branch
. 78of the Soviet-sponsored and Alma Ata-basad STPNLC.
75. ibid.; IOLR, L/P&S/12/2359, EXT.2314.1945, p.3.
76. Chan, op.cit., p. 221.
77. Mingulov, op.cit., p. 184
78. Clubb, Russia and China, p. 366) cf. Lee ru-hsiang, op.cit., p. 67
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Little is known of Ahmadjan Qasim (sea plata 24), tha Uighur Turk
•
who was to assume de facto control over the IIi Rising and who was subsequently
to become the most influential leader of the "East Turkestan Republic" (ETR).
According to Chen, Ahmadjan Qasim was born in the IIi Valley during 1912•
•
His family must heve been reasonably well-to-do, for although hi. father
died when Ahmadjan was only fiva years old, the young boy was well looked•
after by his mother and uncle, and received a good education. Shortly
after the assassination of Yang Tseng-hsin, when Ahmadjan had reached the•
age of seventeen, he was taken to the Soviet Union by his uncle. Here he
remained for the best pert of a decade, returning to Sinkiang in 1938, at
79 -the height of Sheng Shih-tstai'a "progressive" period. Ahmadjan's
•
activities in the USSR remain an almost complete mystery, though it appears
he received a higher education under Soviet auspices (probably in Moscow),80
and may even, according to Chinese sources, have adopted Soviet nationality.Sl
By the time of his return to Sinkiang in 1938, AhmadJan wasa "communist-•
minded progressive" with a Russianiaed name (Akhmedzhan Kasimov).82
79. Chen, op.cit., pp. 246-7.
80. p. 98; McMillen, D.H., Chinese
~~~ ~~~~~~~ __ ~~~ __ ~_19_4_9_-_l_9_7_7(Boulder, Colorado, and
81. Whiting, Soviet strategy in Sinkieng, p.lll; cf. Myrdal and Kessle, op.cit.,
pp. 217-8.
82. Chen, op.cit., p. 247; Mingulov, op.cit., p.184.
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He is reported by Chen to have found work as a carpenter and glazier
(though 8eloff describes him as a school teacher)83 until, following
Sheng Shih-ts'ai's break with the Soviat Union, he was arrested as a
suspected communist and thrown into Jail. Chen concludes on a
reassuringly domestic note which is not altogather convincing: 'Released
only in 1944, he returned to his work and studies and got married.
84Two weeks after the wedd1ng the 111 Uprising began'.
Whatever the nature of Ahmadjin's activities in the months immediately
•
preceding the outbreak of fighting at Nilka, it is at least clear that both
he and his "progressive" colleagues acted swiftly following the fall of
Nilka in'early October to take political control over the burgeoning
rebellion. In the words of Jack Chen: 'the revolutionaries in IIi did not.
wait to be liberated'.SS As aOon as news of the events at Nilka reached Kulja
the STPNLC began to prepare an armed uprising designed both to oust KMT
forces from the city and to pre-empt its 'liberation' by rural partisans
whom the urban "progressives" (rightly) suspected of wooll,.-minded Islamio
fundamentalism and anti-Han chauvinism. Seemingly, the STPNLC'. partial
attainment of this objective was considerably facilitated by the military
incompentence of the KMT.
83. Belof'f',Soviet Polioy in the Far East, p. 98.
84: Chen, op.oi t.; p. '241 ~ Chen further states spec1f'lcally that Ahma.djan
.'was not a member of the underground organization but immediately
:volunteered for and threw him.elf' into any work the revolutionary
leadership gave him to do'.
85. ~, p. 212.
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According to Chen, the KMT maintained three battalions in and
around Kulja. Dna of these, a force of Han regulars raised and trained in
China proper end armed with 'modern automatic rifles, mortars, light and
heavy machine guns, and plenty of ammunition', was Quarterad in central
Kulja 'in barracks on present-day Stalin Street, a poplar-shaded avenue
not far from KMT ermy headquarters'. The second battalion, 'a scratch force
distrusted by the Kuomintang', was stationed In the West Park area of Kulja.
Made up of conscripts from the various non-Han nationalitias in the IIi
region, this force was poorly armed, having 'only two or three rifles to
a company'. The third battalion, also of well-armed Han regulars, was
stationed in the Alrambek district and guarded the nearby alrfield.86
Both Chen and Mingulov suggest that immedistely before Ahmadjan Casim's rising,
•
Nationalist strength within Kulja was seriously depleted by the despatch
of the greater part of tha KMT garrison towards the rebel-held village of
Nilka;S7 according to contemporaneous British diplomatic reports, however,
88only e 'smell detachment of troops' was involved in this sortie, and there
must be a distinct possibility that both Chen and Mingulov have deliberately
exaggerated the weakness of the Kulja garrison as a device to explain the
apparent ease with which rebel forces, said to have been armed initially
with 'fowling pieces, pitchforks, hatchets and sticks' succeeded in defeating
two battalions of Han regulars armed with machine guns, artillery and even
aeroplanes.
S6. ~., p. 212.
87. ~.
es. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/l0 (British Consulate Urumchi to
srr-R. Stavenson, British Ambassador Nanking, 24/9/46), p. 1.
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As might be expected, accounts of the rising at Kulja and the
subsequent struggle for control of the whole IIi Valley are both few .in
number and differ radically in their interpretation of events. It seems
clear, however, that by early November, 1944, the column of Muslim
insurgents from Ni1ka had arrived at the outskirts of Kulja New City,
having evaded the contingent of KMT troops despatched to engage them in
the countryside. Meanwhile within Ku1ja the KMT, 'panicky and desperate'
according to Chen, had declared martial law and 'unleashed a wave of
terror' during which
Security guards rounded up hundreds of suspects.
Patrols indiscriminately gunned down anyone moving
on the streets. Suspects were butchered. Without even
a pretense of investigation or trial thirty-three men
and women were shot insi~e the first district police
station. Another thirty-five were shot at the central
police stetion. Two hundred and thirty-three newly
arrested people were herded together, shot in batches,
and buried in a single mess grave. Another thousand caught
in groups was shot and tumbled into wells and ravines'89
The Kuomintang terror was 'wild and indiscriminate'. However, whilst the
revolutionary organization in IIi Buffered losses, 'its leading cadre was
90intact and swiftly reacted to the attack'. Although the ectual sequence
of events surrounding the rebel capture of Kulja remain unclear, by piecing
together the available Chinese, Russian and British accounts of the rising,9l
89. Chen, op.cit., p. 212.
90. ~., P. 213. ,.
r
The main Chinese sources are: Chang Ta-chun, Sau-shih nlEm tuna-Iuan t,
He1n-chiang. PP. 145-76, and Chen, op.cH., PP. 203-75 (in English,but based(
upon numerous interviews with participants in the IIi Rising, including the i
widow of Ahmedjen Qesim), The main Russian source consulted by the present '
author has'been N.N. Mingulov's Voprosy lstor!i Kazakhstana I Vostochnono
Turkestane, an abridged translation of which appeared in CAR, II, 2(1963),
pp, 181-95, The most detailed (ng1ish account of the actual fighting for
Ku1ja is certainly the report of HMC Urumchi A.C. Graham to Sir R.
Stevenson, then British Ambassador to Nanking, cited in fn.88 above. None
of these accounts may be legitimately described as 'primary sources',
though Graham biasin Sinkiang at the time of the Ili Rising, and l!Iubsequent-"
ly travelled in both KMT and ETR regions of the province during 1946,
91.
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Jt becomes possible to state with some certainty that despite KMT
counter-measures, the STPNLC succeeded both in establishing contacts with
the Nilkapartisans, and in winning over to the rebel cause the greater
part of the Turkic and Mongol conscripts serving in the KMT's West Park
92batallion. On the night of 6th-7th November, 1944, a large band of
insurgents assembled in an orchard near Kulja New City. It seems probable
that this force was comprised of both Nilka partisans and local KulJa rebels.
In any event, early on the morning of 7th November this party attacked KMT
positions in KulJa Old City (neither city is welled), and within a short time
had ceptured the administrative headquarters. According to Graham, the
British consular representative in Urumchi who made an official visit to
IIi in 1946: 'Many Chinese soldiers threw down their erms and hid, only to
93be routed out end butchered at leisure'. Other Han troops took up strong
defensive positions, most notably at the power stetion end the centrel police
station, which they defended with vigour. It took the insurgents almost a
week to reduce these last strongholds of KMT resistance within KulJa.
Meanwhile, the regular Han troops stationed at the airfield were brought under
siege, though no major rebel attack was launched in this direction.94
By November 12th 'green flags dominated more and more buildings', so that
the insurgents deemed themselves sufficiently well in control of Kulja to
set up a Central Military Staff of their own,. and to plan the formation of s
95provisional government. The central police station (reportedly defended by
92. Chen, op.cit., p. 213.
93. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/l0, p. 2.
94. 1£!2.; Chen, op.cit., PP. 213-4J Mingulov, op.cit., p. 184.
95. Chen, op.cit., p. 214: Mingulov, op.cit., p. lB4 (citing the ETR organ
Ingilebi Sargi TUrkistan '-Revolutionary East Turkestan. 7th October, 1947
not seen 6y present author).
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over three hundred armed polIce who must have known that their lives would
inevitably be forfeit tn the event of defeat), finally fell on November 13th.
Two days later, on November 15th, 1944, a new separatist regime, operating
under the soubriquet "SargiTUrkistanCumhurlyetl" ("East Turkestan Republic",,
or ETR) was set up at Kulja under the titular presidency of cAli Khan TUre,
en Uzbek religious leader who enjoyed widespread eupport amongst the Muslim
96peoples of IIi. It was 800n to become apparent, however, that the real
power behind the ETR ley in the hends of the Soviet-sponsored STPNLC,
under the chairmanship of the Uighur "progressive" Ahmadjan Qasim ••
8.3 The Soviet Union end the InItial Consolidation of the (TR.
Possibly the most vexatious question surrounding the shadowy
"East Turkestan Republic" is the degree as to which the predominantly
Muslim rebels received support and encouragement from the neighbouring
Soviet Union. Predictably enough, Wu Chung-nsin and the KMT authorities
lost no time in accusing the Soviets of military intervention in S1nkiang.91
96. Mingulov, op.cit., p. 184J IOLR, L/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/l0, p.3.
97. Whiting, Soviet strategy in Sinkiang, p. 104-5; Wheeler, G., 'Sink!ang
end the Soviet Union', The China Quarterly, XVL (October-December, 1963)
p. 58; Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, pp. 102-3.
Equally predictably, the Soviet authorities strenuously denied this
charge, subsequently informing the nationalists that the Kremlin 'had
98no intention of interfering in China's internal affairs'. In his
Pivot of Asia (1950), Lattimore makes it clear that he discounts reports
of Soviet involvement, adding that: 'most of the Uighur (rebels) were in
99fact without rifles and were armed only with hand grenades'. In contrast
Whiting, in his 1958 study Pewn or Pivot?, clearly accepts that thera WdS
some degree of Soviat involvement, though he adds the caveat that this
conclusion rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, whilst 'firm evidence
on the relationship between the rebels and Soviet strategy is lacking,.lOO
As a result of materials made availabla by the Russians, tha British and
the Chinese over the 23 years sinca Whiting published his conclusions,
it is now possible to state with certainty that tha Soviet Union was deeply
involved in the establishment of tha ETR, though tha precise degree of
Soviet aid to the rebels must remain in soma doubt. Similarly, any
analysis of Soviet diplomatic purpose in setting up a secessionist Muslim
98. Moore, H.L., Soviet far Eestern Policy, P. 276, Wheeler, 'Sinkiang
and the Soviet Union', p. se.
99. Lattimore cites (with epparent concurrence) the reports of frenk Robertson,
'an American correspondent who reached the region (Of the ETR) somewhat
later'. Pivot of Asie, p. 87. In this context, see e1so Robertson's
"report in the New York Times of february 1st, 1948, which stetes clearly
that'thera has bean no evidence to support Chinese charges that IIi
troops are armed with modern Russian equipment' (cited in Lee fu-hsiang,
op.cit., p. 76).
100. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang, p. 105.
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statelet in north-western Sinkiang - or of parallels between the
ETR and the two contemporaneous secessionist movements backed by the
Soviet Union in north-westErn Iran (the "Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan"
and the "Kurdish Republic of Mahabad")lOl_ must inevitably remain speCUlative.
Aa has been shown, despite Chinese claims to the contrary, it seems
probable that the rising at Nilka in September, 1944, was a spontaneous
and purely local affair. following the November 7th rising at Kulja,
however, Chinese claims of Soviet complicity with the rebels were redoubled.
Thus, on November 8th, whilst the fighting in Kulja was still in ita early
stages, the KMT Special Commissioner for foreign Affairs, Chaucer H. Wu,
cabled Chungking from Urumchi to the effect that:
According to a telegram from IIi, on the morning
of November 7, approximately 500 naturalised White
Russians began a revolt in I-ning (Kulja) with
machine guns and grenades. When our airplane flew
into I-ning for reconaissance, machine guna 1n the
Soviet consulate opened fire.102
Whilst this report remains unconfirmed by any independent primary source,
it is difficult to believe that 8 group of insurgents armed chiefly with
cluba,· 'fowling-pieces' and KMT weaponry captured from the amall garrison
at Nilka could so swiftly have overcome many hundreds of heavily-armed Han
regular soldiers and KMT police, particularly when tha lass than spectacular
101. Sea below, pp. 435-40.
102. Copy of telegram from Special Commissioner Wu to Ministry of foreign
Affairs of November 8th, 1944 (Wai-chiao Pu Archives, Taipei, Taiwan),
cited in Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkieng. pp. 104-5.
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military performance of the TIRET and Kumullik rebels during the 1930s is
taken into consideration. Chen ascribes the rebel victory to Buperior
103morale, but Graham, who was probably the first Westerner to visit IIi
under the ETR, reported that: 'The insurgents were ••• Joined by many
Russians with military experience, both with and without Soviet pepers,
104who fought well, and many of whom were killed'. The involvement of
Russian soldiers in the early stages of the rebellion 18 confirmed by
N.N. Mingulov, who describes them as 'settlers living in Sinkiang, having
migrated there from Semirech'ye in the 19th century', he identifies their
lOSleaders as r. Leskin and A. Polinov. Taken together these three sources
(one Chinese, one British, and one Russian) would seem to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that a sizeable group of trained Russian soldiers took
part in the initial stages of the IIi rising, though whether their political
colouring was "White" or "Red" remains unclear. Besides, as Hedin had
indicated in the early 1930s, time and geographical iaolation had served
to heal the wounds of the Civil War, end many ostensibly "White" Russian
settlers in Sinkiang had become reconcIled to the Soviet aystem prevailing
in their motherland.l06
103. Chen, The Sinkiang Story, p. 214
104. IOlR, l/P&S/l2/2360, r/15S~0/324/l0, p.2.
105. Mingulov, op.cit., p. 184.
106. Hadin, Big Horse's Flight, p. 184.
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Seemingly, therefore, during tha initial stages of the rising at
KulJa, the rebel forces ~ere divided into t~o main factions. Of these
the largest and the least-well organised might loosely be described as pan-
Islamic and conservative, consisting primarily of partisans from Nilka
assisted by 'gangs of Moslems armed only ~ith sticks, ~ho paraded the
107streets shouting slogans and murdering defenceless Chinese'. In marked
contrast to this group, the Soviet-sponsored SlPNLC under AhmadJan Qasim
•
sought to establish a secular, secessionist state ~hich might embrace
people of all nationalities and religious persuasions including, at least
in theory, Han Chinese.
In this context, ~hilst it is clear that during the early stages of
the IIi Rising anti-Han pogroms seem to have been the rule rather than the
exception, it is also pertinent to note that ~hen such massacres took place
not all Han Chinese fell victim to the mob. Turral, the British Consul at
Urumchi in 1944-45, identified the most common victims of anti-Han pogroms
as first generation Chinese immigrants, KMT officials, and soldiers. lOB
107. ~,L/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/l0, p.2.
lOS. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2359, £XT.23l4.l945, p. 3.
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This point is elaborated by Graham, who notes that:
Hardly any Chinase civilian officials escaped. ror
example, of over a hundred telegraph employees in
the IIi Ch'u, only three are known to be 8afe. The
only senior official to escspe was the postmaster,
who was hidden by a Muslim friend, but his family
was butchered. Of non-official Chinese, men from
Manchuria had the least chance, as Sheng and the
majority of his troops were from the north-ea8tern
provinces... The descendants of the camp followers
of T80 Teung-T'ang's army in the 1870s, mostly
Tientsin sutlers and prostitutes, fered best; end
generally, though by no means invariably, the mobs
spared women and children. ranaticism was evidently
not entirely unbridled.l09
There are no indications as to the STPNlC's attitude to these massacres.
Ahmadjan Qasim was subsequently to admit that initially the ETR 'made no•
distinction between Han Chinese and the Kuominteng reactionary clique,
considering the whole Chinese nationelity es our enemy,.110 In retrospect
it might be supposed that most of the blame for the anti-Chinese pogroms
of 1944 and early 1945 lay with the conservative and pan-Islamic faction
within the rebel group. On the other hand, a more Machiavellian
interpretation would point to STPNlC complicity, for the victims were
chiefly KMT officials, followers of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, and recent colonists
whilst small merchants, tradesmen and lumpen proletarian elements were
generally spared.
109. lQhB, l/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/l0, p. 2.
110. A-ho-mai-ti-ch'ang (Aomadjan Qasim), 'Wo-men teat min-tzu wen-t'i chung
tii-heieh ts'o-wu' ('Some of Our Mistakes with Regard to the Nationa11ties
Question'), Hsin-Hua Yueh-Pao (New China Monthly, Peking), I, 4 (reb.
1950), p. 883.
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It is at least clear that the ETR government proclaimed on
November 15th, 1944, was based on a coalition between "progressive" end
"reactionary" elements within rebel ranks. Whilst Ahmadjan Qssim and his•
"progressive" STPNLC was certainly more powerfully armed and better
organised within Kulja, the pan-Islamic conservative faction equally
certainly enjoyed more support in the countryside, and wae overwhelmingly
more numerous. Accordingly, in a move designed to promote unity amongst
the anti-KMT forces, the Uzbek calrm cAli Khan T~re was declared president,
of the ETR, whilst Hakim 8eg Khoja, an influential Uighur landowner, was•
appointed as his deputy. Mingulov notes with approval the 'flexible
tactics' employed by the STPNLC at this Juncture, and comments: 'the
organisers were alive to the necessity of roping in everybody at this
111initial stage, from toiling peasant to affluent merchant or great landowner'.
Seemingly the conservative faction within rebel ranks wes elso prepared to
compromise at this stage, for both the epithets "Turkic" end "Islamic" were
omitted from the title of the ne~ secessionist state (not least, one suspects,
because of "White" Russian involvement in the rebellion), whilst a tentative
welcome was extended to various non-Muslim minority nationalities (including,
besides Russians, Mongols, Sibos, Solons end Manchus) who either supported,
or did not actively oppose, the revolutionary movement. No mention was
111. Mingulov, op.cit., p.184.
made of Islam as the state religion of the ETR, though the green
flag of Islam bearing a white crescent and star was retained as the
112"national flag" of the nascent republic.
An examination of the more influential figures in the ETR
c -.administration at this stage indicates that, apart from Ali Khan Ture
and Hikim Beg Khoja, most senior ofticials belonged to the "progressive"
•
faction. Besides Ahmadjan Qasim, "progressive" elements attached to the
•
Central staff of the ETR ere known to heve included the Uighurs Saif al-orn
. -
cAzlz, Rahrmjan Sabir Hajji, and cAbd al-Kar1m cAbbas; the Kazakh,• •
cAbd al-Hayir Ture; the Kirghiz, Is~aq 8eg (a180 known 88 Ishaq ~;n)J
•
the Mongol, Fucha-Afandi; and the Russians, F. leskin, A. Polinov, and
Glimkin.113 Besides Ahmadjan, only two members of this shadowy group were•
to achieva real prominence. These were the Klrghiz, Ishaq Beg, who became•
commander-in-chief of the rebel armies, and above all the Uighur 5aif al-01n
c -Aziz (better known as "Salfuddin" - see plate 32 - the 80n of a well-to-do
merchant from Artush, near Kashgar. Born c. 1914, Sa!f 8l-01n received his
112. It is interesting to note that following the 'Seur' (April) Revolution
of 1978 in Afghanistan, the Khalk (Peoples') faction of the Afghan
communist movement substituted a red flag for tha former Afghan national
flag which had contained green - the prophet Muhammad's favourite
colour - for Islam. Following the Soviet invasIon in late 1979 and the
installation of a puppet government drawn from the Parchem (Banner) faction
of the Afghan communist movement, this decision was reverssd, and green
was reintroduced into the Afghan national flag.
113. Mingulov, op.cit., p. 184, lea Fu-hsiang, op.cit., p. 73, Kotov, op.cit.
pp. 443-4, Isma'il and Isma'il, op.cit., p. 28, lattimore, Pivot of Aeia,
p. 87, Chen, The Sinkieng story, p. 241, Mclean, 'Sinkiang Today', p.385
Of the various "progressive" figures attached to tha ETR Central Staff,
the "Mongol" Fucha-Afandi (described by Mingulov as a 'distinguished
patriot') is perhaps the hardest to place. The first element of his name
might possibly be a RUBsification of the Mongol khuch (- strong), which is
indeed used as a nama by Mongols. 'Afandi', however, is certainly not
Mongol, but may well ba a distorted transcription of the Turkic Muslim
title efendi/effendi (- gentleman, Mr.). This suggests that Fucha-Afandi
was probably en Islamicised Mongol, end was therefor. not truly
representative of the lamaist-Buddhist Mongol population of IIi.
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early education in Sinkiang. He then travelled to the Soviet Union,
where he studied law and politics at the Universi ty of Tashkent, became
fluent in Russian, and joined the CPSU. Following his return to Sinkiang,
he was to serve the ETR as Minister of Education and (according to the
the Biographical Dictionary of Republican China) as head of the
Yashla.r'Tashkilati or Ili youth organi~ati~zi.114 . ".
,
According to KMT sources, of the "progressive" figures cited above,
Ishaq Beg, Polinov and Glimkin were members of the S'I'PNLC,whilst CAM•
al-KarIm cAbbas and Leskin were 'either Soviet agents, or closely
. 115associated with the Russians.
Further indications of Soviet involvement with the ETR may be found
in the sequence of events which followed the founding of the separatist
regime in November, 1944. As Mingulov points out, despite the '~uccess of
the rebels in seizing Kulja, the most immediate problems facing the new
regime remained military. Accordingly, a "Home Guard" was established, and
KMT military stores captured intact were made available to the nascent
armed forces under the leadership of Leskin and Ishaq Beg.116
•
114. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol III, pp. 87-9. According to Barnett,
however. the Yashlar Tashkilati was led by an Uighur of Turfan called
Saifullah who, like Saif aI-DIn, had been educated in the Soviet Union
(op.cit., p. 269). For an alternative bibliogra~ of Saif aI-DIn, based
primarily on sources dating from the current communist era, see McMillen,
op.cit., pp. 34-7. According to McMillen, Saif aI-DIn was born at
Chuguchak and studied at the Central Asia University in Moscow. Despite
these discrepancies, however, it seems to be agreed that Saif al-DIn
received his higher education in the Soviet Union, and became a member
of the CPSU.
115. Chang Ta.-chiin,'Hsin-chian I-nin shih- ien 00 wei Tun Tu-erh-szu-tan
Kung=ho-kuo ch t eng-Ii chi ch'i hui-mieh' Sinkiang's I-ning Alfair z The
Establishment and Subsequent Collapse of the "East Turkestan Republic"),
in: Kl48.DgLu (ed.), Hsin-chiang Yen-chiu (Studies on Sinkiang, Taipei,
1964), p. 324; similarly HsU Po-ta, 'Su-o tui Hsin-chiang chih ch'in-lueh',
(Soviet Aggression Against Sinkiang) in the same compilation, pp.304-5.
See also Lee Fu-hsiang, op.cit., pp. 72-3.
116. Mingulov, op.cit., p. 185.
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Whilst the KMT forces holding the airfield at Airambek were closely
baseiged, it was clearly imperative to reduce this position before KMT
reinforcements could arrive from Dzungaria. In·an apparently successful
attempt to pre-empt this latter development, a force of rabels under the
command of Leskin was sent to hold beck tha KMT at the gorge near Kensai;
according to Mingulov, by December, 1944, this group had succeeded in stemming
the KMT advance.117 Meanwhile, smaller detachments of rebel troops moved
against KMT garrisons in Tekas and Kura to tha aouth-west of KulJa, both
lISof which fell by the end of th8 year.. A:8imilar advance on Suiting S8ems
to have been eccompanied by a local rising; however, the local KMT garrison
'defended themselves stoutly' and were not overcome until Januery 3rd, 1945,
'when mortars were brought up to batter the walla of their positions',l19
Considerable mystery surrounds the reduction of the KMT stronghold at
Airambek, which did not fall until January 29th. According to Chen, more
than 8,000 KMT troops and officers, together with thair families and 'hangers-
on', had taken refuge 1n threa carefully prepared military positions in and
around Airambek. Once again, Chen attributes the victory of the rebels to
superior morale and innovative siege tactics which included the usa of a
converted "Stalinetz" tractor as a tenk (aee plat. 25),120 Chen's version
117. .!.!?lE.,
lIS, ibid.-
l19, IOLR, L/P&S/l2/2360, r/15550/324/l0, p, 2,
120, ror Chen's lengthy account of the struggle at Airambek (written throughout
in the tedious "black and white" style of the Great Proleterian Cultural
Revolution), sea his Sinkieng story, pp. 222-6.
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of events would seem to be partially confirmed by Turral who, ~n a
report dated rebruary 5th, 1945, informed the India Office that: 'the
small garrison at the (Airambek) airfield succumbed probably through
starvation, owing to the failura of supplies dropped by eir,.12l On the
other hand, KMT sources cited by Lee ru-hsiang claim that 'two regiments
of Soviet artillery came from Jarkent (Panfilov), a Russian city neer the
Sino-Soviet border, to help the insurgents in fighting the Chinese garrison
122troops'. Moreover, this latter version of events is eccepted by Graham,
who notes that, as at Suiting, morters were brought up to reduce the Airambek
garrison. He continues:
According to a White Russian, whenever the rebels
were unable to make progress, detachments of the
Red Army were brought in from over the frontier, did
what was necessary, and retired; and these mortars
were part of their contribution. I should have
accepted this statement with reserve, es the mortars
might have been captured from the Chinese, and would
not have been beyond the capacity of the rebels to
use, but for a less doubtful report, tending in the
same direction. During the two months' defence of
the aerodrome the Provincial Government tried to
essist the garrison by dropping supplies by parachute,
but after the first consignment had been dropped, anti-
aircraft guns were used against the Chinese. Such guns
were not seen in KulJa before or since, and it seems
reasonable to suppose that they were brought in from
over the frontier, end withdrawn as soon as the need
for them had passed.123
121. IiL" L/P&S/12/240S, ColI. 12/62, EXT.2733.1945 (HMCU Turral - ID
945).
122. Lee ru-hsiang, op.cit., p. 74.
123· lQh[; L/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/l0, p.2J In this context see also Whiting,
who states: 'Men as well as materiel support appear to have been provided 'r:
by the Soviet Union. Reserves for rebel forces were readily obtainable from
ethnically akin groups across the border. Participants in the revolt later ~)
testified that key leaders, as well as many followers, crossed from Russian r
territory during the winter of 1944-45' (Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang. p.lOStr
It is pertinent to note that during their 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the f
Soviets are similarly reported to have made usa of ethnically Turkic troops; I
this practice was almost immediately discontinued because of fraternisation I
between Soviet Muslim troops and Afghan Muslims. 1
4~
Whether Soviet troops participated covertly in the fIghting or not,
~
the rebels enjoyed remarkable success, end by the end of January, 1945,
the ~hole III Valley, excepting only 'aome pockets of'resistance on the
borders towards Kensai ••• and Santa!' was in rebel hands. Mingulov notes
that these last pockets of resistance 'could not be liquidated until the
month of March,.124 The fighting in the 111 Valley during the late autumn
end ~inter of 1944-45 seems to have been both fierce end pitiless. KMT
sources continued to allege enti-Han massacres, most notably at Suiting,
125Kulja, and in the Tekes end Borotala Vallies, ~hilst the ETR continued
to accuse the KMT of murdering prisoners and other brutalities. In this
context Graham, following his visit to the rebel zone in 1946, reported
that: 'Both sides allege atrocities, mutilation and murder of prisoners,
and I see no reason to doubt either,.126
Mean~hile, having consolidated their hold on the IIi Valley, the
rebel forces turned their attention to the neighbouring administrative
districts of Chuguchak and Shara Sume. On January ~Oth, 1945, one day
after the fall of the KMT strongpoint at Airambek, rebel forces ~on a
major victory at Seiram Nor, thus 'leaving the way open for the revolt
" 127to surge out of the IIi Valley into the Dzungarian plains'.
124. Mingu10v, op.cit., p. 185.
125. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2~59, EXT.23l4.l945, p. ~.
126. IOlR, l/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/l0, p.2.
127. IOlR, L/P&S/12/2405, Call 12/62, EXT.27~3.l945.
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c - --Shortly thereafter Uthman Batur. leader of the Kazakh rebellion in the
128Altai region, 'placed himself at the disposal of the ETR'. Taking
advantage of the KMT's preoccupation with events in tha IIi Valley,
c -Uthman's Kazakhs swiftly occupied both Shara Sume and Chuguchak,
The feta of the KMT garrison In tha formar administrative centra remains
uncertain, but at Chuguchak no resistence wes offered, the Han officiels
and soldiery preferring to flee en masse to neighbouring Soviet territory.129
cUthman was subsequently ~ppointed ETR epecial executive officer for the
Altai. with headquarters at Share Sume.130 Links between the two centres of
c -rebellion remained tenuous, however, and it seems that Uthman never paid
mora than lip service to the "progressive" ideals of the ETR. During this
period Kazakh rebels in the central and eastern Tien Shan owing allegiance
to cAli eeg Rehim13lstepped up their harassment of the KMT, r"iding towards
•
Manass end mounting guerilla attacks on the small towns lying along the roed
to the north of the Tien Shan. both eest and west of Urumchi.132
128. Hayit. Turkesten Zwischen Russlend und China, p. 318
129. Boorman end Howerd, 0prcit., Vol III. pr 47J IOLR, L/P&S/12/2360,
r/15550/324/10, p.2.
130. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol III. P. 47. See allo Appendix VI
at the end of this study.
131. See above. P. 346.
132. IOLR, l/P&S/12/23S9, EXT.2314.1945, P.S.
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following the KMT defeat at Sairem Nor, a relatively stable front
between rebel-held end KMT-held territory formed in the region of Tsingho,
where the provincial forces began to mass, ostensibly in preperation for
133a counter-attack. It is clear, however, that the series of rapid end
unexpected reverses suffered by the KMT between October, 1944 end January,
1945, hed both thrown the provincial forces into disarray and, for a
134short time, had 'caused ecute panic' in Urumchi. Turrel, the British
Consul in that city, reported to his superiors in the India Offic~ that
'Central government troops of Li T'ieh-chun's 29th Army.have not merely
feiled to break into the III Valley ••• but are being driven back', a
development which he attributed to: 'The fect that••• central government
troops••• ara not as well accustomed to, or equipped for, the icy north-
west winds of the Sairam Nor 8asin as their highly mobile end incredibly
135tough (Kezakh) opponents'. Wu Chung-hsin and Chu Shao-lieng, however,
preferred to explain KMT reverses in terms of massive Soviet intervention
on behalf of the rebels. Despite being shown captured armaments, Turre1
133. Chen, op.cit., p. 230.
134. IOlR, l/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/l0, p.3;
135. IOlR, l/P&S/12/2359, EXT.23l4.l945, p.S.
404
remained unconvinced of these claims, commenting to his superiors:
I heve of course myself no proof one way or
the other as to Soviet complicity, but on the
fece of it, it seems to me unlikely. What the
Chinese authorities will not accept is the fact
that there are ample causes purely internal to
Sinkiang which do not need supplementary external
causes to explain in the fullest degree not
merely the present discontents but also a future
conflagration of the greatest eize.136
However, whilst Turral was certainly correct in blaming the Chinese
authorities for creating the conditions which led to the outbreak of
rebellion in IIi, developments within the rebel zone during the first
half of 1945 pointed increasingly towards substantial Soviet compliCity
in backing the secessionist regime.
To begin with, following the fall of Suiting and tha affective
establishment of rabel supremacy in the IIi Valley, on January 5th, 1944,
the 'Provisional Government' of the ETR issued a declaration (subsequently
known es the "Kulja Declaration") setting out its aims. According to
Mingulov, these were:
1. The 'annihilation' of the Kuomintang.
2. The creation of a 'Democratic 8asa' founded on the·
equality of all nationalities inhabiting the
territory of the ETR.
136. ~., p.4. The armaments shown to Turral by the KMT bore no markings,
but he was informed that 'miscellaneous rifles of Polish, rinnish,
German and Romanian manufacture' had been captured from the rebels.
Such arms would, of course, have been widely available to tha Soviets
following their major advances in the European theatre during 1943
and 1944. In this context see Werth, A., Russie et War, pp. 74-9;
493-508; 519.
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3. The formation of a competent, multi-national
People's Army.
4. Nationalisation of banks; postal, telegraphic
and telephone communications; forestry; and
mineral resources.
5. The development of industry, agricultura,
stock-breeding and private trade.
6. The establishment end preservation of religious
freedom.
7. The development of educational and public
health services.
8. The establishment of friendly relations with
'all democratic countries of the world' and,
in partIcular, with Sinkiangts 'next-door
neighbour', the Soviet Union.137
~ingulov comments approvingly that this programme, 'as will be
observed from several of its items', took into account the specific
character of society in the Threa Regions: 'That ia, its patriarchal
or feudal atamp; the backward productive relations in the villages where
elements of domestic serfdom persIsted, and the powerful influence of
the Muslim clergy,.138 According to Kuomintang sources, however, the
first clause of the "KulJs Declaration" made no reference to the
'annihilation of the K~T', but announced that the objective of the
Ili Revolt was to 'sweep eway the Han Chinese,.139 KMT sources elsa report
137. Mingulov, op.cit., p. 185; cf. Kotov, op.cit., pp. 443-4.
138. ibid•..........
139. Lee ru-hsiang, op.cit., pp. 67-8.
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that the programme contained the following ominous passage:
After having led a elave lifa under the yoke of
the Han Chinese for sixty years in the dark ages,
we have now awoken by raising the revolutionary
flag of the crescent and ster which signifies
the bright future of Eestern Turkeatan ••• But our
goal has not yet been reached, and the aixty year
blood debt has not yet been peid by the Hen Chinese.140
Whatever the truth behind these conflicting claims, there can
be no doubt that anti-Han sentiment played a major role in the initial
stages of the IIi Revolt.14l It may also be, as indicated ebove, that
during this early period STPNLC elements within the rabel leadership
turned a blind eye to "anti-Hanism", either out of weakness, or out of
142political expediency, or out of a combination of both. Subsequently,
however, the anti-Han tenor of earlier pronouncements by the ETR
leadership was gradually set aside as Ahmadjan aasim and other•
"progressive" pro-Soviet elements came to eclipse Muslim fundamentalists
and members of the "national bourgeoisie" represented within rebal ranks
by CAli Khan Ture, Hakim Beg Khoja, end B string of lesser Muslim culame,.143
•
140. Cheng Te·chUn, Seu-shih nien tung-lusn Hsin-chlang. p. 176.
141. This has also been acknowledged by CCP sources aince 1949, See, for
example, China News Analysis. 103 (October 7, 1~S5), p.2.
142. See above, pp. 394-5.
143. According to Lee fu-hsiang (op.cit., p. 68, citing Chang Ta-chOn), et least
seven 'Moslem clergymen' held cabinet level posts in the ETR. However:
'they had little or nothing to do with the real power, which was in the
hands of modern-educeted young men who were mar. or leas associated with
the Soviet Union'.
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The influence of the "progressive" STPNLC faction within the ETR
seems to have achieved primacy during the spring of 1945, following the
fall of the KMT stronghold at Airambek. rrom this time onwards anti-Han
rhetoric was phased out of ETR pronouncements {not lesst, one suspects,
because ao few Han Chinese settlers and officials had survived the pogroma),144
145and a aaries of genuinely constructive social reforms was introduced.
These reforms included the implementation of a "sowing campaign" aimed
at boosting agricultural production in which loans of seed and money were
advanced to the rural population 'to enable them to prass ahead with the
146apring sowings of 1945'. In the field of public health, the incidence
of typhus in the IIi Valley is said to have been arrested, whilst in
education: 'Courses for teachers and extension courses were organised eo
that the scholastic year could begin in all schools in the IIi district
147by 1st September, 1945'. Meanwhile, the central administration of the
144. When Graham visited the ETR zone in 1946, he asked a junior officer of
the revolutionary ermy whether there were many Han Chinese in Kulja. The
officer replied that: 'There used to be, but (with gusto) we killed a
lot of them in the war' (IOlR. L/P&S/12/2350, r/15550/324/l0, p. 1).
145. Even some KM! sources agree with this evaluation. See lee ru-hsiang,
op.cit., p. 68; Chang Ta-chUn, Ssu-shlh nlen tung-Iuan Hsln-chiang. Pp.
175-6; Chang Chih-chung, 'Dilemma in Sinkiang', Pacific Affairs, XX (1947),
P. 428.
146. Mingulov, 0e_cit., p.186.
147•. ibid.
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148ETR ~as reorganised into eleven departments under the indirect
supervision of a 'National Council' composed of members of 'every
nationality' resident in the IIi region, each nationality supposedly
being represented in proportion to the size of its population.149 According
to Lattimore, these developments encouraged the participation of various
non-Muslim nationalities in the Iii Revolt, thus: 'The Chinese residents
of Kulja cautiously declared that they had nothing in common with the
150oppressive policy of the provincial government', whilst the Tungusic
agriculturalists delivered supplies to the rebel administration, the
Sibos in particular earning great preise tor 'distinguishing themselves
in carrying out tasks assigned them by the Kulja regime, such as
151delivering grain and clover'. It i. noteworthy, however, that despite
148. Chang Ta-chUn, S!u-ehih nien tung-Iuan Hsin-chieng, P. 175, cf. Idem,
'Hsin-chieng I-oing shlh-pien', etc., p. 327J Lee ru-hsiang, op.cit.,
p. 67. The eleven departments (ten ministries and ana banking dept. )
are listed in Appendix VI, Fig. 4, at the end at this study.
149. Lee ru-hsieng, op,cit., p. 69. In tact, the ETR'a aeventeen man council'
(presumed to be Lee's "National Council") appears to have lacked Han
Chinese representatIon and to have been dominated by Muslim nationalities
(See Appendix VI, passim. and Fig. 4,in particular, at the end of this
study.
150. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 87.
151. ibid., Pp. 87, 148-9.
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their edherence to the Islamic faith, the Tungan minority in the IIi
152region seems to have played little or no part in the rebel movement.
It seems clear that CAli Kh;n TUre and the Muslim fundamentalists
remained opposed to the participation of non-Muslim peoples (and especially of
Han Chinese) in the ETR, and to this end they fought a vigorous rearguard
action against the STPNLC "progressives" during the first half of 1945.
According to Chen, a triumvirate of Muslim fundamentalists including cAli
Khan Ture, the titular president of the ETR, cAbd al-Mutta cAli KhalTfa,
••
the Minister of Religious Affairs, and 5acud Damullah, the Vice-Minister
of Education, attempted to 'integrate etate and religion' by advocating
that Islamic eharrca law should be applied throughout the ETR; that the
Muslim religion should be taught in all state achools; and that (according
to Lee fu-nsiang) ETR officials should be exclusively aelected from
amongst 'those who ara familiar with the teachings of the Qur'en,.l53
152. ibid., p. 114 (but cf. Chen's unsubstantiated report of an exclusively
Tungan cavalry regiment fighting as an integral part of the rebel army
during 1945, The Sinkieng story, p. 228; see also Appendix VI, at the
end of this study, passim). Lattimore explains Tungan hostility towards
the ETR in terms of 'the social conservatism of the Chinese Muslims'.
This is certainly an over-simplification, however. As the present study
has attempted to indicate, the history of the Sinkiang Tungan community
during both the late Imperial period and throughout the Republican period
was characterised by loyalty to China (though not necessarily to the
ruling Chinese regime) and by opposition to Turkic Muslim separatism
{whether of the "Muslim fundamentalist" or "progressive" strand).
It is clear, therefore, that the predominantly Turkic Muslim leadership
of the ETR must have regarded the Tungan population of III with deep
mistrust. This mistrust, moreover, must have been shared by the ETR'a
Soviet backers, as Moscow had good reason to recall the fanatical support
lent by the Tungans of Dzungaria to Ma Chung-ying'. invading armies during
the mid-1930s. It is, therefore, by no means clear that the ETR leadership
and their Soviet backers would heva Bought Tungan support, even had that
support been readily available. Besides, can it really be aaid that the
Tungans of III were more 'aocially conservative' than the (predominantly
Uighur) Muslim fundamentalists of the region, who actively backed the
ETR regime?
153. Chen, The Sinkiang Story. p. 241J Lee fu-hsiang, 0prclt., p. 68. :t:ote,
however, that in Table 4 below (P. ), the Minister of Religion
is listed as "Tee-I!".
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Chen further notes that during this period:
Religious courts tended to dogmatic interpretations
of religious· texts and failed to adapt to the
complexities of modern conditions. They particularly
infringed on the rights of women, whose emancipation
was one of the aims of the revolution. Great injustices
were done to women when ege-old religious laws and
customs were blindly upheld.154
By mid-l945, however, Muslim fundamentalist moves to Islamicise the ETR
seem finally to have been defeated with the result that, according to
Mingulov, 'in criminal law it was made a heinous offence to stir up
communal hatred,.155 Indications of this "progressive" victory may be
found in the two chief propaganda organs of the ETR (printed on Russian
presses either imported from the Soviet Union or seized from the KMT
administration .at tha tima of the III rising),namely Azsd ~argi TUrkistsn
156('rree Eastern Turkestan'), and subsequently Inglishi ~srgi ~urki~tsn
( 157'Revolutionary Eastern Turkestan'), ss well as In the numerous propaganda
leaflets produced from about this time which emphasised the close ethnic and
cultural ties existing between the ETR end the Soviet Central Asian Republics,
and which stressed the 'freedom' enjoyed by the various national minorities
within the Soviet Union when contrasted with the oppression suffered by
the peoples of Sinkiang living in the region still under KMT control.ISS
154. Chen, The Sinkiang Story, p. 241.
155. Mingulov, 0prcit., p. 186.
156. lE!2., citing 8 report in Azed ~8rgi Turkieten to the effect that the
ETR: 'guaranteed the (Han) Chinese community the right to productive work
or to employment in public institutions or in trade, and allowed papers
to come out in Chinese'.
157. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, P. 87.
1S8. According to Da11in (op.cit., p. 364, citing the New York Times of June 3,
1946), one such leaflet stated:
'Our nearest blood relations are the Kazakhs, Kirghiz,
Uzbeks and Taters. In the Soviet Union esch of these
xaoes has organised its own government and its members era
living free end joyful lives'.
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Meanwhile, the ETR continued to essume the trappings of statehood
with remarkable swiftness. Thus, tha nawly-established edministration
159instituted an (apparently viable) system of taxation, issued its own
160currency, and (in marked contrast to its incompetent end ill-fated
predecessor et Keshgar), sat about creating a wall-armed and disciplined
'popular army' as described in clause threa of the "Kulja Declaration"
cited above. According to Mingulov, shortly after the announcement of this
revolutionary programme on January 5th, 1945, a defence fund was started
to which 'the people of IIi District contributed with great enthusiesm,.16l
By April 8th, 1945, the foundations of this 'child of the people' (variously
styled the "IIi National Army" by Kotov, the "National Peoples' Army" by
Chen, end the "Sinkiang Democratic Army" by Barnett),162 had baen successfully
laid.163 Overall command of this force was given to the Kirghiz leader
159. Mclean, 'Sinkiang Today', P. 383.
160. Whiting, Soviet strategy, p. 106. This (paper) currency was certainly
locally printed, and not imported from the USSR, a8 according to Graham:
'the local (ETR) notes, though still in circulation (1946), are printed
on such shocking peper that they will soon all hava disintegrated
entirely~ (~, L/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/l0, p. 4).
161. Mingulov, op.cit., p. 186.
162. Kotov, op.eit., p. 443; Chen, op.cit., p. 228; Barnett, op,elt., p. 264
In the present study the term "IIi National Army" will be preferred
for its comparative accur~cy.
163. Mingulov, op,cit., p. 186; Kotov, 0D,clt" p. 443.
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Ishaq Beg, who had been a brigade commander in the service of Sheng Shih-,
ts'ai before the latter's break with the Soviets in 1942.164 It is known
that he was assisted in this task by the "Whits" Russians Polinov (who had
165been a regimental commander in Sheng's forces during the same period),
and Leskin (who was responsible for having defeated the initial KMT counter-
offensive near Kensa! in December, 1944).166 All three leading officers of
the revolutionary forces in the IIi region are thus known to have been
.~ssoclated with the pro-Soviet STPNLC (indeed, according to Barnett, Isheq,
Beg was reported to ho~d dual Sino-Soviet nationality and to have been 'one
167of the most completely pro-Russian men in the I1i group'. whilst only
c -in distant Shara Sums, in the person of the Kezakh chieftain Uthman
Betur, did a powerful rebel leader without avowedly "progressive" views
hold sway,
164, Lee ru-hsian~, 0Rteit., p. 73. According to A. Dosk Barnett (oR.cit.,
P. 264), Isbaq Be9 actually commanded one of the (CPU) units sent by
Stalin to aid ShengShih-ts'ai during his struggle with Ma Chung-ying
during the 1930s. Before this, according to Chen, he fought as a
partisan in his native southern Sinkiang during the struggle against
Chin Shu-Jen (Chen, op,eit" p. 228).
165. Lee ru-hsiang, 0R.cit" p. 73.
166. See above, p. 399.
167. Barnett, op.cit., p. 264.
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8.4 The Soviet Union and the Military Expanelon of the ETR
following leskln's victory over units of the KMT 29th Army at
Sairam Nor on January 30th, 1945, the defeated provincial forces fell
back on Tsingho, which became the effective front-line between ETR- and
KMT- held territory. Here General Hsieh, the commander of the provincial
units opposing Leskin's rebel forces, began to reorganise his dispirited
troops in preparation for a counter-attack scheduled for the spring of
1945 by which time the bitterly cold weather, which was considered by
both Wu Chung-hsin and Chu Sheo-liang to favour the local Kazakh partisans,168
should have abated. In retrospect it seems clear that the KMT leaderahip
miscalculated badly in taking this decision, for during the intervening
winter months the ETR was able to liquidate all continuing KMT resistance
within the Ili region, and to build up a surprisingly powerful "Ili National
Army" (INA).
Information concerning the following military struggle is both
sparse and contradictory. It seems clear, however, that despite an apparently
overwhelming superiority in men and material (consisting of an estimated
100,000 troops in Sinkiang, many of whom were armed with modern American
169weaponry), the KMT vera unable to break through the Talki Pass and
168. IOlR, l/P&S/12/2359, PZ.23l4.l945, pp. 1, 5.
169. See above, p. 311.
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into the IIi Valley. Rather, when full-scale hositilites broke out in
July, 1945, it was the INA which assumed the offensive, sweeping the KMT
forces back towards Urumchi and striking deep into Chuguchak and Shara Sume
c - --to make contact with the Kazakh rebels owing allegiance to uthman Batur.
How was this possible? Clearly, within a period of six months
following the fall of the KMT stronghold at Airambek, the rabal forces
must have been transformed from a group of partisans numbering, at most,
a few thousands (and ermed, it will be recalled, with 'fowling pieces'),
into a sizeable, well-disciplined force capable of routing a powerful,
if dispirited, force of professional soldiers armed with tanks, field
artillery, and planes. According to Chen, by the summer of 1945 the INA
170had expanded to an estimated strength of 30,000 men:
••• A modern force, armed with several thousand
rifles and other modern equipment captured from
tha enemy. Designations and flags were given to
tha various units. Thera were tan regiments: the
First, Second and Third were infantry, the rast
were cavalry units••• In addition there were
machine gun and mortar companies, an artille~y
battery, rear service establishments and a political
department far the education of the troops. Captured
Kuomintang trucks became the core of an independent
motorised battalion.l7l
172Chan continues by emphasising both the mixed ethnic composition of the INA
170. Chen, The Sinklang story, p. 236.
171. ibid., p. 228.
172. ibid.
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and, true to the "Red before Expert" dialectic fashionable at the
time of the Cultural Revolution, his contention that what the rebel forces
lacked in firepower was more than compensated for in terms of political
commitment, thus:
Regular political education was introduced from
the start ••• political commissar(s) •••led the men
in discussions of the aims of the national liberation
struggle and the policies of the provisional
government (ETR). All instruction and other activities
were designed to bind commanders and men together in
brotherly unity, to teBch them to observe revolutionary
discipline conscientiously and to lava and cere for
the people es if they were all ona family. They took
the oath of the army (INA) "to serve the peopla to tha
death and never retreat in the struggle to overthrow
the Kuomintang oppressors".173
Other sources, however, adopt a less sanguine view of the (TR's
intrinsic military potential. According to Whiting, the "IIi National Army"
not only obtained substantial supplies of ammunition through the Soviet
c~nsulates located in Kulja, Chuguchak and Share Sume, but also received
much-needed reserves of fighting men 'from ethnically akin groups across
the border,.174 The American reporter Ooak Barnett, who travelled
extensively in Sinkiang at the time of the ETR-KMT struggle, similarly
noted reports that Soviet advisers ('most of them Asians from Kazakhstan. .
and Uzbekistan') were attached to every major unit of the INA. Hi.
contemporaneous account continues:
173. ~., p. 229.
174. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkieng, p. 105.
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Military supply on the IIi side is somewhat of a
mystery, even to Chinese intelligence officers
with whom I talked in Sui-lai (Manass). There is
not enough industrialization in IIi territory to
support sizea.ble number ot troops. A1 thouSh some
of their arms ••• were captured from tha Chinesa in
the initial campaign, they undoubtedly have received
aid from the Russians ••• It seems probable ••• that
the IIi Army is dependent upon Russis for soma
military supplies, and it is definitely known that
the IIi troops wear a Russian-type uniform.175
ror soma time the origin of these 'Russian-type' uniforms remained
uncertain. Thus, when reporting on direct negotiations between senior
KMT end rebel officials et Manass in October, 1945, Turral described
the uniforms of the ETA delegates es being 'green, bearing the (Islamic)
emblem of a crescent and star,.176 When Graham visited Kulja during the
summer of 1946, however, he was able to get a closer look at tha
mysterio~s garb of the INA, as a result of which he reported to his
superiors in the British Embassy et Nanking that: 'All flags, uniforms
and inscriptions' within the rebel zone bore the insignia "ETA" ("East
Turkestan Republic"), but in Russian lannueae end cyrillic script ("VTR",
or "Vostochneye Turkestenskeya Respubllke") and not, as might more
reasonably have been expected, In Turkic ("STC", or "~ergi Turklsten
Cumhuriyetl", even in the cyrill1cised script adopted in 1939-40 by the
neighbouring Kazakh SSR); indeed, according to Graham: 'the latters VTR
(in Ill) were es common as SPQR in Rome'.177
175. Barnett, op.cit., p. 265.
176. lOLA, L/P&S/12/2405, EXT.267l, 1946 (letter, HMCU Turrel-IO, 1/11/1945)
177. lQbfi, L/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/l0, p. 3.
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Given this fact, the origins of the INA's 'Soviet-type' uniform
(and therefore, by association, much of its more sophisticated materiel)
can be in little doubt. Moreover, although the Soviet Union continued
(and has since continued) vociferously to deny having aided or abetted
tha INA, on at least one occasion the Kremlin seems to hsve let slip
its guard. Thus, on May 14th, 1967, In a Uighur-language broadcast
beamed into Sinkiang by Radio Tashkent, the Soviets announced that:
In 1944 the peoples of East Turkestan broke
the chain of tyrrany and slavery of the KMT
hordes and set up an Eest Turkestani Republic
under a national government ••• The Soviet Stata,
formed under the leadership of the great Lanin,
provided the Eest Turkestan nationsl srmy with
erms and trained commanding cadres ••• Moreover,
the Soviet Union extended all-out aid to the
young Turkestan Republic for its economic and
cultural construction.178
In this context it is also pertinent to note that the secondment of Soviet
military advisers to the INA has been independently acknowledged by a
179senior CCP cadre in the presence of Mao Tse-tung.
It is clear, therefore, that by the time the spring thew came to
northern Sinkiang in April-May, 1945, the KMT forces stationed around Tsingho
ware no longer facing a militarily inexperienced, if enthusiastically anti-
Chinese, band of Muslim rebels. This must have become painfully apparent
to the Nationalist High Command in Urumchi as, in July of that year, the
INA went over to the offensive. According to Chen, the "White" Russian
178. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: The USSR, No. SU 2475 (May 26th,
1967, p. A3!2.
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Polinov was first to break out of the Sairam Nor region, leading a cavalry
column across the KMT'a right flank towards Chuguchak. He wes followed by
the Kirghiz Ishaq Beg who, at the head of the main body of the INA (a force
•
estimated at 15,000 men), pushed south to attack the KMT 29th Army
concentration at Tsingho (also estimated at 15,000 men).lBO At about the
same time a third rebel column of uncertain strength is reported to have
set out from Suiting, marching in a wide arc to the north and east of the
Ebi Nor, in a move apparently designed to bypasa Taingho and to take the
181KMT garrison town of Wusu from the rear. The subsequent chronology of
events remains unclear, but on or about September 6th, 1945, the INA,
having captured Taingho and severely disrupted Nationalist communication
182lines to the north of Urumchi, succeeded in destroying the KMT Ne~ 2nd
Army in the ,immediate vicinity of Wusu. As might be expected, partisans of
the ETR andpro~ationalist sources differ wIdely in their account. of this
stunning rebel victory. According to Chen, the INA forces involved in the
capture of Wusu amounted to no more than 3,000 poorly-armed men. Against
this the KMT could muster 8,000 troops 'armed with submachine guns in
considerable numbers, lIght and heavy machine guns, some artillery ••• and
183a couple of lIght tanks'. Chen admits that: 'According to the principles
180. Chen, The Sinkiang Story, pp. 230-31.
181. ~., pp. 231-2.
182. Mclean, 'Sink1ang Today', p. 384.
183. Chen, op.cit., p. 233.
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of orthodox warefare the proportions between attackers and defenders should
have been reversed', but continues by explaining that: 'this revolutionary
war of the peoples of Sinkiang against their oppressors shattered all such
, 184accepted principles'. Whiting, however, citing KMT sources, offers a
more militarily orthodox explanation:
In a major battle near Wusu In early September •••
The legions of the self-proclaimed "Eastern
Turkestan Republic" ••• smashed the new Nationalist
Second Army with combined air, cavalry and infantry
assaults, capturing a divisional commander and
several thousand prisoners. ISS
KMT claims that the INA enjoyed air support at Wusu have nevar bean
confirmed by independent sources, but on September 7th, ona day after the
KM~ defeat, the Chinese Foreign Office officially protested to tha Soviet
185Ambassador over the alleged presence of Soviet aircraft among rebel forces.
Meanwhila, tha rebel advance towards Urumchi continued unchecked until the
INA reached the next major KMT defensive position, on the banks of tha Maness
184. .!l?!£.
185. Wo-men ti ti-kuo (Our Enemy), (Taipei, Taiwan, Chung-Yang Jih-Peo.
1952), II, pp. 254 ff. (Cited in Whiting, Soviet Streteoy in Sinkieng.
p. 106).
186. ~.
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River. According to lattimore:
The fighting at Manass was SO severe that the
population was reduced from 40,000 to 17,000,
and the physical devastation was proportionately
great. 8y this time the Kulja insurgents were
reported to heve 40,000 men under arms, end were
considered a grave threat to Urumchi itself. Crack
troops from the command of Hu Tsung-nan, which
throughout the war against Japan hed been garrisoned
in Northwest Chine to "contain" the Chinese
Communists, were sent to Sinkiang, but feiled to
throw back the insurgents.187
MeanWhile the fighting had spread to southern Sinkiang for the
first time since 1937. In late August and early September groups of Kazakh
cavalry owing allegiance to the ETR had crossed the Muzart Pasl from the
188Tekes Valley to seize the towns of Aksu and 8ai. Almost .imultaneously
groups of (predominantly Kirghiz) rebels appeared in the Sarikol region,
driving the Nationalist garrison from Tashkurgan and advancing to threaten
189Kashgar. Sinkiang was clearly slipping from KMT control at an increasing
speed, and by the autumn of 1945 the situation must have appeared as bleak
to the incompetent Wu Chung-hsin in Urumchi as it appeared promising to the
rebel leadership in Kulja.
187. lattimore, 0., Pivot of Asia, p. 87J cf. lattimore, E., 'Report on
Sinkiang', rES, XIV, 7 (April 11, 1945), p. 78.
188. lOlR, l/P&S/12/2405, EXT. 5980.1945 (letter, HMCU Turra1-10, 2/9/1945),
Kotov, op.cit., p. 443.
189. lOlR, l/P&S/12/2360, EXT.5299.1946 (letter, HMCGK Etherington Smith-
GOI, 3/10/46, p. 2. Kotov (op.cit., p. 443), describes this incident
as 'an armed uprising of the working masses of Tashkurgan'.
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It ~as at this point, however, that Chungking and Moscow intervened
once again decisively to influence the course of events in Sinkiang. faced
with the near-certainty of military defeat before Urumchi, Chiang Kai-shek
determined to negotiate with the leadership of tha self-styled "East
Turkestan Republic". Accordingly, following the KMT debacle before Wusu,
the Chungking government despatched GeneralChangChih-chung, commander of
the KMT's Northwestern Headquarters at Lanchow, to assist the incompetent
190 'Wu Chung-hain at Urumchi. It is apparent that the KMT laid the blame for
the unparalleled advances of the INA squarely upon the Soviet Union - and
with some justification, for, on September 13th, General Chang went directly
to the Soviet Consulate-General in Urumchi where he informed the Russians
that: 'Unless a cease-fire were effected immediataly, China would make an
international affair of the mattert•19l On September 14th a Soviet consular
official is reported to have left Urumchi for rebel lines. only 24 hours
later Moscow was able to transmit to Chungking an ETR request that the
dispute should be mediated, accompanied by an expression of Soviet willingness
192'to act in such a mediatory capacity'. This development, which must surely
190~ Clubb, China and Russia, p. 367J Boorman and Howard, 0p.cit., I, p. 43.
191. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang, p. 106J Clubb, China end Russia.
p. 367, citing U.S. Department of Stat., United States Relations With
China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-49 (Washington, 1949),
p. 125.
192. Clubb,!E!2.
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provide yet another positive indication of Soviet links with the IIi
rebels, was to lead to an almost immediate ceasefire between the INA and
tha Nationalist forces, and subsequently to an armistice by which the
province of Sinkiang was effectively partitioned into KMT- and ETR-
controlled zones.
8.5 The Soviet Union end tha KMT-ETR Armistice of 1946
Chang Chih-chung (eee plate 27), the senior Nationalist commander
despatched by Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate with the IIi rabala in September,
1945, was a man of markedly different atamp trom the provincial governor
Wu Chung-hsin. Born in Anhwei in 1891, reportedly the aon of a poor
family, Chang began hia association with the military in 1911, whan he
joined a student corpa dedicated to the overthrow of the Ch'ing Dynasty.
Subsequently he attended-tha Paoting Military academy, graduating in 1917,
before travelling to Kwangtung where he gained a commission in the nationalist
forces surrounding Sun Yat-sen. Chang remained associated with the KMT
after Sun'a death, and participated in the Northern Expedition as chief-of-stefr
of the Nationalist first Army's 2nd Division. His career continued to
prosper and, following visits to Europe, the United States end Jepan in 1927,
Chang became Dean of the Central Military Academy in 1929. During the
following eight years he saw active service against both the Japanese and
tha CCP before, in November, 1937, being appointed governor of Hunan.
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In 1938, following the burning of the provincial capital of Changsha,
193Chang lost this post, being 'demoted but retained in office'.
Despite this (temporary) setback to his career, however, in 1939 Cheng
194travelled to Chungking where, as a result of his wartime aervices,
he was to become one of Chieng Kai-shek's most trusted lieutenants.
By 1945, therefore, when he was sppointed commander-in-chief of
the KMT's Northwestern Headquarters at Lanchow, Chang Chih-chung was a tried
and trusted military figure of impeccable Nationalist credentials. Yet he
was also a man of known political integrity who had. predilection for
compromise and was not associated with any of the various pressure groups
(such as the "C.C. Clique" and the "Political Science Group" ) operating
within the KMT.195 These qualities clearly made Chang an acceptable figure
to opponents of the KMT, and when in 1945 differences between the KMT and
the CCP came Into the open, it was ChangChih-chung that Chiang Kai-shek
sent to Yenan as his personal representative In discussions with the CCP
Politburo. rollowing this mission, as a result of which, in August, 1945,
Mao Tae-tung was persuaded to travel to Chungking for talks, Chiang Kai-shek
ordered Chang Chih-chung to Urumchi in the hope that his chief negotiator
might also succeed in bringing the IIi rebels to the conference table.
193. Boorman and Howard, op_cit., Vol I, Pp. 41-3.
194. During the years 1940-45, Chang served the KMT as director of the
political department of the Military Affairs Commission at Chungking
and (concurrently) as secretary-general of the executive board of the
Sen Min Chu I Youth Corps_ Boorman and Howard, ~.
195. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 88) Barnett, op_cit., p. 247.
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Cheng.was either accompanied, or closely followed, by three Uighur
opponents of Sheng Shih-ts'ai who had fled Sinkiang and had been living
for a number of yeers in Chine proper, where they had become closely
associated with the KMT. These Uighur nationalists, ~ho shared none of
c-the IIi group's sympathies towards the Societ Union, were Mas ud Sabri,
cYsa Yusuf' Alptekin, and Muhammad .Aml'n :Bugra (not to be oon1'used with the
•
ex-"AmI'ro£ Khota.n,,).196Another Uighur of markedly anti-Soviet views who
re-entered Sinkiang with KMT approval at about this time was Yulber! Khan,
the former counsellor of Khan Maqsud Shah of Kumul and one-time political
associate of Khoja Niyas Hajji.197
•
following the delivery of Chang Chih-chung's ultimatum to the
Soviet Consulate-Genaral in Urumchi on September l3th,.194S, a preliminary
meeting between the Ili rebels and the provincial authorities was arranged
at Urumchi for mid-October. According to Turral, on October 12th, three
senior representatives of the ETR (the Uighurs Ahmadjan Qasim and Rah!mjan• •
- cSabir Khoja, and the Kazakh Abd al-Hayir Ture, all of whom were closely•
associated with the "progressive" faction within the I1i group), arrived
at the Chinese lines some 6 miles to the east of Manass where they were
198met and escorted to Urumchi. Negotiations, which began on October 14th
196. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2405, EXT.2671.1946J IOlR, L/P&S/12/2359, EXT.3270.
1946 (latter, HMCU Graham - British Embassy Chungking, 6/4/1946).
Sea also Appendix I, "Who Was Who in Republican Sinkiang".
197. Boorman and Howard, Dp.cit., IV, p. 60.
198. IOLR. L/P&S/12/2405, EXT.2671.l946.
under Soviet mediation, progressed well. The KulJa delegates professed
themselves willing to renounce their separatist goals and to drop the
designation "East Turkestan Republic", provided that Chungking would
agree to grant autonomous self-government to tha whola of Sinkiang. Chang
Chih-chung indicated Chungking's preparedness to allow the rebel area
to maintain its armed forces as a local "peace preservation corps", but
insisted that the KMT retain overall military command and exclusive
. 199authority over diplomatic relations. Despite the tona of compromise
set at this initial meeting, however, negotiations were to extend over
several months, with both the IIi delegates and Chang Chih-chung breaking
off talks at regular intervals in order to return to their respective
200capitals for consultations. These prolonged talks ara reported to have
centred on two main issues: (1) the ethnic and political composition of
e new Sinkiang government which would give due representation to the n~n-
Han peoples of the province and(2) the future form of milItary organisation
201for the province. The main treaty, guaranteeing full freedom of religion
199. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 88-9.
200. ibid., p. 89; IOLR, L/P&5/l2/2360, EXT.5299.1946, p.3; Whiting, Soviet
Strategy in Sinkiang, p. 107.
201. Clubb, China and Russia, p. 367.
427
publication, assembly and speech, was signed on January 2nd, 1946.
Under this treaty it was agreed that district officiels (formerly appointed
directly by the provincial government) would in future be elected by
universal adult suffrage; that Uighur and Kazakh should, besides Chinese,
become official languages; that non-Han nationalities should have the right
to use their own languages in primary schools with Chinese only becoming
a compulsory language at middle school level; that taxation should be
calculated according to 'the real productive power of tha people' and
'their ability to pay'; end that the 'free development of reciel cultures
202and arts' should be guaranteed.
An annexe attached to this treaty and signed at the ssme time provided
for the reorganisation of the Provincial Commission which was to be expanded
to 25 members, 10 of whom (including the Chairman) were to be directly .
appointed by Chungking, whilst the remaining 15 (including tha Vice-Chairman)
were to be recommended by locally elected representative bodies and subsequently
appointed by the Central Government. Of these 15 locally-recommended
members, the IIi group was explicitly. granted the right to choose six
commissioners of senior rank, including the Vice-Chairman, the Deputy
Secretary-General, the Commissioner of Education (or Reconstruction), and
203 --the Assistant Commissioner of Civil Affairs (or Finance). A.seoond annexe
202. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 89-90J Barnett, op.cit., pp. 248-9.
203. Barnett, op.cit., p. 249.
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to the main agreement, dealing with the military reorganisation of the
province, proved far more troublesome than the first and was not signed
until June 6th, 1946. By this second annexe it was agreed that the "IIi
National Army" should be reorganised into three cavalry and three infantry
regiments with a total strength not exceeding 12,000 men. One infantry
and two cavalry regiments were to be enlisted in the National Army (and
thereby to receive military equipment and other supplies from the Nationalist
authorities), whilst the other units were to be incorporated into the
provincial Peace Preservation Corps. All si~ regiments were to remain in
exclusive control of the (former) rebel zone, under thair own military
commanders, though they would (in theory) be snswerable to a chain of command
originating from Chang Chih-chung's own Northwestern Headquarters at lanchow.
Moreover, in 8 further striking concession by the KMT, all police units
within the (former) rebel zone were to be locally staffed and directed.204
As a result of the signing of this second annexe, the overall peace
agreement was ratified on June 6th, 1946, to come into effect on July 1st
of the same year. from that day, at least in theory, the "Three Regions" of
IIi, Chuguchak end Shera Sums would be reincorporated within the Chinese
province of Sinkiang, end the secessionist "East Turkestan Republic" would
cease to exist.
204. ibid., pp. 249-50; Whiting, Soviet Strateny in Sinkieng, p.l10.
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As has already been indicated, the signing of the KMT-ETR Armistice
of 1946 through the "good offices" of the Russian Consul-General at Urumchi
provides a clear indication of the high degree of political control exercised
by the Soviet UnIon over the Kulja regime. Yet in provIdIng an answer to
this long-debated point, the KMT-ETR ceasefire raises a series of further,
inter-related questIons, which also require clarification. Why, for example,
did the Soviet Union halt its surrogate divisions SO shortly before their
final advance on Urumchi? Why did the predominantly Muslim rebel forces
concur with such apparent readiness in this decision? And why had the
Kuomintang not made an 'international affair' of the Sinkiang conflict
at a much earlier stage, as soon as Soviet involvement had become apparent?
O. Edmund Clubb, the contemporaneous US Consul in Urumchi, equates
Chang Chih-chung's talk of 'internationalising' the KMT-ETR struggle with
a barely-implicit threat to involve the United States, then (as now) the
KMT's chief military ally, in an area which the Kremlin had long considered
205as a predominantly Soviet sphere of influence. No doubt there is some
sUbstance to this claim, but it is hardly likely to have played a decisive
role in Soviet strategic thinking. Rather, it seems probable that, following
the fall of Wusu to the ETR and the advance of the "IIi National Army" to
the banks of the Manass River, the Soviet Union had attained its primary
aims in Sinkiang and had no good reason for encouraging further INA advances
on Urumchi. By extending its 'all-out support' to the IIi rebels (and,
more discreetly, to CUthman Bitur's Altai Kazakhs), the Kremlin hsd
205. Clubb, China and Russia, p. 367.
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effectively re-established its primacy in the traditionally Soviet-influenced
border districts of IIi, Chuguchek and Shara Sume. Moreover, in
assisting the INA 1n its advance to Meness, the Soviets had ensured that
the important oil-producing region of Tu-shan-tzu passed under rebel
control.206 Nor ~8S oil the sole economic attraction of the ETR-controlled
"Three Regions". As has already been shown, the region of western
Dzungaria near the Soviet frontier is rich in tungsten, copper, wolfram
and - of singular strategic significance following the explosion of the
207atom bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945 - uranium.
rollowing Sheng Shih-ta'ai's break with the Kremlin in 1942, the Soviet
Union had been rigorously excluded from north-western Sinkiang. Shortly
after the establishment of the ETR in January, 1945, however, Soviet
technicians crossed back into the "Three Regions" and began once again to
exploit these resources, along with the gold of the Altai and the considerable
livestock resources of the area as a whole.208
206. According to Chen (The Sinkiang Story, p.235), almost the first action
of the INA command following the capture of Wusu was to send troops
'to occupy the oil wells and refinery south of the main road'.
207. See abovepp.325-6, also Whiting, Soviet strateoy in Sinkiang. pp.
65-6; Barnett, op.cit., P. 270; Clubb, China and Russia, p.320.
208. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang, PP. 109-10; Cheng Tien-fong,
op.cit., P. 282; Barnett, op,clt., p. 270; Moseley, C., A Sino-Soviet
Cultural rrontier: The IIi Kazakh Autonomous Chou (Harvard, 1966), p. 25;
Wheeler, G., 'Sinkiang and the Soviet Union', p. 58; McMillen, op,clt.,
p.23.
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In addition to these economic and strategic advantages,
indirect control of the "Three Regions" of IIi, Chuguchak and
Shara Sume through the agency of its ETR clients provided the
Soviet Union with an important political card which could be
played in both the international theatre (at a time of Soviet
expansion in the far East closely associated with the Valta
Conference and the entry of Soviet forces into the Pacific War),209
and on the regional stage, where Stalin remained uncertain es to
the eventual outcome of the Nationalist-Communist power struggle
209. At the Valta Conference (february 4-11, 1945), Stalin demanded
as a price for Soviet entry into the Pacific War: 'first, the
maintenance of the status quo in Mongolia; second, the
restoration of Russia's former rights violated by Japan in
1904- the return of southern Sakhalin; the restoration (subject
to an early agreement with Chiang Kai-shek) of Russian interests
in~ respect of Dairen, Port Arthur and the Chinese Eastern end
South Manchurian Railways, to be operated Jointly by a Soviet-
Chinese Company, with China retaining·tull sovereignty in Manchuria;
and third, the handing over of the Kurile Islands to the Soviet
Union'. Werth op.cit., p. 997, See also: Lensen, G.A., 'Velte
and the far Eest' in Snell, J.L., (ed.), The Meaning of Yelte
(Saton Rouge, 1~S6), pp. ISO ff.
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210in China and therefore as to which side to back. In retrospect,
it seems probable that, so long as Soviet influence remained limited
to the north-western third of Sinkieng, the KMT ~es prepared to treat
the issue as a purely local problem in the hope that the Soviet Union
~ould impose a restraining influence on the CCP as an appropriate
211 .quId pro guo. In the final extremity, moreover, it ~as even possible
that the Kremlin might be "bought off" ~ith a direct transfer of the
"Three Regions" to Soviet authority, either 81 an MPR-style satellite,
or as a sixth Soviet Central Asian Republic, or to be directly absorbed
210. Moscow remained uncertain as to the outcome of the CCP-KMTstruggle
until ~Bll into 1949, and had long held serious reservations
concerning the desirability of a CCP victory. In this context it
is interesting to note that in August, 1944, ~hen Roosevelt's
special envoy Major General Patrick Hurley stopped off in MOlcow
en route for Chungking, he was informed by Molotov that the Soviet
Union '~as not interested in the Chines. Communists: thay waren't
really communists anyway' (Stattinius, E.R., Roosevelt and the
Russians: The Yalta Conference, London, 1950, p. 28). Hurley, doubtless
es intended by the Kremlin, conveyed this message to Chiang Kai-shek.
He later reported beck to the State Department that:
At the time I came hereChiangKai-shek believed that
the Communist Perty in China ~as an instrument of the
Communist Party in Russia. He is now convinced that the
Russian Government does not recognise the CCP as communist
at all and that (1) Russia is not supporting the communist
party in China (2) Russia does not want dissensions or
civil war in China, and (3) Russia desires more hermonious
relations with China. (Clubb, Russia and China, p. 334)
211. According to Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Ka1-shek'a eon, his father
certainly believed that Stalin would be prepared to exercise (end
indeed able to exercise) auch restraint. Ta'eo Chu-jen, Chiang
Ch1ng-Kuo lun (Oiscussions With ChiangChino-kuo, Singapore and Hong
Kong, 1954), p. 61. lCited in Clubb, Chine end Russia, p. 345).
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within the RSFSR in the manner of the neighbouring "Tuvinian People's
212Republic" which lost the last vestiges of its autonomy in 1944.
An important indication of the fect that the Soviet Union was indeed
prepared to use its hold over the "Three Regions" of north-western Sinkiang
as a bargaining card in its wider dealings with the KMT may be found in the
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (signed in Moscow on August 14th,,
1945, on the very day that Soviet-sp~sored negotiations between Chang
Chih-chung and the ETR rebels were to begin in far-off Urumchi), as a result
of which the Soviet Union regained, at a very low cost, many of the
privileges once enjoyed by Tsarist Russia in China's three north-eastern
provinces.2l3 The precise role played by the KMT-ETR conflict in Sinkiang
during the discussions surrounding the ratification of this treaty remains
unclear, but a passage of the final agreement reaffirming Moscow'.
recognition of China's sovereignty over Manchuria continues: 'As for
the recen.tdevelopments in 5inkiang, the Soviet government confirms that•••
it has no intention of interfering in the Internal affairs of China,.214
212. The KMT was later reported to have considered the idea of abandoning
the whole of 5inkiang to the Soviets in a bid to 'save the Chinese
heartland'. Lieberman, H.R., 'Nanking i. Seeking a oe.l with the
Soviets', New York Times (rab. 1st, 1949); Sullivan, W., 'China
Northwest Veering to Ruseia', ~., (March 30th, 1949). See alao
Whiting's account of 'interview with a firsthand source', Soviet
strategy in Sinkleng, pp. !~?-9.
213. For details see Clubb, China and Ruesia, pp. 344-7.
214. ibid., p. 364. The implication that Stalin pressured the KMT through
the advance of the INA on Urumchi (as wall as through hi. suggestion·
to T.V. Soong, the chief KMT negotiator, that tha Nationalista 'had
batter raach an agreement quickly, or the Chinase Communists would
entar Manchuria'), is apparent.
'. 434
In this context, the helting of the INA on the banks of the
Manass River in September, 1945, may be seen as a compromise between
the USSR and the KMT; a breek in hostilities ~hich ~as'acceptable to
both sides pending the outcome of developments else~her. in China,
most notably in Manchuria (~hich had been overrun by troops of the
Red Army far Eastern Command during the short-lived iuBso-Japanese war
of August-5eptember, 1945), and in Chungking, which ~as the setting for
important negotiations between the KMT and the CCP during September and
215October of the same year.
One further reason for Soviet/ETR compromise at the banks of the
Manass River may be found in the changing ethnic end political make up
of the territories overrun by the INA. Specifically, the further that
rebel forces pushed from IIi, the weaker Soviet control became over the
movement. Whilst ~ithin Kulja the authority of "progressive", pro-Soviet
elements was paramount, beyond the narrow confines of the IIi Valley
anti-Soviet sentiment was rife amongst the independent Kazakhs of the
Altai region, and still more so amongst the traditionally conservative
,
and Muslim fundamentalist population of tha Tarim 8asin. ' This must also
have been an important factor In the willingness of "progressive" STPNLC
rebels (who, through no coincidence, controlled both the main body of the
216INA and completely dominated the three-man ETR delegation to the Urumchitalks),
215. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang, p. 109.
216. The INA ~as dominated by Ish:q Beg, Leskin and Polinov, whilst the
thrBe-man negotiating team comprised Ahmadjen Qesim, Rahimjen Sabrr,
and cAbd al-Hayir TUre. All six figures are clearly associated· with
the "progressive", pro-5oviet faction ~ithin the ETR.
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to acquiesce in the Soviet-sponsored ceasefire with the KMT.
That other leading Muslim rebels not associated with the STPNlC
disagreed with this decision will be shown below.2l7
rinally, mention should be made of contemporaneous end possibly
parallel political developmen~s in north-western Iran where, in December,
1945, an "Autonomous Rep~blic of Azerbaijan" (together with e related
"Kurdish Republic of Mahabad") was established through a pattern of
subversion similar (but not identical) to that employed by the Soviets
-in north-western Sinkiang. In August, 1941, Iran hed been simulteneously
invaded by Soviet and British forces, ecting in conjunction, in e move
designed to exclude German influence from the country. Iran wes subsequently
divided into British end Soviet zones, with the Red Army assuming control
over the northern part of the country, and the British teking over the eouth,
218including the entire concession area of the Anglo-Iranian oil company.
rrom the very beginning of thie enforced partition, there emerged a marked
difference between conditions in Soviet end Britieh zones. According to
lenczowski:
Whereas the British considered their presence in Iran a
temporary expedient••• The Russians geve eerly eigns
that they were embarking upon a long-range policy
thet would effect basic changes in the political,
economic and eocial life of the provinces under
their occupation.2l9
217. See Chapter 9, Section 1, "The Establishment of "Coalition Government"
and Muslim Factionalism in Share Sume and the South'.' --
218. Pounds, J.G., and Kingsbury, R.C., An Atlas of Middle Eestern Affeirs
(london, 1966), pp. 48-9.
21g. lenczowskl, G.l~ Russi, and the West 1n Iran, 1~IA-194A (Ithaca, 1949),
p. 194.
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As 1n Sinkiang during Sher,jShih-ts'ai's "progressive" period. pro-Soviet
elements (in this case primarily the Iranian Tudeh Party) were encouraged.
pro-Soviet propaganda was widely disseminated, and local attention was drawn
to historical and cultural links existing between ethnically-ekin groups
(Azerbaijanis. Kurds. Turkomen) living on either side of the Soviet-Iranian
220frontier. In September. 1944. only months before the establiehment of the
secessionist "East Turkestan Republic" in Sinkiang, the Soviet Assistant
Commissar for toreign Affairs, Sergei Kavtaradze, arrived in Tehran ostensibly
to discuss the exploitation of oil reserves at the negligible (and previously
. 221unworked) Soviet-held oil concession of Kavir-Khurian, near Semnan.
Shortly after his arrival, however, Kavtaredze dropped all pretence of
discussing Kavir-Khurian. and demanded a new Soviet oil concession which
would cover all five northern provinces of Iran bordering on the Soviet
Union. Not unnaturally. tha Iranian Premier Sa'ed demurred. and Kavtaradze
left Tehran after denouncing 'the disloyal and unfriendly position taken
up by Premier Sa'ed towards the Soviet Union' and appealing to the Iranian
people to bring pressure upon their government 'ror a favourable solution
222to the disputa'.
220. ibid., pp. 212-13, 249.
221. ibid., PP. 85, 171-2, 216-7.
222. ibid., p. 219.
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Under the terms of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1942, it had
been agreed that allied forces occupying Iran should be withdrewn from
223that country within six months of the cessation of the war. During the
summer of 1945, however, shortly after the surrender of Germany, the
eppearance of an "Azerbaijan Committee for National Liberation" (cf. STPNLC),
was reported in tha Soviet-occupied north-western provinces of Iran where
the authority of the Tehren government 'had been reduced virtually to
224zero.' In August, 1945, Tudeh-led disturbances broke out in Tabriz,
and en A~erbeijani 'Democratic Party' was established, incorporating both
local Tudeh supporters and Soviet Azerbaijanis brought in from across
, ,
the frontier.225 Meanwhile, several new divisions of the Red Army entered
Iran (bringing total Soviet strength'in tha area to between 30,000 and
70,000 men), and large quantities of arms were distributed by the Russians
to both local "progressives" and to sections of the peesentry.226 Throughout
this period centrel government officials and troop. were excluded from the
area, and it must have come as little surprise to Tehran when, on December
12, 1945, an "Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan" was proclaimed at Tebriz
under the leadership of Jacrar PIshavarr, a veteran Comintern agent who had
223. Kirk, G., The Middle East, 1945-50 (London, 1954), p. 57.
224. ibid., pp. 57-8.
225. ibid., pp. 58-Y.
226. ibid., P. 60 Lanczowski, op.cit., p. 287-8.
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been Commissar or the Interior in the short-lived "Soviet Republ1c or GUan"
during 1920_21.227 Three days later, on December 15th, 1945, a "Kurdish
People's RepublIc" lIIasdeclared at Mahabad, In the presence or Soviet
of'ficiala, under the leadership of' - I 228one Cad Muhammad.• •
There can be no doubt that in 1945 (as, indeed, today), the
predominantly Turkic population of Iranian Azerbaijan felt considerable
antipathy towards the central government iriTehran, partly because of their
persecution at the hands of Riza Shah, an,dpartly because the central
authorities did not permit the official use or the local (Azarr) dialect
of Turkish. (Kurdish hostility towards Tehran has, or course, been a long-
established factor in Iranian politics). Nevertheless, the situation in
north-western Iran could not be compared to that in Sinkiang (which had
been in a state of'almost constant armed rebellion since the Kumul rising
of 1931), and the i~effectuBl Azerbaijani "People'a Army" co~bled together
by the SovIets229 was in no way comparable to the INA in Ill. The survival
of both "the "Autonomous Republic or Azerbaijan" end the "Kurdish Republic
or Mahabad" was therefore entIrely dependent upon the presence' or Soviet
troops in northern Iran. Accordingly, .the IranIan authorities were obliged
227. Kirk, ov.cit., p. 59.
228. Roosevelt, A. Jr., 'The Kurdish Republic ot Mahabad', ~, I, 3
(JUly, 1947),p. 257.. , " .
229. Lenozowski, op.oit., p. 308.
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to travel to Moscow to seek satisfaction, where they were informed that:
The Soviet government would abandon its demand
for an oil concession. Instead it proposed that
an Iranian-Russian joint stock company be set
up with 51% of the shares owned by the Soviets
and 49% by Iran.230
The chief reason for Soviet intervention in Iran thus became clear -
and indeed parallels with Tu-shan-tzu in Sinkiang are immediately apparent.
As Allen S. Whiting has pointed out, several features of the Azerbaijan
affair invite comparisons with the Iii revolt. 80th risings occurred in
areas adjacent to the Soviet Unionf both areas possessed minerel reserves
of interest to the war-ravaged Soviet Union; and in both instances the Soviet
Union could supply covert support for the rebels from ethnically akin groups
231resident within its own frontiers. Here the similarities end, however,
for following Iranian acceptance of Soviat demands for oil concessions in
the insurgent areas, and as a result of strong pressure for Russian withdrawal
from Britian, the United States end the UN, the Red Army pulled back across
the Soviet frontier in May, 1946. Within six months, central go~ernment
230. Lenczowski, op.cit., p. 296. Moscow also demsnded that Soviet
troops should be permitted 'to stey in some parts of Iran for
an indefinite period'. This was rejected outright by Tehran.
231. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang. p. 129;
Lenczowski, G.L., 'The Communist Movement in Iran', The Middle ta~t
Journal, I, 1 (January, 1947), p. 42. As with the INA, besides covertly
supplying arms, the Soviet Union supplied both tha "People's Army of
Azerbaijan" and the officers of the Kurdish militia of Mahabad with
Red Army uniforms bearing local insignia. Lenczowsi, Russia and the ~Jest
in Iren, p. 290; Roosevelt, 'The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad', p.257, 261.
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troops crossed into Azerbaijan to put down the rebellion.
Jacfar P!shivarr succeeded in escaping to Soviet territory, but
- 1" 232Qad Muhammad was apprehended at Mahabad and hung. Subsequently
• •
all traces of the separatist regimes were effaced by Tehren, and on
October 22, 1947, the Iranian MaJlis abrogated the oil agreement
233forced on it by the Soviet Union. In Sinkiang, however, retribution
was to be less direct, and was to be postponed ,for a number of years
pending the installation of a strong, centralised government in Peking
which might once again extend Chinese authority to the remota frontier
regions of Inner Asia.
232. Kirk, op.cit., p. 82; Roosevelt, 0Ptcit., p. 267.
233. Lenczowski, Russia end the West in Iren, p. 312.
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CHAPTER 9
SINKIANG, 1946-49: THE MUSLIMS ON THE EVE Or THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER
It eppears thet the 50viet-oriented leaders in the
three districts were persuaded by the Russiens to
adhare voluntarily to the CPR and that the ebsence
of popular resistance to CPR rule was due to the
belief that the Russians, so nearby, would provide
a guarantee for China's good behaviour. In the end,
everyone was to be disappointed, except the Chinese
Communists. As the non-Han peoples of the three
districts were to discover, no autonomy was any
longer possible between Russia and Chine in the
middle of Asie.l
Even while they were singing the comradely strains
of "The International", the Russian and Chinese
Communists looked at each other with shining eyes,
but suspicious hearts'.
2Sheng Shih-ts'ei.
9.1 The Establishment of "Coalition Government" end Muslim rectioneliem
in Shera Sume end the South
On July 1st, 1946, Cheng Chih-chung addressed the people of Sinkieng,
by redia, from Urumchi. In his speech he announced the peaceful settlement
of the IIi dispute, thanked Chine's 'great and friendly neighbour, the Soviet
Union' for acting es medietor, and urged all the peoples of Sinkieng 'to work
1. Moseley, A Sino-Sovlet Culturel rrontier, P. 22.
2. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Red reilure in Sinkieng. p. 186.
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:5unitedly for peace'. On the same day e new Sinkiang coalition government
4came into being, with Chang Chih-chung as Provincial Chairman, end
Ahmadjan Qaslm as Provincial Vice-Chairman.• Other {"ex")-ETR appointees
c - c -to the coalition government were Abd el-Karim Abbes as Deputy Secretary-
General, Ra~imjin Sabir Khoja es Assistant Commissioner of Civil Affairs
and Saif al-01n cAziz es Commissioner of Education.5 All rebel appointees
to the coalition were thus closely associated with the "progressive" STPNLC
faction within the rebel alliance, whilst "bourgeois nationalist" elements
such as c -.. c .. --Ali Khen Ture and Uthman Batur were excluded. Other non-Han
members of the coalition included the Tatar Burhen Shahrdr (second Vice-
Chairmen); the Uighurs Muhammad AmIn Bugra (Commissioner of Reconstruction).' .
and cisa Yusuf AlPtekinJ6 the Kazakhe Jan!m Khan (Commissioner of rinance)
3. IOlR., l/P&S/12/2360, EXT.5613.1946 (Speech by Ch~ng Chih-chun~ to
the People of Sinkiang, 1/7/1946).
According to Boorman and Howard (opceit., Vol. I, p. 44), Chang Chih-chung
replaced Wu Chung-nsin as Governor of 5inkiang on 29th March, 1946,
Lattimore, however, gives ths date as 'July, 1946' (Pivot of Aeie. p. 90).
In this context it should be noted that Wu Chung-hsin was elected to the
state Council of the National Government when the latter wes reorganised
-in April, 1947. (Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol III, p. 424).
5. Barnett, op.cit., p. 250; Hayit, Turkestan Zwischen Ruesland und Chine,
P. 320;.Clubb, Chine end Russia, p. 368" Chen, The Sinki~n9 Story, P. 245.
c- ~ .'-., ..... ",,_ -The position of. Isa Yusuf Alptekinin the coalition government remains( . c-unclear. According to Barnettopccit., p. 250), lsa held tha role of
Provinciel Secretery-General. Lettimore, however, nemes the Hen Chinese
Liu Meng-hsun as Provincial Secretary-General (Pivot of Aeia, p. 90).
Barnett describes Liu Mengech'un (sic) as 'Chang Chlh-chung's Secretary-
General' (op.cit., p~ 251). M~ammad Amrn Bugre should not be confused with
the former Khotan Amir of the seme name; indeed, according to Lies (op.cit.,
P. 20), he wes the latter's son.
6.
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and S;lis (second Deputy Secretary-General)J and the Tungan Wang
Tseng-ehan (Commissioner of Civil Affairs).? The "returned" Uighur
c-~as ud Sabri, a politician who enjoyed close links with the K~T, was
given the post of Supervisory Commissioner for Sinkieng (with
8direct responsibility to the Nationalist authorities at Nanking).
Despite these (apparently) promising concessions by the K~T, the
Sinkiang political scene was to experience few changes of substance es a
result of the formation of tha coalition government of 1946. Within the
"Three Regions" authority continued to be wielded by the pro-Soviet STPNLC,
whilst in the remaining eeven regions of the province real power remained
concentrated in the hands of Han Chinese appointees of the Nanking
government, including specifically Chang Chih-chung, his Secretary-General,
Liu Meng-hsunJ the Social Welfare Commissioner, Chao Chien-feng, the Vlce-
Commissioner of Reconstruction, Ku Chien-chiJ and General Sung Hsl-lien,
gcommander of the lDD,DOO-strong Sinkieng garrison forces. or this group
only Chang Chih-chung seems to have been committed to genuine reform, the
remainder of his Han colleagues (except Sung), as well BS the Tungan Wang
? Lattimore, op.cit., pp. 90-91, Barnett, op.cit., pp. 250-51.
8. ~, L/P&S/12/2359, EXT.32?0.l946 (letter, H~CU Graham - British Embassy,
Chungking, 6/4/1946), P. 1.
9. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 90-91.
c-Tseng-shan and the Uighur Mas ud Sabri, were all activa members of
the "C.C. Clique", and as such intractably opposed to co-operation
with the IIi rebels.lO
following the formation of this ill-matched and disparate coalition,
during the latter half of 1946 Chang Chih-chung introduced a series of reforms
designed to reduce communal tensions within the province and to reconcile
the predominantly Muslim population to continuing Chinese rule. Even before
the formal establishment of the coalition, Chang had given his approval for
the release of 811 political prisoners, the remission of all taxes for a
period of six months, and the abolition of the government-controlled
Sinkiang Provincial Trading Corporation (set up by Sheng Shih-ts'ai),
which had enjoyed a monopoly of all foreign and domestic trade.II Shortly
after the establishment of the coalition, Chang followed up these reforms
by passing a series of laws under which provincial Officials were forbidden
to engage in trade (whilst the right of free foreign and domastic trade
wes restored to the population in general), privata bank. were ancouraged
to increasa investment and production; state requisitions in kind were
strictly limited; taxes in arrears were cancelled; and a reduction of taxes
was promised for 1947.12 Chang gave proof of his determination to combat
10. ~.;' Chen,~The Sinkleno story, p. 250. Sung Hsl-lien was epparently
associated with the "C.C. Clique"'s main rival, the "Political Science
Group". This, however, did not make him eny the more favourably disposed
towards the IIi group, and he is reported to have told his supporters:
'Our first enemy is the 111 party' (New York Times, february 1st, 1948,
cited in Chen, op,cit., p. 250, tn.)
11. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2~60, EXT.5299.l946, P. 8.
12., Lattimore, Pivot of Asie, p. 91.
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official corruption by seizing some 25,000 Chinese ounces of opium (formerly
the property of the Sinkieng Provincial Trading Corporation) and having it
13burned in front of his Urumchi headquarters. In a move designed to plecate
Muslim fundamentalist sections of the population, marriages between Musl1ms
14and non-Muslims were prohibited, whilst in an apparent gesture of good-will
towards the Chinese Communists, more than 100 CCP members imprisoned in
Sinkiang since Sheng Shih-ts'ai's break with the Soviet Union were released
15from jail and sent back to Yenan by a epecial convoy of lorries.
Cheng also sought'to reach a genuine understanding with:the IIi
leadership, subsequently declaring (in terms surely never before employed
by a Han Chinese official in Sinkiang):
The I-ning (Kulja) Incident, which was said to be
a revolutionary movement, featured slogans calling
for an anti-Han campaign, the overthrow of despotism
and the independence of Eastern Turkistan. From the
standpoint of revolution, it cannot ba said that it
was absolutely wrong. Recently, at a press conference
for Chinese and foreign journalists in Nanking, I said
that our former policy in Sinkiang had been unreasonable.
We Chinese comprise only five per cent of the popUlation
of Sinkiang. Why have we not turned over political power
to the Uighurs and other racial groups who constitute
the other 95 per cent? In many respects, the policies
adopted by the Sinkiang government in the past were
entirely wrong - no different, in fact, than the policies
of imperialist nations towards their colonies. These mistekes
we must correct, end we must remove and atone for the many
evils and.bloodstains left behind by ex-Governor Sheng Shih-ta'ai.16
13. ibid., Boorman and Howard, op,clt., Vol I, p. 44.
14. 1QhB.,l/P&S/12/2360, EXT.6245.l946J cf. Chen, The Sinkieng Story, P. 245;
15. lattimore, Pivot of AsIa, p. 91, citing Hen Hal Ch'ao (Desert Tides),
Shanghai edition, January, 1947.
16. Chang Chih-chung, Hsin-chiang Jih-pao (Sinkieng Daily), Urumchl, August
14th, 1947. An English summary may be found in Chang Chih-chung, 'Dilemma
in Sinkiang', Pacific Affaire, XX, 4 (Dac. 1947), pp. 422-9. The passage
cited above appears on p. 428.
As might be expected, these astonishingly conciliatory gestures
found absolutely no sympathy amongst Chang's more orthodox KMT colleagues.
Within Sinkiang, the nasset-stripping" operation by which KMT officialdom
survived and profited was dependent upon the corruption ~illch
Chang sought to stamp out, whilst in Nanking KMT headquarters can hardly
have received with delight Chang's request for an annual subsidy of
17165,000,000 Chinese dollars to pay for tax reductions in Sinkiang.
Thus the appointment of the conciliatory and morally upright Chang Chih·chung
was clearly a temporary device, intended both to secure e breathing epece
for the KMT leadership during its struggle with the CCP in China proper,
end to limit the growth of Soviet influence in Sinklang pending the full
restoration of Chineee authority over the area.
Meanwhile, within the "Three Regions" a serious split was emerging
between pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet Muslim rebels. Indications of this
development had become apparent as soon as the Soviet Union brought pressure
to bear on the rebel leadership in a successful bid to halt the INA on the
banks of the Manass River. The nominal President of the ETR, the
Uzbek c - hAli Khan Ture, was strongly opposed to compromise with the provincial
authorities, and is reported to have wept at the conclusion of the initial
peace agreement. He subsequently declined all offers of posts in the new
provincial coalition and, according to Graham, 'disappeared none knows whither,~9
17. Hsin-chieng Jih=peo, April 11th, 1947 (cited by Lattimore, Pivot of Asia,
p. 91, fn. 77).
18. ~, L/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/l0, P. 3.
19. ~.; cf. Hayit, Turkestan Zwischen Russland und Chine, P. 320.
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According to anti-Soviet Kazekh sources, however:
On August 16th (1946), four Soviet Officers from the
border town of Khorgos came across the frontier andc - ••paid a polite calIon Ali Khan Ture at his home in
KulJe. At the end of their visit, they cordially
invited him to lunch with them at Khorgos. cAli Khan
Ture accepted and drove off with the officers in
their car. He never returned.20
rollowing this development, political power within the IIi region
passed entirely into the hands of the STPNLC end (despite the retention of
~akim 8eg Khoje as cAli Khan's successor),2l Soviet influence within the
valley became still more marked. When Graham visited the region during the
autumn of 1946, he found 'no outward signs of returning Chinese control in
22KulJa itself or along the road'. All Official notices within IIi were in
23Turklc and Russian, but never in Chinese; all trade was with the Soviet
Union, and all movable property belonging.to murdered or refugee Hen Chinese
had been confiscated end exported to the USSR to pay for arms and other
24assistance; whilst Soviet doctors end nurses administered the locel hospital
20. Lies, Kazekh Exodus, p. 120; cf. Barnett, op.cit., p. 269.
21. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/l0, P. 3; Bernett, op.cit., 0; 269.
Nota that, since the ETR had officially ceased to exist, ~8kim 8eg
became District Officer of I1i under the coalition rather than
·President-of the ETR.
22. IOLR, L/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/10, p. 3.
23. ~. Graham comments that this was in direct contravention of the June
1976 peace agreement.
2~. 1£!&., pp. 3-4; cf. Barnett, op.cit., PP. 269-70.
25where injured INA soldiers were taken for treatment. Moreover, Soviet
technicians continued to supervisa Illegal mining operations on Chinese
territory without Chinese permission, end Soviet consular officials in
Kulja (as well as in Chuguchak and Share Sume) were issuing Soviet nationality
papers to residents of the Three Regions (particularly to "White" Russians)
25at e prodigious rate. On the other hand, during the short-lived period
of the Sinkiang coalition government, no sUbstantial steps towards land
reform or the redistribution of , ~ealth seem to have been undertaken in the
IIi region. Chinese forms of regional administration (including the ~
and the heien) 27.were retained, and no anti-religious oampaigns were mounted.
By the autumn of 1946, therefore, Sinkiang had effect~vely been
partitioned into KMT-controlled and Soviet-controlled,%ones, 'whilst within
IIi those rebel leaders who sought to oppose both Chinese and Russian
hegemony had been ousted from power. Yet despite the apeed with whIch the
c - uSoviet Union and its STPNLC allies had moved to eliminate Ali Khan Ture
following the KMT-ETR armistice, it was aoon to become apparent that the
25. IOlR. L/P&S/12/2360, r/155S0/234/l0, P. 4.
26. ibid., P. 3. According to Graham: 'The very larga majority of the Russian
population took advantage of the offer of Soviet papers ••• and of those who
did not wish to do so, nearly all intend to leava for Urumchi or further
east as soon as possible. They look on IIi as lost to China and doomed, to
become part of the Soviet Union'. According to Barnett (op,c1t., pp.268-9),
as many as 20,000 residents of IIi took out Soviet nationality papers
during this period. Sea also Lattimore, Pivot of Asia. pp. 146-7.
27. Barnett, op,cit., P. 259.
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subordination or rebel interests to Soviet control vas unacceptable both
to many Kazakhs or the "Three Regions", and to the Muslim fundamentalist
guerillas opereting in tha rar south-west of the province, in the vicinity
of Kashgar.
Kazakh opposition to the tightening of Soviet control over the
"Three Regions" or IIi, Chuguchak and Shara Sume was initially manifested
after the Signing of the initial KMT-ETR armistice, but before the related
"disappearance" of.CAli Khan Ture, when two int'luential Kazakh leaders
c - --from the Chuguchak and Shara Sume regions - namely Uthman Batur and
oAli Beg RahIm
•
(see plate 30) - broke away from the Kulja regime and,
28together with their followers, took to the mountains. Doubtless this
development can partly be explained as a manifestation of the traditional
antipathy felt by Sinkiang Ka2akhs towards centralised authority, 8S well
by a desire on the pert of at least c - --Uthman Batur's seasoned, aemi-bandit
29forces to go on fighting even after the KMT-ETR armistice had been signed.
c - --It is noteworthy, however, that despite the defection of Uthman Batur in
c -the Altai and All Beg Rahim In the eastern Tlen Shan, most Kazakhs within•
the .IliVallay seem aither to have remained loyal to the Kulja regime, or
to hava maintained a sympathatic neutrality. In part thIs may be explaIned
by the proximity of IIi to the Soviet Union, and by the pervading influence
of the pro-6oviet STPNLC within the valley. A more important factor, however,
seems to have lain In the traditional tribal and eocial distinctions dIviding
the Kazakhs of Dzungaria from their bretheren in the IIi Valley.
28. Boorman and Howard, op.clt., Vol IV, P. 47, Barnett, op.cit., p. 276.
Lias, however, dates CUthm&n' s defection to Septamber 7th, 1946 (op. cit"
P. 122).
2~. See, for example, Barnett's statement that CUthmen's Kazakhs 'edmit they
like to fight' (op.ctt., p. 275); see also IOLR, L/P&S/12/2359, EXT. 2314,
1945, p, 3.
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Within Sinl{iang the Kazakh people may be divided into three main
tribal groups, the Naiman, the Kirei and the Auwak. According to Barnett,
on the eve of the communist takeover the Naiman were divided into nine
further sub-tribes, chiefly concentrated in Ilil_the Kirei were divided
into twelve further sub-tribes~ chiefly concentrated in Shara Sume, but
also in the eastern TienShan and at Gez Kol in the eoutb-eae t] and the
Auwak were divided into three further sub tribes, 'scattered in small,
, , ,0 'unimportant groups throughout northern Sinkiang'. Whilst the Naiman
Kazakhs of Ili had belonged to the Great Horde (Tk. Ulu Zhuz) oentred on
Lake Balkash, which was severely disru~ted by the Dzungars in the late 11th
and early 18th centuries and subsequently _oame under oonsiderable Russian
influence,31 the Kirei K~zakhs of Shara Sume had belonged to the Middle
Horde (Tk. Orta Zhuz) located in the central steppe region, and had
escaped strong Russian influence prior to their eastward movement into
Dzungaria following the Ch'ine destruction of the Oirot Dzunear Enpire in
1757.32 Within Ili (and to a lesser extent Chuguchak), the Naiman were
ex~osed to prolonged commercial and oultural contaot with Tsarist Russia
during the 19th oentury (and, in IIi, to a decade of Russian occupation
between 1811 and 1881), whilst the Kirei Kazakhs, isolated in the Ch'!ng
backwater of Altai, avoided disruptive contaots with the Russians to
a far greater extent.33 Finally, it was to Ili (and to a lesser
30. Barnett, op.cit., 1'.214.
31. Hambly, G., et al., Central Asia, pp. 145-6. Moseley (op.cit., ~. 16),
would appear to be mistaken in assigning the Naiman Kazakhs to the
Great Rorde and subsequently to Shara SUme.
,2. Hambly, op.cit., 1'.146, cf. Moseley, ov.oit., 1'.16. '-
33. ibid., p. 18.-
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extent to Chuguchak) that most Kazakh tefugees from the Soviet Union
fled during the years of the Civil War and the subsequent 'ketl-i-eem'
(general massacre) associated with Stalin's collectivisation of the steppe.34
located in the south and west of the "Three Regions", they remained exposed
to considerable Soviet influence under the administrations of Yang Teeng-hein
and Chin Shu-jen, and particularly during the "progressive" years of Sheng
Shih-ts'ai. Though the experiences of the Naiman Kazakhs at the hends
of the Russians can hardly have endeared them towards the Soviet Union,
constant exposure to successive generations of Russian (and subsequently
Soviet) influence had, to a considerable extent, broken down their
traditional social structure so that, by the time of the esteblishment
35of the ETR, the Kazakhs of the IIi region hed no khans at all.
In marked contrast, the isolated and culturally traditionalist Kazakhs of
Shara Sume and the eastern Tien Shan were still governed by a complex system
of chiefs and khans (often of artistocratIc, or "whIte bone" status, whilst
36commoners were classIfied as "black bone"), emongst whom may be numbered
c - - - - c 17such leaders as Uthman 8atur. and Ali Eeg RahIm. E7 the mid-20th
- .
century, moreover, regional distinctions between Klrei and Naiman Kazakh
34. See above, p. 345.
35. According to Moseley (op.ctt., p. 18), the heredItary aristocracy of the
IIi Kazakhs had disappeared completely by the end of the 19th century.
36. Barnett, op,cit., p. 274; Moseley, op.cit., p. 19. See also Krader, l.,
Social Or anization of the Mon ol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads (The Hague, 1963)
and Hudson, E., Kazakh Social Structure New Haven, 1938), for general
studies of traditional Kazakh social organisatIon.
37. The official tribal chief of the Kirei Kazakhs at this time, however,
was 'Ailin Wang (Ch. 'King'), an ineffective, hen-pecked little man who
is overshadowed even by hi. wIfe, the 250 pound Hatewan'. Barnett, ~
ill., .p. 214.
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within Sinkian9 had become less marked. Thus those Sinkian9 Kazekhe who
were attracted by the material advances made in Soviet Kazakhstan tended
to gravitate towards IIi, regardless of tribal affiliation, whilst more
traditionally-minded or anti-Soviet Kazakhs tended to move towards the
38Altai in a bid to avoid Soviet influence. By the mid-1940s this mutually
opposed flow of Kazakhs (which included, in particular, members of
the small Kazakh upper classes and intelligentsia), had resulted In the
emergence of a pro-Soviet Kazakh elite in IIi, whilst 'traditional Kazakh
aocial ideala found their last refuge ••• in eastern and northern Ozungaria,.39
Following the initial signing of the KMT-ETR armistice in January,
1946, this split came into the open, with cUthmin Batur and hie allies in
Shara Sume breaking away from the Ku1ja regime, whilst IIi Kazakh leadera
c .• - ... ..such as,Abd al-Hayir Ture and Dalil Khan continued to support its pro-
Soviet oriantation.40 According to Barnett, CUthmen broke with the IIi
leadership on April 1st, 1946, ostensibly beceuse they w.~~ Soviet-domlnated
but in reality becausa 'they tried to bring him under control end to ensure
41 c -his obedience to their orders'. Uthman immediately withdraw to the remote
38. Moseley, op.clt., p. 20.·
39. ~. See alao Wang Chih-lal, 'Shih-tun chieh-fang ch'ien wo~uo He-e8-k'o
tsu ti she-hui hslna-chin' ('A Preliminary Discussion of the Nature of
Kazakh Society in Our Country Before the Liberation'), Min-t8tJ t'wm-chl ..h
(Peking), I (1963), pp. 30-33.
c _.Abd al-Hayir Ture's tribal affiliations remain unclear, but according
to earnett, DalIl Khan was ona of aevaral leading Naiman chief. who
supportad the Kulja regime (op,clt., p. 275).
41. !E!£., p. 276.
40.
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Pei-ta-ehan range on the Sinkiang-MPR frontier (in the region of his old
Tayingkul power base - see Map 12), where he began to organise resistance
to the IIi regime whilst entering into secret negotiations with the KMT in
Urumchi. c -He was subsequently joined in this struggle by Ali 8eg Rahim of
•
the eastern Tien Shan, who h~d once been magistrate or Shawan,near-
Manass.42 Meanwhile the administration of Shara Sume, which remained under
the control of the Kulja regime, seems to have paesed to the Naiman Kazakh
- - - 43leader Dal!l Khan. 80th Soviet and pro-Soviet sources tend to make light
f c - 44 i 1o Uthman's defection, but in real ty the oes of the Kirei Kezakh
chieftain proved to be a grievous blow to the IIi authorities, To be sure,
there was no place for independent, elitist, semi-bandit leaders such as
c -Uthman in the Soviet-orientated "democracy" emergingwlthin the "Three
Regions", yet CUthman's defection signalled the start of large-scele
desertions amongst the Kazakh cavalry which had provided the backbone of
the INA during its initial liberation of the "Three Regions" and subsequent
45 c -advance on Urumchi. Precise figures are not available, but Uthman'.
personal followers are reported to have numbered 4,000 yurts and 15,000
46Kazakhs, whilst in November, 1946, a further 10,000 Kazakhs who refused
42. ~., P; 268, Lias, Kazak Exodus. P. 125; Isma'i1, M.S., and Isma'il,
M.A., op.cit., P. 29; Hayit, Turkestan Zwischen Russland und China, P. 320.
43. Chen, The Slnkiang Story, P. 261. Oal!l Khan's "progressive" stance is
confirmed in Mingulov, op.cit" p. 188. According to Oallin (optcit., p.276)
another senior Naiman chieftain to continue supporting the IIi regime was
'8ashbai'. This is almost certainly the "Ba-asu-ba-yi" identified by KMT
sources es the administrative heed of the Chuguchek region under the rebe1e
(see Appendix VI, Teble 4, at end of thie study).
44. Mingulov, op.cit., P. 189; Chen, The Sinkieno Story. PP. 260-61.
45. Barnett, op.cit., PP. 264-5, 215; Lias, Kazak Exodus, pp. 129-30; Dreyer,
J.T., 'The Kazakhs in China', in: Astri and Noble (eds.), Ethnic Conflict
In International Relat!on~ (NY, 1977), p. 154.
46. Barnett, op.cit., P. 276;-Boorman end ,Howard, op,ett., Vol IV~ P. 47
cf. Kotov, op.cit., P. 189, however, where it is stated thst Uthman
commanded '!rr1gu1ar horse numbering 1,500', whilst CAl! Beg, 'another
of his sort', commanded 900. .
455
c -to fight against Uthman are reported to have fled from 111 to KMT-dominated
territory, reducing the overall percentage of Kazakh troops serving with
the rebel forces to no more than 30% (whilst Kazakhs make up more than
4760% of the total population of the "Three Regions"). By any stendards,
therefore, the defection of c - --Uthman Batur, which may be interpreted as
an indication both of Kirei-Naiman differences and of a wider Kazakh-Uighur
48disjunction of interest, must be seen as a serious setback to the Kulja
regime.
Meanwhile, in eouth-western Sinkieng, a second area of Muslim
factionalism had emerged in the Kashgar region following the establishment
of the KMT-ETR armistice. Here, it will be recalled, a revolt 'similar in
character to, though of smaller dimensions than' the IIi rising, had broken
49out in August, 1945. Within a short time the rebel Muslim forces (predominantly
Kirghiz) succeeded in capturing Teshkurgan and in aeizing the entire Sarikol
50region before advancing to threaten Kashgar.
47. Barnett, op.cit., p. 265; Moseley, op.cit., p. 17, citing Wang Wei-ping
and Hu Ving-mei, Hdn-chieng Wl!i-wu-erh tzu-chl" ch'u (The Slnkhnn-lJiohur
Autonomous Reoion, .Pe_kin~,1959), p. 46.
48. following the Kazakh desertions of 1946, the percentage of Uighurs within
the armed forces of the "Three Regions" rose to 6~ (compared with 30%
Kazakhs and 10% Mongols), whereas in 1944-45 the majority of "INA" troops
had been Kazakh. Barnett, op.cit., PP. 264-5.
49. l/LR, l/P&S/l2/2360, EXT. 5299.1946 (letter, HMCGK Etherington Smith-GOI,
11946), p. 2.
50. See above, P. 420.
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The origins and nature of this ne~ south-western revolt have long
remained uncertain. According to KMT sources, the rising in Sarlkol was
directly inspired by the ETR and its Soviet backers, and indeed Chang Te-chun
claims. the existence of a direct administrative link between the rebel
capital at KulJa end 'So-che chou, P'u-li heien' (Yarkend Region, Tashkurgan
County), whilst identifying the ETR administrative head or this area as one
"K'a-la-4a1an"(7 Qaliwun).51 Vet the areas controlled by the tlllOrebel groups
were never contiguous, and regular communication between IIi and Sarikol can
only have been possible with direct Soviet connivance. Certainly HMCGK
Etherington Smith believed it 'lIIellestablished' that the southern revolt
had been 'engineered and organised by 8 group which came ovar the border
52from the Soviet Union', and attention has already been drawn to Kotov'e
sympathatic referenca to 'an armed uprising or the working masses of
53Tashkurgan'. Vet both the timing or the revolt (which occurred shortly
before the initiel KMT-ETR ceasefire, and therefore at a time when the Soviet
Union had all but achieved its primary objectives within Sinkiang), and it,
subsequent course, suggest that the Sarikol rising was, in feet, e
spontaneous and purely local affair over which tha ETR end it, Soviet backers
immediately (but unsuccessfully) attempted to assert control. It i, at
51. See Appendix VI at the end of this study.
52. IOLR, l/P&S/12/2360, EXT.5299. 1946, section 14.
53. See above, p. 420.
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leest clear that, by mld-1945, conditions in southern Sinkiang had
deteriorated to a point where, independent of eny external factors, a new
Muslim rising had become 8 distinct probability.
Etherington Smith:
Thus, according to
Foreign trade was at a standstill and domestic trade
had shrunk to minute proportions as a result of the
many restrictions imposed on it. There was en ecute
shortage of essential consumer goods and prices ~ere
rising at an alarming rate, assisted by a growing
lack of confidence in the currency. The whole
administration was inefficient and corrupt, and no
attempt was made to improve the condition of the
people, who were, on the contrary, continually
subjected to new exactions in the form of forced
lebour and arbitrery local texes. The ermy, too,
was in a deplorable state, the officers corrupt
and irresponsible, the men ill-cared-for and
undisciplined - as evidenced by the acts o( looting
which occurred in various parts of the province.
Signs of demoralisation were becoming increasingly
evident in both the military and Civil administrations,
reflecting a growing lack of 'aith in the stability
and permanence or Chinase rul•• Meanwhile the native
population were becoming ever more resentful or the
.herdships imposed on them and less amenable to
authority, having lost much of their respect for the
administration as a result of the successes achieved
by tha .rebels and the poor showing o( the government
troops.54
Little information is available regarding the sequence of events
surrounding the revolt in the south, but according to Mclean, in mid-August,
1945, 'rebel bands poured through the passes leading from the Soviet Union
to the Pamirs and drove out the Chinese garrison' before advancing to
threaten Kashgar and Varkand.55 Similarly Barnett, who travelled in the
south, was informed by 'a foreigner that lives in south-west Slnklang' that:
54. IOlR, L/P&S/l2/2360, EXT.5299.1946, p. 6.
55. Mclean, 'Sinklang Today', p. ~84.
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It ~as more of an invasion than a revolt ••• the
fighting was done almost entirely by troops from
the Soviet republics across the border, and •••
these troops actually antagonised the TaJiks and
Kirghiz in eouth-western Sinkiang by destroying
their crops and flocks.56
Vet the fighting 1n the south was to continue for more then a yeer efter
the KMT-ETR ceasefire of September, 1945, by which the INA wes halted in
its advance on Urumchi, and indeed the Kulja leadership was to disclaim
57all responsibility for the Sarikoli rebels whom they denounced as "bandits".
Thus in January, 1946, even as the initial KMT-ETR armistice was
being signed in Urumchi, the,south-western rebels diverted the main
thrust of their attack from Kashgar to Varkand, which they succeeded in
investing following the capture of the lesser oases of Posgam and
Karghallk (see Map 7).58 This advance was subsequently beaten back by
KMT garrison troops la development ~hlch, in itself, casts some doubt on
claims of direct Soviat involvement), but Muslim rebels continued to
control most of the countryside between Khotan and the Soviet frontier
until the autumn of 1946 when, following the establishment of the Sinkiang
coalition government under Chang Chih-chung, Chinese troops 'cleared the
rebel forces from the region of the Pemirs end reopened the routes to
India·~59
56. Bernett, op.cit., p. 266.
57. IOLR. L/P&S/12/2360, EXT.5299.l946, P. 4.
58. ~., PP. 4-5.
59. Beloff, Soviet Policy in the far East. 1944-51, p. 98.
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The political identity of the south-western Muslim rebels of 1945-45
has long remained uncertain. British diplomatic sources are contradictory,
indicating, on balance, a belief that the Soviet Union was behind the
rising. 50 Yet in a report dated October, 1945, (shortly after the reessertion
of Chinese authority), HMCGK Etherington Smith informed his superiors that:
Tha rebels took particular care not to interfere
with the native population and made efforts to
win their favour by such measures as the distribution
of food captured from the Chinese. They also
conducted a vigorous propaganda campaign based on
(1) a racial appeal for the overthrow of alien rule
and the expulsion of the Chinese, and (2) the
promise of a return to a traditional Moslem culture
and way of life.5l
Etherington Smith continues by noting that 'this policy was not without
effect', and elsewhere states that:
In the south ••• not only are most people indifferent
to the Soviet Union, but a considerable section of
the populetion - partly on account of the oppression
which they suffered under Sheng Shih-ts'ai, but chiefly
for religious reasons - are actively hostile to it
<an interesting illustretion of this antipathy is the
fact that the word "communist" is frequently used as
a term of oppobrium by the natives).62
In sum, therefore, it seems probable that KMT misrule in southern
Sinkiang led to a spontaneous and purely local rising in the Kashgar region
during August, 1945. ro110wing the,established pattern of Muslim revolts
in that region, the rising was Muslim fundamentalist in character, being
60. ~, L/P&S/12/2360, EXT.5299.l946, passim.
61. ~ .., P. 5.
62. ibid., section 18.
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not only anti-Chlnese, but also anti-Soviet. At this stege the
Soviet Union intervened to take control of the rebellion by sending
pro-Soviet Kirghiz (and possibly Tajlks) ecross the frontier in en
63exact repetition of the "Tortunji" reids of 1~33-4. That this move
~as at least partially successful may be inferred from the southward
movement of the main centre of rebel activity, early in 1~46, from an
area contiguous with the Soviet border to the Muslim fundamentalist
baIt (formerly the domain of the "Khotan AmIrslt) between Khotan and
Varkand, as well as by the emergence of an (almost certainly) pro-Soviet
organisation known as the "Partisans of the Red Tents" in the Teshkurgan
area.64 little is known of the political objectives of the rebels, but
claims that they envisaged the establishment of an authoritarian, pan-
Turanian state would seem to confirm their anti-Soviet identity. 55
63. Sea above,p. 275.
64. Lattimore (Pivot of Asia. p. 139), notes thet the politicel
orientation of this organisation remeins uncertein. See, however,
Bacon, £., 'Soviet Policy in Turkestan', MEJ. I, 4 (October, 1947),
P. 397, where mention is made of "Red Tents" (Soviet educational
centres) being established amongst Muslim nomads in neighbouring
Kazakhstan.
65. Jackson, The Rueeo-Chineee Borderlands. PP. 62-3.
c-The Administration of Mae ud Sebri end the "Pei-te-ehen Incident"
As hes been shown, following the advance of the Soviet-assisted
INA to the banks of the Manass River in September, 1945, the KMT, fearing
the fall of Urumchi end a consequent extension of Soviet influence over
Sinkiang in the north-west paralleling the Red Army's take-over of "Manchuria"
in the north-east, determined to seek a temporary accommodation with the
rebel forces. This was acceptable to the Soviet Union, which had attained
its primary security and economic goals within Sinkiang, and which needed
time to secure its vast post-war gains in territory (extending from rinland
and Romania to Japan), pending some indication as to the likely outcome of
the KMT-GCP struggle within China proper. In effect, Moscow had to determine
whether it was better to lean towards an avowedly anti-communist but
politically pragmatic KMT, or to throw its full support behind an
increasingly intransigent CCP which the Kremlin had long suspected of
heterodoxy end recognised as a possible future rival for supremacy in the
world communist movement. There can be no doubt that the political scenario
which suited Moscow best in this dilemma was a continuing impasse, as
whichever side was to emerge victorious from the Chinese Civil War would
surely seek to re-establish the sanctity of China's Inner Asian frontiera
and to exclude Soviet influence from that region. Moreover, this analysis
had not escaped the indigenous Muslim peoples of Sinkiang, who saw only too
clearly that in the coming Sino-Soviet struggle, whether wagad by the KMT
or the CCP for the Chinese side, they would once again be caught between
the hammer and the anvil.
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By the spring of May, 1946, events within China proper end therefore,
by extension, within Sinkiang, were rapidly moving to a climax. During
March and April, Malinovski's 300,000 Soviet troops withdrew from "Manchuria"
having failed to wring major economic concessions from Chiang Kai-shek,
but taking with them US$900,OOO,OOO in "wer booty" looted from Chinese
territory.66 Due to a combination of KMT military inefficiency and
comparative CCP competence, during April, May and June the Chinese
Communists, acting with tacit Soviet approval, overran the greater part
of the territories thus vacated. Within Sinkiang, these developments
were to signal the implementation of a more 'robust' KMT policy both towards
the Soviet Union, and towards the Kremlin's Turkic Muslim prot'g'es with!n
the "Three Regions".
During the autumn and winter of 1946-47 the unfortunate Chang Chih-chung,
bereft of power base both amongst his C.C. Clique-influenced KMT colleagues
and amongst the various sections of the Sinkiang Muslim population, strove
to please all sides but succeeded !n pleasing none by consistently advocating
policies of compromise and reconciliation. It is clear that Chang genuinely
sought to promote a peaceful eettlement to the "IIi Problem". He thus
toured Sinkiang (in itself a novel departure from the behaviour of former
Han Chinese governors, who preferred to remain securely in Urumchi),
issuing a series of apparently contradictory statements to the effect thet
66. Clubb, China and Russia, PP. 355-6. Not. thet according to the (American)
Pauley Misson's estimate, total losses to the economy of North-east
China directly attributable to tha effects of Soviet looting amounted
to ten times this amount, or apprOXimately usty,OOO million.
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he would be prepared to support the independence of Slnkiang if a
oenuine ind~pendence could be achieved, but cautioning that, in his
67opinion, this was impossible. He therefore advocated closer links
between Sinkiang and ~hina proper, with rail links and a fully unified
national currency.68 His conciliatory attitude aeems merely to have
strengthened the will of the Muslim population to resist closer links
with China, whilst it certainly infuriated the dominant C.C. group
within the Sinkiang coalition government. In Chang Chih-chung's own
words:
Because Provincial Vice-Chairman A~madJ.n end other
governmant members from I-oing(Kulja) have constituted
a minority and' thus could not expect to have their
motions pessed, I never exercised my right to put
their motions to a vote. Whanever I differed with the
minority, I settled the difference by negotiation or
concession ••• In consequence, a fels. impression has
been created emongst outsiders to the effect that I was
too weak to prevent tha I-oin9 group from gaining
control of everything.69
.Meanwhile, within the seven regions of Slnkiang etill under
Nationalist control, KMT herd-liners were preparing for a aecond round
of hostilities with the KulJa rebels which they saw as being both inevitable
and desirable. To this end the C.C. Clique continued to expand its
membership within Sinkiang, both amongst Han Chinese and other non-Hen
67. Chang Chih-chung, 'Dilemma in Sinkieng', p8seim.
69. ~., p. 427) cf. lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 96.
69. Chang, 'Dilemma in Sinkiang', p. 425.
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nationalities, throughout the period of Chang Chih-chung's
70administration. Muslim factionalism also provided the KMT with a
means through which to extend its control. Thus, following the Kulja
regime's disclaimer of links with the Sarikoll Muslim rebels, KMT troops
moved into the area and successfully reasserted Nanking's control over
71Posgam, Karghalik and Tashkurgan. Similarly, at the other side of the
c - --province, the defection Of the Kirei Kazakh chieftain Uthman Oetur was
c -followed by negotiations batween Uthmen and Sung Hsi-lien, commander-in-
chief of the KMT garrison forces in Sinkiang, as a result of which, on
c -August 26th, 1946, Uthman's re-equipped forces launched a large-scale
raid against the "Three Regions", briefly capturing Shara Sume in mld-
September, only to be driven out (according to CUthman) following the
arrival of 160 Russian trucks bearing troops of the INA;2 rollowing ,
these developments, combined with the Implamentation of KMT policies in
Urumchi which 'often seemed designed to delay and block realisation of
joint Chinese-Turki rule rather than to implement the principles agreed
73upon in January and June of 1946', large-ecala demonstrations and riots
broke out at Urumchi early in 1947. Thus, on rebruary 19th: .
70. LAttimore, Pivot of Ada, pp. 92-3.
71. ~, L/P&S/12/2360, EXT.5299.1946, P. 5.
72. Barnett, op.cit., P. 276; Lias, I<BZl!lkExodus, P. 128.
73. Boorman Bnd HowBrd, op.cit., I, P. 44.
A "liberty maes meeting" held in the Uighur Club
in Tihw8 (Urumchi), drew up a petition to the
Provincial Government. Two days later, on february
21, a Uighur demonstration of eeveral hundred men
took place in the streets of Tihwa. A second long
petition was formulated, followed the next day by
a third. The three petitions demanded reduction of
provincial taxes by half, rapid reorganization of
the Aksu and Kashgar Peace Preservation Troops, an
increase of native personnel in the administration,
cessation of "oppression" by Chinese troops and
police, evecuationof the majority of Chinese
troops in Sinkiang, prohIbItion of milItary
purchases of supplIes on the open market, and
the cessation of political arrests. They also
called for re-elections in areas where "oppression"
had occurred, complete judicial reorganization,
including the removal of all "chiefs" of judicial
organs, release of all political prisoners, the
end of secret police activIties, and organizatIon
of a province-wide Uighur police force.74
SignifIcantly, these petitions also demanded the dismissal of a
number of incompetent or "oollaborationist" Kazakh officials (including,
most promInently, ~;nim Khan, the coalition government's allegedly-iliiterat~
CommIssioner of Finance, and Silis, tha second Oeputy Secretary-teneral),
as lIIellas the arrest and punishment of CUthman B.tur, now openly eligned
75wIth right-wing elements of the KMT. Two days later, on february 24th,
similar lists of grievances and demands lIIerepresented to the coalition
government by groups of Kazakhs and Tungans - two Muslim minority groups
who are reported by Barnett to have been given special consideration and
support by tha KMT, doubtless in a bid to split the "coalItion nationalism"
76of the Kulja regime. AccordIngly, the effect of these latter petItions Illes
74. Barnett, op,cit., p. 251.
75. ibId, pp!,251, 2~7. According to lias (Kezek (xodIJ8, P. l2B), both
Janim Khan and Selis wera involved in Sung Hsi-lien'. negotIatIons with
c - --Uthman Batur leadIng to tha latter'. attack against Shara Sum. in August,
1946. If true, this would have marked both men down for attack by agents
of the Kulja regime regardless of their supposed literary abilities.
76. Barnett, op,cit" p. 251, 259.
'to counterbalance the Uighur demands, counteract Uighur pressure on the
government, and place the Chinese provincial authorities in a better
77bargaining position'. These developments led to the outbreak of serious
rioting in Urumchi on rebruary 25th, during ~hich (according to Chen), a
crowd of 'tens of thousands' beseiged the government offices in the centre
of the city, ~hilst attempts ~ere made by anenh provocateurs of the C.C.
Clique to assassinate both AhmadJan Qasim and 8urhan Shahrdr.78 Another
•
sign of the increasing provincial unrest during thil period ~as the reported
outbreak of communalist fighting between Torgut Mongol nomads and Uighur
79agriculturalists in the region of Karashahr.
By no~ Chang Chih-chung. was clearly in lome despair. On May 13th,
1947, he reiterated his stance that 'If Sinkiang really can achieve
independence, I shall be the first to approve, or at least to offer my
support when the Central Government discusses the matter', before adding
(with considerable foresight) ••• 'On the other hand, our Sinkiang
'1
compatriots should ponder whether, if their independence were achiaved,
it would resemble that of Switzerland ••• or of Poland'. As for the
Sinkiang coalition government of which he ~as heads 'Superficially the
government appears to be democratic in spirit, but political discord lies
80in its marrow'. These were not sentiments guaranteed to win the support
and confidence of the C.C. Clique, and accordingly on May 28th, 1947, it
77. .!lli.', p. 251.
7B. Chen, The Slnkieng Story, p. 254.
79. ..!E.!!!. , p. 255.
eo. Chang, 'Dilemma in Slnkiang', pp. 425-6.
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wes announced by Nanking that Chang Chih-chung, whilst retaining his
posItIon es commander of Chieng Kai-shek's north-western headquarters,
c-~as to be replaced by ~as ud Sabri, the first non-Han governor or Slnkiang,
. 81as chairman of the coalition government. During the subsequent governmental
reorganisation Mas~d's fellow Uighurs, Muhammad Am!n 8ugra and cr.a Yusuf
•
Alptekin, were similarly given increased prominence in a clear bid to split
the political loyalties of the Uighur people of Sinkiang.
rlascud Sabri, the new provincial chairman (see plate 28), was born
in IIi in 1886, the son of a wealthy merchant and landlord who was also a
devout Sunni Muslim. c-After studying at a Muslim college In KulJa, Mas ud
was sent to Turkey in 1904. Here he studIed at milItary school, and
subsequently at the UniversIty of Constantinople, where he received his
medical degree in 1914. In 1915 he returned to Sinklang to practIce
medicine, also devoting much of his time to the improvement of educatIonal
facilities for the Uighur. of Sinkiang. These latter activities led him
into trouble with the provincial authorities, and brought about his
imprieonment by Yang Tseng-hain in 1924. rol10wing hi, release after
c-servIng 8 term of 10 months, Mas ud took pains to place his schools under
the direction of conservative, orthodox ~uslims in a bId to avoid further
trouble with the authorities. In .1934, however, he ia reported to have
become involved as a 'political worker' in the forces of the Turfanlik
- 82 -Uighur leader Mahmud shlh-cheng. In April, 1937, following in Mahmud• •c-shih-cheng's footsteps, Mas ud fled to India, subsequently returning to
81. Boorman end Howard, op.cit., Vol I, p. 44; Bernatt, op,cit., p. 252,
82. See above, pp. 252, 303-10.
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China by way of Tientsin. He then travelled to Nanking, where he was
'welcomed by the city's Sinkiang community (comprised primarily of
anti-Soviet refugees from Sheng Shih-ts'ai's "progressive" regime), and
83 c-by representatives of the National Government'. Once in Nanking, Mas ud
- 84 c- - 85became closely associated with Muhammad Amin Bugra and lea Yusuf Alptekin,
•
two young Uighur nationalists who collaborated in the publication of the
pen-Turenian peper Tien Shan (and subsequently, from Chungking, in the
pUblication of the monthly journal Altai). -Unlike Muhammad Amin Bugra
•
and cYsa Yusuf Alptekin, however, Mascud also became closely associated
with the right wing C.C. Clique and, possibly through their influence,
a member of the KMT Central Executive Committee. In 1942 he joined the
National Government, becoming one of only two Muslims serving on the KMT'e
36-member State Council.86 Yet despite his attainment of this apparently
c-elevated position, Mas ud does not seem to have been held in any great
respect by his KMT colleagues. Thus, when he arrived in Sinkiang during
83. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol III, p. 23.
84•. According to Lias (who knew 8ugra as a refugee in Istanbul during the
early 1950s), Muhammad AmIn was the son of his namesake, Muhammad AmIn
Bugra, the seniof and only surviving "Khotan AmIr" (Kazek E~odus, p. 20~
Jack Chen's claim that Masc~d Ssbri (born Iii, 1886). was the son of the
last "Khotan AmIr" (born Khotan, c.1900) is patently mistaken, as is his
claim that the younger Muhammad AmIn Bugra (If indeed the son of a man
born c.1YOO) worked In th~ Chinese consulate at Tashkent during the 1920s
(The Sinkiang Story, PP. 250-51).
85. According to Chen (The Sinkieng Story, p. 251), cYsa was 'the former beg
of Kashgar' (?)
86. Boorman and Howard, op.ett., Vol III, p. 23 (the other Muslim was the
Tungan former Governor of Tsinghai, Ma Lin, a great uncle of Ma Chung-
ying).
the autumn of 1945, ostensibly as Provincial Inspector-General
(a post theoretically superior to that of Provincial Chairman),
HMCU Graham reported to the India Office that:
Mahsoud does not seem to be taken, or to take
himself, over seriously. There ~es almost no one
at the aerodrome to meet him on his arrival, and
among the large crowd that welcomed General Chang
he took up a most inconspicuous position.S?
c-Clearly Maa ud was returning to Sinkiang as something of a KMT puppet.
Thus, according to lattimore:
When (in 1947) Maaud Sabri became Chairman of
Sinkiang - the first "native" ever to hold that
post - he did not come to the fore as the head
of a movement originating in Sinkiang, but es
a "tame" Uighur who had long been the pensioner
of the powerful C,C, C1ique'88
c-Yet Maa ud was also closely associated with anti-communist sentiment in
Sinkiang end, es such, anathema to the Kremlin, subsequently to be
denounced by Soviet sources as 'a double-dyed nationalist end pan-Turkist,
en agent of imperialist intelligence' who had served Germany, Britain,
89Japan end the United States seriatim, Moreover, in an interesting
indication of the parochial nature of nationalist Turkic politics in
Sinkiang, Mascud was also the uncle and father-in-law of Rahimjen Sebir KhoJa,,
the strongly pro-Soviet ex-ETR Assistant Commissioner of Civil Affairs
87. IOLR, l/P&S/12/2359, EXT.3270.1946 (letter, HMCU Graham-IO, 6/4/1946).
P. 1.
88. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia. p. 97.
89. Mingulov, op,cit., PP. 188-9J cf. Kotov's description of 'the Uighur
nationalist and agent of Ang10-American imperi.llsm, Masud' (Oprctt.,·
P. 444).
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i 90 c-n the Sinkiang coalition government, Mas ud'a appointment must
therefore have been galling to the IIi group on personal, as ~ell
as purely political grounds.
c-In replacing Chang Chih-chung with Mas ud Sabri, therefore, the
KMT was deliberately attempting to exploit the substantive political
differences existing between the predominantly pro-Soviet ~'Taranchi")
Uighurs of the IIi Valley and their anti-Soviet, traditionalist bretheren
in southern Sinkiang, Doubtless it was intended that this manoeuvre should
provoke a split amongst the Uighur. of southern and western Sinkiang
paralleling that which had emerged between the Kazakhs of the north and
east of the province. It is clear, however, thst the KMT made a serious
c-miscalculation in choosing Mas ud Sabri - a discredited and wholly
disliked Uighur "collaborationist" from IIi with no real following south
of the Tien Shan - as their vehicle for winning Uighur traditionalist
91support. Had they selected a staunchly anti-Soviet Uighur from the
south-west who was not too closely associated with the KMT - euch as,
- c- - 92perhaps, Muhammad Amin 8ugra or lea Yusuf Alptekin - then their efforts•
might possibly have met with more success (though the very nature of south-
90. Barnett, op,cit~, p. 286.
91. ( ) c-According to8arnett op,cit" p. 257 , Mas ud was 'far from popular'
amongst Uighurs generally.
92. ~ c--Mu~ammad Am1n 8ugra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin were both genuine Uighur
nationalists and not (as alleged by Soviet sources) puppets of the
KMT. 80th men, however, recognised that the attainment of Sinkiang's
independence was increasingly unlikely, and therefore preferred to work
for autonomy within China rather than within the Soviet Union (Barnett,
op.cit,·, pp, 256-7, 272-3), They ara acknowledged as Uighur patriots by
pan-Turanian writers such as Hayit (Turke~t8n Zwl~chAn RIJ~!landund Chln~,
P. 320) and Isma'il (QP.cit" p. 29) and condemned as 'Pan-Turkic
nationalists." demanding self-government for themselves' by lattimore
(Pivot of A~1e, 112-14). Even the slavishly Maoist Jack Chen ~llows that
M~ammadAmfn Bugra had 'a bigger popular following (than Mas ud Sabri)
bacause of his long-continued activities in the region' (The 5inkiang
Story, p. 251).
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western Muslim traditionalism made its adherents hostile to both China
end the Soviet Union in almost equal measure, a fact which cannot have
eecaped the KMT hard_liners).93 As it was, however, news of Mascud's
94appointment in late May, 1947, led to almost immediate riots in Kashgar,
whilst in e meeting of the Provincial Assembly held at Urumchi on June
4th, no fewer than 63 of the 90 members present adopted a resolution
c-opposing Mas ud's appointment. Meanwhile, extensive demonstrations took
place outside, whilst pro-Kulja groups distributed leaflets criticising
c- 95Mas ud throughout the bazaars of the city.
One month later, on or about July 7th, simultaneous Uighur risings
directed against the new chairman broke out in Turfan, Toksun and Shanshan.
These revolts were rapidly and efficiently suppressed by crack KMT forces
under Sung Hei-lien, who announced that he had captured agents from III
96 -amongst the rebel leadership, a charge specifically rejected by Ahmadjan,
•
who described the risings as fa spontaneous result of overflowing Muslim
97anguish'. However, it was clear that the days of the 'coalition government'
93. In this context, eee Sung Hsi-lien's werning that 'if our first enemy
is the Kulja party, our second 1s tha nationalist group (i.a. Bugra and
Alptekin). The nationalists had better forget their slogan -Turkistan
first", or there will be trouble'. Despatch by r. Robertson, NVT,
rebruary 1st, 1948.
94. Barnett, op.cit., p. 253.
95. Min-Chu Pao (Kulja), June 24th and July 3rd, 1947 (cited in lattimore,
Pivot of Asia, p. 97).
96. Barnett, op.cit., p. 252.
97. ~., p. 253.
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founded only one year before were strictly limited. Shortly
after Sung Hsi-lien's suppression of the Turfan risings, in late July,
1947, a group of 27 members of the Provincial Assembly (including members
for Karashehr, Turfsn, Khotan and Aksu, as well as from the "Thres Regions"),
left Urumchi for Kulja. Within days,this group was followed by a further
22 members from the Kashgar region and finally, on August 26th, 1947, by
- - 98the remainder of the IIi delegates including AhmadJan Qasim •
•
8y the end of August, 1947, therefore, the 'coalition government'
had collapsed in all but name and Sinkiang was once again splIt into two
mutually hostile zones with no direct communication possible between
Urumchi and Ku1Ja. This can scsrce1y have been Nanking's original aIm in
c-replacing Chang Chih-chung with Mas ud Sabri, and indeed it seeme likely
that, far from isolating the Kulja regime or promoting discord amongst the
"Taranch!" Uighurs of the IIi Valley, the appointment of an Uighur puppet
of the KMT had the effect of splitting the population of the Muslim
traditionalist south-west, with the peasantry looking increasingly to
Kulja, the begs and conservative land-owners looking to Urumchi, and the
. c - 99fundamentalist u1ama' undecided as to which way to turn. Yet despite
this overall failure of KMT strategy, there can be no doubt that the
appointment of anti-Soviet, pan-Turanian Uighur. to senior posta in the
Urumchi administration - coupled with the appearance of KMT-armed and
c - --supplied Basmachi-type guerillas owing allegiance to Uthman 8atur along
98. Hsin-chieng Jih=peo (Sinkiano Daily, Urumchi), July 11th and 14th, 1947,
cited in Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 90.
99. cf. Lattimore, ibid., p. 97.
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the Sinkiang-MPR frontier - touched an exposed nerve in Moscow, where
the emergence of even the slightest indication of Central Asian Muslim
nationalism hes always been viewed with a hostility verging on the
pathological.
Moscow's response, which was clearly designed to "destabi1ise" the
c-Mas ud Sabri administration rather than to bring about the overall collapse
of KMT authority in Sinkiang, was of a limited nature end aimed directly
c - --at Uthman Batur'a Kazakh partisans in the southern Shera Sume and northern
Kumul regions. Here, following his break with the KulJa regime in April,
1946, c -Uthman had set up his headquarters in the remote Baitik Bogdo, known
to the Chinese as Pei-ta-shan, a emall range of mountains about 20 miles
long and la miles wide, running south-east to north-west along the Sinkiang-
MPR border, and rising to 10,000 feet at their highest point (see Mep 12).
Until 1911, Pei-ta-shan had remained a little-known end politically
unimportant region set well ~ithin the frontiers of Imperial China. With
the collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty and the secession of Outer Mongolia,
however, Pei-ta-ehan suddenly assumed new geo-political and strategic
importance as en adequately-watered potential military stronghold set
firmly astride the undefined and disputed Sino-MPR frontier zone. Although
it was stipulated by the tripartite Sino-Ru.sian~longo1i.n agreement of
1915 that the Sino-Mongo1ian border should be demarcated by mutuel
agreement, t~is was never in fact undertaken, and the Pei-ta-shen remained
disputed territory, claimed by both China end the MPR, throughout the
100Chinese Republican era. Seemingly, from 1911 to 1944, ownership of the
100. Lamb, Asian Frontiers, pp. 198-204.
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Pei-ta-shan remained a purely academic question. Sinkiang was isolated
from China proper under a series of mili tery strongmen, .,ta,h !lst Pe1-ta-shan
was similarly isolated from Urumchi and Ulan Bator both by distance and by
poor communications. What is more, China had never acknowledged the ~
Jure independence of Outer Mongolia (nor, indeed, of Urianghe1/Tennu Tuva),
and therefore, from the official Chinese p'oint of view, not only Pei-ta-shan,
but elsa the entire territory of the MPR, lay by right within China.
All this was to change as a result of the Sino-Soviet Agreement of August,
1945, by which (under Soviet pressure), Chiang Kai-shek was obliged formally
101to acknowledge the independence of the MPR. Following the signing of
this treaty, Pei-ta-shan ceased to be 8 neglected backwater and became
instead the front-line of KMT-MPR confrontation in the Sinkiang sector.
Considerable disagreement surrounds the origin and subsequent course
of the Pei-ta-shan incident, though it is clear that the southward migration
from Share Sume of c - --Uthman Batur's Kazakhs provided the spark Which led to
the outbreak of open hostilities. Under both Ch'ing and Republican
administrations, the pastures of the Pei-ta-shan had been shared by Kirei
Kazakh and Western Mongol nomads, with the former apparently predominating
in the south and west of the region, whilst the lattar controlled the north
and east. According to lattimore, it was the custom of the Sinkiang
Kezakhs to use the slopes of the Pei-ta-shan for aummer pasture, whilst in
the winter they would drive their sheep, cattle and camels down into the
Dzungarian lowlands 'where they were clearly within the jurisdiction of
Sinkiang', leaving only their horses, which could paw down through the
101. See above, p. 433.
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snow for winter fodder, in the exposed uplands, Lattimore continues:
There was a tendency on the part of the Kazakhs
to move clear across the desert and up to the
lower slopes of the Bogda Ula near Kuchengtze
(Kitai); but the policy of the Sinkiang authorities
was to drive them back towards the Baitik Bogda
(Pei-ta-shan) and to keep them out of the jurisdiction
of Sinkiang, because they were regarded 8S cattle
thieves and trouble makers. In practice, tharefore,
the attitude of the Sinkiang authorities was that
the Ba1tik Bogda lay outside of Sinkiang'102
It is apparent, however, that Whilst from 1911 to 1942 the Slnkiang
authorities may well have regarded Pei-te-shen as lying beyond the pale
of provincial control, this pragmatic approach can hardly have been
shared by the Chinese national government, which was primarily concerned
with the de lure, and not the de fecto, status of the Slnkian9~on9011an
frontier, It was inevitable, therefore, that following the extension of
KMT authority to S1nklang during 1942-44, Chungking should attempt to
reassert Chinese control over the strategically significant Pei-ta-shan
region, Moreover, it seems probable that this drive would have gained new
.impetus following Chiang Kai-shak's belated recognItion of MPR independence,
under Soviet pressure, during August, 1945.
The extension of indirect KMT control to the greater part of the
Pei-ta-shan may be dated to the late spring of 1946, following c -Uthman
8at~rts break with the Kulje regime end subsequent realignment with the
c -Chinese authorities. Most sources agree that Uthman and his followers
103migrated directly from the Share Sume region to Pei-ta-shen, where 8n
102. Lattimore,> Pivot of Asia, p, 100.
103, Boorman and Howerd, op,clt., Vol III, p. 47J Barnett, op,cit" P. 276;
Lias, op,cit" P. 122; Cheng Tien-fong, 0r,cit., P. 282,
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c ... - - t ti 5agreement wes reeched between Uthman Betur and a represen a ve of ung
Hsi-lien, the KMT garrison commander in Sinkieng. According to Lettimore,
c -however, Uthman first migrated to the northern foothills of the Bogda Ula
before being 'encouraged' by the Chinese authorities to move northwards
and 'occupy' the Pei-ta-shan 'which were accordingly claimed as Chinese
104territory'. Precise details of subsequent events in the Pei-ta-shan
region remain, apparently, unestabliehed. It may be that c -Uthman, acting
with tacit KMT approval, attempted to expel the Mongol inhebitants of
the area, or that he crossed into the northern foothills of the Pei-te-shan,
105into a zone regarded by the MPR es its special preserve. On the other
hand, it may be that the MPR, with tacit Soviet backing, sought actively
to extend its control over the Pei-ta-shan in preparetion for the frontier
delimitation negotiations which had, sooner or later, to follow China's
106formal recognition of Mongolian independence.
104.
105.
106.
Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 100.
In this context, note Lias' statement (based on extensive interviews
c - )with Uthman's Kirei Kezakh supporters that: 'The northern slopes of
the 8aitik 8ogdo are well-wooded and watered and with good pasture,
though the southern slopes are slmost waterless and barren (op,cit"
p. 122).
frontier delimitation between China and the MPR was,in fact,delayed
until 1962, when Peking abandoned claims to large areas of the .
frontier region: including a tract 0' lend extending northwards from
Pei-ta-shen towards Khovd. 8y this agreement, the Sino~~ongoli.n frontier
was agreed to run along the watershed of the Pei-ta-Shen, establishing
the greater part of the disputed range es Chinese territory, but
confirming the more fertile northern slopes as lying within the MPR.
Lamb, op.cit., p. 200; Chun~-kuo ti-t'u chi (An Atlas of China,
Hong Kong, 1972), p. 28.
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Whatever the exact sequence of events surrounding CUthman 8atur's
withdrawal to the Pei-ta-shen, it is clear that forces owing allegiance
to the Kirei Kazakh chieftain clashed both with MPR frontier units and
with units of the INA during the summer of 1946,107 Initially these
hostilities remained low-key, being limited to short exchanges between
local militia units, c -Uthman seems to have been the first to have deviated
from this pattern, and it is apparent that his autumn raid deep into northern
Share Sume was viewed with hostility and concern not only In KulJa and
Ulen Bator, but also in Moscow, As has been shown,
c _
Uthman was driven out
of Shara Sume and back to the Pei-ta-shen, where he remained during the
winter of 1946-47. Yet despite this setback, he clearly remained a constant
threat both to Soviet interests in Sinklang, and to the frontier security
of the MPR, c-Accordingly, following Chang Chih-chung's replacement by Mas ud
Sabri in May, 1947, the Soviet Union determined to make its displeasure
c -felt in both Urumchi and Nanking by launching a major attack on Uthman's
mountain stronghold,
According to KMT aources, the "Pei-ta-shan Incident" began on June
c-5th, 1947, only five weeks efter Mas ud Sabri's appointment as Chairman of
the Sinkiang coalition government, when a force estimated at 500 MPR troops,
reportedly backed by four or five planes with Soviet markings, moved into
the disputed region and attacked cUthm;n's Kazakh irregulars,lOS The Chinese
107. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol III, p. 47J Lattimore, Pivot of Asia,
P. 100.
108. Clubb, Chine and Russia, PP. 368-9 (citing a report from the Chine New~
Aqency, dated 5th June, 1947); Calvocoressi, p., Survey of International
Affairs 1949-50 (London, 1953), pp. 359-60, cf. Bernett, op.cit., p. 267,
Whiting's suggestion that 'it ie possible that Outer Mongolian aircraft
were mistakenly identified as Russian' (Soviet 5tr.te~y in 5inkleng.
p, 115), is scarcely relevant, as the idea of Mongolian aircraft operating
in Chinese airspace without direct Soviet connivance was as improbable
in 1947 as it is today.
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authorities responded by lodging an official protest with the Soviets
109through their embassy in Moscow, whilst strengthening their position
on the ground through the despatch of elite unite of Teinghei Tungan cavalry
110to the Pei-ta-shan region. Accounts of the subsequent struggle ara
uniformly eparee, but differ widely in interpretation. Thus both Clubb
and Whiting indicate that Soviet-MPR pressure forced a Chine •• withdrawal
from the disputed area by mid-1947, and the former authority goes so far
as to call the "Pei-ta-shan Incident" '. clear victory for the Mongolian
People's Republic,.lll Vet according to Barnett, more than 15 months later,
in September, 1948, the 'northern crests' of the Pei-ta-snen remained
securely in the hands of the KMT 14th Tungan Cavalry Regiment, whilst the
closest MPR positions were located 'at the foot of the northern slopes of
the mountBins,.ll2
How may this divergence of accounts be explained? On balance it 889mS
c - ...probable that, during late 1946 and early 1947, Uthman Satur' I Kezakh
irregulars had thrust beyond the Pei-ta~han (which, according to Darnett's
KMT informants, had been garrisoned by Chines. troops 'for many yeara' ),11'
109. Clubb, China and Ru~si8, p. 368) Whiting, Soviet Stuhn¥. p. 115.
110. Barnett, op.cit., p. 236.
111. Clubb, Chine end Ru~~18, p. 369) Whiting, SoviRt Stretel"'Y,p. 115.
112. Barnett, oP1cit., pp. 236, 267.
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out into the ~parsely-inhabited lowland region to the north of the
mountains, which the MPR controlled, but which China claimed (and was
to continue to claim until 1962).114 The Joint MPR-6oviet attack of
c -June, 1947, was thus successful in driving Uthman's Ch1nese-eupported
Kazakh irregulars back to the 11ne of actual control before their invasion
of 1946, and to this extent, in purely regional terms, the outcome of the
so-called "Pei-ta-ehan Incident" may be seen as an MPR victory. Yat both
Clubb and Whiting are clearly mistaken in their assumption that the "Incident"
115came to an end during the summer of 1947. According to Barnett, fighting
was to continue on a reduced scale for at least another year, with thirteen
separate clashes taking place in the Pei-ta-shan region between Juna 5th,
1161947, and July, 1948. No doubt Sino-Mongolian rivalry played an important
part in this continuing confrontation - thus MaJor-General Han Yu-wan,
tha KMT front-line commander in the Pei-ta-shan region, informed Barnett
'that he believed the border should be about 40 miles to the north of the
117mountains'. Yet beyond this purely local disputa, in which tha MPR,
114. In this context, see Lias' statament that: 'Tired of abortiva attack and
counter-attack bet~een the Altai and Baitik 8ogdo, the Russians built a
road from Mongolia across the wild country on Osman's western flanks•••'
(Kezak Exodus, pp. l28-9), which would seem to confirm that CUthman had
indeed struck northwards from the Pei-ta-shan towards rayingkul
(see Map ra),
115. Clubb, China end Russia, p. 369. Whiting (op,cit., P. lIS), similarly
claims that fighting ended in June, 1947, but allows that 'the situation
remained tense in early 1948'.
116. Barnett, op.cit" p. 267.
117. !2!2., p. 266~
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with Soviet backing, had succeeded in restoring the 8t8tu~ quo ante,
lay the wider Sino-Soviet struggle for control of the Central Asian
heartland, in which, at a time of Chinese weakness, the Manass River
and the northern slopes of the Pei-ta-shan had become the effective
front-line. Thus, by maintaining indirect pressure on China in the
Pi c - --e -ta-Shan sector of the Sinkiang-MPR frontier long after Uthman 8atur's
Kazakh raiders had been expelled, Moscow undoubtedly sought to hasten
c-the demise of the Mas ud Sabri regime in Sinkiang without, however, openly
breaking with the Nationalist authorities in Nanking. In wider inter-
national terms, therefore, the true beneficiary of the "Pei-ta-shan
Incident" was the Soviet Union, though its victory was to be purely
Pyrrhic, as will be shown.
9.3 The Victory of the Chine~e Communl~ts
Following the disintegration of the Sinkiang coalition government ~
during the summer of 1947, the effective partitioning of Sinkiang into two
Zones - one administered by nominee~ of the KMT and the other by nominees
of the Soviet Union - became virtually complete. Little or no contact
seems to have taken place between the two sides, and no serious fighting
took place to disturb the status quo. The Manass River remained the
dividing line between the "Three Regions", where the secessIonist (TR
Was re-established in all but name, and the remainder of the province.
Meanwhile, both the Urumchi and Kulja regimes took steps to consolidate
their respective positIons and to exclude each other's influence from their
particular spheres of control.
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Little or no non-partisan information is available concerning events
In Sinkiang during this pariod. According to reports from tha insurgent
c-press in Kulja, following Mas ud's essumption or power in Urumchi, C.C.
Clique hard-liners within the KMT implanented a programme designed to
discriminate against "progressives" in particular, and against Muslims in
general. Thus, even before AhmadJ;n's return to Kulja, known or•
suspected supporters of the IIi rebels were excluded from the provincial
assembly and the provincial peace preservation corps, whilst the KMT
military authorities retained control over locelly-alected district magistrates
and severely limited the appointment'of Muslims to the provincial police
force, thus:
Out of 421 appointments to the police bureau in
Urumchi only 48 ~ere Moslems, with Chinese holding
84% of the posts. Police orders were ~ritten only
in Chinese, and Moslem members of the force were
not allowed to carry erms. Moreover, 8 secret
police farca continued to operate, although
supposedly abolished under the "basic provincial
law" of July, 1946.118
Similarly, the Kulja regime charged that, in the KMT-controlled zone,
San Min Chu I (KMT Youth Corpa) activists, assisted by members or the
provincial police, mounted vicious attacks on local "progressIve" politicIans
and their supporters, whilst ordinary 'people in the street' were beaten
c-up end imprisoned simply for reading wall posters critical of the Mss ud
regime.119 There is no raason to doubt these charges, end indeed,
118. Mln-ehu Pea (Kulja), Juna 24th end 29th, 1947 (cited in Lattimore,
Pivot of A~ie, pp. 97-8).
119. Min-chu Pea (Kulja). July 9th, 1947 (cited in Lattimore. Pivot, P.
98), cf. Mingulov, op,cit., p. 189.
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c-following the replacement of Chang Chih-chung by Mas ud Sabri, it
is clear that the conciliatory policies associated with the former
were completely abandoned.
Partly because of the comparative aooessibilit,J of the KMT zone
to Western correspondents tas contrasted with the total inaccessibillt,y
of the "Three Regions"), and partly as a result of the CCP's subsequent
endorsement of the legitimacy of the Kulja regime, much has been made of
the brutality and corruption surround!ng the last years of KMT power in
Sinklang.l20 By contrast, our knowledge of conditions within the Soviet-
dominated "Three Regions" remains rudimentary - yet it is apparent that,
in many ways, the polItical repression meted out in the KMT-controlled zone
of Sinkiang was mirrored by the domestic activities of the Kulja authorities.
Thus, at least on a surface level, the Min Chu Peo's charge that Muslims
were discriminated against in the provincial police forca was paralleled
in Kulja, where all official notices were in Russian or Turkic (but never
in Chinese), and even Han supporters of t.heregime lIIereexcluded from t.he
- 'l- -
121INA and forbidden to carry arms. More significantly, there can be no
doubt that a secret police force based on tha Soviet model operated
cthroughout. the "Three Regions", and that the reported abduction of Ali
Kh;n Ture lIIasfoilalliedby the harassment and arrest of many simllerly-
minded conservat.ive Muslim nationalIat ••122
120. See, for example, lattimore, Pivot of Ade. PP. 97-l0J DavIdson,
Turkestan AlIve, PP. 120-33; Chen, The 5inkleng story, PP. 242-66.
121. IOlR, l/P&S/12/2360, r/15550/324/l0, p. 3J Chan, The Sinkieng story,
P. 228.
122. Isma'!l and Isma'il, op,eit., p. 28; cf. Barnett, 0prcit" p. 270,
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It is clear that the KMT leadership in Urumchi was eware of the
Kulja regime's persecution of "anti-Soviet" end "pan-Turkist" elements
within its sphere of control, and that in this development it perceived
a way to counterbalance ETA propaganda and to win the "hearts end minda"
of the traditionally. conservative Muslim south of the province, now
tilting increasingly towards the KulJa regime. Accordingly, in en
extraordinary move never before (or since) sanctioned by the Chinese
authorities in Sinkiang, the anti-Soviet Uighur nationalists Muhammad•
.,. c"-Am~n Bugre and lea Yusuf Alptekin were permitted openly to publish pan-
Turanian literature which, in a direct challenge to the established Soviet
(and, by extension, ETR) line, stressed the ethnic and cultural unity of
the various Turkic Muslim peoples of Central Asia. Thera can be no doubt
that this development, which conjured up one of the darkest spectres of
official Kremlin demonology, infuriated the Soviet leadership. Thus,
according to MinguIov:
Mas'ud formed his government on 28th May, 1947.
The §Q1-d1=ept Champion of the raith gagged the
public press and spoke through two pan-Turk journals
called Yelkyn ('rIeme'), and ll!s. ('rreedom'). The
people of Sinklang were told that they were a single
Turkic nation~ and that the names "Uygur",
"Kazakh", "Kirgiz", were mere ethnic abstractions.
An organization es powerful as it wss bogus, known
as the Society for the defence of Islam, functioned
under the supervision of ths C-in-C Sinkiang and
stretched its tentacles everywhere.123
123. Mingulov, op.eit., p. lsg; cf. Chen, The Slnkieno story, pp. 251, 254,
259, Kotov, op.cit., p. 444.
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The precise KMT logic behind this development, ~hich directly contravened
the previously established Han policy of accentuating splits and divisions
between the various Muslim and non-Muslim nationalities of Sinkiang, remains
124uncertain. Its immediate effect, ho~ever, was clearly beneficial to the
Nationalist authorities in that it served to accentuate the already
sUbstantive differences between the 50viet-backed Uighur leadership in
Kulja and the KMT-backed Uighur leadership in Urumchi, whilst at the eame time
proffering a tantalising mirage of potential Turkic autonomy outside the
Soviet orbit to the deeply conservative Muslim population of southern
Sinkiang.
In response, the Kulja regime and its Soviet sponsors 8eem to
have determined to press ahead 'with the building of "Socialism in Thre.
Regions" pending the outcome of the KMT-CCP struggle within Chin. proper.
Accordingly, amongst numerous other reforms claimed by Chen and Mingulov,
125limited land redistribution wes initiated in III during thIs period.
124. It may aimplybe that the KMT ~as obliged, through the dictatea of
necessity, to tolerate aome degree of conservative pan-Turania~ism
as a counter-balance to Soviet influence. Yet both Muhammad Amin Suora
and cYsa Yusuf Alptekin had long been activa in Nanki~g (8ubsequentiy
Chungking), and it is interesting to note that KMT "Greater Han" theory
tended to subsume all Turkic Muslims under the generiC heading 'Tatar',
as 'one of the five peoples designated in China' (5•• above, p.,6 ).
125. Mingulov, op.cit., p. 189; cf. Chen, op.cit., p. 259. Mingulov a1ao
claims that, during thia period: 'loan8 of money and seed were advanced,
taxation was reduced by 50%. The area under cultivation w~. increaeed
from 251,000 hectares in 1941 to 375,000 hectares in 1948, and the grose
grain harvest from 212,000 tons to 2Y5,OOO tons. Towards popular
education there was a literacy drive; health measures included a medical
school, dispensaries, and maternity homes'.
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Similarly, in response to the establishment of a "Society for the Defence
of Islam" in Urumchi during 1947, an organisation called the "Union in
Defence of Peace and Democracy in Sinkiang" was set up at KulJa during
126the first half of 1948, Membership of this party, which waa clearly
intended a9 a mass base for tha STPNLC, was open to 'whoever eete etore
by the interest of the people', and ita programme wae formally based on
the "Kulja Declaration" of January 5th, 1944, by which the political
programma of the secessionist ETR had been initially proclaimed, Thi.
cleer indication of Soviet concern with the "Three Regions" to the
exclusion of the remainder of Sinkiang is amply confirmed by Mingulov,
who notes that
The (revolutionary) movement, therefora, had
survived in ona corner of the country (eic),
but it wes powerless to capture tha remainder",
The naxt best thing was to make cartain that the
fires would go on burning in the Three Districts
and to hopa that their warmth would eventuslly
reach out to the other corners'l27
Meanwhile, far to the east, the balance of the Chine •• Civil War
was swinging inexorably in favour of the CCP, During 1946 and early 1947,
Chiang Kai-shak's forces succeeded in scoring a .eries of apparently
spectacular successes, including the capture of tha Communist capital at
Yenan, Yet it soon became apparent that the CCP was 'losing the cities,
but winning the war', Thus the Nationalist conscript forces became
126, According to Mingulov, this union was .et up in July-August, 1948
(op,cit" p. 190). Kotov, however, give. the date a. January, 1948
(op,cit" p, 444), .
127, Mingulov, op.ctt" pp, 189-90,
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increasingly bogged down in a debilitating guerilla conflict, whilst
popular discontent with the KMT government mounted rapidly throughout
south China. During the winter of 1947-48 the PLA went over to the
offensive, winning a series of major set-piece battles against the
Nationalists in the north-eest, and advancing towards Peking. In April,
1948, Yenen was recaptured, and on June 19th Kaifeng, the capital of
Honan, fell to the victorious PLA. By the autumn of 1948 it was clear
that Nationalist power within China was crumbling, and that a final CCP
vIctory could not long be delayed.
There can be little doubt that the Soviet Union viewed the advance
of the PLA towards Sinkiang with mounting apprehension. Stalin muat long
have suspected that Mao Tse-tung was a chinese nationalilt firat, a communilt
second, and a loyal disciple of the Comintern scarcely at all. Accordingly,
despite the continuing pin-prick pressures of the "Pei-ta-shan Incident",
end under the camouflage of a constant drum-fire of anti-KMT propegande
from KulJa, the Kremlin sought to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to compromise
in Sinkiang before it was too late. Chiang, who clearly atill believed
that the Soviet Union could exarcise a restraining influence over the
Chinese Communists, was quick to respond. Thus in October, 1947, Chang
Chih-chung, who had remained In Sinkiang as commander of the Nationalist'e
north-western headquarters, travelled to Nanking to begin negotiations with
the Soviet Embassy. Ha was aither accompanied or shortly followed by the
Tatar 8urhan Shahidl, who had aerved a. Vice-Chairman in tha ahart-lived
coalition government of 1946-47. During the remainder of 1947 and much
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of 1948, the Uighur, Russian and Chinese-speaking Burhin is reported
to have acted as an intermediary between the Soviet Embassy end Chang
in a prolonged series of negotiations designed to pave the wey for a
128secret KMT-Soviet deal over the future status of Sinkiang. That aome
progress was made in these talks may perhaps be inferred from the
cessation of hostilities in the Pei-ta-shen region in the middle of 1948.129
It seems clear, however, that Soviet demands for economic and political
concessions in the north-west were too great for Chiang Kai-shek seriously
to consider until some time in December, 1948, mid-way through the great
and decisive Battle of the Hwai-Hai, during which the impending
collapse of the Nationalist forces must have become apparent even to the
130moat loyal partisans of the KMT. Accordingly, in a conciliatory gesture
1 ~c early aimed at the Soviet Union, on December 31st, 1948, Mas ud Sabri
was recalled from Sinkiang and, in a move thought to have been negotiated
with the Soviet Embassy in Nanking during the previous autumn, replaced
by the amenable Burhan ShahIdI.13l
128. Boorman and Howard, op,cit., Vol I, p. 4.
129. It is interesting to note that Sung Hsi-lien, the right-wing KMT
gerrison commander of Sinkiang who was responsible for provoking the
initial "Pei-ta-shan Inci£ent", we! recalled at this time, apparently
at the suggestion of Burhan ShahIdi. He was replaced by the more
moderate T'ao Chih-yueh. Boorman and Howard, lE!2.
130. Tha Battle of the Hwai-Hai, which delivered the coup de ~rece to KMT
aspirations in mainland China, was fought for 65 days between 7th
November, 1948, and 12th January, 1949, acrose a battlefield extending
from the Hwal River to the Lunghai Railway. By the end of tha battle
the Nationalists had lost five army groups, seven other full divieions,
the Armoured Corps, and miscellaneous other unita - in all, approximately
550,000 men. Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p. 291.
131. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol I, p. 4. According to Heyit (Turkestsn
) c-Zwischen Russland und China, p. 321 , Mas ud Sabri was offered the post
of Chinese Ambassador to Iran, but he refused and chose to atay in China.
He wes arrested by the Communiat authorities on 5th April, 1951, and
died in prison during March, 1952.
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On January 1st, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek made an offer of peace to the
CCP in his New ,Year's message. Shortly thereafter Chang Chih-chung
returned to Urumchi with the stated purpose of negotiating a new treaty
with the Soviet Union to replace the ten year agreement which Sheng Shih-
ts'ai had signed in 1939 to govern Sino-Soviet economic relations in
Sinkiang.l~2 As Clubb has indicated, the advantage to the Soviets of the
ratification of any such new agreement was obvious - as with Chiang's
recognItion of MPR independence during 1945, Moscow would at least be
able to confront a CCP euccessor regime with a valid document which would
have to be taken into consideration in the working out of any new Sino-
Soviet relationship.l~3 Chiang, however, wes certainly playing for higher
stakes. By reaching an agreement with the Soviets over Sinkiang, he
clearly hoped to widen the sUbstantial rift which he already knew to
exist between Yenan and Moscow, though whether this was intended to prolong
his rule over mainland China, or alternatively to facilitate his reconquest
of the mainland from Taiwan, must inevitably remain speculativa.134
132. Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol. I., p. 4.
133. Clubb, China and RUBsia, p. 370.
134. Lattimore, Pivot of Asie, pp. 101-2 (citing numerous contemporary
!!!dispatches from H.R. Lieberman and Welter Sullivan), Whiting,
Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang, pp, 116-7; Moseley, A Sino-Soviet Culturel
rrontier, p, 14. According to the Royal Institute of International
Affairs, the KMT mey also have considered establishing 5inkiang as
an alternative western bastion to Taiwan, 'possibly even with Russian
support', Calvocoressi, op.clt., p. 360.
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Little is known of the subsequent negotiations, though according
,
to K~T sources Stalin's demands paralleled those made on Sheng Shih-te'ei
by the infamous "Sin-Tin" Agrement of 1939. Thus, in exchange for
unspecified support - which may not have exceeded good wil1135 - the
Soviet Union is reported to have sought virtually exclusive control over
136the mineral resource. of Sinkiang. Similarly, Stalin is reported to have
sought full import-export freedom for the USSR without offering any reciprocal
benefits to China.137 Even in extremis these terms proved too much for
the KMT leadership, and negotiations were abandoned in May, aftar Nanking
and ~oscow had failed to reach any agreement beyond the extension of
138Soviet rights to operate an air service between Urumchi and Alma Ata.
According to Allen S. Whiting, following the breaking-off of KMT-
Soviet talks et Urumchi in May, 1949, the Soviet Union made one further,
unofficial attempt to confirm their position in Sinkiang before the arrival
of the Chinese Communists. Thus, as units of the PLA under P'eng Te-nuai
marched into neighbouring Kansu during the summer of 1949, the Soviet
135. Most sources remain unspecific on this point. June Dreyer, however,
believes that the Soviet Union was 'clearly offering Chiang Kai-shek'.
government arms••• in return for 80me form of control over Sinklang'.
'The Kezakhs in China', P. 155.
136. Su-lien tui Hsin-chieng t1 chinC"-chl ch'in-lueh, Pp. 142 ff., cited
in Whiting, Soviet stretegy in S1nkieng. p. 117. Paralleling demands
made to Sheng In 1939 and to Chungking negotiators in 1942-43,
general managers of all proposed companies to be set up under joint
Slno-Sovlet auspices in Sinkiang were to be Soviet citizens.
137. .!.!?!E..
138. ibId.; Clubb, China end Russie, p. ~70, Sceptics of Chiang's refusal to
compromise the territorial integrity of China in the Sinkiang region
should note his subsequent refusal to condemn the CCP taKeover of Tibet,
even under 8trong US pressure to do so.
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Consul-General in Urumchi is reported to have approached General T'ao Chih-
yueh, the KMT garrison commander in Sinkiang, with a suggestion that he
should declare Sinkiang independent 'on the precedent of Outer Mongolia',
following which Moscow would 'order' the PLA to halt ita advance from Kansu,
.T'ao is reported to have referred this proposal to Canton (Nationalist
headquarters following the fall of Nanking), for deliberation.
however, the Soviet offer is said to have been declined,139
By the end of ~uly, 1949, P'eng Teh-huai's.PLA forces stood at the
Once agein,
very gates of Sinkiang, T'ao Chih-yueh wal apparently ordered by the KMT
Government in Canton - itself in hurried preparation for flight to Taiwan -
to continue his stand, and to fight a harrying rear-guard action, apparently
with the ultimate objective of retreat across tha Himalayas, T'ao was
clearly unwilling to follow these instructions, Accordingly, he gave orders
permitting thosa of his men who wished to flee to Taiwan permission to do
so, Most, however, chose to stay with T'ao, who surrendered peacefully to
the PLA on September 25th, at tha head of the 80,000 KMT troops still
remaining in Sinkiang,140 One day later, on September 26th, 1949, Burhan
Shahrdr, in his capacity as Provincial Chairman of Sinkiang, severed
relations with the Nationalist authorities at Canton, pledged allegiance to
the Communist Government then being established at Peking, and announced thst
he would accept peace terms offered by tha CCP panding thair reorganisation
of the Sinkiang provincial administration,
139, Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang. pp, 117-9, McMillen, op,cit"
p, 24. Nota that in ~une, 1949, at the tima of thie supposed Soviet
approach to T'ao Chih-yueh, tha Soviet Ambassador wae the 801a foreign
diplomatic representative to accompany the Nationalist Government in its
flight from Nsnking to Canton (Calvocoressi, op,eit" p, 360),
140, Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkieng. pp, 117-8, McMillen, op,eit"
p, 24,
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9.4 The limitetion of Muslim Separatism end the D~cline of
Soviet Influence
Throughout their long struggle to win power in the Chinese heartland,
not only Sinkiang, but also the greater part of Northwest China had remained
hostile and largely unknown territory to the cepe Thus, whilst it i8 true
that in 1937 Chinese Communist forces had edvanced to within 300 miles of
the Sinkiang frontier, they were unexpectedly defeated and driven beck by
a coalition of "Wu Ma" Tungen forces in a series of reverses said to have
been regarded by the CCP leadership as 'the most cruel and punishing they
141had suffered up to that time'. Similarly, whilst it is true that a teem
of more than ona hundred Chinese Communists had served in 51nkiang under
Sheng Shih-ts'ai between 1937 and lY42, their power had been strictly
circumscribed, and their influence constantly overshadowed by Stelin and
the CPSU. Moreover, with their sudden fall from grace in 1942, even this
tenuous link between Yenan and Urumchi had been broken, leaving 5inkiang
isolated from CCP influence by a wide swathe of hostile Tungan-controlled
territory and subject to the exclusive competition of Moscow and Nanking.
Yat it should not be supposed that the CCP leadership remained
totally unaware of developments in 5inkiang during this period. Certainly
Yenan must have kept a watchful eye on tha power struggles centred on
141. Lindbeck, J.M.H., 'Communism, Islam and Nationalism in China',
The Review of Politics (Indiana), XII, 4 (October, 1950), pp. 477-8,
W!les, Nym, Inside Red China',(NY, 1935), p. 154. Chang, ~ajjr
-Yusuf', 'Islam and Communism in China', Islamio Literature (Lahore),
XIII, 12 (1967), p. 8.' . -.
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Urumchi, and above ell on the situation in the "Three Regions", where the
CCP's supposed Soviet ally and "mentor" continued to expand its influence
and power at the expense of China'e political and territorial integrity.142
Thus, when on October 12th, 1949, units of the PlA rirst field Army Group
under General Wang Chen advanced acrosa the Kansu-Sinkieng frontier to extend
CCP power to Sinkieng for the first time, they moved purposefully and with
certain predatermined commitments, foremost amongst which - the elimination
of Muslim separatism in the former KMT-controlled zone not withstanding - was
the restoration of Chinese political control in the "Three Regions" and,
ultimately, the exolusion of Soviet influence from the provinoe.
In October, 1949, howevar, the CCP was in no position to move hastily
against its perceived Soviet rival in Sinkisng. Indeed, the situation
in the fsr north-west was potentially most embarrassing, as the leaders
of tha Kulja regime, although regarded by Peking as Soviet puppeta far
more threatening to China's territorial integrity than euch minor
anti-communist "bandits" as c - --Uthman a.tur, actually welcomed - or feigned
to welcome - the establishment of CCP power in Sinkieng.143 In line with
142.
143.
Besides the certain presence of covert CCP sympathisers and informants
in Sinkiang during the period 1942-49, the CCP leadership had been in
regular and intimate contact with Chang Chih-chung in his capacity as
KMT negotiator. Chang was probably better acquainted with Soviet
machinations and the course of Muslim separatism in Sinkiang than any
other senior KMT official. He was also. Chinese p.triotwho, between
1945 and 1949, became increasingly sympathetic towards the CCP.
c - cOn 11th May, 1949, Abd al-Karim Abbas is reported to have announced
at a meeting in Kulja: 'We categorically assert that the success of the
Chinese People's Army of liberetion alone rendered possible the victory
of our own movement ••• Only the victory of the national liberation
struggle of the entire Chinese people can leed to the full freedom of the
people of SinkiangJ only than will the correct solution of the 'national
question in ,Sinkiang be reached' (Slnk1eng Gazette, 30th September, 1949,
cited 1n Mingulov, op,cit., pp. 192-3). It ehould be noted that thie
speech, which would appear to be the first direct statement of Kulja
support for the CCP (a9 opposed to renunciation of seperatism), ~e9
not published until more than one month after its euthor's death, end
four days after the formal submission of the Sinkiang provincial
authorities to the PlA. Its authenticity mey therefore be open to
some legitimate doubt.
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this political stance, the "progressive" STPNLC faction which h~d
successfully purged the former "East Turkestan Republic" of anti-Soviet,
pan-Turanian elements during 1946-47, was obliged overtly to acknowledge
the revolutionary leadership of Mao Tse-tung in the hope of maintaining,
under covert Soviet auspices, a high degree of "autonomy in north-western
Sinkiang. Accordingly, on August 15th, 1949, by which time the ultimate
victory of the CCP over the KMT had becoma a foregone conclusion, the most
prominent members of the Kulja leadership, including the Uighur. Ahmadjen
•
Cesim and cAbd al-Karim cAbbas, the Kazakh Delil Khan, and the Kirghiz
Is~aq Beg, left KulJa for Alma Ata in Soviet Kazakhstan, ostensibly ~
route for Peking, where they were to take part in the first plenary session
144of the Chinese People'a Political Consultative Confarence.
During the subsequent KMT capitulation and PLA occupation of
Sinkiang, nothing more was heard of Ahmadjan Casim and his colleagues •
•
Only in late December, 1949, just as the CCP was setting up a new political
administration in Urumchi, was it quietly announced by the Chinese Communist
authorities that almost four monthe previously, on August 27th, the plane
carrying Ahmadjen and the other IIi leadere had crashed into a Manchurian
• 145hillside, killing everyone on board. Considerable mystery surrounds
th~lidisaster, not least because of Peking's long delay in meking it
144. Whiting, Soviet Strategy in Sinkiano, p. 143, Hayit, Turkesten Zwischen
Russland und China, p. 12.
145. ~., cf. Davidson, Turkestan Alive, pp. 132-3; McMillen, op.cit.,
p. 24; Dreyer, 'The Kazakhs in China', p. lSSJ Clubb, Chine and Russia,
P. 371; Chen, The Slnkieng Story, p. 275.
495
146publicly known. It cannot be doubted, however, that the death of
Ahmadjan Qasim and his colleagues, ~hether a genuine eccident or•
deliberetely engineered, came at a most oppo~tune moment for the CCP
and dealt a considerable blow to Soviet political embitions in Sinkiang.
Thus, with Ahmadjan's death, euthority within the "Three Regions" passed•
- cto Saif el-01n Aziz, the sole surviving senior member of the Kulja
regime, e Soviet-educated Uighur and card-carrying member of the CPSU
147who spoke Chinese haltingly but was fluent in Russian. Under these
circumstances it is hardly surprising that civil power within Sinkiang
flowed 'almost automatically' into the hands of the 'durable and emenable'
Tatar, Burhan Shahidi, who ~as retained in office by the CCP even after
the PLAts victorious entry into Urumchi on October 20th.148
146. Chen, characteristically, makes no mention or this delsy, whilst Soviet
sources (Mingu1ov, Kotov, and Yskolev, A.G., 'The National Liberation
Movemant of the Peoples of Sinkiang, 1944-49', Uchenvye Z~pieki Institute
Vostokvodeniya, XI (Kiteyskiy Sbornlk), 1955), choose to ignore the
crash completely. Many Western sources have made indirect ellusions es
to the possibility of (CP complicity in the crash, but only recently,
in September, 1979, has !n a~onymous source ("Former Peking Student").
supposedly citing Ahmadjan Casim'a granddaughter, openly claimed that
the plane ~ss 'deliberatelyaabotaged' by the CCP ('A Strained Type
of Unity', rEER, September 14th, 1979, pp. 8-9).
147. McMillen, op.cit., p. 24; Dreyer, 'The Kazakhs in Sinkiang', p. ISS.
148. McMillen, ibid.; Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol I, p. 5.
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Meanwhile, at some time during September, 1949, a three-man delegation
under the leadership, of Saif al-01n left Kulja for Peking to represent the
IIi regime during the celebrations marking the founding of the Chinese
People's Republic. Saif al-oin, no doubt chastened and apprehensive
following the (still officially unannounced) death of his colleegues,149
apparently took pains to make it clear to the CCP leadership that, in
future, he would be speaking withthevoioeot Chinese, and not Uighur or
Soviet nationalism. As for the "Three Regions", with the entry into
Sinkiang of the PLA, the problem had been 'basically solved', and the
area in question would in future be part of 'an independent Sinkiang
150under the leadership of the Central People's Government'. Meanwhile,
Peking clearly needed a pliant representative of the former Kulja regime
(in theory an "heroic ally" In the struggle against the KMT), to participate
in the new, unified Sinklang administration which wes being aet up in
Urumchi. Accordingly, when the first cep Si~kiang Provincial Government
was inaugurated on December 18th, 1949, the Tatar Burhan Shah!d! was
- c -appointed Chairman, with the Uighur Self el-Oin Aziz es hi. daputy.
l49. According to the supposed statement of A~madjin Qisim'. granddaughter
Salf al-oIn did not trust the CCP leadership. Thus, at the time of the
original flight to Peking:
Saifudin had expressed his doubts about the aircraft
reaching its destination and hed pleaded illness ea en
excuse for not joining the ill-feted party. Ahmadjen
overruled Saifudin on the ground that a Chinese (La
Tze) would accompany them on tha aircraft, and the
communists would surely not knock off one of their
own number. (But) Saifudin remained unconvinced. (~.
cit., p. 8).
150. Boorman and Howard, op,cit., Vol IV, P. 88.
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Military power within the province, however, remained exclusively In
Han Chinese hands, through the agency of the PLA commander P'eng Teh-huai,
151and the rehabilitated ex-KMT commander Chang Chih-chung.
With the problem of the "left wing" ETR thus partially defused,
Peking was free to turn its attention to the various "right wing" Muslim
elements still active within Sinkiang. Since the KMT had effectively
crushed the last, short-lived conservative pan-Turanian movement in
152 cT -southern Slnkiang during 1946-7, and since both sa Yusuf Apltekin
and Muhemmad Amin Bugre had succeeded in fleeing-the'province in October,. ..., .
1949,153 by the spring of 1950, the sole surviving "right wing" Muslim
opponents of CCP power in Slnkiang were the ageing but active Kumullik
leader Yulbars Khan, and the various Kazakh groups owing allegiance to,
or otherwise associeted with, the Kirei Kezakh leader CUthmen Setur.
As has already been shown, following the collapse of the 1937 Muslim
rebellion in southern Sinkiang end the related disturbances et Kumul,
Yulbers Khan fled Sinkiang end was given e sinecure in Nenking by the
Nationalist authorities.154 Yulbers remained with the Nationaliets
151. Clubb, Russia end Chine, pp. 371-2.
152. See above, p. 464. Note also that Jack Chen mantions a rising at
Turfan in 1948 which was put down with 3,000 deeths by units of Tsinghai
Tungan cavalry under Ma Chin-shan (The Sinkieng Story, PP. 259-60).
153. c- - . -Isa Yusuf Alptekin and Mu~ammad Amin Bugra arrived et leh, in ladekh,
on December 12th, 1949, epparently at the heed of saverel hundred'
refugees. The~_hed endured a very severe crossing of the Himalayes,
during which Isa's own daughter had died. Leter they were flown to
Srinagar by military transports, where they were 'given sanctuary end
c - (treated with kindness' by Shaykh Abdullah of Kashmir Isma'il end
Isma'il, op.cit., P. 36).
154. See ebove, p. 317.
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throughout the wer yeers, returning to Sinkieng in 1945 es KMT Speciel
Executive Commissioner for Eastern Sinkiang. He survived the subsequent
collepse of Cheng Chih-chung's coalition government, being named Executive
Supervisory Commissioner end Peace Preservetion Commender at Kumul in 1947,
as well as "Strategy Adviser" to Chieng Kei-shek in 1948. finelly, in 1949,
ha was appointed KMT Deputy Commander of Peece Preservation forces in
Sinkieng.155 When elements of the PLA first field Army Group moved into
Sinkiang during October, 1949, scettered lest-ditch resistance in the
Kumul eree coelesced eround Vulbars, who had refused to eccept Burh;n'e
surrender. According to Jeck Chen, Vulbere wes Joined in this wild
endeavour by units of Tungen cevelry under Me Chin-shen (a eon of Ma Pu-fang,
the "Wu Me" warlord of Tsinghai),156 end by various 'dieherd Whita Russian
6miorGst.157 Vulbars wes abla to carryon guerille operetions in tha Kumul
aree for severel months, es a result of.which, in April, IYSO, ha was
declared "Governor of Sinkiang" and "Commander in Chief of Provincial
Pacification forces" by the exiled KMT authorities on Taiwan. Vet despite
this largely sumbolic gesture, by July, 1950, Vulber. end hIe rasletenca
forces were confronted by increasingly severe shortage. of grein, fodder
155. Boorman and Howard, op,cit" Vol IV, P. 60
156. Ma Pu-fang fled China in 1949, travelling to Egypt and subsequently
(in 1957), becoming Nationalist Chinese Ambassedor to Seudi Arabie,
See Appendix III, 'The "Wu Ma" ("rive Me") Werlord Clique', at the
end of this study.
157. Boorman and Howard, op,cit., Vol IV, p. 6PJ Chen, Tha Sinkieng story
P. 269.
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and ammunition. Accordingly, they ~ere forced to eeek refuge first
in the region of Yulbars' old mountain stronghold at Bardash, then in
the Tun-huang region of Kansu, and finally in the sparsely-inhabited
depths of Tsinghai. At some stage during the latter part of these
~anderings, Ma Chin-shan'a Tungan cavalry went over en bloc to the Chinese
- 158Communists, leaving Vulbars isolated ~ith a group of perhaps 90 follo~ers.
Mean~hile, a second focus of "right wing" Muslim discontent had
c - --emarged around Uthman Batur who, after withdrawing from the Pei-ta-shan
region in early 1948, had set up hie headquarters at Kizil ~ala 811, near
159Kitei, in the northern foothills of the 80gdo Ula. Here, et tha heed of
some 15,000 followers, he lived 'like a potentate ••• surrounded by a group
160of loyal lieutenants'. Moreover, also in 1948, as a reward for his loyal
service to the Nationalists following hi. defection from the ETR, c -Uthman
was appointed commander of three KMT peo-en ("peece preservation") squadrons,
. 161also stationed in the Kitai region. In September, 1949, therefore, at the
time of Burh;n Shah!d!'s submission to the PLA, CUthman was closely
identified with the K~T power structure in Sinklang and bitterly anti-communist,
Accordingly, like Yulbers Khan, he refused to accept Burhin's surrender,
and ~ithdrew to the Barkol Tagh ~here he ~as subsequently Joined by Jenrm
158. Boorman and Howard, ~.
159. Lias, Kazek Exodus, p. 129.
160. Bernett, op,cit., p, 276.
161, Boorman and Howard, ep,eit" Vol III, p. 47.
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Khan, the supposedly illiterate Kazakh ex-Commissioner of rinance in
162Chang Chih-chung's coalition government. At about the Bame time, during
t c -he summer end eerly eutumn of 1949, a group of Uthmen's Kez.kh eilies
under the 1eedership of cAli Beg Rahim set up their headquerters et
•
Kukuluk, in the eastern Tien Shan above Kar.shahr, where they were Joined
by Salis, Janlm Khan's ex-colleague as Deputy Secretery-Generel in the
1946-47 coalition government.163 During the following months, both groups
164fought a series of hit-and-run engagements with units of the PLA.
It was a struggle which they could not hope to win, however, end in lete
December, 1949, cAli Beg's group was forced to break awey from the Tien
Shan and to head for the southern Kazakh stronghold of Gez K5l,
on the Sinkiang-Tsinghal frontier. Similerly, after more than aix months
of protracted guerilla warfare in the Barkal region, c - --Uthman Batur, like
cAli Beg before him, was forced to break off contact with the PLA and
to strike southwards towards Gez KOl.
After a bitter and hazardous crossing of the Kuruk Tagh and Lop
Nor regions, CAli Beg Rahim and his followers arrived at Gez Kol In the
•
spring of 1950, where they made contact with the local Kazakh chi.fhina
- r - - 165 ..~usayn TaJj and Sul~8n Sharif. The Kazakhs of Gez Kol had remained
162. Lias, Kazak Exodus, p. 152.
163. ibid., pp. 151-2. Selis was apparently accompanied by a number of- ,.-"Whiten-Russian emigres.
164. ~., pp. 154-9, 172-4J Boorman and Howard, op,cit., Vol III, p, 47.
165. Lias, Kazak Exodus, pp, 160-67J Clerk, M.J., 'How the Kezakhs rled to
rreedom', The Netional Geographical Megazine, CVI, 5 (November, 1954),
pp, 625-6,
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almost entirely outside the sphere of Sinkiang politics since their flight
cfrom Sheng Shih-ts'ai during 1934-36, but as Ali Beg's arrival presaged,
this wes soon to end. Some six months later, in September, 1950, c -Uthman
satur's Kazakhs arrived in the region after a fighting retreat via Tun-
huang and the Teaidammarshes of Tsinghei. They were accompanied by Yulbers
Khan and his remaining followers, who hed apparently joined forces with
c - 166Uthman en route.
Almost immediately Yulbers and his followers, accompanied by the
Kazakh leader Selis, set out for Tibet with the apparent intention of
reaching India and, ultimately, of joining Chiang Kai-shek in exile on
Taiwan.167 The various other Kirei Kazskh chieftains present at Gez Kol,
however, chose to remain. four months later, on february 1st, 1951, PLA
forces launched a major offensive in the region, capturing c - --Uthman Batur
and Janlm Khen, and obliging tha remaining rebel chieftains to flee
into Tibet.16S 80th CUthmen and Janim were taken to Urumchi, where they
were eventually executed as "counter-revolutionaries" by the Chinese
Communist authoritIes.169 cAli Beg Rahim, Husayn TajjI and Sulten Sharif,.• • •
166. Lias, op_cit., p. 174; Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol III, p. 47;
Vol IV, p. 60.
167. Lias, lE!£., Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol IV, p. 60.
168. Lias, op.cit., pp. 180-82, 187-90; Boorman and Howard, op.cit., Vol III,
p. 47.
169. c -According to Jack Chen (The Sinkieng Story, p. 270), Uthman was shot
and killed during a skirmish. Other sources agree that he waB captured
end executed, however._ Lias, op.cH., PP. 180-1)4; Boorman and Howard,
op.cit., Vol III, p. 47; Dreyer, 'The KezakhB in Chine', p. 156) Yang
I-fan, Islem in Chine (Hong Kong, 1969), PP. 75-9 ('The Kezekh Revolt');
Bush, R., Relioion in Communist China (NY, 1970), pp. 269-70J
Gayretullah. Hiz"ir.Bek.Osman Batur [lstanbul.ISBBJ.
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however, succeeded In evading Chinese pursuit and, together with some
hundreds of their followers, reached the frontiers of ladakh in August,
1701951, after a six month retreat across the Tibetan plateau. Meanwhile,
Yu1bars Khan and his fo110w~rs - having, reportedly, shot Salis in a
dispute over food supplies - reached lhasa in January, 1951, after an
astonishing crossing of the Tibetan plateau during mid-wintar.17l Once in
lhesa, most of the refugees were detained by the Dalai leme, though Yulbars
and five of his compenions were permitted to proceed to Darjeeling in India.
Yulbars then travelled overland to Calcutta, before flying to Taiwan, where
he arrived on May 1st, 1951, to take up a comfortable sinecure under the
172KMT as "Governor of Sinkiang" in exile.
With the capture of CUthman 8at~r end the flight of Yulbars Khan,
serious "right wing" Muslim opposition to CCP authority in Sinkiang was
brought under control, though for several years more the province was to
be 'constantly disturbed by local rebellions which were probably more
anti~Chinese than anti-Communist in Charaeterl•173 There still remained,
170. cAli 8eg and his colleagues reached the ladakh frontier, in the region
of lake Pangong, on August 18th, 1951. They were permitted to enter India
on October lOth, and travelled to Srinagar by road and air. Many were
subsequently resettled in Turkish Anatolia «, _"';_:_ ·r_
171. Lias, Kazak Exodus, pp. 219-22, Boorman and Howard, op,cit., Vol IV,
p. 60.
172. Boorman and Howard, op,eit., Vol IV, p. 60.
173. Anon, Moslem Unrest in China (Hong Kong, 1958), PP. 5l-2J fedyshyn, 0.5.,
'Soviet Retreat in Sinkiang I, American Slavonic snd Esst European Review,
XVI, 2 (April, 1957), p. 129.
however, the potentially far more serious problem of "left wing" Muslim
separatism in the ."Three Regions" comprising the former ETR.
Initially, following the death of most of the Kulja leadership in
August, 1949, the CCP had adopted a relatively circumscribed approach in
dealing with the "Three Regions" question. Thus, although Saif al-01n had
formally acknowledged Peking's hegemony over the whole of Sinkiang, he
was still a member of the CPSU when he took up hie post as Provincial
Vice-Chairman; similarly, when PLA ~ork teams fanned out across the entire
~
former KMT-controlled zone of Sinkiang in December, 194Y, the~specificallY
excluded from the "Three Regions" on the grounds that 'conditions were
as yet unsettled in those areas,.174 During the aame month, Mao Tee-tung
travelled to Moecow for prolonged telks (lasting nine weeks) with the
Soviet leadership; ha was followed in January by Chou En-lai~. Vet, in
rebruary, 1950, even as the CCP's pre-eminent leaders were engeged in
negotiations with Stalin, a separate Sinklang delegation under the
- 175leadership of Saif 81-Oin arrived in the Soviet cepital, lendIng
credence to US Secretary of State Dean Acheson'. charge of January 12th
176that Moscow ~as not treating Slnkiang as a Chinese province.
174. Dreyer, 'The Kazakhs in China', p. 156; McMIllen, op,cit., p, 37,
#
175. 8eloff, Soviet Policy in the rer Eest, 1944-51, p, 100; Boorman and
Howard, op.cit., Vol III, p. 89.
176. Calvocoressi, op,cit., PP. 356, 361.
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Saif a1-orn's delegation subsequently participated in the continuing
Sino-Sovlet negotiations, as a result of which, on March 27th, it was
announced that two Joint-stock Sino-Soviet companies were to be set up
for the exploitation of Sinkiang's oil and non-ferrous metal resources.
Capital, control and profits were to be shered equally between the Russiens
and the Chinese. One side was to provide the chairman of the 'board of each
company, and the other the general manager. These positions were to
alternete every three years, but the first general managers were to be
177Soviet. The agreement was to run for thirty years. At a press
conference on March 31st, Deen Achason described tha total effect of these
agreements as 'the detachmant of Sinkiang from China by Russia by a femiliar
178process'. One month later the Soviet press countered this charge by
arguing thet 'despite the element of foreign partitipation, this investment
was a constructive and not an exploitative one, and that full respect for
Chinese sovereignty had been maintained.,179
Yet both Acheson end Stalin had underestimated tha nationalism and
determination of Mao Tse-tung - who had long dreamed of restoring China'.
180imperial frontiers in Inner Asia, end who had no intention of eXChanging
ona set of foreign masters for another. There can be no doubt that the CCP
177. Soviet News. 29th March, 1950, cited in Calvocoressi, op.cit., p. 361;
The Times (London), 31st March, 1950; 8eloff, Soviet Policy in the ter
Eest, p. 100. A similar jOint-stock Sino-Soviet company was set up at
the same time to run aviation in Slnkiang, the agreement to lest for
10 years.
178. NYT, 1st April, 1950, cited In Calvocoressi, op,elt., p. 361.
179. New Times, 26th April, 1950, cited in 8eloff, Soviet Policy In th~ ter
f!!i, p. 100.
180. Schram, Mao Tee-tung, p. 256; Lee fu-hsieng, op,eit., pp. 128-30.
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regarded the 1950 agreements with the Soviet Union'as a necessary but
purely temporary concession, to be re-negotiated or abrogated as soon
as was politically expedient. Thus, as an indication of future Chinese
Communist intentions in Sinkiang, it was announced from Peking, even as
the Moscow talks were in full session, that Saif al-orn had resigned from
the CPSU and was being admitted to membership of the CCp.18l
Meanwhile, within Sinkiang, the Chinese authorities took steps to
dissolve the effectively atill extent "IIi National Army" - a development
which had been bitterly and auccessfully resisted by the Kulja leadership
five years earlier during the "coalition government" of Chang Chih-chung.
In 1950-61, however, this strategically vital advance wal aChieved by
the CCP under the guise of "integration" and "promotion". Thua ex-INA
units were attached to PLA units end dispatched to distant corners of
Sinkiang far from their home region, whilst· ex-INA commanders were given
182commissions (and often promotions) within the PLA. Vet, despite this
measure, Soviet political influence within the "Three Regions" continued
to remain paramount, in indication of which, When the organs of local
government in IIi, Chuguchak and Shara Sume were reorganised during the
autumn of 1950, the administrations remained dominated by pro-soviet
Uighur and Kazakh intellectuals, whilst no less than 17,000 Soviet-orientated
183cadres of the former ETR were retained in positions of influence.
181. Boorman end Howard, op,clt., Vol III, p. 09; McMillen, op.clt., p. 35.
182. Whiting, Soviet Strategy In Sinkieno, p. 143; Lee fu-hsieng, op.c1t"pp. 162-3; Salf al-Oln, 'Wu-chUn (ch'!en Min-teu-ch~n) t! teu-ch~n9
chi-chi ko-ming shih' (The Composition end Revolutionary History of the
Fifth Army/former National Army), Hsln-Hue yUeh-peO, II, 4 (August 15th,
19SO), p. 767.
183. Moseley, op,eit., PP. 25-6; Dreyer, 'The Kazakhs 1n China', p. 155;
McMillen, op.eit., p. 39.
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Similarly, following the CCP victory of 1949, the "Union ~n Defence
of Peace end Democracy in Sinkiang" - effectively the political arm
of the Kulje ragime - was not dismentled outright, but remained
widely influential in the north-west, with a reported membership of
·18477,394 by the summer of 1950. This situation was clearly intolerable
to the Peking leadership, and during mid-1951 a widespread purge was
implemented in north-western Sinkiang 'which liquidated key officials
in the three districts, including most of the original revolutionary
ISSleaders who had not perished in tha airplane crash of 1949'. Staps
were also taken to diminish tha influence of the Kulja ragime's mass-based
political arm, which was accordingly re-styled the nSinkiang leagua for
Peaca and Democracy" in June, 1950, under a newly-elected executive
committee which included five Han Chines. and on. Hui. Over the next
three years, many new branches of this organisation were established in
southern and aestern Sinkiang, effectively completing its transformation
from a Sovi.t-orientated symbol of "Three Regions" Muslim seperatism into
a CCP-orienteted symbol of Sinkiang unity. Once this purpose had baan
achieved - by the summer of 1953 - the "5inkiang league for Peace and
Democrecy" was allowed to fede quietly eway as Sinkleng itself beceme
more closely integrated within Chine.186
184. Sai f a1-oIn, CThe History of the Sinkiang League'.
Jen-mln llh-peo (Peking), June 19th, 1950, p. 1.
185. Whiting, Soviet Stretegy in Sinkieng. p. 143; cf. Orayer, 'The Kazakha
in China', p. 156.
186. lIe fu-hsleng, op.cit., pp. 165-6.
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Meanwhile~ in Naroh, 1950, Peking gave formal notioe of the
importanoe it attached to future Chinese oontrol over Sinkiang by
,announoing a programme of mass Han emigration to the provinoe.187 This
was followed, in 1950-52, by a oampaign for the "suppression of countel."-
revolut'ionariesff (aimed primarily at landlords and I'Iuslim°ulamal in
. sedentary agricultural areas and at feudal or traditionalists elements
amongst the nomadio peoples) and, in 1952-53, at land reform.188 It is
apparent that these campaigns caused widespread local resistance amonest
both Uighurs and. Kazakhs, though not amongst the Hul, who appear to have
played their usual role (in Sinkiang) as supporters of Chinese ~uthOrity.189_
By mid-1954, however, after almost five years of CCP rule, the situation
had beoome calm enough for Peking to feel seoure ingrantlng some measure
of local autonomy to the various peo;les of Sinkiang.190 AcC?ordingly, a ,
system of autonomous distriots (~) and counties (hslen) was introduoed,
187. Jackson, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands, PP. 61-8.
188. Lee ]u-hsJ-ang, op.cit., p. 167. <>rea Yusu! Alptekin, 'Temir parda .
arqasindae Sarqi 'lUrkistan" (East Turkestan Behind the Iron CUrtain),
Millr TUrkistan, LXXIV (1951), PP. 23-1.
189. Significantly, one of the last centres of conservative resistanoe .
to CCP reforms in southern Sinkiang was the Khot&n region, where a
Uighur called cAbd aI-MajId Damla (1 namullih), a reported follower
of the exiled MUhammad AmIn Bugra, is said to have staged a major.
rebellion during'1954 (Isma'il and Ismalil, op.cit., P. 43).' Generally.
speaking, most Naiman Kazakhs, as well a! the majorit,y of th! Ki~e!,
seem to have acoepted CCP rule. Sherdirman, the son of Cuthman Batur,
is known to have led a small band of Kazakh rebels in the south-east
of Sinkiang until 1953, when he surrendered to the authorities and
was "re-eduoated" to become laresponsible offioial in the :people'S
administration' (L1as, op.cit., p. 184; Chen, The Sinkiane story, P.
270)._
190. Sa!t al-Dln,'Saifudln ti fa-yen', (A Speech of Saifudin), Chunf,DkuO
kun chan tan. ti tei chuan-kuo tal- iao ta-hui wen-chiai Doouments
From the E1ght .ational Congress of the CCP, Peking, 1957 • II, PP.
520-21.
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starting with those nationalities ~hose loyalty was considered least
in question by Peking. Thus, on March 15th, 1954 - some two weeks
after 30,000 men and units of the PLA in Sinkieng had been awarded
" 191.speoial merits" for bandit suppression - the first Hut autonomous
county wes established at Kereshehr. This was followed later in the
same month by a Sibo autonomous county near KulJa; in June, by a Mongol
autonomous district at Bayan Gol; in July, by a Kirghiz autonomous
district at Kizil Su in the .Tien Shan, a Mongol autonomous district in
the 8orotala Valley, and smaller Kazakh and Hui autonomous counties to
the north of Barkol and Urumchi; and in September, by a TaJik autonomous
county In the Sarikol area, a Hui autonomous county near Kumul, and a
192Mongol autonomous county near Chuguchak.
MeanwhIle, during October, 1954, as a result of SIno-Soviet talks
held at Peking following the celebrations marking the fifth anniversary
of the founding of the CPR, it was announced that the Soviet Union had
agreed prematurely to terminate the Sino-Soviet joint-stock compenies
set up in 5inkiang during 1950. Within days of this striking Chinese
191. HSin-chleng 11h-peo (Sinkiang Daily), March 4th, 1954, cited in
Survey of Chine r.einlendPress, No. 793 (April 25th, 1954), pp. 4-5.
192. 'The Evolution of Minority Nationality Regional Autonomy in'Sinkiang',
CAR, XV, 3 (1967), pp. 232-7.
509
diplomatic success - the reasons for which remain uncertain193
on November 29th, 1954, the IIi Kezakh Autonomous District was
set up in the remainder of the "Three Regions" es a concrete
expression of the resumption of full Chinese authority over the
area. Just under oneyeer leter, on October 1st, 1955, Sinkiang
wes formally reconstituted as tha "Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region"
under the compliant chairmanship of the formerly pro-Soviet Uighur,
- c -Seif al-Oin Aziz.
193. Dreyer ('The Kezakhs in China', p. 157), believes that Kruschev
withdrew from Sinkiang 'hoping to obtain Chinese support in his
bid to succeed Stalin'. See, however, Clubb, Russia ~nd Chin~
PP. 403-5, for a full discussion of the factors surrounding
this development.
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CONClUSIONS
The history of Republican Sinkiang - like the history of
Republican China as a whole - may be divided into two separate and
quite dis tinot periods. :Between 1911 and 1928, under the "feudal
bureauoracyn, of Yang TsenS'-hsin, the provinoe remained an island of
relative calm in a sea of civil war, secession and rebellion. Yet
this was a period of peace without prosperity. Sinkiang's relative
tranquillity was purchased at the price of eoonomio and intellectual
stagnation, so that by 1928, in the year of Yang Tsene-hsin's
assassination and the Nationalist seizure of power in China proper,
Yang's personal fief in Northwest China h~ become an anachronismr
a relic of China's Imperial past surviving, through the will of one
autocratio mandarin, some seventeen years into the Republioan period.
Under Yang's successors, the pressures whioh had built up
within Sinkiang during the first three decades of the 20th century
were to explode with spectacular and devastatine regularity, so that
the province - aptly described by Fletcher as the most rebellious
terri tory in the Ch'ine Ebpire during the 19th century1 - might
justifiably claim the same, somewhat dubious distinction for the first
half of the 20th centuryo
The catalyst for this series of ~mslim rebellions and invasions
was undoubtedly the il'icompetence'2nd' venal! ty of Yang's immediate
successor, Chin Shu-jen. :By 1931 Chin had contrived to alienate both the
1. See above, p. 69.
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nomadio and sedentary peoples of Slnkiang through a series of ill-
judged actions oulminating in the annexation and colonisation of the
Khanate of Kumul, a politically impotent but previously inviolate
symbol of Islamic autonomy held in var,ring degrees of esteem by
Muslims throughout the "province. Over the next six years, all Sinkiang
(with the exoeption of the Ili Valley) was to be torn apart by a series
or related and almost contInuous Muslim rebellions in a period of
bitter internecinoe strife which was only to end as a result of direct
Soviet mili ta.rr intervention wi thin the province in 1934 and again in
1937.
In previous studies of Republioan S1nkiang (conoentrating
primarily on great power competition within the region), there has
been a tendenoy to dismiss the various Muslim risings of the 1930s
in a few words, attributing their origins to Han Chinese misrul.,a.nd
explaining their failure in terms ot Islamio tactionalism and laok
ot leadership.2 To some considerable extent this analysis - favoured
by Lattimore, Whiting and Nyman alike - is correct. Yet the tendency
bas been to over-simplify and generalise. thus exoessive emphasis haa
been placed upon ethnio and eoonomic differences between Uighur and
Kazakh, nomad and agrioulturalist, whilst inadequate attention has
been paid to the various regional faotors affecting these rebellions.
Moreover, the role of the TUngans within S1nkiang has only been
partially understood. As a result, an image of Sinkiang as an
intrinsioally faction-ridden province, inherently incapable ot attaining
it8 independenoe because ot Muslim diauni ty, has attained widespread
acceptanoe. Yet such a oonclusion cannot be justified, as it presupposes
2. See ..for example, Chen; Tha Sinkiang Story t ,fl, ' .......5; Flaming, News From
Tartary, If· U.e·:&.
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that the various Muslimrebellions of the 19'Os shared a commonaim
in the establishment of a secessionist Muslimstate. It is the
finding of the present study that such was manitestly not the case.
Abetter understanding or developmentswithin Northwest China
during the Republican period maybe p,ined if, instead ot considering
the province of "Sinkiang" as a whole (a relatively newconcept, dating
from the late 19th century), the region in question is considered
according to its earlier political divisions - that is, "Uigburistan"
(the K1llIII11-Turtanarea), "Altishahr" (the Tarim:Basin) and Dzunearia
(including the IIi Valley). These regions were consistently disunited
throughout the pre-Ch'ing period, and responded dll'ferently to the
imposition of Ch'1ng rule. '!hus "Uighuristan", the only region subject
to somedegree of Chinese pcli tical control under the Ming, remained
generall1' loyal to the Chinese polit1', whilst "Altishahr" proved to be
a source of constant Turkic MUslimrebellion and discontent. Meanwhile
the IIi Valley and Dzungaria, having been largely depopulated by Ch'ien
Lungin 1755, was resettled by Tungusioand Hui agriculturalists who
tended to remain 101'al to China, as well as by "Taranchi" Uigburs trom
the TarimBasin whooameincreasingly under the intluenoe ot the
expandingRussian Empire.
In retrospeot, it is clear that this pattern cf political loyalties
continued into the Republican era. Thus, rollowing Chin Shu-jen'B
annexation of the ICha.na te ot Kumul, the Turkio Muslimleadership of the
oasis, t'epresented by KbojaNiyas VajjI and Yulbars Kh~, Bent an appeal
eastwards, towards Kansuand Nanking, tor assistance. ~e aim of the 1931
Kumullikrebellion, therefore, was the restoration or limited ~11m
autonomyin the region, and the replacement of Chin Shu-jen by a more
amenableChinese governor. Further important distinguishing features ot
the Kumulrebellion were the active participation of local Kumull!kTungana
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in the rising, and the preparedness of the Turkio MI1slims of the region
to cooperate, at least initiallY', with the invading Tungan armies of
Ma. Ch~ying from neighbouring Kansu.
Clearly this response was diotated by Kumul's proximitY" to China
proper, bY' the centuries-old tributar,y relationship between its royal
house and the rulers of China, and through the long years of autonomous
status enjoyed by the Khanate which had precluded - or at least limited -
the stationing of occuwing Tungani earrison foroes in the area. Kumul
may have been part of Dar aI-Islam, the Islamio World, but it had also
learned. to live with China. Renoe MaqeUd Shah spoke Turk! with a Chinese
acoent and wore Chinese clothes, whilst his chief counsellor, YUlbars Khin,
spoke fluent Chinese and ultimately chose exile in Taiwan rather than in
Turkey. Even the incompetent Khoja Niyas HajjI, when torced bY' circumstance•
to retreat into the Tarim 13aein and to take up an avowedly separatist
stance, was quick to enter into an agreement with Sheng Shih-ta'ai and
to assume a sinecure within the Chinese administration.3 In short, the
Kumul rebellion was not secessionist, and did not become anti-TUngan in
character until after the oasis had experienced the press-gangs and
material exactions ot Ma ChunB'-ying's army.
An entirely dUferent situation pertained in the Tarim 13alin -
the "Altishahr" ot old - where the rebellions of 1933-4 and 1937 were
openly and avowedlY' seoessionist in charaoter. Unlike Kumul, southern
S1nkiang lay oloser to Ate,hanistan and the Muslim Middle East than to
China. No selt-respecting Kashgarlik or Khotanlik MUslim would wear
Chinese clothes, and few spoke Chinese at all, let alone speak TUrki with
a Chinese accento Moreover, southern Sinkiang was garrisoned bY' Tungan1
3. In this context, note also Khoja Niyas Hajji's unlikely appeal to
Nanking for the "protection of rights" of the secessionist TIRET
(below, PP. 558-9).
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forces who were viewed by the local Turkic Muslims less as co-
religionists than as an occupying al"Ilzy'of Muslim collaborators in
the service of the Chinese.4 This situation was oertainly made worse
by the barbarous administration of the Hu! r-tuslimMa Fu.-hsing (1916-24),
as well as by the activities of his Hu! Muslim suocessor, Ma Shao-wu
(1924-33), who, although more just, ruled with an iron hand, remained
unquestionably loyal to the Chinese authorities, and was responsible
for various militar,y aotions against Turkic Muslim rebels including
th ~ -e suppression of the Kirghiz leader, Id Mirab, during 1932.
Accordingly, when the opportunity for rebellion in southern
S1nkiang arose in 1932-33, the local Turkic Muslim leadership at both
Kashgar and Khom were quick to Bieze the opportuni t1. The Muslim
rising which followed was of a fundamentalist nature, resulting in the
establishment of the short-lived seoessionist "TUrkish-Islamic Republio
of Ea.st Turkestan" at Kashgar between 1933 and 1934. The TIR.EJrleadership
(drawn chiefly from the conservative CNR element assooiated with the
Khotan !mIra), was as strongly anti-Tungan as it was anti-Chinese, and
may be seen as the direot spiritual successor of the Aktagblik regimes
briefly established in the same region during the first half' of the 19th
century, as well as of the orthodox Islamio AmIrate set up by yaCqub }leg
between 1866 and 1811.5 1he TIRE'l'leadership, moreover, was also markedly
anti-Soviet as a direot consequence of Russian aotivities in Central Asia
f'rom the 19th century oonquests to the suppression of' the Basmach1 revolt
and the colleotivization of' the Kazakh steppe.
The Cove~ent of the Khotan !mIrs, which dominated the TInEr and
represented the Turkio Muslim separatist movement in S1nkiang in its most
,
4. This attitude oertainly persisted from at least the mid 19th-century. See
above, pp. 61~. 172.
5. It ls interesting to note that Yarkand, a former Karatasblik centre, _,__"
failed to emerge as a major oentre of support for the 1933-34 reb~~lion.
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extreme and radically conservative form, was thus at a variance not
only with the provincial authorities and the invading TUngan general
Ma. Chun~y1ng, but also with its erstwhile Uighur allies, the Kumullik
leaders Khoja Niyis HajjI and Yulbars Khin, whocameto be seen as•
collaborators with the Chinese following their reoonciliation with Sheng
Shih-ts·ai.6 Given this uncompromisingstance, it is scarcely surprising
that the TIREl' found itself virtuallY' without triends, the victim of
Soviet "destabilisation" during 1933, before being avept awaybY'a
succession of Kumullik, Tungan and provinoial foree. early in 1934. Yet
despite this disaster, the seoessionist spirit in southern Sinkiang
continued to remain strong, giving rise to the short-lived "sabIl-illah"
rebellion of 19:H. to the "Sarikoli" revolt of 1946-41, and, according
to Muslimrefugee sources, to a major revolt in the Khotanregion as
recently as 1954.1
As a result of the Soviet interventions ot 1934 and 1931, Muslim
unrest in both Kumuland the Tarim:Basinwas brought largelY' under oontrol.
Between1931 and 1942 SiDldangwas run as a police eta t. along Soviet lines,
with the assistanoe of NKVD officera. During this period, overt Muslim
opposition to Sheng's rule was restrioted to the Altai region, where small
numbersof fiercely independent Kirei Kazakhsmountedguerilla raids in
the MPH border area, In 1943, however, rollowing Sheng's break with the
Soviets and realie,nment with the KMT, Muslimdiscontent emergedin the IIi
Valle,r for the first time since 1811.8 It Beemsoertain that thia
developmentwas aotively encouragedby the Soviet UnionwhiohBoU8ht,
through its rounding and support of the STPNLC,to bring pressure first
6 .. •• -• See, tor example, _'~ i Tiirkistan milli fa '~~i,,1\. 6.a.tr: arar ra am 0'
(tOn the National Tragedyof Eastern TUrkestan, ITotoool No. 30' , Ya~
TUrkistan, LXXI (1935), Pp. 19-25 (Letter of SUl~in Beg:Bakhtiar :Bei).-
1~ See above, pp. 299-316. 456-60, p. 501, rn. 189.
8, For the suppression of the 1811 revolt in IIi of SUltanAbuOshlan
see HaU, op. oit., tf-:'O -1\. •
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on Sheng and subse~uently on his KMTsuccessors for a restoration of
Soviet economic and political privilege within the "Three Regions" area.
Direct Soviet military involvement on the side of the rebels resulted in
the establishment of the "East Turkestan Republic" at Kulja. in 1945.
Similarly, direct Soviet involvement with the rebel movementforced the
INAto halt on the banks of the Manass River later in the same year,
whilst pro-Soviet elements within the ET.R purged their administration of
Muslim fundamentalists and consolidated their hold over Ili, Chuguchak
and Shara Sume- the three regions of S1nkiang which were the chief
economic and political concern of the Kremlin.
:Becauseof the involvement of looal "progressive" elements in the
Em, and because of the group's political opposition to the XMT,the Ili
Rebellion of 1944-49 is generally represented both bY'the CCPand by its
partisans in the West a.s a true "war of liberation", untainted (or only
partly so) bY'elements of Islamic fundamentalism and pan-Tu.ran1an1sm,a
manifestation less of Turkic Muslim separatism than of Turkio l-lUslim
support for the Chinese Revolution. Thus, acoording to Chen, 'the effect
ot the liberation struggle in S1.nkiangwas like a great tributar,y joining
the mother river in the final journey to the open sea,.9 Such claims are
ei ther mistaken or openlY'designed to mislead, however, ~or the Ili Rising
was manifestly Soviet-orientated, it not Soviet-insitieated. This was well
understood by the EMT,whoresponded by appointing anti-Soviet Muslim
nationalists such as Muhammad AmInl3ugra and cYsa 1Usur Alptekln to senior•
posts in the Urumchl administration in a bid to win over the Turkio Muslims
ot Bouthern S1nkiang and to provide an alternative focus tor. the loyalty'
ot MUslimnationalists within the "Three Regions" abutting the Soviet Union.
This policy enjoyed Bomelimited success, but su!fered overall tailure
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partly because of the repressive and paternalistic tactics eenerally
employed by the EMTthroughout the region of Sinkiang under their
control, and partly because of the appointment of MasOUd Sabri, a pro-
Chinese Uighur widely viewed by his fellow Tarkic MIls1imsas a puppet
of the KMT, to the post of Chairman of the Sinkiang Provinoial
Government.
With the arrival of PLAunits on the eastem frontiers of Sinkiang
during the autwml of 1949, both the Soviet Union and its Ili :proteges
were obliged openly to aoknowledge the authority of the COPthroughout. .
Sinkiang, probab11 in the hope of retaining a substantial element ot !!.
facto Soviet-int1uenoed autono~ in the north-west of the provinoe. The
CCPwas quite unprepared to tolerate such an arrangement, however, and
whilst paying lip-service to the role of the Ili Rebellion in the Chinese
Revolution as a whole, took·steps not only to crush "right wing" Muslim
separatism in the south and east of the province, but also to eliminate
all traces of Soviet-influenced "lett wing" Muslim separatism trom the
north and west,of the province, and to exclude Soviet influence from Sinkiang
as a whole.
In retrospeot, it is olear that during the six years between 1949
and the establishment of the Sinkiang Uighur AutonomousRegion in 1955,
the Chinese Communistswere overwhelminglY' suooessful in these aims. With
the subsequent emergence of Islamabad. as Peking's main ally on the Indian
suboontinent, the hand.f'ul otsurviving "right wing" l'hlslim separatists in
the mountains above Kashgar and Khotan lost their last hope of winning a:rrr
external support for the oontinuation of their struggle. SimilarlY', the
Sino-Soviet ritt of 1960 and the subsequent migration of an estimated
60,000 Kazakhs from Ili to the Kazakh SSRma;y have provided the Kremlin
with a propaganda viotor.r, but vas also fin&ll1 to 801vethe Problem ot
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residual Soviet-ETa influenoe amongstthe Kazakhsof S1nkiang, and to
resul t in the all-but-total olosure of the S1nkians--Sovietfrontier.1 0
Meanwhile,Han Chinese migration to S1nkianghas continued at a prodigious
rate, so that in the last thirty years the provinoe has experienoed a
demographiochangeunparalleled in the modernhistory of Central Asia.
Today, Sinkiang is more a part ot China than it has ever been. 'lhus, whilst
somenostalgia for the separatist regimes of the 19308and 1940smay
possibly survive amongstelements of the Tarkic MUslimpopulation, it
is clear that the establishment at an independent, ~mslimSinkiang has
becomean impossibility. Nothing remains ot the short-lived TIRETin
Kashgar, whioh is still offioially exeorated, whilst all that remains at
the Soviet-sponsored ErR in IIi is a mausoleum,set in a grove at trees
near Kulja, bearing the following eulogy-bY'MaoTee-tungl
May the spirits of ComradesAhmadjan Qisim, Ishiq
:Beg,cAbdal-KarIm cAbbas,Daiil Khin and to Tw
live forever! !!heyperished in the service of
national liberation and of the people's democraoyJ11
10. Mosel~. op.cit., pp. ,107-15.
11. Chen, The Sinkiang stoEl. p. 275 (note the inclusion of the Ban,LoTau).
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APPENDIX I
*WhoWasWhoin Republioan Sinkiang
cAbd al-BiqI ~bi t namw.lih (Uighur, 1-1934):
A native o~ Kulja, Sinkiang, where he served as a sohool teaoher
and judge. Reported to have travelled extensively in the Soviet
Union, Turkey, Egypt and India. A pan-Turanian nationalist with
anti-Soviet leanings, sabit joined the CNRin Rhotan in 1933. In
1933-34 he beoame Prime Minister of the short-lived TIRET. He was
hanged at Aksu in 1934 on the orders of Sheng Shih-ts' ai.
°Abd al-Hayir TUre (Kazakh, dates unknown):
"Progressive" memberof the ETRadministration. No. 15 in the ETR's
"11 ManCommission" (see Appendix VI, fig. 4).
°Abd al-Kadlr ("AmIr"), (Uighur, dates unknown):
Looal insurgent leader at Chira, southern Sinkiang, in 1933.
°Abd al-KarIm °Abbas ("Abassov"), (Uighur, 1-1949):
"Progressive" Uighur o~ the Ili Valley. Closely assooiated with,
though not neoessarily a memberof, the STPNLC.In 1946 beoame
Deputy Seoretary-General of the Sinkiang Government under Chang
Chih-ohung. Killed in air orash en route to Peking on August 21th,
1949.
°Abd al-KarIm KhanMakhdiim(Uighur, dates unknown):
Native o~ Kashgar. Eduoation Minister of the TIRET, 1933-34. Magistrate
of Kashgar Old City April 1937 to June 1938. Subsequent fate unknown.
°Abd al-Niyas (Uighur, 1-1931):
Senior offioer in the oommandof MahmUd shih-ohang, stationed near
Yarkand. Beoameinvolved with Kiohll Akhund in 1931 Muslim rebellion
in southern Sinkiang. Captured and killed near Yarkand on September
15th, 1937, by troops loyal to Sheng Shih-ts'ai.
c '
Abd al-Ra.9Im Bai Batcha (Uighur, dates unknown):
Rioh merohant of Kashgar and pan-Turanian activist. Leading member
of YKP.Possibly pro-Soviet sympathies. Left Sinkiang tor India in
the mid-1930s; finally settled in Istanbul.
cAbdullah l3ugra (alia.s nAmIrAbdullah Khan"), (Uighur, ?-1934)&
Native of Khotan, second o~ the "Rhotan AmIrs". Anti-Soviet, Muslim
fundamentalist. Memberof the CNR.Killed by TUngan troops professing
loyalty to Ma Chun€-ying at Yarkand,April 2nd, 1934.
* Chinese and Western names are given with the surname tirsto Muslim names
are given as they appear in the text, e.g. Muhammad !mIn Bugra is listed
under Muhammad,not under Bugra. •
•
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cAbdullah nalnullib (? Uighur, dates unknown):
Possibly a native of Turfan. Communications Minister of the TIRET.
Fate unknown, though according to IOLR, L/P&S/12/2i92, EXT.4910.1941,
one cAbdullah DamuIlah, 'a personal friend of ~d shih-chane',
escaped to India in April, 1937. In Tokyo, 1940.
cAbdullah Khan (? Uzbek, ?-1934):
Anti-Soviet refugee, possibly with Basmachi connections. Thought
by Hayit to have emigrated to Sinkiang in 1924 (Turkestan Zwischen
Russland und China, p. 313, fn. 19). Subsequently became Health
Minister and Chairman of the Independence Society under the TIBET.
Died of hardship during flight across the Himalayas during 1934.
Ahmadjan ~sim (Uighur, 1912-1949):
• Native of Ili, the son of well-to-do family. Father died in 1917.
Ahmadjan was taken to the Soviet Union by his uncle in c.1929. Here
he remained for about 10 years, studying (probably in Mosoow), and
possibly adopting Soviet nationality. He returned to Sinkiang in 1938,
working either as an artisan or a school teacher in Kulja until 1942,
when he was imprisoned by Sheng Shih-ts'ai. A "communist-minded
progressive", Ahmadjan played an important part in the Ili rising ot
1944, and was almost certainly the leading member ot the STPNLC in
Sinkiang. In 1945 he became the most powertul member of the ETR (a
position which he retained until his death in 1949), and in 1946 he
became Vice-Chairman of the Sinkiang Provinoial Government. Killed in
an air crash en route to Peking on August 27th, 1949, Ahmadjan is still
honoured by both MoscOW and Peking. •
Akbar CAli (Turkic, probably Uighur, dates unknown),
Interpreter at Soviet Consulate-General in Kashgar blamed for
starting serious riots at Kashgar in March, 1926. Imprisoned by
Ma Shao-wu despite Soviet protests. SUbsequent fate unknown.
CAli Akhund Bai (Uighur, dates unknown),
Native of Kashgar. Finance Minister ot the TIBET, 1933-34. Fate
unknown.
0-" -,'Ali Beg ~Im (Kazakh, 1908-?):
Kazakh leader trom eastern Tien Shan~ Rrobably ot Kirei tribe. Friend
ot Yunus HajjI and ally of Cutnman Batur. In state of almost constant
rebellion· against Sheng Shih-tslai and KMT. Fled to Kashmir in 1950-51,
and was subsequently resettled in !natolia by the Turkish government.
A photograph ot CAli Beg RahIm may be found as the frontspiece of
•Lias' Kazak Exodus.
CAli Khan Tiire (Uzbek, dates unknown):
Popular religious leader at Kulja who became titular head ot the
ETR in 1945. He opposed the September, 1945 cease-tire between the
ETR and the KMT, and was reportedly kidnapped by Soviet otfioia1s
from Khorgos in August, 1945. According to Kazakh reru~e sources
emanating trom TUrkey (Lias, op.cit., p. 120), CAli Khan TUXe was
accused of pan-Turanianism by the soviets. His subsequent tate is
not known.
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Annenkov(Russian, dates uncertain):
"White" Russian Cossack general. Retreated to Sinkiang's Ili
Valley in May, 1920, at the head of 1,500 troops. Arrested by
Yang TsenB'-hsin in January, 1921. Subsequent fate uncertain -
either died in custody in Sinkiang, or was handed back to the
Soviet Governmentand executed.
Apresoff, Garegin A., (Russian, ?-1937):
Soviet Consul-General in Urumchi, 1933-37. Specialist on Central
Asian affairs. As consul in Masbhad, Iran, Apresoff worked closely
with local Persian communists and affiliated minority groups during
the 1920s. Executed during Stalinist purges of 1937 as a "Fascist-
Trotskyite" plotter.
Bash Bai (Kazakh, dates unknow):
Native of Ili or Chuguchak, a memberof the Naimantribe. He
became administrative head of the Chuguchakregion under the ETR.
Burhan ShahIdI (Tatar, 1894-?):
A native of Aksu (either in Sem1rech'ye or Sinkiang). Thought to
have received his early eduoation at Kazan, then to have studied at
the University of Berlin. Travelled to Sinkiang before 1918, either
to esoape Tsarist consoription of Tatars.or Russian Civil War. Beoame
successful trader in Sinkiang, also entered provincial government
service under Yang Tsens-hsin. BecameForeign Affairs Commissioner
under Chin Shu-jen, and was sent to Germanyto 'study political and
economio conditions I. Thought to have returned to Sinkiang in 1934
following Chin's fall from power. Served under Sheng Shih-ta'ai as
Sinkiang consul in Andijan, Uzbek SSR, and later in zs.ysan, Kazakh
SSR. Returned to Sinkiang in 1937 but was accused of "Trotskyism".
Sentenced to nine years imprisonment (surprisingly not to death).
and remained in jail until Sheng's fall from power. Served under WIl
Chung-hsin, and in 1946 became SeoondVice-Chairman of Sinkiangc-
under ChangChih-chung. In 1949 he replaced Mas \id Sabri as Chairman
of Sinkiang, a post he retained under the CCPuntil 1955. Subsequently
a leading official representative of China's MUslimcommunity, Burh&n
was truly the great survivor of Sinkiang politics. A skilled linguist,
he compiled China's first Uighur-Chinese-Russian Dictionary in 1953.
ChangChih-chung (Han Chinese, 1891-1):
A native of Chiao hsien, Anhwei. Participated in the 1911 Revolution,
subsequently serving under Sun Yat-sen and later Chiang !Cai-shek. In
1945 was appointed C-in-C of Chiang's Northwestern Headquarters at
Lanchowand in August, 1945. was ordered to Sinkiang where he succeeded
in bringing the ETRleadership to the negotiating table. He served as
Chairman of Sinkiang from March, 1946 to May, 1947, earning a reputation
as a moderate and tolerant administrator who genuinely sought to
ameliorate conditions in the province. Following his replacement by
Masciid Sabri in May, 1947. he continued to serve under Chiang Kai-shek
until 1949, whenhe chose to remain in Peking under the CCP.
ChangMu (Han Chinese, 1-1931):
.It native of Ho-chou region, Kansu, whowas employed as a tax collector
and chief-of-police in Hsiao-p'u village, Kumuloasis, by Chin Shu-jen.
Early in 1931 Chang either raped or attempted to seduce a local Uighur
girl in an incident which sparked orf the Kumulrising. He was killed on
the night of April 4th, 1931. by a crowd of infuriated Uighur farmers.
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ChangP'ei-yi.ia.n (Han Chinese, 1-1933):
Nothing is known of Chang's antecedents. He was mili ta.ry commander
of the Ili region until 1931, whenhe was appointed provincial
commander-in-chief in place of Lu Rsiao-tsu by Chin Shu-jen. Under
Chang's command,the siege of Kumulwas lifted by White Russian
forces on or about November1st, 1931. Chang subsequently took
part in the looting of the oasis, before returning to Ili where he
was appointed Reclamation Commissioner for north-western Sinkiang
on 28th March, 1933. In 1933-34 he entered into secret negotiations
with Ma Chung-ying with a view to ousting Sheng Shih-ts Iai, but his
position became untenable following the soviet intervention of
January, 1934. Chang is believed to have tried to flee across the
Muzart Pass to southern Slnkiang, but was oaught in a snow storm
and committed suicide to avoid capture by the Soviets.
Chao Chien-feng (Han Chinese, dates uncertain):
Sooial Welfare Commissioner of the 1946-41 Sinkiang coalition
government (under Chang Chih-chung). An active memberof the KMT's
C.C. Clique.
Ch'en Chung (Han Chinese, dates uncertain):
Sheng Shih-tslai's chief-of-staff (and therefore, almost certainly,
a north-easterner). Despatched 'to Nanking' via Moscowin April, 1933.
In fact, probably oarried Sheng's initial plea for assistanoe against
Ma Chung-ying to Moscow.
ChenHsiu-ying (Han Chinese, 1-1942):
Wife of Sheng Shih-ch' i, the fourth younger brother of Sheng Shih-
ts'ai. Reportedly a memberof the CPSU.Acoused By Sheng Shih-tsla!
of Sheng Shlh-ch'i's assassination, ChenHsiu-ying was tortured and
executed by the former in 1942. Her "confession" - a frightening
document which gives a clear image of the terror imposed by Sheng
Shih-tslai _ is reproduced, in translation, in Appendix C of Whiting
and Sheng, Sinkiang: Pawnor Pivot?
Chen T'an-chiu (Han Chinese, 1-1943):
Founding memberof the CCPat Shanghai in 1921. Travelled to Sinldang
with MaoTse-min inJ931.Arrested by Sheng in 1942. Executed 1943.
Chiang'tu-fen (Han Chinese, dates uncertain):
Initially brigadier and chief-of-staff to Liu Pin, c-in-c Kashgar
1934-31. Subsequently appodrrted c-in-o Kashgar in l1lace of Liu Pin
during the 1931 Muslim rebellion. SUcoeededin holding Kashgar New
City throughout this rebellion. According to British diplomatic
sources I 'an efficient officer, ruthless when the occasion demands'
(IOLR, L/P&S/12/2392, EXT.4910.1941). Subsequent fate unknown.
Chin Shu-chih (Han Ch'inese, 1-1933):'. _ -
Brother of Chin Shu-je~~ th~refore a native of lIo-ohou, Kansu. -_
. Al1Pointed c-in-o'Kashgar, where be died in 1933. either of illness
or by; committi.n8 'suioide. ,,,.
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Chin Shu-hsin (Han Chinese, ?-1933):
Younger brother of Chin Shu-jen. Appointed Provincial Commissioner
for Militar,r Affairs at Urumchi following latter's seizure of power.
Said to have manipulated grain market for personal gain during Ma
ChunB'-ying's siege of Urumchi in 1932-3. Captured and executed by
White Russian supporters of Sheng Shih-ts'ai after April, 1933 coup.
Chin Shu-jen (Han Chinese, 1883-?):
Native of Tao-ho hsien, Ho-chou district, KanSu. Graduated from
Kansu Provincial Academw.Subsequently served as prinCipal of a
normal school. Entered official service in Kansu and sained favour
of Yang Tse~hsin. Followed Yang to Sinkiang in c. 1908. Became
Secretary General of the Sinkiang Provincial Government by time of
Yang's assassination in 1928. Succeeded Yang as Provincial Governor
in 1928. A corrupt and incompetent man, possibly addicted to opium.
Like Yang, stripped S1nkiang of assets for personal gain. Responsible
for widespread nepotism. Absorbed Kb.anate of Kumul in 1930. Permitted
settlement of Kansu Han on Uighur lands, leading to outbreak of
KumulRebellion in 1931. Responsible for murder of Tsetsen Puntsag
Gegeen in 1932. Overthrown by coup at Urumchi on April 12th, 1933,
during invasion of Ma ChunB'-ying. Fled to China proper, where he
was sentenced to 31 years imprisonment for signing an illegal
treaty with the USSR.Released after only 6 months (possibly after
payment of bribe), and returned to native Kansu. Subsequent fate
not known.
Ch'iu Tu-fang (Han Chinese, dates uncerta!nh
Wife of Sheng Shih-ts' ai, daughter of Ch'iu TsunB'-Chun,a 'tru.sted
subordinate' of the Northeastern Warlord Kuo Suns-ling. Described as
'ambitious and intelligent' (Chan, 'The Road to Power'), Ch'iu
survived Sheng's years in Sinkiang and followed her husband to Taiwan
in 1949.
Chu Jui-ch'1h (Han Chinese, dates unknown):
Tao-yin of Aksu under Chin Shu-jen who successfully defended Kumul
Old Clty against Ma Chung-ying's invading Tungans between June 28th
and November1st, 1931.
Chu Jui-hsi (nan Chinese, 1-1934):
Figurehead Chairman of Sinkiang under Sheng Shih-ts' ai between
1933 and 1934, when he died, apparently of natural causes. Replaced
by Li Yung.
Chu Shao-liang (Han Chinese, dates uncertain):
Commanderof the KMTEigth War Area (Headquarters Lanchow)who
flew to Urumchi in March, 1942, to negotiate Sheng's break with
the Soviets and realignment with Chungking. Troops under Chu
entered Sinkiang from Kansu in June, 1943. In September, 1944 Chu
.was appointed Acting Chairman of the Sinkiang. Government.(to be
replaced by Wu Chun8'-hsin:in ootober of. that year). According to
HMCUTurral, the C.C. Clique-1nfluenced'Chu was: 'a splendid chap,
with a direct manner, bulldozer jaw, and tollllIzy'-sunlaugh... drinks
like a.fish and holds it like a British oonsul'. IOLR, L/P&S/12/
2405, EXT.211.1945.
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DalYl Khan (Kazakh, ?-1949):
NaimanKazakh chief who supported the "progressive" faotion
within the ETRand assumed administrative control over Shara
SUme following cuthInin BatUr's break with the Kulja regime.
Killed in air crash en route to Peking on August 27th, 1949.
Fan Yao-nan (Ran Chinese, ?-1928):
Japanese-educated 'modernist' appointed by Chinese national
government to post of tao-yin of Aksu under Yang Tsen~hsin.
Subsequently rose to become tao-yin of Urumchi, and then
Sinkiang Provincial Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. On .
July 6th, 1928, Yang was assassinated at an official banquet,
reportedly at Fan's instigation. Within a few hours of Yang's
death, Fan Yao-nan, his accomplices and members of their
immediate families were put to death on the orders of Chin
Shu-jen.
Fucha Afandl (Mongol, dates unknown):
Mongol of the IIi region supposedly associated with the
"progressive" faction of the ETR. FIlcha Afandi's name suggests
that he may have been an Islam1cised Mongol.
Glimkin (Russian, dates unknown):
"White" Russian "progressive", aocording to KMTsources a member
of the pro-Soviet STPNLC,and subsequently a memberof the ETR
central staff in 1945.
Hariz (Uighur, ?-1931):• •
Native of Turfan. Commanderof Uighur troops owing allegiance to
T1mUr,Kucharl1k leader during 1933 Muslim rebellion. Involved in
prolonged dispute with forces of Khotan AmIrs during siege of
Yarkand NewCity in April-May, 1933. Subsequently advanced into
Khotanl1k terri tory as far as GuIDa. Onhearing of Timiir's exeoution
at Kashgar (9th August,1933), lIafi~ withdrew to Yarkand, and
subsequently to Kashgar. Served as magistrate at Yang! Bissar from
June 1934 to June 1935. Killed by Ma. Ru-shan's Tungans at Yarkand
in June, 1931.
~ikim Beg Khoja (Uighur, dates unknown):
Native of IIi. An influential landowner, who beoame deputy
president of the ETR (along with the "White" Russian Polinov)
in 1945. Following the offioial disbandment of the ETRand CAli
Khan TUre t S abduotion in 1946, Rikim Beg Khoja became titular
head of the IIi administrative aistrict, though real power was
excercised by AhmadjanQasim. Subsequent fate unknown•
•
RSiung Fa-yU (Ran Chinese, ?-1933):
Second in oommandto Chu Jui-ch' ih during Ma Chun~ying' s siege
of Kumul (June 28th-November 1st, 1931). Subsequently responsible
for mass executions at Kumul and for destruction of much of the
oasis. Killed by the Tungan leader Ma Ji'u-mingat Turfan during
the winter of 1932-33.
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HuangHan-chang (Han Chinese, ?-1937):
Seoretary-General of Sinkiang Provincial Government (as figurehead)
under Sheng Shih-ts Iai. Acoused of being a "Fascist-Trotskyite"
plotter during the Sinkiang purges of 1931, and thoueht to have
been exeouted at that time.
HuangMu-sung (Han Chinese, dates unoertain):
KMT"Pacification Commissioner" sent to Sinkiang in June, 1933,
ostensibly to halt confliot between Ma Chung-ying and Sheng Shih-
tslai. Aocused by Sheng of oonspiring to effect his overthrow,
Huangwas plaoed under house arrest and only permitted to leave
Sinkiang after wiring a reoommendation to Nanking that Sheng be
confirmed in his post.
~usayn TajjI (Kazakh, dates unknown):
Thought to have been an Kirei Kazakh, probably a native of the
Barkol region. Fought prolonged guerilla struggle against Sheng
Shih-ts Iai before emigre.ting, in 1936, to the GezKol region with
Sultan SharIf. Fled to Kashmir following CCPviotory. Subsequently
resettled in !natolia by TUrkish government.
cid Mirab (Kirehiz, dates unknown):
Leader of '1932~Khghiz r~bellion in central Tien Shan. Movement
suppressed by joint Sino-Soviet militar.r action. Subsequent fate
unknown.
clsa Yusur Alptekin (Uighur, dates unknown):
Anti-Soviet Uighur nationalist, probably a native of Kashgar. An
intelleotual. Fled to China proper to escape Sheng Shih-tslai, and
settled in Nanking (subsequently Chungking), where he collaborated
with Muhammad AmIn Bugra (II) in the publication of Tien Shan and
Altai. Returned to Sinkiang in 1945. :BeoameSeoond Provinoial
Secretary-General under Chang Chih-chung, a post he continued to
hold under Mascud Sabri. orsa lost this position in January, 1949.
Fled to India over the Karakoram Pass in 1949-50, in the company
of Muhammad AmIn Bugra ••
Ishaq Beg (Kirshiz, 1903-49):o
Native of Aksu region in southern Sinkiang. Travelled to Soviet
Union -shortly after 191Trevolution. Said by Chen (Sinkiang story,
p. 228) to have returned to southem Sinkiang in 1922, and to have
'distinguished himself' in Kirghiz rising against Chin Shu-jen.
Aocording to KMTsources and :Bamett, however (see p. fn. 164
above), Is~aq re-entered Sinkiang as commanderof CPUunit sent to
aid Sheng Shih-ts'ai during 1930s. Becamec-in-c of IIi National
A:rrrr:r in 1945. One of the most important figures attached to the
"progressive" faotion within the ETR. Reportedly strongly pro-
Soviet. Killed in air crash en route to Peking on AU8USt21th, 1949.
Isma:CYIBeg (Uighur, dates unknown):
Native of Aksu. Thought to have been follower of Khotan AmIn. On
May31st, 1933, drove Ma Chan-tslang's Tungan foroes from Aksu, and
became rebel tao-yin of that oasis. Subseq'l1entfate not known.
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Ismiell Khan Khoja (Uighur, dates unknown):
Mine-worker's leader from Karakash, southern Sinkiang, who led
local miners in 1933 rising. Later believed to have joined the
Khotan !mIrs. Subsequent fate not known.
·Janib :Beg (Kirghiz, dates unknown):
Basmaehi leader who fled to Sinkiang and was detained by Ma Shao-
wu, apparently at the request of the Soviets. Was banished to
Keriya oasis in 1931, but made common oause with the Khotan !mIrs
during the 1933 rebellion, and returned to Kashgar at the head
of 1,000 Khotanlik troops. On July 13th Janib was arrested by
Timur in a sudden coup, possibly organised and financed by the
Soviet Consulate-General. Strongly anti-Soviet, Janib later
succeeded in escaping across the frontier into Afghanistan. Subsequent
fate not known.
Janlm Khan (Kazakh, ?-c.1951):
c - -Kirei Kazakh leader ally of Uthman Batur. Described by Barnett
as 'illiterate (but) ••• undoubtedly popular' (op.cit., p. 257),
became Commissioner of Finance in Chang Chih-chung's coalition
government (1946). Captured at Gez Kol by the FLA in 1951, he was
taken to Urumchi and shot.
"K'a-Ia-wan" (? Qalawiin - presumed Kirghiz or Tajik, dates unknown) I
Nothing is known of this Muslim rebel leader who, according to
Chang Ta.-chUn, administered the Sarikol area under the ETR.
Kamal Kaya Effendi (Osmanli Turk, dates unknown) I
Apparently a native of Istanbul. Reported to have entered Sinkiang
from the Soviet Union in the company of another Istanbul TUrk. Both
men apparently exiled opponents of Kemal AtatUrk. Kamal arrived in
Urumchi c.1930, ostensibly as a merchant, but was arrested by Chin
Shu-jen, probably as a supposed spy. He was later released - minus
his goods - and made his way to Kansu, where he entered into service
wi th Ma Chung-ying. Ka.rnilhad apparently seen service during the First
World War, and subsequently during the Russian Civil War. Subsequently
he became Ma Chung-ying's chief-of-staff. Kamal is supposed to have
been instrumental in encouraging Ma's invasion of Sinkiang in 1931 -
according to Cable and French, in a bid to revenge himself on Chin
Shu-jen. Later he served as Ma Chung-ying's ohief-of-staff during
the second Tungan invasion of 1933-34. According to Georg Vasel
(Durchdringungspolit1k in Zentralasien, p.7), KamBl had served in
the German Imperial Army in Elbing before travelling to FariS, where
he graduated from the French Military' AcadelIlY'.Later he served under
Von Epp in the Cauoasus (as a starf officer). If this information is
correct, then Kamal's contribution to Ma Chung-ying's war effort is
likely to have been very great indeed. Again according to Vasel (~
£!l., p. 15), Kamal was captured by pro-Soviet forces in Kumul during
1934.and sent to Urumchi. Instead of being imprisoned or executed,
however, he is said to have been made Commissar for Road Construotion
in S1nkiang. He may, therefore, have been a Soviet agent. Subsequent
fate unknown,
Khoja Niyas ~ajjI - see under Niyas ~ajjI, Khoja.
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Kichik Akhund (Uighur, dates unknown):
- cSubordinate of Mahmud shih-chang and fellow offioer of Abd
al-Niyas, in command of Uighur troops stationed near Yarkand
in early 1937. Became involved in 1937 "sabII-illaI1" rebellion
against Soviet influenoe and Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Captured Kashgar
Old City 30th May, 1937. Later advanced towards Aksu, but was
routed by provincial forces. subsequent fate unknown.
Ku Chien-ohi (Han Chinese, dates uncertain):
Vioe-Commissioner of Reoonstruction in the 1946-47 coalition
government of Chang Chih-ohung. Member of KMT and part an of
C.C. Clique.
Kuang Lu (Han Chinese, dates unoertain):
Native of north-western Sinkiang. Deputy General-Seoretary of the
Sinkiang Government under Chin Shu-jen. Travelled to Nanking in
1929. Instrumental in Sheng Shih-ts'ai's decision to go to S1nkiang.
Played a key role in Sheng's negotiations with Consul-General Apresoff
in 1934. Subsequently posted to Tashkent as Sinkiang consul. Recalled
in 1938 and imprisoned as a "Trotskyist". Released in 1942, he
served under the KMT as an adviser,on S1nkiang affairs, subsequently
transferring to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Taiwan. Thought
during the 19308 and early 1940s to have been pro-Soviet. According
to Whiting (Pawn or Pivot, xiv), he was offered a post in the ETR,
but declined.
Kung Chen8'-han (Han Chinese, c.1904-?):
Sheng Shih-ts'ai's Pacification Commissioner for southern Sinkiang,
1934-5. Replaced by Liu Pin.'
Lan Yen-shou (Hul, dates unknown) :
Vice-Commissioner ofSinkiang Provinoial Government purged by Sheng
Shih-ts' ai for .I~conspiracy" in 1939. Subsequent fate not known.
Leskin, F., (Russian, dates unknown):
A "White" Russian of the IIi Valley. "Progressive" supporter of
the ETR. Beoame a senior offioer in the INA (under Ish!q Beg).
Responsible for stemming initial KMT counter-attack at Kensai,
near Sairam Nor, in December, 1944. Defeated elements of the KMT
29th A.rr1ry at Sairam Nor on January 30th, 1945. Subsequent fate
not known.
Li Hai-ju (Han Chinese, dates unknown):
Probably a native of Northeast China. Commander of the provinoial
forces at Kitai during Ma Chung-ying's second invasion. Kitai fell
to the Tungans in late MaYi'1933,-'but Li's fate is not known.
Li Hsi-ts'eng (Han Chinese, dates unknown):
Probably a native of He-ohou region, Kansu. Divisional Commander
in Sinkiang provincial forces stationed at Kumul in 1930. Suggested
to Chin Shu-jen that Khanate should be absorbed following death of
MaqsUd. Shih.
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Li Yi-ch'ing (Han Chinese, dates uncertain):
Sheng Shih-ts'ai's chief-of-police in 1943-4, and a trusted political
subordinate. Following Sheng's departure from Sinkiang in 1944, Li
conducted his own purge of Sheng's prisons, during which an estimated
400 to 500 prisoners were 'liquidated'. Li was subsequently dismissed
and permitted to return to China proper by WI1 ChunS'-hsin.
Li Yung (Han Chinese, 1::'1940): .
• ' " ~,..>;-, ,,___ -.----'_" .... -..-,!~: ....ttft.!...ft'~.i!;,~...... _~__ ....."i_
Native of Kansu, Figurehead Provincial Chairman of Sinkiang under
Sheng Shih-ts' ai from 1934. Died in the 'spring of 1940.
Liu MenS'-hsun (Han Chinese, dates uncertain):
Secretary-General of the S1nkiang coalition government under Chang
Chih-chung. Member of KMT. Closely associated with C.C. Clique.
Liu Pin (Han Chinese, 0.1895-1):
Native of Northeast China. Commander of Northeastern troops who
arrived in Stnkiang via the Soviet Union in March, 1933. At first
Chief-of-Staff to Sheng Shih-ts'ai, then commander in IIi region.
Appointed C-in-C Kashgar in August, 19'4. Lost favour and transferred
as a result of ~d shih-chang's flight to India. Said to have been
appointed chief inspector of gold mines, Sinkiang, in 1937. rotR,
L/P&S/12/2'92, EXT.4910.1941, p. 17, concludes: 'his subsequ~
history is not definitely known, but it is believed that he has
been done away with'.
Liu Wen-lung (Han Chinese, dates uncertain):
Commissioner of Education under Chin Shu-jen. Later became figurehead
Provincial Chairman (under Sheng Shih-ts' ai's tupan-ship) in 1933.
Liu was confirmed in office by Nanking on August 1st, 19", and forced
from that office by Sheng Shih-ts'ai in September, to be replaced by
the more pliable Chu Jui-hsi.
Lo Tau (Han Chinese, 1-1949):
Han Chinese supporter of the ETR who died in plane crash en route
to Peking on August 27th, 1949. Apparently his chief significance
to the ETR (and to the mythology constructed around the ETR following
its dissolution) lay in his ethnic origin. ,
Lo Wen-kan (Han Chinese,'l ;a"Q S ~lq""l): -
, c _ •• '~_"" .~'_'~ '.' .,-T. " '-. , ... ,
Nationalist FOreign Minister. Travelled to Urumchi by air on
September 2nd, 1933, to negotiate between Sheng Shih-ts'ai and
Ma Chung--ying. Under his auspices a truce was reached and Ma was
appointed Garrison Commander of Eastern Sinkiang. Shortly after
Lo's departure in October, this truce broke down.
Lu Hsiao-tsu (Han Chinese, dates unknown):
Chin Shu-jen's chief secretary. A civilian with little or no
military experience, he was appointed c-in-c of the provincial
forces during Ma Chung--ying's 1931 invasion. Replaced by Chang
P' ei-yUan during the same year because of his incompetence.
, ,
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Lung Hsieh-lin (Han Chinese, dates unknown):
District magistrate at I-ho hsien, Kumul, under Chin Shu-jen.
Responsible for expropriation of Uighur land and settlement of
Han Chinese settlers from Kansu leading up to Kumu1rising in 1931.
Ma Chan-ts'ang (Hul, dates 'UIlknown):
Tungani Muslim of Kansu. E:nerged as leader of rebel forces in
Karashahr region during 1932-3. Entered into alliance with local
,Uighur leader T1mUr.Advanced towards Kashgar, capturing Aksu.
'Reached Kashgar in May, 1933, but fell out with local Turkic
leaders and in August, 1933, came under siege in Kashcar New
City. Relieved by units of Ma Chung-ying's forces under fo1'a.Fu-
yUan in February, 1934. Withdrew to Khotan under 11aHu-shan in
July, 1934. Arrested by Sheng Shih-ts'ai after collapse of Tungan
forces in 1937. Subsequent fate not known.
Ma Chin-shan (Hul, dates not certain):
Tungani 1-ms1im.Son of Ma Fa-fang, "'Wll Ma" warlord of Tsin@lai
from 1938 to 1949. Ma Chin-shan was therefore a scion of the Ma
family of Pieh-tsang, near Ho-chou, Kansu. Commanderof Tungan
cavalry deployed in Sinkiang by KMTafter 1944. Reported to have
put downUighur rising at Turfan in 1948. Later joined YulbarsKhan in opposing PLAentry into Sinkiang. According to Jack Chen,
most of Chin-shan's troops surrendered to the Communists, but he
escaped with Yulbars to Tibet, where he joined up with the anti-
CommunistTibetan Khambarebels (The Sinkiang stOry, p. 271).
Ma Chung-chieh (Hul, c.1913-1933):
Tungani Muslim of Kaneu, Younger brother of Ma Chunc-ying. Led
1933 Tungan invasion of Sinkiang. Captured. Kumul in folay.Killed
leading successful attack on Kitai later in same month.
Ma Chung-ying (Hul, c.1910-0.1937):
Tungani Muslim of Ho-chou, Kansu. Shared same paternal grandfather
as "Wu. r-1'a." warlords MaFa-ch'ing and Ma Fa-fang. Chuns-ying, the
fifth of the "Five Ma" warlords, was to achieve perhaps the greatest
notoriety of all. Entered military service in 1924. Foucht against
against Kuominchtinforces of Feng Y"u-hsiang. Travelled to Nanking
in 1929, where he enrolled briefly in military academy. Invaded
Slnkiang in 1931~ Failed to take Kumul, and was wounded in leg.
Returned in 1933. Would certainly have seized control of province
but for Soviet intervention. Withdrew to Kashgar in April, 1933,
and to Soviet territory in July of that year. Subsequent fate
unknown, though almost certain to have been executed by stalin.
Ma FU-hsing (Hul, c.1851-1924):
"Panthay" Muslim of Yunnan. HowFU-hsing came to be in Sinkiang
is not clear. However, at the time of the 1911 Revolution he was
appointed head of the Tungan levies raised by the Ch'ing authorities
at Urumchi. He remained in Urumchi under Yang Tsene-hsin until
1915, when he was appointed t'l-t'al at Kashgar. Ma T'l-t'al, as
he became better known, was responsible for a reign of terror in
southern Slnkiang which lasted until 1924, when he was shot.
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Ma Fu-ming (Hui, dates unknown):
Tungan garrison commanderat Turfan under Chin Shu-jen; went over
to Ma. Chung-ying in the autumn of 1932. Captured and executed Hsiung
Fa-yii, the Han officer in charge of repression at Kumul, during the
winter of 1932-33. Subsequent fate not certain, but probably withdrew
to southern Sinkiang.
Ma Fu-yiian (Hui, dates unknown):
Tungani Nuslim of Kansu, On sta£f of Ma Chung-ying. According to
Yulbars Khan, participated in fateful dinner at Soochowin June,
1931, whenMaChung-ying "decided" to intervene in Sinkiang. Later
took part in Ma Chung-ying' s invasion, lifting siege of Kashgar- New
City in February, 1934. Captured Yang! Hissar in March. Responsible
for looting and massacres in both Kashgar and Yangi Hissar Old Cities,
apparently in revenge for "Kizil Massacre" of June, 1933. Later
withdrew with Ma Hu-shan to Khotan. Later believed to have returned
to Kansu.
Ma Hu-shan (Hui, 1910-1954):
Tungan. Brother-in-law (or, possibly, half-brother or cousin) of
Ma Chung-ying. Succeeded Chung-ying as c-in-c of 1Q.1T36th Division
and as leader of Tungan forces in Sinkiang following latter's flieht
to Soviet Union. Absolute ruler of "Tunganistan" between 1934 and
1931. Eventually compelled by mutiny amongst his own troops to escape
across the Himalayas to India. Returned to China in 1938. According
to Kao Han-jen (The Imam's Aooount, 1960), Hu-shan led a Tungan
rebellion against the Chinese Communists in the early 1950s. He was
captured in 1954 and executed at Lanchow (op.eit., pp. 93-8, 'Fate
of a Hero').
Ma Ju-lung (Hui, dates unknown): .
Tungan of'Kansu. Commanderof Ma Hu-shan's First Brigade (KMT36th
Division), which oocupied Kashgar Old City during Muslim rebellion
of 1931. Aocording to British diplomatic sources 'an illiterate, but
ra ther a pleasant man to deal with'. Fled to India with Ma Hu-shan
in 1931. Subsequent fate not known.
Ma Shao-wu (Hui, 1890-c.1931):
"Panthay" Muslim of Yunnan. Trusted lieutenant of Yang Tsen~hsin.
Appointed garrison commanderat Kuchar in 1914. later rose to be
amban at Uch Turfan. In May, 1924, shot I-'Ia Fu-hsing at Kashgar on
Yang Tseng-hsin's orders. Becamechief civil authority in Kashgar
(and, by extension, in all south Sinkiang) from 1924. Beseiged in
Kashgar NewCity with Ma Chan-ts' ang! s Tungans during period of
TIRET. Later reappointed, but viotim of attempted assassination (on
Sheng Shih-ts'ai's orders?) in Ootober, 19:54. A loyal supporter of
Nanking, he was probably too anti-Soviet for Sheng's "progTessive"
period. Thought to have been exeouted after failure of 1937 Muslim
rebellion - though he was almost oertainly not involved.
Ma Sheng-kuei (Hui, 0.1900-?) I
Tungan. Childhood spent in Kansu and Shensi 'in bad oompany'. Later
became bandit in Ninghsia. 'In the pursuit of his livelihood he was
very cruel and tortured his victims' (IOLR, L/P&S/12/2392, EXT.4910.
1941). He joined Ma Chung-ying in 1933 and travelled to Sinkiang 'to
seek his fortune'. Later went to Khotan as commanderof Ma Hu-shan's
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Second :Brigade. Participated in fighting surrounding 1937 Muslim
rebellion in southern Sinkiang, but mutinied at Faizabad and
joined provincial forces. Later posted to Khotan in subordinate
position. :Believed to have returned to Kansu.
Ma Shih-ming (Hui, dates unknown):
Tungan of Kansu, On staff of Na Chung-ying. Participated in Ma
Chung-yingl s supposed dinner party with Yulbars Khan at Soochow
in June, 1931. Led first Tungan as saul t on Kumulin 1931. Later
remained .in Slnkiang to lead Tungan units near Turfan after Ma
Chung-ying had been wounded and withdrawn to Kansu. Subsequent
fate not known.
~ NedimBey (Osmanli Turk, dates unknown):
cCompanionof Mu~~afa Ali Bey, an anti-Kemalist exile who appeared
briefly in Kashgar as "adviser" to the TIBEr in November, 1933.
~ shih-chang (Uighur, dates unknown):
Native of Turfan. Originally a rich merchant, became chief military
commanderof Khoja Niyas HajjI's Kumull1k torces in 1933-34. Atter
endorsing Khoja Niyas ¥8:jjII s agreement with Sheng Shih-ts'ai, became
c-dri-c Uighur torces in Kashgar area, July, 1934. Hostile to Sheng's
increasingly close alliance with Soviet Union. Fled to India in
the autumn of 1937 before making his way to Mecca. Later (1940)
reported to be in Japan (IOLR, L/P&S/12/2392, EXT.4910.1941).
MaoTse-min (Han Chinese, 1.1~-1943):
:Brother of MaoTse-tung. NamedMinister ot Finance in the Sinkiang
government trom 1937 to 1942. Arrested and executed by Sheng on charges
of plotting aeainst his government•.
MaqsUdShah (Uighur, c.1864-1930):
Khan ot Kumul. Acceded to throne in 1908 on death of his tather,
M~ammad.Maqsud ruled over some 25-30,000 Kumulliks, paying a
small annual tribute to the Chinese administration in Urumch1.
Friendly to the Chinese, he wore Chinese cloths and spoke Tarkio
with a marked Chinese accent. Whenl-1aqsUd ied in 1930 (ot old ae-e),
he was succeeded by his son Na~Ir, but Chin Shu-jen intervened to
seize control ot the Kumuloasis, thus creating the oonditions tor
the Kumulrising of 1931.
MasOUdSabri (Uighur, 1886-1952):
A native of I1i, the son of a wealthy merchant and landlord. lliucated
in Kulja and Istanbul. Lived in Turkey from 1904 to 1915. Imprisoned
by Yang Tsene-hsin in 1924 but released after ten months. Political
adviser to Mahn:iiidshih-chang in 1934-37. Fled to India and thence to
Nanking in 1937. Became closely involved with I<MTand especially c.C.
Clique during 1938-45. Returned to Sinkiang in 1945 as Provincial
Inspector-General. Became first Uighur chairman ot Sinkiang in 1947.
Otfered post of Chinese Ambassador to Iran in 1948, but refused.
Arrested by CCPin 1951, died in prison in 1952.
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~ammad .AmIn Bugra (I), (Uighur, c. 1897-?):
A native of :Khotan. Muslim scholar of fundamentalist beliefs. Anti-
Chinese, anti-Soviet, anti-Tungan, anti-Christian. Founding member
and leader of Khotanlik CNR.Became eldest "Khotan AmIr" and real
power behind Khotanlik Hu.slim rebellion of 1932-34. Unlike his
two younger brothers, remained in Khotan throughout rising. Later
escaped advancing Tungans of Ma Bu-ehan and fled to Afc,ha.nistan,
where he was grarrted a pension by the Afehan government. Later
made contact with Japanese ambassador to Kabul. Subsequent fate not
known.
~amma.d. AmIn Bugra (II), (Uighur, dates unknown):
Mayhave been son of the above, though this remains uncertain (see
Lias, Kazak Exodus, p. 20). If so, a native of Khotan. Turkic
nationalist; anti-Soviet. Fled to China proper during Sheng Shih-
ts'ai's "progressive" period, and edited Tien Shan and Altai
together with clsa Yusur Alptekin, first in Nanking and later
in Chungking. Returned to Sinkiang to serve as Commissioner of
Reconstruction in the 1946 coalition government. Later escaped
CCPtakeover and fled to India. Settled in Istanbul.
Muhammad Niyas ACla.m(Uighur, dates unkno~rn):•
Qa~! of Karakash, near Khotan, in 1932. "President" of the CNR
provisional' government formed at Khotan on February 20th, 1933,
under auspices of "JChotanAmIrs".
~ammad Qasim Jan ~jjI (Uighur, dates unknown):
Foreign Minister of TIRETin 1933-34. Escaped to Karachi.
Mu.l}a.mmad SharIf Khan (Afghan, dates unknown):
Head of Afghan mission sent to Yarkand in autumn of 1922. Regarded
by Yang Tseng-hsin as head of visiting trade delegation, he styled
himself "Afghan Consul-General in Sinkiang", however, and remained
at Yarkand for several years. Responsible for the creation of an
Afghan "cult" at Yarkand.
,<
Mu~:a£a cAli Bey (Osmanli Turk, dates unknown):
Companionof MahIDUd NedimBe,y. Apparently an anti-Kemalist exile
(? for pan-Turanian reasons) who appeared briefly as an adviser
to the TIRETin Kashgar, November, 1933.
(Uighur, dates unlmown):.NasIr•
.,
Son of MaqsUdShah, Khin of Kumul. Kept .as political hostage in
Urumchi following his father's death, and forbidden to return to
Kumul. SUbsequent fate not known, but probably kllled by Chin
Shu-jen.
Niyaa ~ajjI, Khoja (Uighur, 1-1937):
Native of Kumul. Leader of north-western Muslim rebel forces in
1933 (with Yulbars :Khan). At first allied to Ma Chung-ying, but
later came to terms with Sheng Shih-tslai and was appointed Vice-
Chairman of the Sinkiang Government in 1934. 'He was an old man and,
in Urumchi, completely powerless ••• killed in Urumch1as a result
of the 1937 rebellion'. ~, L/P&S/20, D.226.
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NUrAhmad Bugra. (Uighur, 1-1934):•
A native ot Khotan. youngest ot the three ~otau !mIra", styled
"AmIrNUr Ahmad Jan". Invested Yarkand on behalf ot "Iiliotan
Islamic Government"in 1933. Forced to withdraw trom Yarkand 11ew
City bY'Hiriz on July 17th. Subsequently imprisoned in Yarkand
Old City: ~ed toll owing execution or T1mUr,Ihtr Ahmad took
charge or Yangi-Hlssar under the TIRET.Killed by Tdngan troops
ot Ma Chan-ts'ang and Ma :EU-yUatl on April 12th, 1934.
Pai Tzu-Ii (Hui, ?-19371):
TunganiMuslimot Kansu. Trusted adviser ot Ma Chune-y!ns'. Later
became chiet-or-statr to Ma. Hu-shan during "Tuneanistan" episode.
Said to have been shot by Ma Hu-shan during escape to India in
September, 1937. 'He was a very Shrewdman' (IOLR,L/P&S/20/D.226).
Pappengut (Russian, 1-1933/34):
"Whiten Russian. Former start otricer ot Russian Imperial Arm~n
settled in IIi area atter White deteat in Russian Civil War.
Placed in commandor ''White" Russian toroe press-eanged to tisht
Ma ChUIl8'-yingduring 1931. Responsible tor relief or Kumulin
November,1931. Shot by Sheng Shih-ts'ai, probably at Soviet
request (via Apresotr) in December, 1933 or Januar,y, 1934.
Pogodin (Russian, dates unknown):
lUCVD :Brigadier-General in charge of Sheng Shih-ts' ai's secret
police organisations (Pao-an-chii and Pao-an-tui) during Sheng'8
"progressive" period.
Polinov, A., (Russian, dates unknown),
"White" Russian of IIi. Opponentot Sheng Shih-ts'ai (post-1942),
and thought to have been a memberor the STPNLC.:BecameVice-
President of ETRin 1945, and led INAoavalry advance trom Sairam
Nor towards Chuguchakin July, 1945.
Pushkin (Russian, dates unknown):
Soviet Consul-General, Urumchi, at the time of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's
break with the USSR(1942).
Qidir ::Beg(Uighur, dates unknown)I
Native ot Kashgar. pro-Soviet chiet-ot-police in KashBar at time ot
1937Muslimrebellion. 'Taken to Moscowin 1938, present whereabouts
not kn2wn'.(rOLR, L/P&S/12/2392.EXT.4910.1941).Not to be contused
with Qadir Beg, subordinate otticer of Khotan AffifrCAbdUlI8h.
~Imjan Sabir ~a3jI (lJishur, dates unknown):
Memberot "progressive" wing or ETa. Son-in-law ot Ma. ...CUd. Sabri.
Assistant Commissionerot Civil Afrairs in 1946 (ChangChih-chung)
ooalition government. Ultimate tate not known•.
~id.iq ::Beg(ethnic origin and dates unknown):
Trade and. CommerceMinister ot the secessionist TIRET,Kashgar. 1933-4.
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Saif al-DIn cAzIz (Uighur, 0.1914 - )
Son of a well-to-do merchant from Artush, near Kashe;ar. Biuoated.in
Sinkiang, later in the USSRat the University of Tashkent. Fluent in
Ihlssian, he joined the CPSU.Returned to Sinkiang after short spell
living in Afghanistan. Memberof "progressive" wing of ETR, he served
as Minister of Education (1945-46), and subsequently as Commissioner
ot IDiuoation,ior Sinkiangin. Chang Chih-chung's coalition government
(1946-47). In December,1949, he beoamevice-chairman of the (CCP)
S1nkiangprovinoial government, and in 1955 Chairmanof the S1nkiang
Uighur AutonomousRegion. Fell from power in 1978 after death of Mao
Tse-tung- discredited by his survivor's role in the Cultural
Revolution. still alive (1981).
Saifull8h (Uighur, dates unknown):
Native of Turfan, memberof ETR administration. Said by Barnett to
have controlled the I1i youth group Yashlar Tashkilati (op.oit., p.
269), though aocording to Howardand :Boorman(op.oit., III, 87-9),
this role was fulfilled by Saif al-DIn cAzIz.
~l~ (Uighur, dates unknown):
Partisan of Khoja Niyas ~ajjI. AKumullik, the father of' the Uighur
girl whoseabduotion/seduotion/ or ~pe by ChangMu sparked off the
Kumulrising. Fought with lO'lojaNiyas throughout the 1931-34 troubles.
:Becamebrigade oommanderand remained at Kashgar until appointed
administrative oommissionerat .Aksu in 1936. SUbsequenthistory not
known.
salis (Kazakh, 1-1950/51):
Deputy Secretary-General to the Sinkiang coalition governmentot
. ChangChih-chung (1946-41" fled to GezKol and later towards India,
in companyof Yulbars Khan. Reportedly killed in Tibet, during winter
of 1950-51, by someof Yulbars' menin a dispute over supplies.
satibaldI Jan (Uzbek, c.1908-1)1
Commanderof force of some300 "Andijani" Uzbeks ollerating in the
Yarkand-Kashgararea at the time of the TIRm' (1933-34). satibaldI
was a native of Margelan, in Soviet Central Asia, and was widely
suspected, both by local Sinkiang Muslimsand by IIMCGK, of being pro-
Soviet, or even a Soviet agent.
Shamsal-DIn Turdi ~ijjI (?Uighur, dates unknown)I
Thou€,htto have baena native of Kashgar. Religious Institutions
Minister (in charge of waqf endowments)under TIREI' (1933-34). Fate
unknown.
SharIf I<han (Kazakh, dates uncertainh
Leader of Altai revolt directed against Chin Shu-jen in 1933. Fought
against ShengShih-ta'ai, but may later have cometo terms, as one
SharIf Khan -quite probably the sameman- was appointed administrator
of the Altai region later in Sheng's rule, only to be purged in 1940.
SharIf QuI (Uighur, 1-1934)I
A native of Ehotan. Justice Minister of the TIREr. captured and
llanged by provincial authorities at Aksu in July, 1934, together
Abdal-BiqI sabit DamullBh••
Sheng Shih-ch' i (Han Chinese, 1-1942):
Fourth younger brother of Sheng Shih-ts' al. Schooled in Moscow
military academies; returned to Sinkiang in the winter of 1941-42
and named commander of motorised brigade in Urumchi. Married to
Chen Hsiu-ying (qv). Died under mysterious oircumstances in l-larch,
1942. Chen Hsiu-ying was accused of, and later executed for, his
JIIUJ."der.More probably, however, he was killed by Sheng Shih-ts'ai
because of his close links with Mosoow.
Sheng Shih-ts' a1 (Han Chine se, 1895-1):
Native of Liaoning in Northeast China. Studied in Japan before
participating in May 4th Movement. Entered military service under
Kuo Sung-ling. FOllowing latter's failed rebellion and exeoution,
Sheng returned to Japan (Shikan Gakko), where he studied until 1927.
In that year fought with Northern EXpedition as staff officer attached
to Chiang Kai-shek's field headquarters. Travelled to Urumchi at
request of Chin Shu-jen in late 1929 or early 1930. Foue;ht against ~1a.
Chung-ying' s Tungans in 1931-34. Replaoed Chin as de faoto ruler or
Sinkiang in April, 1933. Remained warlord ot S1nkiang from 1933 to
1944 (much ot that time a.s a virtual puppet ot the Soviet Union).
Replaced by EMT in 1944. in 1949 he accompanied the EMT to Taiwan
where he lived in comtortable retirement with his wite, Ch'iu lU-tang,
who had borne him a daughter and three sons.
Soong Chins-ling (Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, Han Chinese, 1.1~-):
Reported to have carried a letter promising 'not only torgiveness
for past deeds, but also a full pardon tor their consequences' from
her husband to Sheng Shih-ts'ai, in Urumchi, in August-September,
1942.
Su Chin-shou (Hui, dates uncertain):
TUngan, probably from Kansu. Ma Chan-ts'an~'s chief-ot-start.
Appointed joint tao-yin ot Kashgar (with Yunus ~eg) in May, 1933.
Subsequent fate not known.
SUrI ZSda (Nationality and dates not known):• Secretar,r of the TIRET National Assembly (Kashgar, 1933-34). Fate
unknown.
Sul~an~eg :Bakhtiar ~eg (?Uzbek, dates unknown):
A native of Margelan, (Soviet) Uzbekistan. Presumed to be anti-Soviet,
probably with ~asmaohi connections. Fled to S1nkiang after ~olshevik
revolution. ~ecame Defence Minister ot TIRET (1933-34). ESoaped across
Rimalayas to India, thence to Arabia, where he lived in Ta'it until
1960.
Sul;a.n SharIr (Kazakh, dates unknown):
lirei Kazakh chieftain. Together with BUsayn TajjI fled to Gez Kol•in 1936. Fled to Kashmir following COP victoI78 Thought to have been
resettled in TUrkey.
Sung Rsi-lien (Ran Chinese, ',c:tob- ~ ):
Commander of the S1nkiang garrison forces in 1946-7. KMT senior offioer
under influence of "Political Scienoe" group.
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~ir :Beg (Nationality and dates unknown):
President of the TIRET National Assembly (Kashgar, 1933-34). Fate
unknown.
Tao Chih-yUeh (Han Chinese, dates uncertain)a
Moderate KMT officer who replaced SUng Hsi-lien as o-in-o S1nkiang
in 1948. Responsible for surrender of S1nkiang to CCP in september,
1949.
Tawfiq Bey (Arab, dates unknown) 1
Styled himself "Sayyid ~ Tawfiq Bey SharIf Erfendi". A native
o! Syria who served for a time in Arabia under °Abd al-Azlz ibn
Saciid. First arrived in Kashgar from India during 1932 and was
deported by Ma Shao-wu. Returned during 1933 rebellion and was put
in command of local (Kashgarlik) Uighur forces. Wounded in stomach
and later deported by sabi t Dimullih for corresponding with Ehoja
Niyas HajjI. Reported ~y 1937 to have made his way to Japan. IOLR,
L/P&S/12/2392, EXT.4910.1941. __.__
T1mUr (Uighur, 1-1933) 1
A native of Kuchar. Emerged as local rebel leader in February, 1933.
Initially an ally of Ma Chan-ts'ang, he later changed sides and was
oaptured and executed by Ma's troops on Ausust 9th, 1933, at Kashgar.
Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen (Mongol, 1-1932)1
Regent and "Living Buddha" ot the Karashahr Toreut Mongols. Murdered
by Chin Shu-jen at Urumchi during May, 1932.
Ts'ui Chao-chi (Han Chinese, dates unknown):
Almost certainly a native ot Kansu. Chin Shu-jen' 8 orderly and
bodyguard, appointed to position o! brigade oommander, Urumchi, in
c.1928. Together with Chin Shu-jen's younger brother, Chin Shu-hsin,
reported to have manipulated grain market for private gain during
Ma Chung-ying's winter 1932-33 siege of the provinoial capital. Fat.
unknown.
TU Chih-kuo (Han Chinese, 1-1931):
Commander of the Sinkiang provincial forces under Chin Shu-jen
during initial stages of Ma Chun~yingl s first invasion. Reported
either to have committed suicide, or to have been killed, as a
result of Tungan nie,ht attack at Ch'i-chiao-ching during the summer
of 1931.
Tu. Chun~yuan (Han Chinese, 1~15-I c=t 4'i.):
Childhood friend ot Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Politioally "progressive"
though not, apparently, a member ot the CCP, Tu. travelled to S1nkiang
in 1931. Author of only firsthand book on Sheng's rule in Sinkiang,
he serndo all director of the Sinkiang College until his exeoution
on Sheng's orders in 1943.
°Umar CAli (Kirghiz, 1-1933):
c - cYounger brother ot Uthman Ali, a native of the southern Tien Shan.
Involved in Kizil Massacre.of May, 1933. Killed during Kirghiz
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seizure of Kashgar Old City' f'rom TIl.ng'an forces of Ma Chan-
ts'ang on August 16th, 1933.
c - c )Uthman Ali (Kirghiz, 0.1903 - 0.1935 :
Leader of' Kirghiz f'aotion during Kashgar rebellion, 1933-34.
Imprisoned at Kashgar, he was released in 1933 by Ma. Shao-w
to commandK1rghiz levies which later mutinied. Desoribed by
Fi tzmaurice as a 'heavy opium smoker', OUthman was &Eparently
not associated with either the YKPor the "Khotan !mIrs".
Rather he was an independent, bandit-like f'igure. Arrested in
Kashgar and taken to Urwnchi in 1935,he was, doubtless,
exeouted on Sheng Shih-ta'ai's orders.
~thmin BitUr (Kazakh, 1899-1951): .
Kirei Kazakh, native of the Altai region of' northern Sinkiane.
Rebelled against Sheng Shih-ta'ai in 1940. Foroed to retreat to
MPRin 1942, where he reoeived_aid f'rom both the MPRand the
USSRgovernments. Temporarily allied with ETRin 1945, he broke
with the Kulja regime in 1946 and withdrew to the pei-ta-shan.
Later f'ought (at least nominally) f'or the XMT.Refused to aocept
CCPVictory in 1949. Captured and executed by COPin April, 1951.
WangTsene-shan (HIli, dates unknown).
Apparently a TUngan (Northwestern Hul). XMTCommissioner of' Civil
Affairs in the 1946-47 S1nkiang coalition i;Overnment. Believed. to
have been associated with the CCClique.
Vu Ai-chen (Aitchen K. WU), (Han Chinese, cW-e6 w\t.~)"
Emissary trom Nanking who attempted to med.iate between Sheng Shih-
ts'ai and. Ma Chung-ling in 1933. Author of' several books and articles
on Sino-Soviet relations and Sinkiang.
Vu Chung-hsin (Han Chinese, 1884-1959):
Native of Anhwei. Military and politioal assooiate of' Sun Yat-sen
and Chiang Kai-shek. Governor of' ADhwei(1932), Kweichow (1935).
Chairman of' the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs CommiaBion(1936-
44). :BecameGovernor of Sinkiang under In1T in 1944-45. Associated
with CCClique.
Wo. Tse-haiang (Chaucer H. VU), (Han Chinese, ~ ~);
KMTSpecial Commisaionertor FOreign Aff'airs. Sent to Sinkiang
in 1942. Active in negotiations with the Soviet Union during
1942-43.
Yang Tsene-hsin (Han Chinese, 1867-1928),
A native of' Meng-tzu, Yunnan. Entered Imperial Civil Servioe in
1899. Served Ch'ing Administration in Kansu and Ningsia until
his transf'er to Sinkia.ng in 1908. In Sinklang served as tao-t'ai
Aksu, then as tao-t' ai, Urumchi, a post he held in 1911. Assumed
de faoto power from Y'Uan Ta-hua in March, 1912. Confirmed in this
posi tion by Peking later in same year. Yang remained Governor or
Sinkiang rrom 1911 to 1928, when he was assassinated by Fan Yao-
nan.
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YangTsuan-hsu (HanChinese, dates uncertain) I
Military commandantof Ili region at the time of the 1911 revolution.
Served as figurehead leader of the 1911 anti-ch Iing rising in Ili.
Later transferred by YangTseng-hain to Kashgar, where he served as
t'i-t'aiuntil August, 1915, at which time he was forced to resign
by his owntroops (replaced by l""a FU-hsing, qv).
YenYu-shan (HanChinese, dates unknown):
Sinkiang Commissionerfor Reconstruotion under Chin Shu-jen. Argued
(unsucoessfully) for adoption of conciliatory policy towards
Kumullik l>Iuslimrebels.
lUa.n Ta-hua (HanChinese, clDJ-u W\e.er\"w.),
Ch'ing Governorof Sinkiang at time of 1911 revolution. Handedover
power to YangTene'-hsin in March, 1912.
l'ulbars Khan (Uighur, 1888 - still alive in 1969)I
Native of Yang!Hiesar, southern Sinkiang. At the ag-eof 15 entered
the service of Mubammad~ Khan of Kumul.Later becamesenior adviser
to ~a.nJl1!d's son; MaqsudShah (ascended throne in 1908). Gained
title "Khan"in 1922. Foue,ht throughout the 1931 risinz against Chin
Shu-jen, but was never anti-Chinese nor, apparently, a secessionist.
Fled to Nanking in 1937, but returned to Kumulin 1946. Civen series
of senior appointments by KMT,but, like cUthIIWlBatUr, refused to
accept CCPvictory. Fought guerilla action against PLAuntil winter
of 1950-51, whenhe fled to Tibet. Finally arrived in Taiwan, where
he retained the appointment of Governorof Sinkiang in exile, in
May, 1951. Yulbars' wife died during his m1d-winter escape across the
Tibetan plateau; however, once in Taiwanhe married a 19-year old o -girl. Hehad two sons by his first. wife, one of whomwas called Ya qub
Beg in honour of the 19th century Sinkiang leader ot that name. Ris
other son was called Niyas, possibly in honour of his ally Khoja Niyas
HajjI. He is believed to have died in the m1d-1970s••
YUnusBeg (Uighur, ? - c.1937):
A native of Kumul.Appointed joint tao-yin of Kashear (with Su
Chin-shou) in May, 1933. Later served as Interior Minister of the
TIRETin 1933-34. Believed to-ha.ve been killed by ShengShih-ts'ai
at Urumohi-in 1937. A partisan of Ehoja Niyas tIij jI.
YUnusHajjI (Xazakh, ? -0.1940).
• 0Kazakhleader from north-eastern slopes of Tien Chan. Ally of Ali
BegRahIm. Arrested by Sheng Shih-ts' a1 in 1940, and apparently-
killed:
yiisur Jan (1 Kirshiz, dates unknown):
Commanderof "Tortunji", pro-Soviet irreculars in Uluachat-Y.ashgar
region, 1933-~4. Reported to have been arrested and taken to Moscow
(IOLR,L/P&S/12/2392,EXT.4910.1941).El. subsequent tate 1s unknown.
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APPENDIX II
The Sectarian Affiliations of the Sarikoli TaJik Muslims
The most important of the various heterodox sects within Islam
-c -care the Shi a. The Shi a, who predominate in Iran and who number perhaps
one-sixth of all Muslims, belong to the "Party of c -Ali". They reject the
legitimacy of the first three orthodox caliphs, and believe that cAlI,
the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, should have been his successor as•
i ~Ccal ph. The great majority of the Sh1 a community believe that the
spiritual mantle of Muhammad passed from father to son through twelve
•
generations of the prophet's family. The eldest male heir of each succeeding
generation was known as the Imam; the ShIca hold that the Imam was both
infallible, and able to intercede with God on behalf of the ShIca community.
The twelfth and last ShIea Imam "disappeared" in 878 A.D.
A major split occurred within the ShIca community between 760 and
7 c -65 A.D., when Ja far, the sixth~, is said to have disinherited his
eldest son IsmacIl. The Imamate duly passed to his younger son, Musa, in
765; however a group of ShIca held that Jacfar had no right to disinherit
his son lsmacrl. They accepted IsmicIl (who was by now dead) as the legitimate
~. His followers, the IsmacIIIs, are known as "Seveners" to distinguish
them from the main branch of the ShIca community whose adherents acknowledge
twelve Imams and are known as "Twelvers" •
Within the IsmacrlI community a further important split was to take
place. This cleavage occurred in 1094 A.D. when al-MustaClI succeeded to
the throne of the IsmacIlI Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt instead of his brother•
Nizar. The partisans of Nizar (i.e. the NizarIs) failed to dislodge al-. .-.-
MustaCII from the Caliphate, and were forced out of Egypt. As multiple
heretics the NizarIs were obliged to retreat to remote mountain fastnesses;_-
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they later attained renown as tha Assassins of Alamut. After tha destruction
of Alamut by the Mongols in 1256, the spiritual mantle of the Ismicrlr
~arrs was taken on by the KhoJa Muslims of India, who accept the Aga
Khan as their living Imam. The supporters of al-MustaC1I, victors of the
ra~imid power struggle in Cairo, also ended up in India where they are known
as Bohras to distinguish them from the Kho'as. The "Mountain TaJiks" o(
the Soviet, Afghan, Kashmiri and Chinese Pamirs are members of the Kho'a
Ismacrl! community.
. Bibliography: Aziz Ahmad, An Intellectual History of IslAm in India
(Edinburgh, 1969), pp. 21-5; Bennigsen, A., and Lemercier-QuelqueJay, e.,
Islam in the Soviet Union (London, 1967), pp. 4,19, 172; Lewis, 8., lh!
Assassins (London, 1967), passim. See also: lOR, L/P&S/12/2331, Chinese
Turkestan: Internal Situation Se t. 1930 - Nov 1933, PZ.52B1.1933, 'Age
Sultan Sir Muhammad Shah Aga Khan} to India Office, 17th August 1933',
Hollister, J.M., The Shi'a of India (New_D~lhi, J919), PP. 364-413.
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Ap;pendixIII
The "Vv'uMa" ("Five J.ia") warlord Clique
The "Wu J.'Ia"group of warlords which dominated much of 110rthwest
China during the latter Republioan period consisted of five Hu! l-Tuslim
militarists related by family, but not necessarily by policy (thoueh
they tended to close ranks against outsiders).
The two eldest Ma's, l-'la Rune-pin and 118.Hune-k'uei, were cousins,
being scions of the powerful Ma family of Ran-chia-chi, some 30 miles
from Ho-chou, Distantly related to the Ma's of lIan-chia-chi, the Ma
family of Fieh-tsang, some 20 miles from Ro-chou, produced the remaining
three "Wu }la" warlords. These were the brothers Ma Pu-ching and Ma Pu-fang,
and the scourge of Sinkiang, l'Ia Chune'-ying, with whomthey shared the same
paternal great grandfather. lola Chuns-chieh, whowas killed at Kital in
1933, and MaHu-shan, the ruler of Tunganistan between 1934 and 1937, were
also scions of the Y.afamily of Fieh-tsan'g (see Fig. 3).
1m Rune-pin (1883-1960) was the son of' l1a Fu-lu and the elder
cousin - of lla Hung-k'uei. Re entered military service in the Hs1-nlng area
c.1904. In 1926 he became Commander-in-Chief of Dandit Suppression in the
Shensl-Kansu border region. Later he served under Feng 1U-hslang. In
1929 he declared his a1leciance to the Kr-lT, and was given commandof' the
Nationalist 7th Division. In 1930 he was appointed. Governor of Kansu. He
participated in the anti-Japanese war bef'ore beinG appointed Governor of
lJinesia in 1948. He declared his allegiance to the CCPin 1949, and remained.
in China to serve in a variety of posts, including that of Deputy Governor
of Kansu, under the Chinese Communists.
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"WU MA"
Ma's of Han-chia-chi Ma's of Pieh-tsang
Ma fu-lu
?-1900
1
I Ma Hung-pin
1883-1960
"distantly related" -
? ?
I
?
Mar:!Ma Ch'!Ma fu-hsiang
1876-1932 ? 1
4Ma 'pu-fang
1903-
2 Ma Hung-k'uei
1893- 3 Ma Pu-ch'ing
1898-
Ma Tung
'1-1929
,r-------....-- .....--':"..........--1
SMa ,Chung-ying :
1910-1937 (?) Ma Chung-chieh :
c.1913-1933 Ma Hu-shan*
1910-1954
* Ma Hu-shan is variously described as Ma Chung-ying's half-
brother, cousin, and brother-in-law.
FIG."3:" The "Wu Ma" (five Ma) Warlord Clique
(the "Wu Ma" warlords are numbered from one to five).
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:r.raHune=k'uei (1893 - 1), the younger cousin of t1a. l-Iune-pin. He
oompleted his studies at the Kansu Mili ta.i-y Academyin 1910, before
entering military servioe under his father in 1913. In 1915 he was
appointed bandit-suppression commissioner for the Kansu-Shensi-l1oncolia
border region. In 1925 he entered the service of Feng 'tu..hsiang. In 1929
he defected from Feng's commandand joined the Nationalists. ne was
rewarded by being given oOIIlIDCUldof the 1:MT64th Division. He became Governor
of Ningsia in 1933, a post which he retained until 1948, when he was
replaced by his cousin and transferred to the Governorship of I:a.nsu. ne
fled China before the CCPtakeover, and settled in southern California
where he took up ranching and horse-breeding.
Ma Pu-ch'ing (1898 - 1), the elder brother of lola Pu.-fang. About
1916 he entered mili tar;y service as commanderof the Ninchai (Ningsia-
Tsinghai) Arrrry Cavalry Patrol's 1st Battalion. He subseq,uently beoame
commanderof the entire Nlnghai A.rrrry. In 1928 he entered the service of
Feng1(u-hsiang, but he was not penalised by the KMTfollowing the defeat
of the latter. In 1936 he became commanderof the EMT 5th Cavalry Division.
In 1937 he was also appointed director of the Sinldane-Kansu hiehwl'J'.1
In 1942 he was appointed reolamation commissioner for the Tsaidam region
of TSinghai province (then under the Governorship of his younger brother,
l'Ia. Pu.-fa,ng). He fled to Taiwan shortly before the CCPviotory in 1949.
Ma Pu-fane; (1903 - 1), the yoUI18Etrbrother of Ma Pu-ch'ing, and
Bon of Ma Ch' i, Governor of Tsinghai from 1929 to 1931. (Ma Ch'i was
succeeded by his brother, Ma Lin, the uncle of Ma Pu.-ch· ing end Ma ru-fang).
l1a Pu.-fang studied ,to beoome a }tuslim ~ before entering mili ta.r;r service
in the Ninehai Arrrry c.1920. By 1930 he had risen to become nIT Paoifioation
COmmissionerfor Northwest China. In the same year he drove Ma Chun8'-ying's
1. See above, p. 321
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forces westwards towards the Sinkiang frontier (possiblY' bY' seoret
agreement with Chung-ylng),2 before partioipating in BJl invasion of
Tibet in 1932. In 1931 he had been named Aoting Governor of Tsinghai
Province (under the titular Governorship of his unole, }ta Lin). In 1938
he beoame full Governor, when Ma Lin beoame a member of the Fl1Tstate
Counoil. Between 1938 and 1949 he retained full oontrol over Tsinghai,
whilst in 1945 he was he became oonourrent del"lty ohairman of the KHT'e
110rthwestem Headquarters and a member of the Nationalist Central
Executive Committee. ~hen Chang Chih-chung deolared his allegianoe to
the CCPin 1949, l-la P'U-fang beoame (veI7 briefly) his suooessor as C-in-C
of the.KMTNo~western Headquarters. In late 1949, he tIed to Hong Kone.
and thenoe to E£;ypt, wh-ere he lived until 1957. Between 1957 and 1961
he lived in Saudi Arabia as Nationalist Chinese Ambassador.
l~a Chung-yin&, (0.1910-0.1937), the youngest BJldbest-known of the
"Wtl lora" warlords, is disoussed in Appendix I, p.531 above.
2. See above, p. 163.
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APPENDIX IV
The Constitution and Composition of the "Turkish-Islamic Republic of
Eastern Turkestan" (TIRET)
1According to fuad Kazak, the draft constitution of the TIRET was
drawn up on March 3rd, 1933, seven months before the founding of the TIRET
at Kashgar Old City, but only a few days after the leadership of the
Khotanlik Committee for National Revolution (CNR) had met at Khotan Old
City to found their provisional administration (the "Government of the Khotan
AmIrs"). Taken together with CNR domination of the TIRET administration,
this factor indicates quite clearly that, despite the new and perhaps
somewhat grandiose title ("Sarki T~rkiBtan T~rk-Isltm Cumhuriyeti")
I
given to the separatist Turkic administration set up at Kashgar in November,
1933, the TIRET was, essentially, the "Government of the Khotan AmIrs"
extended to include Kashgar Old City, Maralbashi and Aksu within its sphere
of influence.
The full text of the draft constitution was published in the Kashgerlik
paper Istikl~l ("freedom") in 1933, and republished in the Berlin and Perie-
based pan-Turanian journal1!, TDrkistan ("Long Live Turkestan");2 an abridged
German translation is given by Hayit in his Turkestan Zwischen Russland und
China. (It is Hayit's abridged version which is translated into English in
the present appendix).3 Lists of the senior administrative personnel of the
TIRET are provided by Hayit, as well es by Badruddin Wee-liang Hai in hie
4Muslim Minority in China.
1. Kazak, f., Ostturkistan zwischen den GrossmSchten (KBnlgsberg, 1937), p. 20.
2. Istikl~l (Kashgar), I, 2 (1933); 1!~TOrkistan, 1934, 53, pp. 31-6; 54, pp.
32-5; 55, pp. 29-32.
3. Hayit, op.cit., pp. 304-7.
4. Hai, op.cit., pp. 105-6; cf. Hails T~rrkh al-Muslimln '1 el-sIa, pp. 125-6 •
•
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Principles of the Constitution
1. The Republic of Eastern Turkestan is based on principles of the sharI'e
and is ruled by the precepts of the Qur'an which means happiness and dignity
to us.
2. The state of Eastern Turkestan, based on the Republic, works for the
well-being and peace of the nation. The state takes responsibility for
protection against the agression of others, and regulates the religious,
national, cultural and economic affairs of the nation. for the fulfillment
of the aspirations of the nation it looks to the Government in Nanking and
to the League of Nations for the guarantee of its independence.
Central Organisation
3. At the head of the state administration is the state president (AmIr
al-mu'minIn) who rules on the basis of the sharI'a.
4. The state is founded on the basis of the nation, consensus, and the
legislature. The will and wishes of the nation are expressed through the
representatives of the people.
Cabinet
Sa. for the administration of the state a Cabinet will be formed in the
capital under the chairmanship of the ruler of the faithful (AmTr el-mu'minIn).
At its head is the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will have 2 deputies.
In the cabinet are nine ministers: Religion & Justice; DefencB; finance;
External Affairs; Interior; Trade and Agriculture; Education; Religious
Institutions and Health. The 9 ministers are divided into 2 groups: the
first consists of National Defence and Trade, to which belong the Ministers
for Defence, foreign/External Affairs, finance end Trade/Agriculture/Industry.
This group is lead by the first Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet. The second
group consists of the Administrative andCultural Ministries, i.e. Interior,
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Religious and Justice, Education, Religious Institutions and Health. This
group is led by the Second Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet.
The Duties of the state President
6b. The state President of the Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan leads
the Government and is the Grand-rather of the Government (HukumetnTn bOy Ok
AtasI), Supreme Ruler, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who is to serve the well-
being, order and the future development of the religion, nation and father-
land.
6c. The State President is elected by the National Assembly for four years.
But our present President, KhoJa Niyas ~ajjI, who struggled for the ettain-
ment of the freedom of Islam, of the ratherland and of the nation and gained
independence, remains President for Life and i~ finally confirmed in this
status by the whole nation and also by the soldiers. The state President
nominates the Prime Minister end confirms the Cabinet of the state Admini-
stration. Note: When the National Assembly convenes, then the state
President recommends the Prime Minister and the Ministers to the Assembly
for confirmation.
6e. The state President will confirm the decisions of the Cabinet. In cases
where he rejects these, he will recommend them to the Cabinet for renewed
discussion. If differences arise between the state President end the Prima
Minister or the Cabinet, then the Prime Minister resigns. The Stete President
then organizes a new Cabinet. The state President will receivB foreign
embassies, missions and delegations, which are sent to Eastern Turkestan, in
the presence of the foreign Minister.
6h. The State President, es Supreme Commander-in-Chief of ell soldiers, will
command the army of Eastern Turkestan through the Prime Minister and the
Minister of Defence.
61. The state President, in his decisions confirming or rejecting the
550
resolutions of the Cabinet, will consult the majority, for the Islamic
Government of Eastern Turkestan is based on advice and discussion.
Duties of the Prime Minister
7. The Prime Minister is the chief of all Ministers. Because of this he
has the right to concern himself with the affairs of each minister. He ia
also Chairman of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister calls a meeting/assembly
of the Ministers once a week, in extraordinary cases as often as he wishes,
which is termed the Cabinet. All measures of the Government are deliberated
at such meetings and resolutions are made concerning them. These are called
"Resolutions of the Cabinet" and are then laid before the National Assembly.
If the resolutions are given a majority (vote), they become law. When the
National Assembly is not present they are laid before the King {pedishah}.S
When the King or Ruler approves the Resolutions of the Cabinet, then they
also become law. The resolutions of the Cabinet ere also designated Rules
(nizamnama).
Departments of the National Administration
8. Because the state is based on the highest principles of Islam, e
Ministry for Religion and Justice will be formed. The Justice Minister will
be counted as Shaykh aI-Islam. A Religious Department will be formed in the
Justice Ministry, which will be termed the "Department of Announcement" at
whose head will be the Mufti. The Ministry of Justice functions as a liaison
organ between the Jurisdiction and the Government. The Magistrates of the
regions will not be elected. The Minister of Justice (Shaykh aI-Islam) and
the Supreme Magistrate will choose the chairmen of the courts. The magistrates
will be chosen only by the Justice Minister. The Minister of Justice must
take responsibility for the fairness of the magistrates through his inspectors.
S. Note that the office of "state President" is here confused with Kingship.
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The Justice Minister is responsible for the conformity of the laws to the
sharI's. One of the duties of the Justice Minister is the founding and
supervision of prisons, the hygienic and cultural conditions of which must
correspond to the moral improvement of the prisoners.
The Duties of the Ministry of Defence
9. The first duty of the Ministry of Defence is the organisation of an
army, which must be able to defend tha territory against foreign armies.
ror this, a military school will be founded. This military school will be
started by highly qualified and foreign specialists. It will build military
manufacturing plants needed by the army. It will choose military observers
to find out the military preparations and objectives of foreign states. An
important duty for Eastern Turkestan is the creation of a military college
from abroad. This armed forces college will be made up of teachers specialising
in infantry, cavalry, artillery, aeroplanes and tanks. Also, chemical supplies
6and experts will be brought in and defence armaments procured.
6. In the original constitution paragraphs 10-16 describe the duties end
responsibilities of the Ministers of roreign Affairs, Interior, Religious
Institutions, rinance, Trade and Agriculture, Education and Haalth.
Paragraphs 17-29 describe the administrative structure or the regions,
districts, towns and cillage communities. Paragraph 30 deals with the
arrangement of the Control Organs of the Government which have the right
to appoint, dismiss and veto all state positions.
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APPENDIX V
Selected Documents Relating to the TIRET
1) Letter from KhoJa Niyas ~aJJr to HMCGK, c. 22nd October 19331
following his retreat from Toksun to Aksu in the autumn of 1933,
KhoJa Niyas HajjI sent an appeal for assistance to the Government of.
India through the British Consulate General at Kashgar. The KhoJa's
letter is important, because it indicates that, at least for a brief
period, one of the two major Kumullik leaders (the other being Yulbars
Khan) was seriously prepared to contemplate the secession of Sinkiang
from ths Chinese Republic. The political duplicity of Khoja Niyas is
apparent in this appeal to the British - it must be remembered that
whilst penning this missive he was negotiating for arms supplies from
the Soviet Union as well as being simultaneously Urumchi's "Chief
Defence Commissioner for Southern Sinkiang" and titular president of the
"Turkish-Islamic Republic of [astern Turkestan" - as is his political
nalvetl (note the use of his mutually contradictory Chinese and TIRET
titles in an overtly secessionist appeal to a foreign power). Had Sheng
Shih-ts'ai been aware of the Khoja's appeal to HrICGK (or at least of its
stridently anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet terminology), it is unlikely that
the Khoja would have survived from 1934 to 1937 (when he was finally
arrested and executed) as Vice-Chairman of the Provincial Government et
Urumchi.
Communication·to HMCGK
from: President of the Republic Pao-wei ssu-ling KhoJa Niy;s ~a"I
'History proves the fact that for more than one thousand years the
yoke of this country was on the shoulders of Muslim kings. It is now
58 year since the Chinese Government treacherously took away our indepen-
dence, and with cruelty brought us under their subjugation. During ths
58 years of most oppressive tyrannical rule, the proud atrocious Chiness
by showering incessant hardships and cruelties reduced us to our present
pitiable state. The proud Chinese officials looked down at us with disdain.
Our cr~ed and religion were contemptible objects to their sight. The
Chinese deprived us of citizenship rights. The Chinese did not acquaint us
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with science, art, industry and trade. The Chinese went so fer that
they closed the only press which we brought for our religious books
to be printed. Because of mismanagement by the Chinese 80% of the
population was unemployed. The tyranny of the Chinese kept us un-
cultured, uncivilised and brought evil days on us, which is well-
known to the world. The oppressed Muslims of the (astern Turkestan
bore with patience all the tyrannies and cruelties of the Chinese up
to the present time and did not create any trouble nor did they
complain to any foreign power. Not satisfied with the infliction of
all the miseries quoted above, they intended to take away our daughters.
The Chinese sold our trade to the Bolsheviks. from all sides Bolshevik
agents began to pour in. They started communist propaganda. We heard
about the tragic fate of the Muslims of Western Turkestan •••The Bol-
sheviks slaughtered a large number of Muslims in Western Turkestan,
the remainder were turned into aetheists by dint of force and cruelty,
thus was the religion of Islam trampled. We, fearing the fatal infection
of Bolshevism, and secondly unable to bear any longer the tyranny of the
Chinese, rose and fought without arms against the Chinese. The All-
Merciful Lord placed the crown of victory on our heads, and we came into'
possession of numerous arms from the conquered Chinese. The Chinese
becoming helpless in avenging themselves on us, gave vent to their anger
on the Muslims of Turfan, by slaughtering and burning their houses. The
Muslims of other places becoming aware of this barbaric deed of the
Chinese raised the banner of revolt from Altai to Khotan. The Chinese of
Urumchi desired peace and the resignation of Chin Shu-Jen, but the latter
possessed no other idea except fighting in the end he was defeated and
fled. After this the Chinese sent their representatives from Urumchi for
peace negotiations. We, after drafting the terms such that ell powers
were vested in ourselves, provisionally eccepted peace. The terms of the.
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peace were so drafted that from one hundred kilometres from Urumchi on
this side, the whole of Eastern Turkestan was solely and wholly under
our rule, and this peace pact was certified by the Chinese of Urumchi.
The Chinese ar'my at Urumchi are in principle followers of Bolsheviks.
• It might be known to your hbnour, that when the Bolsheviks came into
existence, there was a certain Russian general, Ootoff Annekoff (Czar
Party) who fought against the Bolsheviks but was defeated, and he took
shelter in Urumchi, and was then handed over to the Bolsheviks. It is
not in the law of any government to hand over a man who has sought
asylum. The Chinese being now unable to fight any more with us, the
Bolsheviks have entered the war arena. The Bolshevik Red Shirts are
excellently armed and are allowed to pass IIi and Chuguchak. And these
soldiers have begun playing havoc with the Muslims. The Bolsheviks
have supplied the Chinese with armoured cars and other arms. for thJ.a
reason the Chinese have captured and burned 14 towns. After our peace
the Bolsheviks remained silent for the time being. Just now in Moscow
some thousands of Chinese soldiers are intending to leave for Eestern
Turkestan. The Muslims of Chuguchak have petitioned me for help, saying
that unless the Chinese ere totally turned out of the country the spirit
of communism will soon be spread throughout Sinkiang. Therefore we look
and expect for help from the British Government to save us from the terrible
and infectious wave of communism. Moreover we pray for arms from your
government and in return the British Government can receive the product.
of this country, i.e. silk, wool and skins. The British Government may
become our guide, and we request the Government may spread education
emong our masses'., .1
October 1933/RaJab 1352
1. ..!Qb,!!, PZ.98.1934 (letter, HIVICGK-GOI, 2:5/11/1934).
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2) Agreement signed bet~een Khoja Niyas HejjI and the provincial
authoritiea at Urumchi under the auspices of Soviet officials
at Irkeshtam in february, 1934.
Little is known of the agreement signed by Khoja Niyes HaJJI•
at Irkeshtam in february, 1934, as the official text wes never re-
leased. A clear idea of the contents of the agreement cen ba darived,
however, from the minutes of a TIRET cabinet meeting held at yangi
Hissar on 2nd March, 1934 under the chairmanship of ~ebit Demullah.
The record of this cabinet session runs as followsl
'from the statement of Sabit cAbd al-SeqI Demullah•
based on Khoja Niyas HajjI's letter of february 25th, addressed to the. .
Prime ~inister of the TIRET and thereby to the TIRET cabinet, it i.
evident that Khoja Niya8 HajjI has made the following agreement with•
the Soviet Union'.
.1. Khoja Niyes HajjI ~ill immediately break his connect.ons with•
the government in Nanking and declare Ealtern Turkestan a province with
internal autonomy under the protection of Russia.
2. He will bring to an end the independence of [astern Turkestsn,
dissolve the government of the Islamic Republic and hand over the members
of that government to the government under Sheng Shih-ts'ai in Urumchi.
3. After his resignation from the poat of ststa President Khoja
Niyas HajjI ~ill be named Civil Governor of Sinkisng for lif•••
4. Khoja Niyas HaJJI will taka various measures to aubordinat ••
the national forces of the territory of ERstern Turkestan to Sheng
Shih-ts'ai.
5. Khoja Niyas Hajji will put his ~wn Boldiera, who conaiat of
Kumulliks end Turfenliks end ere unner the orders of Mahmud Seu-cheng,•
at the disposal of Sheng, in order to disarm. the national armies (~il1i
ordularnr) of the Tungan~, Khotanliks, Uzbeks, Kirghiz and Kazakhs and
in order to impose order in Eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang) will msrch
from Urumchi to AltI-Shahar (i.a. Southern Sinkisng), in order to help
the Manchurian, Chinese and Russian soldiers.
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6. The agreement between Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai and the
Soviet Union about the repatriation of the ~anchurian troops from the
Soviet Union to Eastern Turkestan remains valid.
7. All foreign military advisers who are in the service of the
TIRET arB to be immediately dismissed and expelled from Eastarn
Turkestan.
B. The Soviet government will supply help for tha reconstruction
and development of Eastern Turkestan.
9. The Soviet government undertake. to defand Esstern Turkestan
against attack from Inner China (Nanking), Manchuria or any other
powers, and against any possible dangers.
10. After the restoration of ordere e regular modern ermy will
immediately ba organised. To this end the Soviet government will
establish a military college and will make available officer ••
11. With reference to questions of political and commercial co-
operation 8 apecial treaty will be signed between the government in
Urumchi and the Soviet union.2
3)
Irkeshtam in February, 1934.
The cabinet decided,
1. The activities of Khoja Niya8 ~ajjr, in Journeying without a
mandata from the Nation to Irkeshtam at the invitation of the Soviet
government and in signing with the Bolshevik. an agreement which we. un-
lawful and against thR interest. of the Nation, are regarded a. trealon
against the Turks of Turkestan.
2. The 12 (sic, only 11 are given) point treaty between KhoJa
Niyas Hajji and the Soviet government ie declared unlawful.
2. Yas Turkietan, 71 (1935) pp. 19-25 (with a photocopy of. the'protocol),
t;~n81ated into German in Hayit, Turkestan Zwischen Rus81end und China,
pp. 310-311. _
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3. The national independence of Eastern Turkestan ~as attained
through countless sacrifices over many years, and now the attempts to
liquidate it means nothing more than the destruction of th~ Turks of
Turkestan. Because of this the Turks of [astern Turkestan are prepared
to make every effort to defend their national independence. Khoja Niyas
~ajjr is damned by his treachery.
4. The Turks of [astern Turkestan will never accept Bolshevik
rule. Because of this the protest of the Nation will be communicated
to the government of the USSR through the Soviet Consulate in Kashgar.
5. The occupation of [astern Turkestan by Soviet troops is
contrary to international law and is an aggression against the Turks of
Eaatern Turkestan previously unheard of in the history of Red Imperialism.
Therefore, all consulates in Kashgar lIIi11be requested to communicah the
illegal behaviour of the Red Bolsheviks to their governments.
6. The Soviets mpsn to occupy [astern Turkestan using the meaning-
less treaty ~ith Khoja Niyas Hajj!. Therefora tha foreign ~inistry end the•
Supreme Commander-in-Chief muat meet (to draw up) defance measure ••3
7. Because of the present difficult situation ell members of the
Nation must be mobilised.
B. SharIf Khan (Kazakh rebAl leader in Altai ragion) must
immediately ba ordered to prevent the incursion of the Red Bolshevik
Manchurian-Chinese from Russian territory, through Chuguchak to Esstarn
Turkestan.
9. The Great National Assembly of [a.tern Turkestan must be called
(into s8ssion) on 10th March, 1934.
10. This resolution of the cabinet concerning the treaty bet~8en
Khoja Niyas Hajji and the Soviet government must be laid before the
Great National Assembly.
- - -11. In the case of Khoja Niyas ~ajji not heeding the requast of tha
cabinet and not renouncing hi. plans, then the question of the diami ••al
of the State President from his position of Suprema Commandar-in-thlef i.
to ba left to the Great National Assembly.
3. Khoja Niyas was, in fact, Supreme Commander-in-Chief or the TIRET
at this time. See claus a 11 below.
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12. We must appeal t~ Nanking'4 to Japan and to the League of
Nations to protect our rights.
Signed: 'Prime Minister Sabit cAbd el-Saq! Camulleh•
Secretary SufI Zada
• 5
4. A remarkable idea; since the TIRET sought activ.ly to eec.d. from
the Chinese Republic!
5. 1!s Turkistan, 71 (1935) pp. 19-25. Trenalated into Carmsn in Heyit,
tTurkestan Zwischen Russlsnd und China, pp. 312-13. Hayit comments,
Madness such a8 Khoja Niyis HajjI-s hes be.n 8
common occurrence in tha history of tha Turks.
One often rinds that, whin someona attain.
supreme power, then h. believ•• he csn dacid.
everything without consulting hie f.llows.
In fact~ rar from providing an ovarall commant on tha history of tha
Turkish peoples in Central Asis, KhoJa Niyas HajjI's action. sarv.
simply to illustrate the lack of social, ideologicsl, and ragional
unity amongst the Turkic peoples of Slnkiang in the 1930s.
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APPJilrnIX VI
Composition of the "East Turkestan Republic"
Little is known of the ethnio composd tion and administrative
struoture of the ETR, thoueh a relatively oomplex diagram ot the latter
(which may be o:pen to some question) is appended to Chang Ta-ohUn's 1964
study, 'Rsin-chiang I-ning shih-pien', ~.,1 a siml'llfied version of
which is l'rovided in fig. 4 (opposite).
]y examining this diagram it is l'Ossible to draw oertain
l'rovisional conclusions concerning the ethnic coml'Osition of the ETR.
Thus, we know that the ETR President (or "Chairman"), was the Uzbek, cAli
Khan TUre, whilst the two Vice-Presidents were Uighur (Hikim DeS' Khoja)
•
and Russian (A.Polinov). Direotly responsible to these three officials
were eleven departments (ten ministries and one banking division, numbered
I to XI on fig. 4), and a "Seventeen ~~ Commission" (presumed to be Lee
Fu-hsiang's "National counoil",2 munbered 1 to 17 on fig. 4). A consistent
claim both of the ETR and of its l'&rtisans has been that the revolutionar,y
administration set up at Kulja in 1945 'represented all nationalities
within the three regions'.' Yet an examination of the ministers and members
of council shown opposite must cast some doubt on this proposition. Thus,
of the eleven departmental heads (see Table 4) recorded by Chane, at least
nine were clearly Muslim (though the ethnicity of seven ot these remains
1.
2. See above, pp. 407-8.
,. ibid.-
ETR CILA.lm-IAlJ:
cAli Khan 'lUre
(Uzbek)
EAST TURYE::TAJ: (P;::OPL.ES') iliT1JJ3LI C
Chief'-of-Staff
ETR VICE-CHAlm-SN: 1$ ::E lA Seventeen r·1anCommission
H8:kim Beg Khoja* Pt $.. IA -I:d Il. ~ ~•(Uiej1ur) "Pi .m
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I1 I I I 1 I 1 J
j!lf{. ~.Ot iII._ ~fX~ iIIifl~ ilI~. iIIlftx iII~* iIIt1;fiJ till ~ M ill It PiliL*'*tI: : : 1~: J _---
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Administrative
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI Districts
Wi l:fc ffl ------J
Jof 'vIar Ashan {Shara Sumel I Wi Ilt Ifiil IWi· it I!!!_IReeion I11 Wi ~ tJt ".lkfTlE.Ot
Ti-hua {Urumchi) Reof Propaeanda • lA A fj T' a-cheng (Chuguchak) J!J'ti.l§A' Hu-t'U-yi and Sui-lof ReliGion ::!t. fj Wi Ita :Ii: Region
-JI: (y-'lanassCountiesof the Muslim Commission lIJ •
I. Ministry
II.
III.
IV.
Bank of I
Ministry
Ministry
V. Y·iinistry
r':inistry of Aericul ture and Forestry ADHINISTRATIVE HEA.D:
c - -Uthm:m :Batur
Spec~al Representat~ve
of Ili Administrative
Area
VI.
VII. Minis try of :!)1ucation
VIII. Hinistry of ForeiL.;nAffairs
IX. Ministry of Justice
x. Ministry of Finance
XI. !1inistry of Internal Affairs
(Kazakh)
Fie. 4: ADHINISTRATlVE STRUCTURE OF T'rC ETR (simplifiedl
as according to CHANG TA-cHfuJ.1
* The Chinese characters read: Ai-ch'inc-mu-pai. This is presumably
an unusually distorted transliteration of Hakim Bai.
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Table 4: Ministers of the mR
problematical),4 whilst the remaining two seem to have been Russian.5
Certainly there are no obviously Han Chinese, Mongol or TUngusic
representatives, and the participation of Hu! (Tungani) ~h1slims remains
in doubt.6
A similar examination of the "Seventeen Man Commission" reveals
the following pattern of ethnicity:
1 Hakim Beg Khoja Uighur Muslim •
•
2 A-mu-tou-pu-t'i Ethnic eroup and religion
not known,
3 A-li-hai-li-pai-t'i Possibly cAli KhalIfa? Almostcertainly a 11uslim.
4 o - (1) Clearly a r'iuslim,though theAbdullah Wu-fu-mai
Qasim n\olll-fu-mai"remains problematical.
5 KarIm HajjI l'1u.sl1rn••
6 Pol1nov Russian.
1 MansUr l<1u.slim.Probably an Uzbek.7•
a Ahmadjan Nai (?) Q,asim Uighur Nuslim. The "~1a.i"is probably• an error in transliteration.
9 Ssu-a-k'e-pai-k'e Ethnio group and religion
not known.
4. Table 4, No's IV and V mieht possibly be Hul Muslims. The remaining five
whose ethnioity remains unolear (No's II, III, VI, IX and X), are almost
certainly TUrkic.
5. The Hinister of War is given as Chih-li-no-ru (as opposed to Po-li-no-ru
in Fig. 4, ETR Vice-ehairman), but this is almost certainly an erroneous
transliteration. Polinov was both Vice-Chairman of the ETR and Minister
of War. The Minister of Internal Affairs (Mo-ssu-kwe-lo-ru) was almost
certainly Russian (possibly Moskelov?)
. '._
6. Chang Ta-chUn names a seven man commission attached to the ~l1nister of
the }fuslim Commission" (op.cit.t pp. 321-8). Two members of this commission(Ma San-ta.-jen and Ma Liane-pao) were almost certainly Hu! l-Tuslims.
1. Lee FU-hsiang, op.cit., p. 13s
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10 Lai-i-mu-chiang Probably RahImjan, Muslim.•
11 Sha-1i-ohiang bai-i. Probably SharIf jan Bai, Muslim.
12 Chu-mai A-hung JUJDayo (JamIc) Akhund, ~7us1im,
Fossib1y Hui?
13 . A:nwu ~!usUm
14 Fucha Arandi Hongo1, but probably Mus1im.S
15 Abu Hayir 'lUre Probably cAbd a1-Hayir TUre,
Kazakh f.lus1im.
16 Mo-sau-k'e-1o-fu Probably Russian (see fn. 5).
17 Waqqas Hajji Muslim.• •
It is immediately apparent that there are no Han Chinese names
in this list, whilst the presence of Buddhist I'longolsor Tungusio peoples
remains very much in doubt. On the other hand, out or 17 oommission
members, no fewer than 13 are definitely Muslim (No. 12, Jumayo Akhund,
might possibly be a Hui).'NO mention of Lo Tau, the Han Chinese who is
reported to have died in the plane orash whioh eliminated all the senior
ETa leadership but Saif a1-DIn, is made in either 1ist.9
S. See above, p. 397, fn. 113.
9. See above, P. 496, fn. 149.
APPENDIXVII
British Consuls-General at Kashgar, 1902-48
November 1909
August 1918
May 1922
July 1922
September 1924
July 1925
October 1927
October 1930
, ?
November 1933
October 1936
October 1938
November 1940
October 1942
March 1945
110vember1946
*Sir George Macartney
Col. P.T. Etherton
N. Fitzmaurice
C.P. Skrine
Col. Lyall
Maj. Gillan
F. Williamson
G. Sherriff
N. Fitzmaurice
Col. J.W. 1bomson-Glover
Capt. K.C. PaCkman
Maj. H.H. Johnson
E. Shipton
M.C. Gillett
R. G. Etherington Smith
E. Shipton
* Sir George Macartney had served as ~ritish representative
in Kashgar since 1890. The Kashgar Consulate was officiallY'
established in August, 1908, when he was on leave in
:Britain.
Sources: Skrine and Nightingale, op.oit., lOLR, L/P&S/12/2345. 10LR,
L/P&S/12/2349. IOLR,L/F&S/12/2350. -----
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SCHEMES OF ROMANISATION
Chinese: Wade-Giles. Chinese place names have been romanised
according to the principles set forth by G. William Skinner in
his Modern Chinese Society (stanford, California, 1973). They
are given in either of two forms: 'in Post Office spelling,
which never involves hyphenation, or in Wade-Giles transcription,
which never combines syllables into an unhyphenated word'. Post
Office spelling is used only in cases where that form has been
'securely established as a scholarly idiom' (e.g. Soochowrather
than Su-chou). in all other cases Wade-Giles is used.
Arabic: Arabic words (and Muslim personal names) have been
transliterated according to the system followed by D. Cowan
in his ModernLiterary Arabic (Cambridge, CUP,1958), with the
exception that the letter ~ ls written thus: c.
Turkic: In so far as has been possible. words and place names in
the Turkic dialects of Slnkiang have been transliterated according
to the new Turkish alphabet employed in Turkey (Moran, TUrkce-
Ingilizce sOzlUk, Istanbul, 1945). Muslim personal names, hbwever,
have been transliterated in the Arabic fashion, thus CUthmin not
Osman, etc. Russianised Muslim personal names have been presented
in their original forms (e.g. omitting the Russi!ll P!tronymio ~
and the use of dzh for the Arabic J.. thus Ahma.djanQasim, not
AkhmedzhanKasimov), except where established custom dictates
otherwise (Sultan Galiyev, Faizulla Khodzhayev, eto.). Within
Sinkiang, Turkic place names (Kumul, Kulja. etc.J,have been
preferred to their Chinese alternatives (Ha-mi, I-ning). For a list
of 'Some S1nkiang Place Namesand their Alternatives' see Lattimore,
Pivot of Asia, Appendix VIII.
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L/P&S/12/2343 (ColI 12/14)1Question of Exclusion of Hindu Moneylenders
, "
L/P&S/12/2345 (Coll 12/16),Kashe;ar Consulate General: Consular and Vice-Consular
Appointments.
L/&S/12/2349 (Coll 12/20),
Kashgar Consulatel Appointment ot Consul General
L/P&S/12/2350 (Coll 12/20a).
Kashgar Consulate I Appointment ot Consul-Generals
* P&S • Political and Secret Files.
10LR. L/P&S/12/2355 (Coll 12/23):
Afghanistan: Moslem Mission to Kabul from Sinkiang
L/P&S/12/2356 (Coll 12/24)&
Internal Situation and Mfairsl Attack on Consulate.
Policy of HMG, December 1933 to 1936
L/P&S/12/2357 (Coll 12/24.2):
Internal Situation, 1937-38 (1937 Rebellion)
L/P&S/12/2358 (Coll 12/24.3):Internal Situation 1938-40
L/P&S/12/2359 (Coll 12/24.4),
Internal Situation, AUgust 1939 - June 1946
L/P&S/12/2360 (Coll 12/24.4):
Internal Situa.tion (Kashgar Reports), June 1948 -
January 1949.
L/P&S/12/2362 (Coll 12/24.5):
1Nhite Russians in S1nkiang
L/P&S/12/2363 (Coll 12/25)&
Sinkiang Rebellion: Alleged :British Encouragement
of Ta.rkiInsurgents
November
L/P&S/12/2367 (Coll 12/29):
Reuter's Special·News Correspondent in Kashsar,
October 1943 - June 1946
L/P&S/12/2369 (Coll 12/31).
General Liu Pin, Defenoe Commissioner, Kaehgar
L/P&S/12/2383 (Coll 12/43)'Internal Situation: KaSh~r Weekly Letter,
OCtober, 1937 - April 19
L/P&S/12/2384 (Coll 12/43.2):Internal Situation: Kashgar Weekly Letter,
April 1942 - July 1946
L/P&S/12/2385 (Coll. 12/44):
Establishment of "Independent Republic of Khotan",
September 1936 - July 1937
L/P&S/12/2386 (Coll 12/45):
Activi ties of the Ex-Amirs of Khotan and the Tungans,
June 1935 - January 1943
L/P&S/12/2387 (Coll 12/46),
General Mahmud, Former Turki Leader in Sinkiang,
Activities of Ma Hu-shan and other Political
Refugees! 'l\mgan Gold, April 1937 - November 1941
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~, L/P&S/12/2392 (Coll 12/49):
"Who's Who in S1nkiangfl,1934-43
L/P&S/12/2405 (Coll 12/62):Reports of EM Consul Urwmohi on Situation in Northern
Sinkiang, January 1944 - April 1947
L/P&S/12/2408 (Coll 12/66):General Affairs, November 1948 - Deoember 1949
IOLH, L/P&S/10/976:
Kashgar Diaries, 1925
L/P&S/18 (C.181):Etherton, P.T., Central Asia: The Pan-TUranian Movement
D.226t!, .
"Who's Who in Sinkiang: Correoted Up To 26th July, 1938
7.2 Publio Records otrice (London):
PRO, Political FO 371 (FOreign Otfioe General Correspondenoe):
FO/371/9209, F/2933/278/10:
Kashsar Diary, 1923
FO/371/11696, F/4632/4632/101Viceroy, Simla, October - November 1926
FO/371/12442, F/819/100/10aForeign Office to India Ottice, 8/2/1927
FO/371/12485, F/6067/1752/10, F/6708/1572/10
Kashgar Diary, April-May, 1921
FO/371/14270, F/2031/416/10:Schomberg, R.F.C., Memo on Chinese Turkestan
FO/371/16214, F/3035/340/10:Sohomberg, ReF.C., Report on S1nkiang, 1930-31
1.3 Parliamentary Papers (Great Britain):
Muhammad Yusuf Erfendi, statement Made by Muhammad Yusuf
Eftendi Late in the Service of the !meer of Kash
Comman Paper 2470 18 0 , 21-3, LXXVIII, pp. 5-7.
(Translated trom the TUrkish).
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